Suicidal tendencies can be pathological, inevitably recurring. Chrysler’s current self-destructive phase, as chronicled by TTAC, is hardly its first. From its very beginnings, the patient has suffered from symptoms of bi-polar syndrome. Chrysler’s biography is a nothing less than a roller coaster ride of giddy highs punctuated by disastrous crashes and self mutilation.
Chrysler’s birth and euphoric immediate success is unparalleled in automotive history. Walter P. Chrysler had a brilliant career in the early automobile business, turning several ailing manufacturers into successes. By 1919, he’d earned $10m ($130m in today’s money) from three year’s work transforming Buick into GM’s early powerhouse.
In 1924, whilst running Maxwell, Chrysler launched his eponymous line. The cars sported a perfect blend of advanced engineering and style. It was a home run that catapulted Chrysler to number four out of a crowded field of 49 domestic manufacturers. The subsequent launches of low-price Plymouth and upper-mid priced DeSoto, and the purchase of mid-priced Dodge, firmly established Chrysler as a charter member of the Big Three.
Chrysler’s first crisis came in 1934, with the failure of the advanced Airflow. The model adopted the latest aerodynamic principles. The company also repositioned the engine and body further forward on the frame (foreshadowing “cab-forward”), delivering major advances in comfort, quietness and handling. While similarly avant-garde vehicles found favor in Europe, the Airflow’s startlingly blunt “waterfall” front end styling was too radical for America’s more conservative taste.
The American car buyer's wholesale rejection of the Airflow taught Chrysler (and GM and Ford) a painful lasting lesson: avoid the risks of extreme innovation. The fiasco helped shape Detroit’s enduring elevation of popular style over genuine innovation.
Chrysler revived, and made enormous profits during the WWII era. But the development of the critical all-new 1949 models was haunted by Chrysler’s lingering Airflow insecurities. Whereas GM and Ford confidently introduced longer and lower models designed to knock the socks off of exuberant post-was buyers, Chrysler President P. T. Keller insisted on tall, boxy and boring cars– specifically designed so that a man’s fedora wouldn’t be knocked off upon entering.
In that post-war buyer’s frenzy, Keller’s stolid tanks sold well enough– initially. By the early fifties, Americans were in the mood for more: horsepower, automatics, power steering and brakes, style and flash. Unlike Chevy and Ford, Plymouth offered none of those; the market punished it unmercifully. In 1954, Plymouth was kicked out of its long-established number three spot by Buick, and dropped to number five behind Pontiac. The mood pendulum had swung too far; it was due for an (over) correction.
Chrysler hired designer Virgil Exner to inject vitality into the company’s products. The 1955’s were an improvement. The radical 1957’s were set to be the great leap forward (“suddenly it’s 1960!”). But in the rush to revolutionize, the dramatically finned ‘57’s suffered from atrocious build quality. Water and dust leaks were notorious. Upholstery split. Springs came up through seats. And the cars started rusting on the dealer lots.
The flashy new product sold, but word spread quickly. Plymouth’s 1958 sales plunged by no less than 41 percent. Despite a rep for engineering prowess, Chrysler would have to dodge a reputation for spotty build quality from then on, deserved or not.
Chrysler nursed itself to health once more, only to be deeply wounded by a staggeringly idiotic act of self-mutilation.
In 1960, Chrysler president William Newberg heard a rumor at a cocktail party that Chevrolet was working on a dramatically smaller 1962 model (the compact Chevy II). In a colossal blunder, Newburg assumed this downsizing rumor referred to ALL the full-sized Chevrolets. Newberg immediately killed development of Chrysler’s best-selling full-size 1962 Plymouths and Dodges, and initiated a crash program for substantially smaller replacements.
In what some historians consider a calculated act of revenge for this folly, chief stylist Exner responded by creating bizarrely-styled 1962 Dodges and Plymouths. When these ugly, truncated cars were first shown to dealers at a convention, they created an uproar. Twenty dealers cancelled their franchises on the spot. Plymouth crashed to ninth place, while GM picked up the pieces, swelling its market share to an all-time peak of 52 percent.
Newberg was shown the door. Chrysler hastily restyled the ‘63’s, and went on to enjoy a relatively long spell of good health. From the mid-sixties through 1974 the company thrived, in part thanks to its successful performance image. But with a portfolio [literally] heavy with large rear wheel-drive cars, lacking the foresight, will (and capital) to invest in new efficient compacts, Chrysler was flattened by the one-two punch of the energy crises.
By 1979, the Pentastar was back on the critical list, saved from bankruptcy by taxpayer funded life-support in the form of a $1.5 billion bail-out package of government guaranteed loans.
Quality or not, the Chrysler Corp. cars of 1957 and 1958 are some of the most spectacular cars of all time. They are to the ’50s what Duesenberg was to the ’30s.
I may be biased (as I own one), but the 1958 Plymouth Belvedere 2-door hardtop is in the top 10 of best looking mass-produced cars ever made.
The only thing on the road that comes close to what Chrysler had in the ’50s is their own 300C. If only they, you know, properly marketed it and kept the prices down they’d be doing even better.
A few points here: while the downsizing was Newberg’s idea, he was long gone by the time the ’62s went on sale. His tenure at the top lasted only 64 days, and he was forced out by mid-1960 because of charges of conflict of interest. Virgil Exner, meanwhile, had had a heart attack, which kept him from supervising the design work, leading to some hodgepodge results (although Exner’s intended designs weren’t an improvement). Lynn Townsend, who became president in ’61, and Elwood Engel, who replaced Exner, ended up having to sell misfired products designed by predecessors who were already gone (an interesting parallel to the present).
The failure of the ’62s was probably a lot less due to size than to the fact that they looked like they’d escaped from a Japanese monster movie. GM’s ’61s had actually been a few inches shorter than their 1960 predecessors, too, to no great harm. Being visibly smaller than Ford and Chevy might have hurt the Plymouth even if it had been better-looking, but not nearly as much.
I don’t think the pricing of the letter-series 300 was a marketing failure. It was not intended to be a mass-production car; it was a halo car akin to today’s BMW M series. If anything, the marketing problem came (coincidentally) in ’62 when Chrysler started selling a “plain” 300 that looked identical, even though it wasn’t nearly as hot. The letter series was still expensive, but it was no longer that special, and after that point it was overpriced. (Chevy had much the same dilemma with the later Corvette ZR-1.)
Chrysler is dying because of their products.
They gave up on designing small cars and outsourced that to Mitsubishi. Now they have nothing on the shelf. The Caliber is stagnant, and the Sebring is a bust of Edsel-ian proportions.
Their large cars (300, etc.) were ground-breaking when they arrived, but have languished for lack of development. (Just like the cab-forward designs of the 90’s, BTW).
They bet the ranch on trucks and SUV’s just like GM and Ford, but didn’t have the resources to develop them properly. Or maybe more to the point, Daimler starved Chrysler out.
Now they have NO competitive cars, their trucks are long in the tooth and selling into a stiff $3+/gal. headwind, and Jeep is being killed by model proliferation and the dilution of the brand (Compass).
The only “hit” they have is the Jeep Wrangler, a niche vehicle with limited market potential.
The new minivans are being hammered in the press for thier cheap interiors and lackluster styling. They look like the box the Odyssey came in.
Once the initial buying wave crests, the new Challenger will drop off like the 300. A specialty coupe will not save Chrysler, HEMI or not.
Chrysler’s only hope is product, specifically mainstream cars with some style and innovative engineering. That is their heritage. They can’t out-Toyota Toyota; they need to build and nurture a culture of engineering excellence and forward-thinking styling. An American Audi, so to speak.
Unfortunately, they don’t have that much time. Their engineering reputation is shot to hell, and their styling rep can be summed up with one word: Sebring.
Chrysler ain’t gonna make it.
Jim Press may be a great executive, but nobody can make their showroom pigs into hits. Add in the fact that Cerberus installed Bob Nardelli, a man known for alienating both consumers and investors while at Home Depot, and the handwriting is on the wall.
Don’t bet on those “lifetime” warranties lasting longer than a gnat’s lifetime.
The Airflow failed because it was ugly. Compare it to most other 1934 production cars, and it’s clear that the Airflow is not an attractive automobile. The real lesson here is that, for Americans at least, homely looks can’t compensate for mechanical innovation.
Edsel Ford and Bob Gregorie would take a John Tjaarda prototype and turn it into the 1936 Lincoln-Zephyr and show America that streamlined cars could also be beautiful.
As for Chrysler’s 1962 models – Virgil Exner was working on a new lineup of cars for the 1962 model year based on a prototype DeSoto. He wanted to regain the momentum of the 1957 cars, which were ultimately hobbled by serious quality woes and the public’s increasing rejection of tail fins as a design theme. He also wanted to trump the outside design firm that had been brought in by his enemies on a “consultation” basis.
These were the S-series cars. They featured long hoods, short decks, curved side glass, no “shoulder” at the beltline, side sculpturing to suggest fender blades and a windshield that was “pulled” at the center to increase its depth. They were full-size cars, as big as contemporary Ford and GM products. Management went with the Exner prototype, and his position seemed secure…
Interestingly, photos of the styling prototypes – as Exner originally envisioned them – survive. The four-door hardtops were predictive of GM’s 1971 full-size cars, while the Plymouth Fury hardtop coupe has a roofline and rear fender “kick up” that looks much like the one featured on the 1965 Chevrolet. Unfortunately, the fronts were bizarre, with staggered headlights and awkward grilles.
When Newberg gave the downsizing order, Exner’s designs were shrunk to fit the smaller proportions. The design cues that worked on the standard-size cars looked strange on the smaller platform. The loss of the curved side glass especially hurt. Exner was opposed to this order, but could do nothing to prevent it. When Townsend took over, he promised not to hold Exner responsible for the 1962 fiasco, but the dealers and division heads were up in arms over not only the shortened 1962 Dodges and Plymouths, but also the ugly 1961 models, which were also failures in the marketplace. Townsend fired Exner to appease them.
Ironically, the downsized Dodge and Plymouth were actually very good cars. But they were ugly and looked “small.” Park a 1962 Dodge Dart next to a 1962 Pontiac or Mercury, or a 1962 Plymouth next to a 1962 Chevrolet or Ford, and the Mopars are not only ugly, but also look “cheap.”
At one point during the 1962 model year, all of Chrysler was outsold by AMC!
Exner supervised the facelift of the 1962 Dodges and Plymouths, which produced the more mainstream – and considerably more attractive – 1963 models. He also redesigned the Mopar compacts with a much more conservative look for 1963. They all sold well – but by then Exner was gone.
After Walter P. Chrysler died in 1940, it was as though the corporation lost its way. After 1935, Chrysler ranked second in sales, after GM and ahead of Ford! During the 1940 model year, Plymouth almost knocked the Ford Division out of second place.
After World War II, the company careened from crisis to crisis, with the 1957 fiasco destroying the company’s hope of ever knocking Ford out of second place. Now it looks as though this may be its final crisis…
My Grandmother had a 62 dodge. She liked the pushbutton drive and bought it for that reason alone.
As bad as it may seem for Chrysler I don’t think Cerberus can allow it to cease to operate. Chrysler Financial floorplans over 70% of dealers plus capital and real estate loans. Cerberus is the majority owner of CF and there is no way they are going to pay the tab if all the dealerships go bankrupt themselves in order to escape this mess. The only way out of this fiasco is the old fashioned way, sell yourself out of the hole. But Cerberus must have forgotten that the first rule of getting out of a hole is to quit digging.
GS650G:
My dad actually has an interesting story he has told a few times about the push button drive on the Dodges. It involved pressing the wrong button whilst the accelerator was floored.
@ Zarba
Darn. Cerberus can’t turn around an automaker in 6 months, in an industry where it takes three years to develop a product. What the hell are they doing wrong.
Here is what I’ll say about Chrysler-it ain’t over yet.
-The Sebring/Avenger are getting an early refresh (see project “D”)
-The LX’s (300/Charger/Magnum) are getting a minor refresh for 08 with the replacement (the “LY” platform) coming about 2010
-A new Ram is due out in 2009.
-Entirely new lineup of V6’s, codename “Phoenix”
-Refresh on the Hemi, codename “Eagle”
-Dual cluth automatically operated manuals with help from Getrag
-Journey and Challenger
To address the engineering reputation: ME412. (Allpar.com)
Am I a Chrysler fan? Yes. Is my opinion bias? Probably. But, given their current situation (read: private company), I think they have more of a chance than people are giving them. There’s plenty of new stuff coming out for them to remain competitive, and there’s not stockholders to keep happy.
After all, Mopar has quite the history of getting out of tight places.
A friend of mine in high school had a '51 Plymouth Voyager wagon – sort of a predecessor to the crossovers of today. Not too big, with a tall roofline.
Hello everyone…I’m new to the website and enjoy reading it!
I found this article interesting; however, I feel it necessary to point out that Plymouth’s 1958 sales being down was probably due at least in part to the fact that there was a recession that year…1958 was sort of a down year for new car sales in general.
The problem with history is it is just that, the past. If you read the blog Chrysler spent it’s lifetime in an up and down hill chase with ford. If this was the only race they had to win in 2008, they would be on easy street. The idea of the Japanese and Koreans remaking the blueprint for style and marketing of the entire marketplace from compacts to pickups and suv’s was not even thinkable in the 60’s and 70’s when chryusler was playing tag with ford. This war will intensify with the Chinese and Indians coming aboard at the lower end. Make no mistake, these newcomers want to emulate the present foreign success stories by having their own brands marketed in the states not as sub captives of the old big three. Chrysler will not win this war and ford and gm will also be radically different (smaller) companies after the smoke clears. When 20%of the US market looks like a huge slice, no one will dominate here. All players will accept a smaller slice of a mature pie. If these players are profitable globally ala toyota, gm they will have the money to retool in America, if not game over.
Bring back the Slant-6.
Its ironic that what nearly killed Chrysler is what saved Lincoln: the Airflow was an unrefined design that almost deserved what it got. The Lincoln Zephyr showed that aerodynamics and beauty can live on the same sheet metal.
Thanks Paul, I didn’t know the 1950s Chryslers had quality problems, I thought that started in the 1970s with the Aspen. While some have great quality, it seems that Chrysler hasn’t changed their evil ways for a long, long time.
Maybe the Six Sigma modus operandi of their new owners can help Chrysler. But I also wonder if Cerberus understood the type of company (one that makes the same mistakes over and over again) they bought…
…or if they just saw assets they thought were valuable and could make a quick buck.
Either way, good luck with that.
Bring back the Slant-6.
And rich Corinthian leather. :)
Commander:
I don’t expect Cerberus to turn around Chrysler in 6 months. My point was that Chrysler’s in such a product hole that Cerberus may not have time to turn it around. Capital is one thing Cerberus has, but are they willing to throw good money after bad to do it?
I doubt it.
The products you cited may be good, but thier track record lately doesn’t give me much hope. The 300 series should have been refreshed and refined already. The Ram redesign is two years overdue, and the Sebring/Avenger “re-fresh” is merely an acknowlegement that the the car was crap to start. It isn’t planned, but necessary to save the initial investment.
I want Chrysler to survive and thrive, but time’s running out.
The real gem here is how they got a bunch of dealers to give up franchises. I wonder if Nardelli is reading?
In the mid 1980s I used to think that Chysler was the one domestic maker that was on the road to success.
Chysler proved to the world what an automaker is capable of doing with one simple platform and one simple engine in NA and turbo setups. When given lemons, make lemonade! K-cars, Mini-vans, LeBaron, coupes, and Convertibles, Lancers, Laser, Daytonas, etc. All were merely decent cars but they were all bargins!
The best way the describe Chysler products back than was; “It is what it is!” Don’t expect too much and you will be happy. If you want more go somewhere else and pay more!
Chysler was the company that offered up a fair deal, a feature rich car nice looking car for a reasonable low price. Yes there was a cheapness factor but you knew what you were getting.
Unlike GM and Ford cars of that era Chylers cars had acquired a modern look and feel to them, with nice “looking” dashboards and modern aerodynamic styling. Chysler managed to pull off some great hat tricks like designing one nice looking dash and using it in just about every car they made then.
Chysler entered the 1990s ahead of both GM and Ford with it new cab forward designs that were equiped with a nice 215 hp v6. etc, etc, etc.
What a a$$ raping Chysler got at the hands of Damiler!!! Chysler today is a company without any decernable focus.
Agreed, whatdoiknow1. The K-cars were appliances, not pistonhead passion-fruit–but they were competent appliances that did what they were intended to do.
There’s a race here-the race is “who goes out of business first”. GM seems to be doing better, or at least doing worse at a slower pace, than Ford or Chrysler. So the race is between Ford and Chrysler. Of the two, Chrysler seems to be worse off. They have almost no product hits currently, are smaller than Ford, and have almost no overseas presence.
Whoever goes out of business first saves the other two, at least temporarily (demand for cars will be stable, but the supply will be reduced by the number the exiting company made). And don’t think bankruptcy will save any of them-who will buy a car from a bankrupt automaker? Nobody-people will be afraid that the warranty will be worthless.
Iloved the looks of the 50s- early 60s Chryslers. Especially the Desoto Firedome. I dont think they were any worse than any other 50s cars for reliability or durabilty. People used to give me 56 Fords and Chevvies that were worn to a nub with only 60k miles on them. Another pretty car was the 47 Dodge business coupe or the later Wayfarers. The new 300C reminds me of a chopped and channeled 49 Dodge. All it needs is flames and it could be a lead sled
The botched 1962 redesign luckily didn’t extend to the entire corporate line; Chrysler kept the 1961 look sans fins, and a rebadged Chrysler was rushed to Dodge dealers mid-year as the 880. The way for this was eased by the demise of DeSoto.
My mother still talks about grandpa’s 1958 Desoto. Push button drive. Stylish. Innovative. Drove from Wisconsin to Georgia and back without a hiccup several times (pre-interstate era….a six day trip each way) with the whole family packed in.