Once upon a time, the myth of Icarus personified the warning that pride goeth before a fall (literally). These days, the RMS Titanic’s death by iceberg– on its maiden voyage no less– illustrates the dangers of hubris. That’s because the public considers the concept of an unsinkable ship patently ridiculous. In fact, the Titanic should have been unsinkable (save tsunami, torpedo or ballistic attack). The reasons the ocean liner eventually slipped into the depths have much to tell us about the ship’s corporate equivalent, General Motors.
Many students of this maritime tragedy reckon the Titanic should have avoided the iceberg entirely. When First Officer Murdoch heard the lookouts’ cries, he ordered an abrupt turn to port (left) and full speed astern. His subordinates stopped the ship's main engines, and threw them into reverse. Thanks to an outmoded rudder and a speed record-chasing engine design (a turbine-driven central screw that couldn’t reverse), Murdoch’s order actually decreased the ship’s mobility.
By the same token, when Toyota and other U.S. imports capitalized on the first Oil Crisis, GM’s corporate “rudder” was antique and ineffectual. The automaker’s arrogant administration and byzantine bureaucracy made maneuvering around the crisis impossible. By the time GM produced smaller, thriftier products, it was too little, too late. Flash forward to Toyota’s hybrid Prius and the SECOND oil crisis, and nothing has changed. How could it change when GM has never been to dry dock for a retrofit?
Again, the same sloth that hobbled the Titanic afflicts GM. By refreshing their products more quickly than the General, Toyondissan have kicked the American automaker's ass. Although GM has updated the vast majority of its vast product portfolio (with the notable exception of the eight-year old Cadillac DTS), the refreshes were WELL overdue. The Chevrolet Cavalier lasted almost a decade; the Pontiac Grand Am hung around for six years. How long will GM’s latest products languish?
In “What Really Sank the Titanic," authors Jennifer Hooper McCarthy and Tim Foeke (of the National Institute of Standards and Technology) claim the liner was done-in by the failure of the metal bow plates' seams. Inferior riveters couldn’t produce enough high quality (i.e. slag-free) rivets to ensure sufficient hull strength. The deficiency is partially down to the fact that Harland and Wolff were building THREE of the world’s biggest ships at the same time. In short, the shipyard bit off more than they could chew and cut corners to get the job done.
You don’t have to speak with the millions of customers who've suffered financial and emotional losses due to General Motors’ engineering failures to know that the automaker shares the same over-reach that sunk what should have been Harland and Wolf’s finest hour. But if you did, you’d be shocked at all the corners– both big and small– GM has cut over the years. The world’s largest automaker, the company that OWNED the U.S. new car market, nickel-and-dimed its way into pariah status.
What started as Alfred P. Sloan’s “a car for every purse and purpose” became (and remains) a desperate struggle to produce enough “rivets” (i.e. product) to keep the GM corporate mothership afloat. Is it any wonder that most of GM’s vehicles are uncompetitive when so many must be? We can debate past strategies, but it’s been clear for some time that GM needs just two brands: Chevrolet and Cadillac. Like, say, Toyota (which needs Scion like a hole in the hull).
If GM had just two automotive marques– which could be the plan even as the ship’s lower decks sink beneath the waterline– the quality of each vehicle would be much higher. The company would have had the strength to survive the oil barrel-shaped iceberg.
As most accident investigators will tell you, epic disasters usually occur when there’s a confluence of mistakes. The Titanic wasn’t designed or built properly. It sailed through iceberg-laden waters to set a speed record on its maiden voyage. The First Officer made a lethal mistake [NB: the Titanic may have survived if she’d simply rammed the ‘berg.] Change any one of these factors and the results would have been vastly different.
But none of this alters one important, arguably over-riding consideration: the captain. Titanic Captain Edward J. Smith should have known his ship’s limitations. He should have refused to follow the route chosen for the Titanic’s maiden voyage and/or participate in the record run. He should have trained his crew to execute an appropriate evasive maneuver (or, as above, not) in the face of an entirely predictable event. He should have ensured that there were adequate plans for survival (enough lifeboats). Fate may have dealt him a cruel blow, but he was responsible for his passengers’ safety.
When the history of GM's final fall is written, CEO Rick Wagoner will feature prominently. As well he should.
Great article, but there is one quibble:
Titanic Captain Edward J. Smith should have known his ship’s limitations. He should have refused to follow the route chosen for the Titanic’s maiden voyage.
It’s my understanding that he was following the standard route for North Atlantic ship traffic. In the wake of the Titanic disaster, nations agreed to move the routes farther south.
Well said! $8 billion to be burned this year. How long will GM sail, before the stern points to the stars?
geeber:
It’s my understanding that he was following the standard route for North Atlantic ship traffic. In the wake of the Titanic disaster, nations agreed to move the routes farther south.
Yes, the Titanic followed a standard route. But she did NOT sail at a standard speed.
There another facet of the Titanic which is very apt for GM.
I remember a story being told to me about the Titanic that a lot of lives were needlessly lost because they carried an insufficient amount of lifeboats*. When questioned about this insane decision a manager said (paraphrasing) “It doesn’t matter, the Titanic is indestructible. We’ll never have to use them.”
Much like GM, corporate greed (milking of profits from the SUV craze), corporate arrogance (dragging their heels over hybrids) and total lack long term planning has caused many people to lose their jobs because of a few MBA’s sticking to archaic management principles they learnt at Harvard.
It is this utter disregard for planning ahead (and the customer) which got GM (and the Titanic) into this mess. For the past 30 years, GM were never intent on selling customers cars which were the best they could be. They were more half-arsed attempts at shutting customers up, rather than satisfying them. Only recently did GM make the Cadillac CTS, which (by their own words) is more of a “European” car with its tighter brakes, stiffer suspension and firmer handling. This car came in the last few years and, remind me, how long have Audi, BMW and Mercedes-Benz been in the North American market?
This funny thing is, the Titanic made a mistake and paid the price. GM started sinking (1973) got a repreive, but still didn’t learn anything……
* = http://www.historyonthenet.com/Titanic/lifeboats.htm
Actually the Vega pre-dated the first oil crisis. The Vega was a response to the dropped Corvair. We won’t even start with that. The Chevette was the response to the first oil crisis, and man was that a first class POS (oxymoron?). There is an old saw about man serving too many masters – biblical I believe – and that is GM’s problem. Feed the myriad and numerous dealers, satisfy Wall Street, placate the unions, make sure top management gets the Aruba vacations. Shoot, what’s missing?
Oh, I know. Merely the customer. Well, can’t win them all.
I’m not persuaded that if GM were to focus its mismanagement on just two brands, they would be better off than they are today, since I expect Chevy and Caddy would then be saddled with the redundant VPs and MBAs from the terminated brands.
CliffG:
D’oh! Vega reference removed.
The problem, in my view, is systemic. North American capitalism is geared toward short-term gains. Accordingly, the domestic automakers do not think long-term.
Capitalism should be about designing and producing reliable, quality cars people want to buy, not manipulating the books and stock prices to satisfy the Wall Street gods. Change will come only if executive compensation is tied to long-term company performance and returns. Management stock options should not be guaranteed, but instead tied to company performance over a decade or more.
This is a good analogy for the errors that GM appears insistent on making.
However, I have to disagree with some of the blame you heap on Captain Smith.
The captain would surely have had no influence over the ship’s design with regards to the number of lifeboats, so I don’t think we can blame him for that? You could argue that he might have refused to put to sea without the sufficient number of lifeboats available, but realistically this would only have resulted in him being relieved of his commission in favor of someone else who was less safety-conscious. And it must be remembered that it was quite normal for passenger ships at that time to have less lifeboat places than passengers. That state of affairs wasn’t unique to Titanic. The rules on minimum lifeboat capacity, unsurprisingly, changed only in the wake (!) of the Titanic disaster.
As it happens (and maybe this makes an even more fitting analogy with GM?) my understanding is that the original blue-prints for the ship did specify a more adequate number of life-boats than were eventually fitted – but the number was reduced before the build phase as a cost-cutting measure?
I also seem to remember from what I’ve read about it that many of the lifeboats that were launched were nowhere near full to their designed capacity so a significant number of people who went down with the ship could have been saved if the evacuation drill had been more efficient.
Oh, and just before we get off the “nautical” and back to the automotive, just one more analogy…. J. Bruce Ismay the director of the White Star line that owned the Titanic, aboard for this maiden voyage, ignored the “women and children first” etiquette to make sure that he secured a space for himself in the lifeboats and his own personal survival (though he was never forgiven this cowardice by the British nation and lived out the rest of his life in shame). Can’t help comparing that to the golden parachutes of the top GM executives who will be damn sure they ain’t going down with their ship…..
One other salient historical tidbit. That night, other ships in the area sent out radio telegraph messages warning of icebergs, and stated that they were shutting down for the night for safety reasons. The Titanic’s radio operator replied back, “Shut up. Shut up. I’m busy.” The rest is history.
See a parallel?
The devil is in the details, unfortunately. Take for example (no, really…PLEASE take it) the POS Grand Prix GXP I just rode in. Supplier came down for a visit and took me to lunch. Outside sits his rental beast, a bright red Grand Prix GXP. Yeah, the V8 variant with paddle shifers on the steering wheel. My first impression when I sat inside? This damn thing was crappier (is that a word?) than a four-year old’s plastic Tonka toy. And please don’t get me started on the fake metal inserts around the gauge cluster. Guys, the gauge stickers on my 1978 Plymouth Arrow looked better. Will GM ever be able to prove (consistantly, mind you) that they can turn out vehicles that don’t look like some reject from a K-mart blue light special rack? As much as the American in me wants to see GM, Ford and Chrylser survive, after my latest experience with several models, I’m not convinced they have the ability to right the ship at this point. Wait…wait…do I hear the violins warming up?
Just had to share:
Titanic Party Slide
The problem, in my view, is systemic. North American capitalism is geared toward short-term gains. Accordingly, the domestic automakers do not think long-term.
Capitalism should be about designing and producing reliable, quality cars people want to buy, not manipulating the books and stock prices to satisfy the Wall Street gods. Change will come only if executive compensation is tied to long-term company performance and returns. Management stock options should not be guaranteed, but instead tied to company performance over a decade or more.
North American capitalism IS about designing and producing reliable, quality cars people want to buy. That is exactly why GM is in trouble. They violated this law of the free market jungle by turning out second-rate crap for so many years.
As for executive compensation, the largest pieces of most executive compensation packages are stock options or grants subject to 2 to 5 year vesting schedules. Even when vested most active senior execs don’t unload their stocks. So the incentive to manage for both near-term and long-term gains is built in to compensation packages. To wit, if Wagoner could turn things around and snatch GM from the jaws of defeat, it would make him wealthy beyond anyone’s wildest dreams because the value of the stock he holds would skyrocket.
So generally speaking I don’t think the problem is external to GM (i.e. the capitalistic system). Their problems are internal, meaning GM’s massive corporate structure and numerous ill-advised constricting agreements they have made over the decades with dealerships, unions, pension funds, non-auto affiliate businesses, and suppliers.
Very good editorial. Amazing how many parallels there are between the two disasters.
The DTS has been on the vine for too long – no argument about that. I don’t think a six-year cycle like the Grand Am had is necessarily a problem; the Accord and Camry are on five-year cycles, for example. However, the problem isn’t so much how long each generation of vehicle is produced, but when sub-par automobiles, such as the Grand Am, are built for six years.
An example of GM getting this right is the Malibu – the previous generation lasted only four model years (2004-2007). They knew they had a dud and addressed it (can’t say the same for the unfortunate G6). I also think (though I’m not positive) that the next Malibu on Epsilon II will come in the 2011-2012 timeframe, so that’s just 4 or 5 years.
William C Montgomery :
Their problems are internal, meaning GM’s massive corporate structure and numerous ill-advised constricting agreements they have made over the decades with dealerships, unions, pension funds, non-auto affiliate businesses, and suppliers.
Well stated. However, I think GM tried (ineptly) to address some of these issues in the mid 90’s during the SUV boom. GM executives aren’t dumb – they knew their dealership, union, and supplier models were insanely uncompetitive (long term) compared to Toyondissan. Half assed changes were attempted resulting in some lame dealer consolidations, a few wildcat strikes, and the spinoff of certain parts businesses.
What was sorely lacking was LEADERSHIP from the top outlining these problems. Everyone was evidently too interested in cashing the SUV boom’s overtime and bonus checks.
We can debate past strategies, but it’s been clear for some time that GM needs just two brands: Chevrolet and Cadillac. Like, say, Toyota (which needs Scion like a hole in the hull).
I don’t know. I never really get this idea of keeping Caddy along with Chevy. We can all agree about keeping the top performer, but why keep the number 5 division? If GM desparately needs to concentrate on product improvement, (and we’re all agreed on this) then why mess about with Caddy? Just keep Chevy and to heck with the rest.
Caddy is barely doing better than Buick. Caddy isn’t sure if it builds luxo-barges or sporting luxury cars, or almost real sports cars, and of course let’s not forget pickups and SUVs. (well, it does, all that, so there’s brand identity for you) Caddy is a microcosim of GM itself, a brand that doesn’t know what it’s doing, or where it wants to go, or who it’s customer is. And of course, it doesn’t know where to price it’s product either – dipping down into Impala LTZ terriotory.
If there’s money enough to play around with Caddy then maybe there’s money enough to play around with a few other divisions too. Why not keep GMC since it’s the number 2 seller with half a million high profit units last year? Or how about #3 Pontiac and it’s 358K sales?
Ok, at some point you have to chop something so there will be money for improvement. But if you chop everything but Chevy and Caddy, then you drop almost 1.4 million sales. (going by 2007 sales data) Isn’t that a bit like throwing the engines into reverse with a screw that doesn’t reverse? Does this make the “ship” more maneuverable or less so, because of lost revenue? IOW where does a much diminished GM get the revenue to put into the two brands it’s retaining? From the ever diminishing sales of those two brands themselves?
GM can either cut back to just chevrolet and try to really make good products and grow again, or it can try to recreate a brand image for several (though not necessarily all) of it’s brands and try to have each one serve a market niche.
To put it another way – if there is the discipline to keep Caddy and Chevy separate with no model overlap (and there isn’t at the moment) then there is the discipline to re-create identities for a few more divisons. If the discipline is lacking (which is an undeniable fact at the moment) then keeping Caddy makes no sense.
addendum:
Using 2007 sales data, a GM consisting of Chevy and Caddy would be 91% Chevy, 9% Caddy. Why divert time, effort, and resources for such a paltry increase in sales? Just cut down to Chevy alone.
Great analogy or is it metaphor? Whatever, as an aside the number one reason a business entity dies is basic-runs out of cash. The reasons how it got there are immaterial at the end except for the postmortem. Similar analogy is that you usually die from your heart stopping, it may stop from conditions caused by obesity, poor nutrition, lifestyle choices,etc. I guess since we are all going to die then companies which are controlled by human behavior may well have a limited lifespan. So put GM in assisted living and let them live out their time with visits from their relatives on holidays or put them out of their misery with a Kevorkian.
Great analogy to the Titanic, so who is going to be the cast in the movie version of “GENERAL MOTORS”? DiCaprio and Winslett to revisit their roles as star crossed lovers? (Oops he went down in the first movie – in the water that is – after she told him “I will never let you go” and then proceeded to drop him like a sack of potatoes into icy Davy Jones locker, of course she had the big diamond in the other hand). There must be a role for Jack Nicholson somewhere in it.
Celine Dion is warming up……
You read my mind, GM would be vastly better off as just Chevrolet and Cadillac.
There is nothing any of the other brands do that GM’s two core brands aren’t already doing or could do better.
“We can debate past strategies, but it’s been clear for some time that GM needs just two brands: Chevrolet and Cadillac. Like, say, Toyota (which needs Scion like a hole in the hull).”
Ah, but Toyota needs Scion. Scion is what is getting the younger crowd (and some of us older ones!) into Toyota showrooms. After they buy their xB they eventually settle down and get married. A kid or two comes along and they are back buying a Sienna minivan. Good marketing if you ask me.
It seems that more and more people are singing from the Chevrolet and Cadillac, everything else is noise hymn book :). Even in it’s current weakened state I bet that Cadillac’s profit per vehicle is better than Saturn or Pontiac are able to book.
GM has so diluted its resources that it is simply incapable of keeping all of its products fresh and competitive. The world’s former largest automaker should have among-the-best-in-class vehicles in every category in which it competes. Right now far less than 30% of GM’s US product line is an A player. At least that puts them ahead of Chrsyler, which maybe has a Jeep or two earning As.
First Mate: “Captain, the ship is sinking!”
Captain: “Quick, rearrange the deck chairs and throw the crew overboard!”
There’s a lot of sick humor here.
So… What new step in GM’s decline is addressed in this article? The article is well-written and the analogy is entertaining, albeit worn, but what new misstep has GM undergone to incur a new addition to the Death Watch series? This just comes off as an upward nudge to the GM Death Watch number, as opposed to a viable and informative addition to the series.
See you at Death Watch 200.
GM could do well with Chevrolet, Cadillac, GMC, and Pontiac. Chevrolet for mainstream…Cadillac for luxury…GMC light/medium/heavy(? Why doesn’t GM compete in Heavy?) duty commercial…Pontiac for performance.
The next new models GM comes out with will be global platform vehicles…Many models on just a few platforms for global markets (Like Audi does)… The only destinguishing points will be sheet metal, interior, and suspension tune…Many different vehicles off one assembly line with minimal conversion effort.
Proper “Badge Engineering” kinda like their Lambdas.
Where is GM getting their money? I don’t think they will have the 5 years and money needed to complete their global platform efforts. Is Rick Wagoner selling cocaine?
8-year-old DTS? The current DTS materialized in 2006, though its G-platform goes back to the 1995 Aurora and Riviera.
Well, Campisi, could it possibly by the prospects of GM only being worth a total of $32 billion (give or take a billion or so, and I believe this figure is right) and having the very real prospect of an $8 billion cash burn in 2008?
I think a better song to describe GM’s current situation would be one by REM:
“It’s the end of the world as we know it, and I feel fine”
Well, Campisi, could it possibly by the prospects of GM only being worth a total of $32 billion (give or take a billion or so, and I believe this figure is right) and having the very real prospect of an $8 billion cash burn in 2008?
Yes, but that is not addressed in the article.
Cutting things down to Chevy and Cadillac is the ideal, I think, but obviously it’s not a good idea if they kill off or sell all their other brands at the same time. Kill one at a time and give those resources to one of the main brands to make it stronger.
Other people keep talking about how GM just needs to focus on making its brands more distinct, but GM has proven over and over again that they can’t make that work anymore. If GM had all the money in the world, maybe they could do it. But they’ve spread themselves too thin and don’t have the resources to turn eight brands around, so they have to keep making compromises. I knew that GM could never stick to that goal of truly distinct brands when they brought out the Pontiac G5 after they said that they’d stop the shameless rebadging.
Tiger 260,
It is almost always the Captain’s fault. It’s part of that “confluence of mistakes” thing. He may not know the rivets are bad, but that doesn’t matter because he is supposed to ensure they are not tested any further than the manufacturer has already tested them. He is also supposed to responsible for all souls on board. There may be some forgiveness if the trend of the time was to be lax in this area, but still, Captains are the people we hope don’t fall for the wrong trends. Just like CEO’s who are taking lame pay packages…
William C Montgomery,
The standard options packages are indeed part of the problem. They get all sorts of different ones, but not enough of them are so long term that they won’t be around to affect them. If you want long term thinking, a much larger amount of the reward should be tied to 10 year or longer results (like Gardiner said). Then they will be more concerned about succession, brand management, and employee welfare.
tiger260 is both historically and factually correct. Good job.
Toyota does need Scion. Scion brought the young ‘uns into Toyota dealerships. They do have one of the youngest age of buyers in the industry, and Toyota was skewing way old. Plus, Toyota’s previous attempt at selling products to younger buyers, Project Genesis, was a complete dud. However, Toyota, unlike GM, learns from it’s mistakes.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toyota_Project_Genesis
Changing GM’s current management team’s pay packages won’t make them better, smarter managers.
Toyota doesn’t need Scion, all Scion vehicles could have been Toyotas easily.
The GM problem is bigger than the Titanic. The Titanic was one accident. It didn’t destroy an entire industry. GMs demise could destroy an entire industry.
@William,
“Changing GM’s current management team’s pay packages won’t make them better, smarter managers.”
Yes, it will. I have watched it happen. It works everytime it is properly applied. If pay is properly aligned with the goals of the organization then people will eventually rise to the mission, or leave the job, because it will be obvious to them and everyone else that there is a bad fit.
There is NO clearer message to send an employee than to pay him/her for results. Right now, the top guys get paid a lot to fail and get fired…
The only tough thing is getting bone headed executives to understand that they need to spend what they will all say is a ridiculous amount of time and effort designing the proper pay plans.
Here is a gem of some management advice. Go around and ask people to list their primary job objectives. You will find that the people who give an answer in line with what their boss agrees with are the happiest, most productive, and most successful employees. The other 80% are not likely well regarded, or well led.
Does anyone on this blog slack, sleep or suck at their job so much that a 20 million dollar bonus package would actually get you to do your job? Why is it that the average american can actually go to work and do his job and get a “normal” pay, but if you are a CEO you won’t do your job unless you have a 20 million bonus plan? And even better, a bonus plan that pays even if you don’t do your job, quit, or get fired. When is the average guy going to say enough is enough. Or do you really think that the CEOs deserve it cause they are just better than you are?
jl1280,
There is a good actual question embedded in your rhetorical question – Would these people quit if they were not offered these packages?
The answer is that they might, but their packages are not like ours. Why? (If you have ever read any of my posts you know that I am about to blame the government). CEO pay is public knowledge. Every CEO, or potential CEO, of a public company can find out what all the others like him are being paid. There are plenty of people who think that making CEO pay public has had the opposite effect than intended. Thanks, Uncle Sugar.
For the rest of us, we can use Dept. of Labor statistics that are somehow warped to look like all of us are paid much better than average for our jobs. Seriously. I live in Houston where the cost of living and also the wages, have been traditionally low, but never meet anyone making less than the government says is average for their job.
There are numerous factors used to set pay. One is what it would take to get someone to do the job. Another factor is what is the going rate. Value to the organization is not one that is really all that important in most jobs. Go figure.
An interesting analysis, but your assertions about the Titanic aren’t entirely accurate.
The Titanic was a record-breaker in size and luxury, but it was emphatically NOT a record-breaking ocean greyhound. It was slower than several existing liners (notably Cunard’s twins Mauretania and Lusitania), and was never designed to set records for oceanic crossings. This is an after-the-fact myth that has persisted over the years, but has exactly zero basis in fact. The Titanic’s turbine engine was a cruising engine only, designed to improve efficiency and vibration, not hurl the ship at record-beating speeds. The ship’s rated speed was 21 knots; it achieved 23 1/4 knots on trials. The Lusitania routinely travelled at 25 knots, and its best day’s average was 26.7 knots. Titanic was not attempting to set a speed record on its maiden voyage — it was physically impossible. Period. End of discussion.
And if the Titanic had faulty riveting, so too must have the Olympic, yet that ship was rammed by a Royal Navy cruiser, rammed and sank a German U-boat, and rammed and sank the Nantucket lightship without sustaining anything remotely approaching the damage caused to her sister. The Titanic sank because icebergs are immensely strong and massive; the slagged rivets theory holds little water, especially since the sample size of rivets is rather small, and they aren’t in the best of condition after nearly 100 years of exposure to rusticles (debunked in Butler’s “Unsinkable,” amongst others).
cars,
Interesting info. However, one of your points stuck out. Why would the Olympic necessarily have had faulty riveting just because Titanic did? To bring this back to cars, it would seem that if that were true, there would be no lemons.
Landcrusher,
It might not be case that Olympic‘s riveting would be as poor as her sister’s, but it is likely. Harland and Wolf was experimenting with the construction of the Olympic-class ships: they were, according to Douglas Burgess’s “Seize the Trident,” the first large ocean liners to be ordered and constructed side-by-side in the same yard. So, every item needed for construction was a double order, and H&W either built or contracted both sets at once: two batches of rivets were ordered simultaneously for both ships, two sets of wood paneling, and two sets of anchors.
That’s one reason that Titanic and Olympic were virtually identical, more similar to each other than Mauretania and Lusitania, and MUCH more similar than HAPAG’s Imperator, Vaterland, and Bismarck. The only differences of note were the weight of glass to enclose Titanic‘s forward promenade, and the Ritz restaurant onboard, along with changes to a few fitments like clothes hooks, as directed by J. Bruce Ismay.
So, if there was a systemic problem with the rivets used on Titanic, the simultaneous ordering system used by H&W means that Olympic almost certainly would have been similarly affected. It was an early principle of assembly-line construction, but a very short production run, with precious little variance.
More fascinating stuff, but materials was not my point. All the lemons are generally made with the same stuff, same people, same assembly line as all the “normal” cars, but we still have lemons.
My limited experience with rivets has taught me that the most important factor in the strength of the rivet is the craftsmanship of the riveter.
I would agree it’s likely they were the same, but I would still object with your so strongly stating it as you did originally.
Point taken, but the materials are very much at the heart of the matter in this case, because the root of the allegations made by these recent critics is that the rivets used on Titanic had too much slag in them, and thus were metallurgically deficient. While I will grant that the quality of the riveting might have differed based on the skills of the riveter, that’s a secondary issue to the allegations already made (although an apt comparison if the Titanic were a lemon in that regard). If the assertion is that the Titanic was vulnerable because her rivets were metallurgically unsound, resulting in inadequate strength, then one has to say that the Olympic should have had the exact same vulnerability, because she used the same rivets, ordered in the same timeframe, yet the Olympic’s service career belies that assertion. Maybe Olympic did have bad rivets, along with her sister, but it obviously didn’t doom that ship, despite her propensity to strike other vessels, so that suggests that the Titanic was doomed for other reasons, like slamming into an object with a hardness equivalent to concrete at more than 20 miles per hour while under hydrostatic pressure.
Ahhh,
Okay, I am having a Gilda Radner moment now.
Nevermind.