[This editorial was sent to us by Charley Territo from the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers.] For the past eight years, a group that represents aftermarket parts suppliers has lobbied in Congress and state houses across the country for legislation that would give them free access to the intellectual property of automakers. Automakers spend more on research and development than any other industry.  The proponents of this legislation can’t keep up. Their hope is that passage of Right to Repair would cut down on the costs and time needed to develop aftermarket parts to compete with OEMs. In practice, this legislation would do nothing to address the problems the CARE coalition says exist.  It is a solution in search of a problem.

Ironically, ALLDATA, one of the largest of these third party providers of service and repair information, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of AutoZone, which is a major funder of the coalition in support of so-called Right to Repair legislation. Either the Automotive Aftermarket Industry Association is misstating a public policy position or ALLDATA is misrepresenting the nature of its product.  

The information necessary to service and repair motor vehicles is widely available to all segments of the nation’s service and repair industry. In 2002, automobile manufacturers and the Automotive Service Association signed a broad industry agreement to ensure the general availability of service information, tools, and training. This industry agreement utilizes the National Automotive Service Task Force (NASTF), a broadly representative voluntary organization designed to resolve any availability concerns that may arise.

In 2007, NASTF reviewed a mere 48 service information requests out of more than 500 million automotive service and repair events. Of those 48 requests—some of which were duplicates—all but one was resolved readily by the vehicle manufacturers involved. We believe NASTF has and will continue to serve as an important organization for the service and repair industry.

Congressional support for the so-called “Right to Repair Act” has diminished as this voluntary agreement has been implemented. A few weeks ago, the legislation was re-introduced with just two cosponsors, down from 177 just a few years ago.  Furthermore, in 2007 the Federal Trade Commission reported to Congress that it had received no complaints from independent repairers or anyone else about this issue.  Unfortunately that hasn’t stopped the CARE coalition from continuing to scour the country looking for a sympathetic legislature to intervene on their behalf.  

Today’s automotive engineers are using computers in innovative ways to produce even safer and cleaner vehicles. And while automotive computers monitor and control everything from airbag safety systems and anti-lock brakes to GPS systems, fuel economy and emissions controls, they also require independent repairers to invest in the tools, training and equipment necessary to properly service theses automobiles.  

For many independent repairers, the current economic crisis has been a boon to their businesses.  Consumers are holding on to the vehicles longer and choosing to make repairs rather than purchase new autos.  Manufacturers are committed to providing independent repairers with the information they need to repair automobiles.  In fact, more than 75 percent of post-warranty repairs are performed by non-dealer shops.  

Right to repair is a parts bill masquerading as a repair bill.  Let’s hope legislators around the country continue to see through the disguise.  

The grand poobahs at the PTFOA are Wall Street bankers and political insiders. None of them have built or run real businesses designing, marketing, selling and supporting high priced consumer products. Everything they think they know they learned from books and lectures, not from actually doing stuff. The old story goes: “When your only tool is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail.” To the Wall Street types, slash and burn is the hammer they know. Even President Hope has taken to using their favorite motto “Lean and Mean.” Surely we need lean, productive companies, but who needs mean?

GM and Chrysler, under orders from the PTFOA, are decimating their dealer network in the perverse expectation that doing so will lead to higher sales and/or profits. The word decimate comes from the Romans’ practice of showing displeasure with the soldiers by randomly killing one-in-ten of them. While the famously brutal Romans capped their ritual slaughters at 10%, GM and Chrysler are killing off more like 30% of these formerly loyal partners.

Many have made the argument that the bloodletting is necessary to improve GMAC’s cash flow, reduce GM and Chrysler’s inventory costs and give the remaining dealerships the chance to make better profits with which to support future sales efforts.

All of those arguments point to second order effects, not primary effects. GMAC’s floorplanning business, for example, has historically been wildly profitable. Credit worthy dealers paying their floorplan loans on a timely basis are a benefit to GMAC, not a liability. What bank hates having good paying revolving loan customers?

Those dealers which do not demonstrate ongoing creditworthiness should have their credit lines pulled, which in many cases will force them to close down. The floorplan and other second order arguments duck the main reason why financially viable dealerships should not be wantonly shut down by decree from Detroit or Washington.

More sales outlets means more places for customers to buy cars, more places selling the highly profitable OEM parts and more places paying the various fees which go along with being a franchised dealer. Franchise discipline practices which enforce quality standards are long overdue, but swinging the hatchet pell mell is no solution to that problem.

The dealerships are in fact the customers of the factory. No manufacturer of any product in history has successfully maintained or increased its sales volume or profitability by decimating its customer base and sales channel. Surely it makes sense to get rid of crooked and/or financial weak dealerships. The speed with which the recent slaughter has been carried out demonstrates simple minded meanness and not smart management.

The dealer slaughter frenzy all started with Wall Street analysts pointing out the numeric sales per dealership advantage which Toyota, Honda and other enjoy over the Detroit-Washington 2.8. Financial analysts are often much better at describing the disease than they are at prescribing the best medicine.

In 1998 when Daimler merged with Chrysler, not a word was said about the excess dealership millstone around Chrysler’s neck. In the eleven years since then the problems with Chrysler have boiled down to a series of botched new products. Dealers didn’t create that problem and nuking dealers will do nothing to solve it.

The rational thing to be doing right now would be a selective culling of dealerships based on quality and financial stability criteria. Most of the really bad dealerships will self-destruct without any help from Detroit or mean spirited zone managers. Instead of this, we are seeing summary decimation carried out as a result of the “appear to do something bold” political imperative.

The contrast between Ford and its cross-town rivals on this subject is quite telling. Ford is selectively culling the dealer herd and will likely come out the other side of this period with the strongest vehicle sales and service channel in North America.

Books and articles will be written about how even with greatly reduced dealer numbers, GM and Chrysler will continue to loose sales at an accelerating rate as the remaining dealers do not in fact pick up the slack from their slain comrades. The real reason the dealer slaughter is going on is to offer blood sacrifice to the gods of Washington and Wall Street. God help us.

One amazing aspect about the hunt for the distressed assets of Chrysler and GM is the absence of the Chinese. Weren’t they eager to snap up anything they could get their hands on? And who would have thought that Fiat of all auto makers would walk away with Chrysler—and possibly large parts of GM—if their Opel bid gets approved? The absence of the Chinese was duly noted in Ed Niedermeyer’s piece “Where Is China?” It talked about xenophobia, and the discussion soon turned into a xenophobic slugfest and had to be closed.

Guess what: China is still interested. But a more serious cold war adversary is currently in pole position to get their hands on the European part of General Motors: Russia. Some see the Kremlin itself running Opel.

Yesterday, we reported that a Chinese company had voiced their interest in Opel, a day late after the bidding was closed Wednesday.

Financial Times now fingers Beijing Automotive Industry Corp (BAIC) as the Johnny-come-lately which “has expressed an interest in buying a stake in Opel together with the rest of General Motors’ European operations.”

Beijing Auto is no stranger to joint ventures. Their joint venture with AMC actually predated Volkswagen’s China engagement by a hair: Beijing Jeep started cranking out Cherokees in 1983. That led to Chrysler and later to a joint venture with Daimler Benz, which is still on-going. Yes, you can buy a Made-in-China E-Class and C-Class Benz.

Beijing Auto’s offer is a bit mysterious and is generally not taken seriously. Even in China, people have their doubts: “No Chinese car company can afford to pay that much money,” said Li Chunbo of Citic Securities in Beijing. Wrong choice of words or bad translation perhaps. They surely “can” afford the €650 million, which is the current bargain-basement price for a controlling stake in Opel. They may not “want” to, but, as the letter from Beijing shows, it doesn’t hurt to ask.

The hot prospect for control of Opel is . . . no, it’s not Magna. It’s pretty much the Russian government. At a Friday briefing in Berlin, Magna co-Chief Executive Siegfried Wolf “laid out the company’s Opel plan for the first time, confirming it aims to team up with Russian partners,” as Reuters has it. In the briefing, Magna confirmed that together with the Russian bank Sberbank Rossii they made a “non-binding indicative” offer to invest €700 million. A portion of this investment would be guaranteed by the German government, which is also expected to underwrite billions of loan guarantees for Opel.

Under the offer, GM would keep a 35 percent equity stake in Opel, while Sberbank would take 35 percent, Magna would get 20 percent and Opel’s employees would get 10 percent. The German magazine Der Spiegel analyzed the deal. Their conclusion: “The one who profits most: the Kremlin.” According to the magazine, Sberbank is a “quasi governmental organization” (60 percent of its stock is owned by Russia’s central bank).

Sberbank is run by German Gref, Russia’s former Minister of Economics and Trade, and part of Putin’s inner circle. GAZ, also part of the Magna bid, is also close to the Kremlin. GAZ’s owner, oligarch Oleg Deripaska, also a Putin faithful, had stock in Magna until last year. The linkup between Magna/Sberbank/GAZ and Opel was an early favorite of the Social Democrats and the German metalworker union.

“A Russian-social democrat-union old boys network for Opel?” asks Der Spiegel. Opel has a cool image in Russia, GAZ can use Opel’s know-how. And Sberbank would finally pull of the Western takeover they had wanted so much and could never complete.

Now what about Magna? With its 20 percent, it would play third fiddle. Says Der Spiegel: “Investment bankers have a suspicion: The Russians knew that they would have met with political opposition if they would have bid directly for a Western company. They simply sent Magna ahead. The partnership with the Austro-Canadian parts maker is only a tactical maneuver. The Russians are in the driver’s seat.”

Funny coincidence: Before striking a deal with AMC, Beijing Auto made Russian Jeeps. Production continued well into the new millennium. Conspiracy theorists to the front, please.

How many Mercedes owners change their own oil to save a few bucks? The latest “Meet the Volkswagens” TV ad doesn’t just insult Benz owners’— and everyone else’s—intelligence. It’s also racially insensitive. By depicting a white guy with his face blackened with oil, it raises the specter of 19th century minstrel shows. OK, that’s a stretch. But so is VW’s supposition that reminding customers of their over-familiarity with their local dealer’s service department is a good thing. And what does a Microbus sliding out of a nearby garage have to do with anything, Amigo? Wait . . . cue-up the Routan commercial . . .

There’s that Microbus again, with its “Cars” rip-off happy hippy stoner’s voice (as opposed to the Beetle’s Arte Johnson-esque German accent). In this ad, the Routan asks an Odyssey owner if her van has an “autobahn-tuned suspension.” Instead of checking her meds, soccer Mom replies that there’s no autobahn in Japan. True! Nor is there an autobahn in Canada, where Chrysler builds the Routan. Or Lincoln, Alabama, where Honda builds the Odyssey. Or the rest of America, where Odyssey mom lives. To the same point, the day a Routan driver explores the limits of her minivan’s autobahn-tuned suspension is the day I’m parking my Audi.

Needless to say, VW doesn’t have the corner on bad commercials. Suzuki’s “Supercar” ad makes it look like an SX-4—or any other car— can’t traverse a pothole without shifting into 4WD. How about Saturn’s recent campaign, where they attempt to reassure their remaining customers that they’re still the “just plain folks” brand that they were back when they were barbecuing—I mean building cars—in Tennessee? A Saturn salesman warns viewers that there’s a car company out there that’ll take your car away from you if you lose your job. Jeez. How un-American is that?

He’s alluding to the “Hyundai Assurance” program where you can return the car with no impact on your credit rating if you lose your job and can’t make payments. Mr. Saturn makes it sound like Hyundai’ll hunt you down and pry the car from your hands as soon as you’re unemployed. Then Saturn man assures you that his [temporary] employer would never treat you that way. Really? Anyone want to guess what Saturn will do the day after their nine-month grace period on payments expires and you’re still unemployed and not making the payments?

And what happens to Saturn’s “Total Confidence” plan after GM sells the “ReThink” brand to the Chinese or Roger Penske or whomever shows up with cash in hand? Or no one at all? Call me cautious but I wouldn’t feel too confident about Saturn’s ability to back any of their promises at this juncture.

Chrysler’s latest commercials proclaim that the bankrupt company (shhhh!) builds dugouts, lockers, easy chairs, radar systems, TV stations, starting gates, skyscrapers, fish finders, battery chargers, base camps, luxury suites, transporters, mechanical bulls, sanctuaries, viewmasters, security cameras, troop transports, and moving vans. No wonder their sales numbers looks so bad. They’ve been building all these neat things while everyone else is building cars and trucks. But don’t worry, be happy! It’s all backed by the U.S. Government, so buy your whatever-it- is they build with total confidence!

Ford wants you to know they’re still building trucks. BIG trucks. In fact, one commercial highlights their extra-cost tailgate and bedside steps and tells you how much you need them to get in and out of the bed of the F-150.  Well, if they’re that important, why aren’t they standard? Or even better, if it’s such a chore to get stuff out of the back, why doesn’t Ford make the F-150 a more manageable size so you can just reach over the side to get what you want, like you could a few years back?

If you’re Chevy, and you can’t match the competition’s feature, you just make fun of it! In a Silverado commercial, Howie Long ridicules an F-150 driver (the usual stereotypical clumsy, balding, overweight schlub they use when they want you to know someone’s less than a “real” man) for using his “man step.” It’s the same sort of “you’re a faggot” put-down used by brain-dead high school football players (not to stereotype or anything) on classmates who can program a computer.

After questioning their competition’s customers’ sexuality, Chevy brags about Silverado’s “unbeatable” five year/100K mile powertrain warranty. But they won’t compare their warranty to the Dodge Ram’s lifetime powertrain warranty. Instead, they just belittle the Ram’s less-than-real-man owner for having a heated steering wheel and a manicure.

One good thing that’s come from the auto industry meltdown: fewer car commercials. Unfortunately, the remaining ones are getting worse, as the automakers grow increasingly desperate for sales. They’ll try anything to attract attention, whether it’s lying, belittling the competition or insulting viewers’ intelligence. Come to think of it, what’s changed?

Politics is the art of the possible. In other words, it’s the art of manipulating expectations. In other other words, Barack Obama didn’t achieve the highest office in the land by doing things. He became president by promising to do things. And now that he’s actually got to do stuff, Obama must resort to the politician’s best weapon in their endless fight to reconcile expectations and reality (i.e., special interests): loopholes. Those exquisite exceptions that allow those supposedly affected by a piece of legislation to avoid the law’s intent—to the point where you wonder why anyone bothered to write it in the first place. The answer to that question is obvious: so that the politicians who crafted the law could be seen to be doing something that meets with public approval. Ladies and gentlemen, I give you the new CAFE standards.

Let me cut to the chase: the feds could mandate a 100 mpg fleet-wide corporate average fleet economy (CAFE) standard and the carmakers would meet it. All they’d have to do is do whatever they have to do to not do it while appearing like they’ve either done it or gave it a damn good try, then pay the damn fine (if necessary), pass on the cost to their consumers and get on with it. Again.

Which means that today’s pre-announcement announcement that the federal government will eventually adopt California’s CAFE standards—42 mpg for cars, 26.2 mpg for trucks by 2016—is meaningless. You know, in the real world. In the political sphere, it will be a major victory for environmentalists, supporters of the president, Chrysler and GM.

Yes, there is that. The president will soon have new CAFE standards AND control of two car companies that can build the vehicles that conform to those standards. I mean, they’ll have to do that, right? Otherwise, a taxpayer-funded automaker may have to pay a large penalty to the taxpayers, using taxpayer’s money, for failing to meet a standard set by the government who owns them (the carmakers, not the taxpayers).

Don’t get me wrong: I’m not one of those people who worries that Chrysler and GM will be forced to build Nancy Pelosi-mobiles. I’m one of those who knows it.

Ah ha! But you just said the automakers won’t meet the standards! They’ll only pretend to. Yes, and to pretend to do it, they’ll build the Volt, an electric minivan or suchlike and act like they’re building the vehicles that will right the sunked ship, meet or exceed all federal regulations, save the planet and reduce our dependency on foreign oil. Meanwhile, they’ll sell other things.

Or not. I mean, what difference does it make? Both car companies are practically 501c3 non-profit charities as it is. Any business that owes its existence to subsidies, noblesse oblige and tax credits is not going to spend too much time worrying about little things like return on investment and long-term profitability. Why should they?

Sorry. I got distracted. The meat of the matter: the new CAFE standards go hand-in-glove with the $100 billion or so doled out (literally) to Chrysler and GM; a “fresh start” for a “clean future” with “green jobs” using “American ingenuity” and “innovative technology.”

It wasn’t planned that way. It just happened. Like I said, it’s the art of the possible: drawing from the temper of the times, tapping into a farrago of common hopes, creating a palatable policy platform for those who need to stay on message. And for those who need to build cars? “Flexibility.” Automotive News [sub]:

The proposal to run from 2012-2016 would maintain a single national standard for fuel economy and give automakers flexibility for meeting it, people with knowledge of the plan said.

The same would apply to anyone with knowledge of any government plan. This is not pure cynicism. This is cynicism based on historical precedent. Lest we forget, the last SUV boom was fueled by CAFE standards that allowed Chrysler to classify the PT Cruiser as a truck.

There is no reason to believe that the new CAFE regs will be any more stringently applied than existing laws, or if they are, that manufacturers will be any less likely to game the system to allow them to build the more profitable vehicles that people want to buy.

That said, again, this time ’round we’ll have two automobile manufacturers who will no longer care [that much] about building the vehicles that people want to buy. So they might NOT cheat. Which will screw it up for everyone else, Ford included.

Either that or they’ll force all automakers to build more fuel-efficient vehicles that will save the planet and reduce our dependency on foreign oil. Oh, and be just as safe as current cars and trucks. After all, there are no limits to human ingenuity.

In the ongoing drama between Porsche and Volkswagen, the MSM tends to forget that this is also a tale of two unions. Volkswagen is organized, not to say owned, by the German metal workers union, IGM. With 2.3 million members, IGM is the single biggest union in the world. Half the VW supervisory board belongs to the unions. In case of a deadlock, the decisive vote lies with the stockholders. The unions can also count on the state government—with its blocking minority vote— being “sympathetic” towards their suggestions. Porsche has their own union representation: The Porsche Workers’ Council. So just as we’ve got Porsche – Piech battle royale, there’s an IGM vs. Porche Workers’ Council cage match. Let the games begin! Or, uh, continue.

On one side stands Uwe Hück, chairman of the Porsche Workers’ Council and former European Thai Boxing champion. On the other, we have Bernd Osterloh, who only looks like a former Thai Boxing champion. Osterloh represents Volkswagen‘s workforce. He’s the man who profited from the hooker scandal that shook Germany three years ago, when Volkswagen management tried to get the Union members on the supervisory board into a more sympathetic mood by paying for amusement trips to South America (mainly because Osterloh couldn‘t be linked to any of it, but there you go).

The troubles began early on, when Porsche decided to take over Volkswagen The company needed a new legal framework for Volkswagen. So they created the Porsche Automobil Holding SE, which now holds 100 percent of the Dr. Ing. h.c. F. Porsche AG as well as 51 percent of Volkswagen. As always, half of the supervisory board of the newly founded holding went to the unions. Porsche’s Uwe Hück negotiated the allocation of these board members with Porsche CEO Wendelin Wiedeking. As a result of these talks, the unions claimed 10 seats, divided evenly between the Porsche and VW unions.

Though no queen, Bernd Osterloh was not amused. He figured that the fact that Volkswagen employs almost 30 times as many workers as Porsche should be somewhat represented when it comes to the allocation of board members. Osterloh took Hück and Wiedeking to court.

Porsche won round one. The court ruled that since Porsche only held a minority of Volkswagen at the time the Holding was formed, they didn‘t need the approval of the Volkswagen workers. This did nothing to improve the relations between Volkswagen and Porsche and their respective workers. Osterloh told the press that Wiedeking had “dangerous phantasies of almightiness“ and that he wants to rule “with the arrogance of an autocrat.“

The next time the Volkswagen board met, the Porsche workers organized huge protests against the board members. With a little help from everyone’s favorite Satanic mechanic (VW’s Ferdinand Piech), Porsche subsequentally lost their votes on the board. All of them.

The power shift towards Wolfsburg leaves Bernd Osterloh is more powerful than ever. He’s made it clear that any merger would only receive his blessing if the workers‘ participation and the so-called “Volkswagen Law” remain unchanged. In other words, the status must remain quo.

Osterloh openly calls Porsche’s management “dilettantes“ and “nouveau-riches“ from Stuttgart. Obviously, the kind of merger that Osterloh has in mind is in reality a takeover of Porsche by Volkswagen. This pleases his counterpart from Stuttgart not one bit.

Nor was Uwe Hück happy when Piech and Osterloh dropped some unfavorable remarks about Porsche. The VW duo claimed Porsche is overleveraged, running out of cash and worth several billion less than the €11 billion the press has been talking about lately. In Piech‘s case, this could be seen as infringement of the stock corporation law, as he also sits on the Porsche supervisory board as a major shareholder.

Hück is threatening to drag Pieh and Osterloh into court. Meanwhile, Hück reckons Porsche should remain independent. The company is doing just fine, thank you very much. What’s more, Porsche workers stand behind the automakers CEO Wiedeking, whose contract expires in 2012.

On Sunday, we witnessed the latest installment of this soap opera. Volkswagen called off any negotiations with Porsche regarding the merger until further notice. It was Osterloh who initiated this move, who later told the press that he‘s missing the transparency on the part of Porsche needed for talks to succeed. Obviously, Osterloh wants to increase the pressure on Porsche and Wendelin Wiedeking, who‘s still looking for outside investors to help him take over Volkswagen.

Today we‘ll see the next episode. The supervisory board of Porsche is meeting in Stuttgart. Uwe Hück has already announced that there will be massive protests by the Porsche workers against Ferdinand Piech. Even so, as we’ve seen in other editorials on this site, anyone who bets against Piech does so at his own peril. Somehow, the man always seems to get his way. We shall see.

Anyone who’s spent any time around preschoolers knows they can ask some really hard questions. Fortunately, even questions like “why is the sky blue” or “where do babies come from” can be answered to their satisfaction with a little thought and careful wording. Questions from gearheads are a bit tougher and aren’t as easily answered. Here are nine questions I’d love for someone to answer. That is, if there really are answers to be had.

1. Why did Jim Press leave Toyota for Chrysler? He was sitting on top of the automotive world at Toyota as the President and CEO of Toyota North America. Press was the first non-Japanese member of Toyota’s management board. Suddenly, he quit, and went to Chrysler to work for Bob Nardelli. Was it Toyota’s executive salary cap that caused him to bail, or was there something more political going on? Did Cerberus promise Jimbo something more than just a co-presidency at Chrysler? Jim ain’t sayin’.

2. Why did GM keep Rick Wagoner around for so long? “Red Ink Rick” inherited a mess created by his predecessors. Instead of taking the draconian steps needed to get the company back on track, Rick accelerated the company’s slide to oblivion. If a GM middle manager had lost the company the kind of money that Rick did, he would have been given a box for his personal belongings and escorted from the building. Even so, how could it take a president of the United States to bring Ricky down. What power did RW hold over the GM Board of Directors that kept him in charge for nine years?

3. Does Fiat really think they can make a comeback in this country? Fiat sold just one vehicle stateside (pause) that met with any kind of critical acclaim: the 124 Spyder. Meanwhile, Fiat earned itself a stellar rep as the manufacturer of trouble-prone rust buckets whose dealers couldn’t get critical parts (even if they knew what they were and wanted to). Fiat’s decision to jump into bed with Chrysler is not the most ridiculously ambitious (or ambitiously ridiculous) idea in the world, but it’s in the top five. How does Fiat plan to market themselves? Just how big of a PR budget do they have?

4. How much longer can the UAW hang in there before it becomes a casualty of the “good” automakers? When American automakers were raking in the cash, the UAW demanded and received . . . whatever they wanted. In the cold light of day, the union priced itself out of the picture. The concessions surrendered during the last round of contract negations are the crack in the glacier [see: Ice Age]. By the time “new” Chrysler and GM find their feet [Ed: in our shoes], the UAW will carry about as much clout as the air traffic controllers union. How can they survive?

5. How long can GM’s ex-Car Czar, Bob Lutz, keep his mouth shut? Bob Lutz is the prince of WTF sound bites. Earlier this year, Lutz announced his retirement. Last week, he cashed in his remaining GM stock (what does he know that we’ve known for the better part of a a decade?). Why hasn’t Maximum Bob defended his legacy? Alternatively, how is GM managing to keep him quiet?

6. Why has Mark Fields been so quiet lately? Mark “Fly Me to Miami” Fields was another gold-mine of blogger fodder. Ford’s Presidente de las Americas even ran a web-based reality series, “How I Turned Around Ford Without Really Trying.” Lately, like Lutz, Fields hasn’t said boo to a goose. Did Big Al have a “come to Jesus” meeting with Fields? Or did Mrs. Fields finally silence her boy?

7. Where is Honda going with Acura? Honda’s schizoid sports/luxury wannabe division can’t seem to decide what part of the market it wants to play in. For a while, they sold a hard-core sports GT car and scrappy sports compacts and wanted to be the Japanese BMW. Now it seems Acura’s trying to be the Japanese Audi with soccer mom CUVs and AWD near-luxury sedans. Toss in styling only a Anime fan could love and who knows where they’ll go next on their voyage of self-discovery?

8.  How much longer will GM, Ford and Chrysler pour money into motorsports? Car and Driver ran an April Fool’s story reporting that budget constraints had forced GM to withdraw from NASCAR. It was so believable no one thought it was a joke. It isn’t. Nothing that any of the domestics are doing in motorsports has anything to do with what you can buy on their showroom. How can they justify spending millions on racing programs when they’re shuttering factories, firing people and begging for handouts to stay alive?

9. Will Toyota wake up and smell the coffee? Toyota’s creating superfluous brands, dragging their luxury division downmarket, trying to fill every market niche, and taking hits due to quality issues. Sound familiar? ToMoCo’s shaking up their management team. But will that be enough to keep them from becoming the GM of the Orient?

A man who doesn’t spend time with his family can never be a real man. Piech certainly spends a lot of time with his family; however, they‘re seldom good times. It has been a long tradition for the Piech and the Porsche side of the family to fight each other and the power struggle over at Volkswagen is merely an extension of that.

For a long time, it looked like Piech would be the loser in Porsche’s Volkswagen takeover. Since the 1980s, the Porsche part of the family held a majority stake in their car company. Back then, Piech‘s brother—in complete secrecy—sold his shares in Porsche to Arab investors (after getting into financial troubles because of some dubious real estate deals). This was a sacrilege! No outside party should get their hands on the family business!

When Piech found out about it, he cried, “I know it was you, Fredo. You broke my heart,“ or something to that effect, and called for a family meeting. The family decided to buy back the lost stake instantly in a combined effort. As a result, the Porsche family ended up with half of the shares that formerly belonged to Piech‘s brother.

With Porsche ruling Volkswagen and Piech not being in control of Porsche, he would ultimately have to answer to Wendelin Wiedeking, something that is unacceptable to someone with Piech‘s ego.

Piech hates Wiedeking with a passion. Piech considers Wiedeking an outsider, the hired help, an employee who holds far too much power. If it had been up to him, Wiedeking would have lost his job a long time ago. Unfortunately for Piech, Wiedeking is the protégé of Wolfgang Porsche, Piech‘s cousin and the new strong man of the Porsche family. In Piech‘s eyes, Wolfgang isn‘t even in his class, merely one of these MBA types who don‘t know anything about cars. And so, while everybody thought that he had finally been beaten, Piech did what he does best: Pulling the strings.

For a long time, he adhered to Vito Corleone’s advice to keep your friends close but your enemies closer. That changed in September of 2008. Piech dealt the decisive blow to his cousin Wolfgang and his man Wiedeking. An important vote took place in Wolfsburg: The supervisory council of Volkswagen had to decide whether Porsche could deal with Audi directly, or whether it had to be consulted every single time.

According to German law, unions and shareholders each control half of the supervisory board. In case of a deadlock, the vote of the chairman, who‘s appointed by the shareholders, counts twice. The unions have been protesting against Porsche for quite some time, so it came to nobody‘s surprise that they didn‘t support Porsche, which meant that Piech had the decisive vote. But somehow, he went missing. In his absence, Piech‘s proxy abstained from voting and Porsche lost the vote. On top of that, Porsche lost another crucial vote that day that could have put an end to the “Volkswagen-Law“ which gives the federal government a blocking minority. This also meant that Porsche could not possibly get their hands on Volkswagen‘s cash reserves in order to reduce their debt. Wolfgang Porsche was furious. “I am appalled by the voting behavior of the chairman,“ he told the press.

With the global economic meltdown hitting the auto industry, Porsche got into even deeper trouble, since the banks refused to prolong the cheap credit Porsche needed so dearly. So the family was forced to adjust their strategy. Instead of taking over Volkswagen, they are now working on a merger. And guess who‘s calling the shots.

Piech made it clear that Porsche will be just another brand in the Volkswagen empire, that headquarters will remain in Wolfsburg and that his man Martin Winterkorn will be CEO.

Like many unfortunate souls before him, Wendelin Wiedeking had to learn the hard way that you don‘t mess with Piech. When asked whether Wiedeking had a future in the new Volkswagen/Porsche alliance, Piech answered: “He would have to take several steps down the ladder. The role play would have to change from someone who‘s used to march through to someone with humbleness—I don‘t know.“

He couldn‘t have been clearer.

Don Piech is about to fulfill his life dream: To forge an automotive giant that builds everything from big commercial trucks to luxurious sports cars to tiny econoboxes controlled by the family. And most importantly, instead of Wolfgang Porsche and his guys in Stuttgart, it is now Ferdinand Piech and his guys in Wolfsburg who have the upper hand.

Hakan Samuelsson thought he had it all figured out. In 2006, the CEO of German commercial truck manufacturer MAN schemed to take over his former employer and Swedish rival, Scania. He had the banks behind him. VW owned 30 percent of Scania; they had to agree to the takeover. And why not? Volkswagen had no use for Scania, as VW’s commercial truck division only operates in South America. So Hakan Samuelsson made a deal with Bernd Pischetsrieder, then head of Volkswagen. Unfortunately for Mr. Samuelsson, he talked to the wrong guy. Ferdinand Piech, the person pulling the strings over in Wolfsburg, had different plans . . .

Before we get to what happened, let‘s take a small detour and look at where Piech‘s story began.

In fact, let‘s begin with his grandfather Ferdinand Porsche, one of the most gifted engineers in the history of the automobile. Before he founded the car company that not only carries his name but also his title, Porsche was a freelance engineer. Amongst other things, Porsche constructed the first hybrid car in 1900, and, most significantly, the VW Beetle.

When Porsche got into legal trouble with Daimler-Benz over a contract in the 1920s, he hired Anton Piech, a young lawyer from Vienna. Piech soon became his son-in-law and, later, Porsche’s business partner. During the war years, Anton Piech headed the Volkswagenwerk G.m.b.H., the precursor of Volkswagen. After the war, he was CEO of the Porsche Holding, one of Europe‘s biggest car dealing networks, specializing in Volkswagen and Porsche cars.

No wonder, then, that young Ferdinand Piech grew up with a sense of entitlement. Like his grandpa, Piech became an engineer (he‘s proud that he‘s not one of those MBA guys running a car company). Piech‘s Master Thesis was on the development of a Formula 1 engine. When he entered the “Dr. Ing. h. c. F. Porsche AG” in 1963, he soon climbed in rank.

During his time at Porsche, Piech’s most noteworthy accomplishment was probably the development of the iconic Porsche 917 race car and Le Mans winner. Legend says that after the completion of the first prototype, he crawled underneath the 917 equipped with a magnet and wherever this magnet would cling to the car, he ordered his engineers to replace that part with something lighter.

By 1971, Piech was director of engineering and a hot prospect for CEO. However, dark clouds were gathering over Piech’s career. The Porsche and Piech halves of the family (each of which held 50 percent) became increasingly fractious. In 1972, the Porsche family decided that no family member (from either side) should be involved in company’s day-to-day operations. Ferdinand Piech’s uncle Ferry Porsche stepped down as CEO. All remaining family members also left the company for a back seat on the supervisory board.

Piech’s ambitions had been thwarted.

So Piech left the sanctuary of the family to earn his spurs at Audi, the same company for which his famous grandfather designed the legendary Auto Union Type C racing car. Piech worked in the R&D department where he masterminded the development of the famous Audi S1 rally car. Piech became a key figure in re-inventing Audi. He introduced the TDI and Quattro drive—making them Audi trademarks—and slowly turned Audi into a legitimate Mercedes/BMW competitor. Ferdinand Piech was appointed CEO of Audi in 1988.

While Audi was doing increasingly well, parent company Volkswagen ran into deep problems. Piech was called to the rescue. In 1993, he took over Europe’s biggest car manufacturer. Problem. To rule Volkswagen, you need to be more than an engineer. You need to be a politician. Volkswagen was controlled by the state of Lower Saxony and the Unions. Piech, ever the alpha dog, needed to learn the art of consensus.

Piech turned out to be a master in building networks and majorities to support him. By the time he had to retire as CEO in 2002 because of age constraints, Piech had placed his guys into every powerful position and earned the support of the government and the unions. Many newspaper editorials hailed the retirement of this absolutist monarch of Volkswagen, but they didn’t see the whole picture. Piech was still in charge.

So what happened to MAN and Scania? Pischetsrieder labored under the illusion he was running the show. When Piech found out about the Scania deal, he was fuming as he wasn’t consulted about the proposal in advance. For this act of treachery, Pischetsrieder had to go. With support of the unions, Piech sacked Pischestreider. Then, instead of selling VW’s share in Scania, VW went on to buy a 30 percent share in MAN—as well as the remaining Scania stocks owned by the Swedish Wallenberg family. Don Piech made them an offer they couldn’t refuse.

Poor Wendelin “walk-on-water” Wiedeking is getting it from all sides. Yesterday, he was the Jesus Christ of the automotive world. Only He could perform the miracle of having more profits than sales—two times in a row. The multiplication of bread and dead fishes is mere amateur hour compared to the unnatural act of turning sales of €3bn into profits of €7.34bn. But will the man be revered until eternity? Just the opposite is true: After bringing in the bacon, Wiedeking is being led to the slaughterhouse, squeaking for his dear life. And yet, Wiedeking’s troubles are just the surface scatter of a brutal family feud that makes the War of the Roses look like flower power. They even brought in the Feds . . .

Automobilwoche [sub] tells its aghast (or smirking) readership that BAFIN, Germany’s equivalent of the SEC, finally opened an investigation into Porsche for stock manipulation, something they had carefully avoided. In March, Berlin’s financial watchpuppies had declared they would not investigate, due to a lack of evidence. However, last week, BAFIN got a smoking gun dropped into their lap and was forced to take action.

The German magazine Wirtschaftswoche just happened to come across the transcript of a clandestine meeting held in early February 2008 between two Porsche executives, their lawyers, and a ranking representative of the government of Lower Saxony, holder of 20% of the VW shares.

In that meeting, Porsche had announced their intent to buy 75 percent of Volkswagen. Not only that, they said they wanted to make sweeping changes at VW, and to strip Lower Saxony of its controlling minority, courtesy of the “Volkswagen Gesetz.” If that piece of news would have become public, the stock would have skyrocketed. Absent of news, the stock dropped. A month later, Porsche denied that it intended to acquire 75 percent of the VW shares. The VW share treaded water.

In October 2008, the news of a global car meltdown attracted short sellers to the VW stock. Unbelievably, it traded at €400. In a few days, it plunged to slightly over €200—still way overpriced in light of the ensuing carmageddon. Just when the VW share had dropped to the level where it previously had languished for a year, Porsche let it be known that they wanted 75 percent of the stock—and were already in control of most of the available shares, one way or the other. Frantic short covering drove the VW stock to vertigo-inducing heights of over €1K a piece. Big hedge funds were NFSWed. Pandemonium. Now, the stock is back in its old €200 range.

Ever since, the humiliated hedgies have been busy seeking revenge, and preferably hefty damage payments from Porsche. Care to guess who leaked the menacing meeting memo to the magazine?

Not too fast. The leaks could have come from another side. Ever since the lurid tale of hookers for union leaders was leaked, conveniently timed before a crucial election, the people working on the top floor of the Volkswagen Hochhaus had gained the respect of professional plumbers and leakers for adroitly using information, the media, and law enforcement—should it come to that.

Even BAFIN is listening for the drip-drip of a leak: BAFIN doesn’t want to bring criminal charges against Porsche . . . yet. They want to conclude their investigation first. Because, so said a speakstress of the agency in charge of financial oversight, it cannot be ruled out that someone has put out the information with the intent of harming Porsche. Sharp thinking!

Porsche of course vehemently denies all charges. Now, Porsche and VW, or make that Piech and Wiedeking, are on a war footing. Porsche even took the chain off an unlikely attack dog: Uwe Hück, head of the Porsche workers council, fired a salvo in the direction of Wolfsburg and said he had hired lawyers to check into reporting Volkswagen’s Ferdinand Piech to the authorities, on grounds of yet to be specified violations of securities laws.

A few weeks ago, we reported that Wendelin Wiedeking and his derivative-wielding CFO, Holger Härter, had been sent to death row after a sitdown by the Porsche Family. The Porsche/Piech clan found themselves suddenly perilously short of funds. All the while everybody had thought they had amassed untold riches with puts, shorts, straddles, long condors and short butterflies, Porsche was running out of dough. They had to go begging to the banks, who grumpily loaned them €10 billion with draconian conditions attached.

This was the minute of Napoleonic (in stature and cunning) Ferdinand Piech, who grabbed his chance to put Wiedeking and Härter back in their box after they had done their deed. The takeover of VW by Porsche morphed into a takeover of Porsche by Volkswagen which is owned by the Porsche Family.

Now, Piech is doing what he does best: slow execution of a top executive by a thousand cuts. At the sidelines of a presentation of the new Polo in Sardinia (befittingly home of the “culture of vendetta, in which clans mete out their own justice with no deference to any state or to any organization,” as Pino Arlacchi’s wrote in his book “Why There’s No Mafia in Sardinia”), Piech pulled out his paring knife and started slicing. Gerhard Mauerer of Automobilwoche [sub] stood close by and took notes.

Usually, Piech doesn’t say much. Questions are often answered with a sardonic grin. In Sardinia, Piech suddenly turned into a verbal waterfall. A simple merger with Porsche is out of the question, “because it would mean the loss of existing rights of Volkswagen” said Piech, head of VW’s supervisory board and capo di tutti capi of the Piech faction of the Porsche/Piech clan. He then said that he also doesn’t want to limit the rights of the state of Lower Saxony, always a trusted Piech ally, especially since Lower Saxony had been ruled by the conservative CDU.

Before Volkswagen and Porsche can merge, Piech went on to say, Porsche (as in Wiedeking) has to solve its own financial problems. Piech opined that Porsche (as in Wiedeking) is having a hard time finding money, Volkswagen (as in Piech) on the other hand doesn’t suffer from financial anorexia. Therefore, said the Chairman, it is not unthinkable that Volkswagen buys Porsche: “That’s one of the possible solutions. Our favorite is what is fast and painless,” said the purveyor of slow and painful death. As for how much VW’s Piech would be willing to pay Porsche/Piech for Porsche (are we confused yet?) Piech doesn’t think it’s much: “VW only will pay what Porsche is worth.” Translation: Not a whole lot. Maybe a few Euro more than what Fiat pays for Chrysler.

Asked about Wiedeking, Piech didn’t grin. He pulled out his whetstone, carefully honed his cutlery, and then slowly sunk it in, twisting the blade: “Currently” Wiedeking still has his trust, he said. And just in case someone hadn’t listened, Piech added: “Did I say ‘currently?’ Strike that.” And on he went to throw Wiedekind to the curb, literally: “He’s trying hard to fix the blown tire.” Unsaid, but understood by anybody who knows Piech: Wiedeking will blow it again, and then he will be blown away by the Machiavellian (in cunning and intrigue) Piech. From Lopez through Pischetsrieder and Bernhard: Piech’s career path is littered with corpses, which he uses as helpful stepping stones.

While applying cuts, Piech couldn’t help himself from filleting the Fiatsco. A possible joint Fiat-Chrysler-Opel doesn’t cost the Chairman much sleep, he said. It had taken Volkswagen and Audi 15 long years to truly merge, Piech said.

And he should know, he ruled both. He did everything to keep Volkswagen at a distance when he ruled Audi. And the true merger came to pass only after Piech took the helm at Volkswagen, surrounded by trusted men from his Audi times.

Never short of a quotable line, Piech quipped: “Two or even three sick people in one bed don’t make a healthy one.” Going back down memory lane, Piech added: “The people who are right now thinking about these mergers won’t have 15 years time, I’m sure.”

Gotta go. I’ll talk to my lawyer about getting the movie rights.

There are x+1 reasons GM is where it is today, with x being a very large number. Those reasons have been hacked and stacked here and elsewhere: a chief executive so hesitant it’s a wonder he didn’t daily swaddle himself in Cottonelle; a Board of Directors so frightened of change that they never swapped out the pine paneling and shag carpet in the board room; and a union stuck so far in the past that Bakelite seems to them unspeakably futuristic. To paraphrase JFK, while success may have a thousand fathers, GM’s defeat also has a thousand fathers—and a network of 6,200 dealers.

But to only blame the current crisis on management is to miss the broader picture: for more than a generation, with few exceptions, GM just hasn’t made cars that inspire people. While factors like fuel economy and build quality no doubt contributed to the slide, it’s been 30 years since GM had a stable of pulse-quickening, shorts-constricting cars. Consequently, GM failed to convert decades worth of excitable, reachable teens and young adults into the sort of loyalists and enthusiasts that sustained the company this long in the first place.

The more Geritol-ed among us remember a time when things were not thus. In the Harley-olithic Era, the good Lord saw fit to provide not just the ’53 Corvette (dayenu!), but also the Skylark, the Rocket 88, the ’57 Chevy, the ’59 Caddy and the Eldorado (dayenu times five!). Our bounty was, um, bountiful for the next ten or fifteen years, too, with the muscle car boom that gave us the GTO and Camaro. If you were lucky enough to come up then, GM was synonymous with sleek and sexy and bold and daring.

And then came the late ’70s, when GM brought us to the edge of the Great Mediocre Desert and, feeling the warmth of the sand, walked right in.

I was born in those lost years, and I’ve never known a time when GM wasn’t wandering the desert. My generation never got its GTO, its ’59 Caddy. We got Impalas, yes, but they were rusty and rickety, not cool and threatening. My friend’s creepy, chain-smoking dad drove the kind of Bonneville driven by creepy, chain-smoking dads. Our Olds were for the elderly.

Those cars thrummed exactly no one’s chords. Worse yet, they were as reliable as someone on Intervention.

In 1950, the Great and Powerful Earl said, “It is a matter of record that poor styling or improperly timed styling has proved financially disastrous to some automobile manufacturers.”

Now, I’m not the brightest rocket surgeon in the picnic shed, but it seems that was a lesson never learned. And during this Craptastic Period in came the Japanese. Honda and Toyota didn’t compete on design; they fought it out with quality. Perhaps their cars were less in—or aspirational—but at least you’d get out of the dealer’s driveway before your feet went through the floorboards. GM never fought that battle, and so when they all but gave up on design, too, the war was lost.

The proof is in the pudding, and the pudding is high school parking lots. Sure, you may still see some guys taking a Huggies to their babies, but you’ll definitely see row after row of Corollas, Elantras, and Whogivesashitimas. GM’s lost a generation of passionate brand loyalists—the sort of loyalists who popped their first boner over a ’58 Impala, not nakednymphs.net. To this generation, a car’s a car. A tranny with limited differential is just a guy in a dress who hasn’t cut off his nuts yet. The appliance-ification is basically complete.

Today’s Generals are certainly better than those of a few moons ago as far as reliability goes, but, man, Garrison Keillor is more exciting than the average Chevy. Were it not for the memory of those older, cooler cars—the fast and aggressive, the sleek and the styled, the innovative and inspirational—GM would not be around today.

That’s well worth noting, and quickly. GM makes a point of saying that their cars are now as reliable as anyone’s. But “as good” and “good enough” are not the same thing, and customers have 30 years of pent up distrust.  If GM is to get customers back into its (culled) showrooms, it needs to banish bland, or there won’t be another 30 years. A Malibu can’t be an Impala can’t be an Aveo can’t be a Cobalt. And this commitment can’t be just a Skystice here and a CTS there; if it’s true that the General’s motors earn them a tie with the imports, inspiring design running through their entire line should be what puts GM over the top.

Pretty will get customers in the door. Distinctive will earn GM another look. Erections will make people remember. If GM is to survive and (gulp) thrive, they have to set their designers free, and give them the freedom to live into Harley Earl’s legacy. They have to en-boner-fy or die.

All’s not well with Turtle Wax. To wit: in a recent Piston Slap article, numerous commentators made less-than-flattering remarks about the brand’s products and image, indicating that Turtle Wax is suffering a dramatic loss of brand equity. It’s a big problem at a bad time. Last October, 3M acquired Meguiar’s. Barry Meguiar is a tireless and charismatic promoter who’s deeply in tune with car care gestalt. With the normally staid Triple M’s enormous resources behind him, the Divine Mr. M could put a serious hurt on Tommy the Turtle. It’s time to put the terrapin’s marketing under the microscope.

The crux of Turtle Wax’s problem was apparent the moment I entered the company’s wood-paneled conference room. The company displayed a farrago of Turtle Wax branded products, sporting vastly different color schemes, graphics, containers and brand names. Why wasn’t everything in a “Turtle Wax Green” bottle, with Tommy the Turtle placed front and center?

Potato chips. Your local grocery store carries a huge variety of potato chips: regular, fat-free, low-calorie, ruffled, jalapeño, small bags, big bags, etc. Potato chip makers don’t like this product fragmentation; it’s expensive to create and stock new variations. But retailers want their shelves filled with as much variety as possible. If a potato chip maker doesn’t play the game, another manufacturer grabs their shelf space.

Same deal at AutoZone. They allocate shelf space according to product lines, not sales of individual products. In other words, the classic green bottle may account for 40 percent of Turtle Wax sales, but it doesn’t get 40 percent of Turtle Wax’s shelf space. The challenge: how do you create a huge “family” of car care products that look similar enough to extend the brand without triggering Stendhal Syndrome?

In this Meguiar’s has the edge. All of its products feature a large script of the brand name over a black/maroon background. In contrast, Turtle Wax has reduced Tommy to a polo shirt logo, and slapped him on all manner of color schemes and container types (thanks to the logo, they all include the word “wax”). AND there are completely Tommy-less Turtle Wax products, some of which have nothing to do with traditional Turtle Wax car care (e.g., CD2 Engine Treatment).

Turtle Wax is aware of their packaging problems. Their redesigned Zip Wax bottle shows progress towards a more unified front, but there’s no question that their band extensions are cannibals out of control. The Turtle Wax website has a prominent “Help Me Choose” function where you can select from three products that all do roughly the same thing—without being able to choose multiple preferences.

Turtle Wax’s ICE brand points to an even uglier truth: success doesn’t always breed success.

Thanks in part to a distribution deal with Wal-Mart, ICE is America’s number one car care product. But the product’s association with the massest of mass market retailers alienates a wealthier, more automotively diverse demographic of car enthusiasts. Which creates a perception gap large enough for the Zainos (via word-of-mouth), Mothers (with their über-exclusive Shine Award) and Barry Meguiars (Host of Car Crazy) of the world to cut into their business.

ICE’s mass market positioning—offering a product without prominent Turtle Wax branding—makes it vulnerable to attacks from below (cheap, no-name knock-offs) and above (premium products reaching down for sales). Turtle Wax reps said the recession is adding brand insensitive customers looking to shine their old ride. It’s not clear how co/re/de-branding a Turtle Wax product could be considered the best way to create future loyalty.

For those who believe branding is bullshit and choose products for their attributes, consider this: after relaying TTAC commentator kurtamaxxguy’s query about the polymer quality of ICE versus its competitors, Turtle Wax indirectly admitted the differences are like consumer perception for Coke and Pepsi. And the (claimed) lukewarm reception to Proctor and Gamble’s excellent “Mr. Clean” system proves that better living through better chemistry isn’t The Truth About Turtle Wax.

Does any of this sound familiar? A company that adds sub-brands to expand its market share, and then loses market share to more focused competitors? The parallels with GM run even deeper.

Turtle Wax is big in China. Channeling their inner Buick, Turtle Wax does well at Chinese Sam’s Club outlets, selling the same ICE kit that you’ll find in the US for roughly five times more coin (about $100). Each store averages around 100 units annually. Meanwhile, Turtle Wax doesn’t sell their full product range in the PRC; the Chinese ICE brand (not Turtle Wax) has no fraternal or external competitors. For now.

Like GM, Turtle Wax’s future depends on recognizing and highlighting their core values and applying them across a more limited product spectrum, in a coherent, effective and instantly recognizable way.

[Turtle Wax paid for Sajeev’s airfare, transfers, hotel, meals and accommodation. They have also provided sample products for review at no charge.]

It’s been a while since we gazed into the crystal ball to see what’s beyond the horizon on the automotive landscape. A lot has happened in the intervening eighteen months or so: GM and Chrysler are closer to bankruptcy, Ford is the only American auto company likely to survive the decade relatively unscathed, the market for hybrids peaked then bottomed out as gas prices did the same, and the only thing flowing out of Washington, D.C., faster than bailout money is political BS.  Join us as we check the tarot cards to see where it’ll all lead. Here are the headlines of the future.

2010 Hyundai and Tata Enter NASCAR: Following Ford’s announcement that they’re joining Government Motors and Fiat-Chrysler in withdrawing from NASCAR, Hyundai and Tata have revealed plans to compete against Toyota. Hyundai spokesman Kim “Bubba” Chun-Joon confirmed the company’s intention to fund three teams. Chun-Joon says Hundai’s ready. “Our front-engine, rear drive two door Genesis Coupe is closer in configuration to the NASCAR ‘Car of Whenever’ than the front-drive, four-cylinder four-door sedans they’ve been trying to pass them off as.” Tata Motors is raising eyebrows with their plans to race 850hp pushrod V8 racers labeled as Nanos. “Yes, it is a stretch,” said Tata director of motor sports, Samarjit Jaysukh Tata. “But it makes as much sense as labeling them Impalas or Chargers. Besides, our research shows that southern males love big Tatas, and these are the biggest ones we can give them.”

2011 American Leyland Volt Goes on Sale: After numerous delays and teething problems, American Leyland is finally offering the plug-in hybrid Volt for sale. Thanks to improved technology, the final version can travel an astounding 125 miles without using a drop of gas. “Once we ditched the gas engine, the subsequent weight savings really improved the Volt’s mileage,” claims chief engineer Reddy Kilowatz. AL is not concerned about the modified vehicle’s range or recharge time. The company’s Commissar points to studies showing that the average buyer in its target market—gated retirement communities— travels fewer than 125 miles per year. “Anyone who needs more range can buy the gas-engine-only version, the Cruze.”

2011 – Chrysler’s UAW Members Threaten Strike Over Health Care Payments – The United Auto Workers (UAW) have voted to go on strike next Thursday unless they meet their own demands to abandon a proposed 25 percent increase in health care co-pays. “We understand the financial pressures we’re under to become a profitable automaker, but we completely reject our own decision to raise these fees,” a union leader said, under condition of anonymity. “It’s entirely unreasonable for us to ask ourselves to make greater sacrifices when our members have already given so much to themselves already.”

2012 NHTSA bans Driving – The National Highway Safety Administration (NHTSA) has banned private vehicles from America’s roads. “The EPA has ruled CO2 a deadly gas,” NHTSA chief Charles Hurley wrote in an official statement. “Public safety demands that we remove the single largest producer of this gas (after all the rest). This move will have a dramatic impact on fatal automobile accidents and will finally remove the threat of drunk driving from America’s roads.” In a press conference later that day, President Obama pointed out that the NHTSA ban only applies to driving. Consumers are still free to buy, own and pay taxes on their cars. “We don’t expect this move to have any immediate impact on production at American Leyland,” Obama reassured. The president promised to increase federal spending on public transportation, which is exempt from the ban. “Getting on the bus is not just the right thing for motorists to do, it’s now the only thing they can do.”

2014 Last Car Magazine Standing – Proctor & Gamble has acquired AutoCar and Track Trend magazine, the last auto-related print magazine in publication. P&G assured readers that the magazine’s content would remain untouched.  “We don’t care what they write; their content is already 89 percent advertising, anyway,” stated Charmin division spokesman Hugh Jass. “Our research showed the only place anyone reads it is in the bathroom. That made it a natural fit into our product line, so beginning with the July edition AC&TT magazine will be printed on rolls of Charmin UltraStrong tissue. Not only will this decrease the amount of old magazines clogging our landfills, husbands won’t have to listen to their wives complaining about magazines cluttering up the bathroom.” Reliable sources tell us that P&G is also negotiating with Sports Illustrated to produce a limited edition “Swimsuit Edition” Charmin MegaRoll.

In November 2007, VeeDub head honcho Martin Winterkorn announced his version of the Schlieffen Plan. Dubbed “Strategie 2018,” Winterkorn plotted the overthrow of GM and Toyota from the top of the worldwide sales charts. Winterkorn called for VW to rule the world in sales, profits, innovation and customer satisfaction by 2018. When the plan was announced, the MSM feted it, insiders (this reporter included) rolled their eyes and denounced the announcement as the usual hubris of an incoming CEO, a suit who’d be busy collecting his pension by the time 2018 rolled around. In any case, by 2018, the Generalstabsplan would long be forgotten and superseded by at least five other grand strategies.

A month ago, the worker’s council at Volkswagen said that the plan has merit. “All at Volkswagen agree that the targets of Strategie 2018 haven’t changed and that we will reach them,” said workers council chief Bernd Osterloh. That story didn’t get much traction. The few who read it sighed. Through plain dumb luck and the incompetence of others, VW may be closer to “mission accomplished” than anybody dared to think.

It’s a done deal: VW will surpass GM in sales this year to become world number two, behind Toyota. Now, Reuters reports that “Volkswagen AG may have overtaken Toyota Motor Co to become the world’s top-selling carmaker in the first quarter, thanks to government incentives that fueled demand in VW’s major markets.”

VW’s overall deliveries to customers worldwide fell 11 percent to around 1.39m vehicles in Q1. Others fell faster and harder, enabling VW to increase its share of the global passenger car market by 130 basis points to 11.0 percent.

“Toyota has given no forecast for retail sales, but its latest estimate for shipments for the 2009 first quarter is 1.23m vehicles, down 47 percent from a year earlier,” Reuters says.

“Volkswagen has the luck of being strong in the markets that are currently growing, while Toyota is exposed to those that are collapsing,” says motor mouth Ferdinand Dudenhoeffer in a rare case of seeing the obvious. VW’s failure to get anywhere in the toxic US market is now its savior. Where you have no significant sales, you cannot have significant losses.

Volkswagen has a very strong position in the world’s only significant growth market, China. In the PRC, VW surpassed the 1m mark last year. It produced more cars in China than Germany. Toyota has seen sales fall every month of this year in China, its third-biggest market. Volkswagen is benefiting from government stimulus plans for the car industry that have boosted demand in Germany, China and Brazil, its three biggest markets that together accounted for half of all group sales in the first quarter.

While VW is lucky to be in the right place at the right time, Toyota definitely finds itself in the wrong places at the wrong time: Toyota’s first-quarter US sales fell 36 percent, while sales in Japan for the core Toyota brand plummeted 31 percent. The two markets account for just under half of its global sales.

Volkswagen China’s Winfried Vahland quickly positioned himself as the top general in Volkswagen’s audacious plan to subjugate Toyota. “We have launched Strategy 2018 in line with the long-term objectives of the Volkswagen Group in China,” Vahland said to China Daily. Note the “We have launched.” Vahland said he would increase annual vehicles sales in China from the current 1 to 2 million units as well as enlarging its fleet by least four models per year by 2018.

The former controller, Vahland, had an uneventful career at VW and his dispatch to Beijing as head of the Volkswagen Group in Beijing was widely seen as a promotion to Volkswagen’s Siberia. The real power centers of VW China are at SAIC in Shanghai and FAW in Changchun. Now, Vahland basks in the limelight of being the frontline general of Volkswagen’s attack on a weakened Japan.

In Germany, VW benefited from the Abwrackprämien boom. Deliveries rose 4.5 percent to about 251,500 vehicles during the quarter. More than 160,000 new orders were booked as owners turn in their clunkers for a new one and €2.5K from the government.

Even in cratering Russia VW grows. Despite a 39 percent contraction in overall Russian demand, Volkswagen grew its volume by 14 percent, making VW the fourth-largest manufacturer in the country.

NPR can’t believe their ears: “Come on? Volkswagen? The world’s top selling automaker? That sounds impossible. Last year, Toyota crushed VW, selling almost three million more cars and trucks. But in the first quarter, Volkswagen sold more vehicles than Toyota even estimates it shipped. Analyst John Wolkonowicz at IHS Global Insight calls it a fluke.”

The disturbing news of the arrival of the former axis member at the gates of Aichi, Nagoya, results in grave head-nodding in the land of the rising sun. “Volkswagen is a big competitor for Toyota,” said Koji Endo, auto analyst at Credit Suisse in Tokyo. “Audi is strong, Volkswagen is strong, and they’re making good use of their small cars.”

The stock market greeted the news by lifting VW’s tock price. VW has also moved up in stock value ranking, grabbing the No. 2 spot behind Toyota, whose market capitalization of $133b still outstrips the German carmaker’s $100b. For now.

[The following is another contribution from our anonymous ChryCo contact] I worked for Chrysler for many years in Product Development as a Design Engineer though I no longer do. I saw comments on a recent post by another employee asking why, when Chrysler merged with Daimler, did they still share platforms with Mitsubishi?

There was always such hope in the platform sharing at the start of every project (JS – Sebring (Mitsubishi), PM – Caliber (Mitsubishi), WK – Grand Cherokee / WD – Durango (Daimler). By sharing the same platform we were supposed to achieve economies of scale, reducing the overall initial investment and engineering effort. Ultimately, those savings vanished during the development of the platform.

In truth, inter-company platform sharing—whether with Mistubishi or Daimler—created a power struggle, as the platform’s respective “owners” struggled to adapt their respective vehicle’s suitability to their local market. The inevitable end result: compromised design AND marginal cost savings.

The Caliber / Sebring are too narrow for the U.S. market (Japanese market cars are more narrow), the Caliber’s suspension system has too much drive shaft angle due to Mitsubishi inherited design optimized for their engines (allowing torque steer). I didn’t work on that platform. But I believe that Mitsubishi dropped out of co-development early after the decision was made to share, resulting in less savings. But I know for a fact that the cost savings initially planned were not fully realized.

I did, however, work on the new Grand Cherokee.

This product was co-developed with Mercedes alongside their next generation ML and GL vehicles. From Chrysler’s perspective this platform made a lot of sense. New crash regulations meant the current Jeep platform would have needed substantial upgrades to be viable. The new Mercedes platform also addressed other issues with the current Grand Cherokee platform: small rear door openings, uncomfortable rear seats, limited wheel size, larger engine box for future emissions/crash.

Mercedes wanted to spread their development costs over Chrysler’s volume to lower piece prices. Internally, we knew that Mercedes gained more than Chrysler from this co-development deal. Our costs were higher than if we had clean sheeted it from the beginning.

What initially started off with many common areas (brakes, suspension etc), eventually resulted in a few common parts and only some savings. The future Grand Cherokee has a small glovebox due to the straight crosscar beam Mercedes engineers use to enhance their vehicle’s crash/stiffness. The cross car beam was eventually cast in magnesium by Chrysler vs steel by Mercedes due to divergence of design goals. Steel is good for strength for side crash or anti-vibration stiffness for improved steering column shake, while cast magnesium normally results in great packaging (big glovebox), costs more, and is lighter. Because the airbag had already been packaged and it couldn’t be moved (its location affects crash performance), the glove box size for the Jeep was already compromised by the initial design.

Mercedes’ focus was their uncompromising design objectives. Chrysler’s was usually cost or off road performance. Mercedes would rarely yield to Chrysler desires for cost savings, and the two teams would go their separate ways. Mercedes wanted a saddle design fuel tank (one tank shaped like a saddle with two fuel pumps at the lowest points) for a large fuel capacity, and for packaging for dual exhaust on the six cylinder. Chrysler wanted a single fuel tank for cost savings, but with a smaller capacity and only one pump. Divergence.

Mercedes is willing to package a mini-spare on their vehicle. Chrysler requires a full size spare as optional for SUV’s. Result: divergence in the rear end of the vehicle. A common floorpan stamping suffered a similar fate. The stampings were supposed to be the same part number (i.e. identical). But differences in small holes or studs in the body for mounting things (e.g. electrical components) quickly separated these parts.

The overarching problem: there was never alignment between the philosophies of the teams developing the vehicle. Mirror that on the Daimler acquisition of Chrysler. Technology transfer could only occur from Mercedes to Chrysler. They could donate their high cost platform to Chrysler with impunity but if they jointly developed a program, they risked their lineage. Who wants a Mercedes designed by Chrysler?

Chrysler on the other hand had to significantly redesign / retool a Mercedes platform to lower cost. On the surface the merger made sense but in reality, the two weren’t reconcilable. Ipso facto.