It’s not a question of if GM will file for C11. GM blew past “if” a long time ago. By the turn of the century, the artist formerly known as the world’s largest automaker was doomed. Still, if they had greeted Y2K by mortgaging everything (à la Ford) and used the cash to buy out dealers and kill brands and ditch models and pay off the UAW and . . . nah. By the time The General re-launched their refreshed GMT900 SUVs in May 2005, the gig was up. By that point, GM should have been in C11. In this alternate universe, GM might have had enough cash—their cash not our cash—to make it out of bankruptcy. Now, I’m not optimistic. But one thing’s for sure: this Death Watch series is, like GM, on its last legs.

The filing’s timing has nothing to do with finances: profit and loss, cash flow, capital investment, depreciation, amortization, tax schedules, that sort of thing. The moment GM cashed its first government check, its fate ceased to be a matter of commercial reality. The corporation that was once the world’s largest company, the world’s most profitable company, had instantly and irrevocably reduced itself to nothing more (or less) than a political football.

The fact that Uncle Sam’s $13.4 billion federal loan didn’t even stretch to March 31st, never mind through the end of 2009 as promised by GM CEO Rick Wagoner, is neither here nor there. GM is now, for all intents and purposes, an off-shoot of the US government. And that means GM’s on government time.

Hence the reason why GM isn’t in receivership, despite failing to satisfy the loan’s conditions (UAW concessions, a massive debt-for-equity swap amongst existing bondholders and a credible viability plan). Never mind. We’ve got a presidential task force. Meanwhile, how about a bridge loan to take GM from their current bridge loan to . . . another bridge loan.

No surprise there. You can’t very well create a new layer of federal bureaucracy without giving it a chance to do something. Witnesses must be called, lawyers consulted, inter-departmental advisors indulged, papers perused, confabs held, policy statements written, copies circulated for approval, etc. And that’s after the appointees are appointed, assistants hired, stationary commissioned, website created, budgets drafted, alliances formed, careers fortified, etc.

If the Presidential Task Force on Automobiles simply cried “basta!” and called the loan, they’d have nothing to do. A federal bankruptcy judge or judges would take over. What would be the point of that?

In fact, doing the right thing would be the exact wrong thing, politically. First, it would make the Obama adminstration seem impulsive. They just got started! Second, it would make the Obama administration seem weak. It would be a throw-in-the-towel tacit admission that the economy is in even worse shape than they won’t admit it is, and there’s not a damn thing they can do about it. Third, a C11 filing would require even MORE money from Uncle Sam than GM is currently requesting.

I’m not talking about a GM C11’s impact on the economy. Nor am I referring to the Bloomberg report pegging the legal costs of GM’s bankruptcy at a cool billion dollars. Truth be told, if the federal government is going to bankroll The General’s bankruptcy—and how could it NOT provide debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing given that there’s this presidential task force occupying precious DC real estate—the real cost of ressurrecting GM will finally emerge.

Remember: no matter how well Uncle Sam puts Humpty Dumpty back together again, the feds will have to keep GM going until the economic recovery. A year? Two years? I’m thinking $100 billion. Easy.

A USA Today poll released today reveals that 75 percent of Americans are now against loaning Detroit automakers more tax money. Just two months ago, 61 percent of the public were pro-bailout. Consider the magnitude of that swing and imagine how John Q. Public will feel if the true cost of keeping GM in the game were suddenly revealed.

How and when will that number swing back towards federal intervention for Detroit? It can’t and never. Uh-oh. Rock, GM. Obama, hard place.

Politically, there is but one answer: continue the bailout buffet diet of little (in some bizarre sense of that word) and often. In other words, “loan” GM just enough operating cash to remain in their current, zombie state. At least for now. At least until March 31st.

By then, the American public may move beyond not wanting to support GM to not giving a damn. The feds can then slip and drip: let General Motors slip into C11 without much public outcry, and then continue the drip feed under DIP.

Here’s the real bottom line: with or without DIP, GM will continue to be tied to the feds with an umbilical cord made of piano wire. The worst is yet to come.

Over the years TTAC has witnessed many skirmishes in the war between those who support car dealers (mostly car salespeople) and those who oppose car dealers (the rest of the known sentient universe).  It’s time to put this particular argument to rest. Car dealers suck. Here’s why: buyers never know what kind of deal they got.

It really is as simple as that. Sure, there’s anecdotal evidence up the wazoo about pushy, intimidating, lying, cheating, incompetent, scummy salespeople. But here’s a little secret: Mother Theresa could be the salesgal and Gautama Buddha could be the F&I guy for Allah’s Ford Lincoln Mercury dealership and I still wouldn’t trust that I got a good deal.

Between sticker price, invoice price, dealer add-ons, incentives, rebates, discounts, hold backs, various employee/college grad/military/loyalty/your mama cash backs, weekly/monthly/yearly manufacturer-to-dealer quota deals and the other probable dozen or so on-again, off-again programs of which I have no knowledge, trying to make a good deal with a car dealer is a bit like trying to make a good deal with the devil himself.

Even when I think I made out like a bandit there’s always that lingering smell of rotten eggs in the air. And if I think I got a good deal shouldn’t I just be happy? Aren’t dealers entitled to make a profit, too? Absolutely not. Given the choice between thinking I got a good deal and knowing I got a good deal, I’ll take the knowing each time.

Unfortunately, after hearing twenty different price quotes from half a dozen dealers, each one implying it was as good an offer as I could get (until the next one, evidently), the knowing is nigh impossible. And even if the dealer is absolutely, positively, completely, 100%, without-a-doubt losing their shirt on the deal, 1) I’m not going to believe it because over the last hour(s) of sales negotiations you’ve lowered your price more than once so I’m getting the sense that there’s wiggle room, and 2) my concern isn’t whether or not you lose money, but rather that I get a good deal.

Car dealers, are you getting the point here? I don’t care if you don’t make a single red cent. I don’t care if the new salesguy I’m working with hasn’t made his first sale yet or if you go out of business and can’t feed your kids because of that great deal I just got (okay, I actually do care about the kids, but not enough to buy rust-proofing). I want to know I didn’t get ripped of while buying my brand-spanking-new massively depreciating “asset.” That’s it.

And assuming for just one infinitesimally small moment I actually did care if you made a tidy profit, just why exactly would I trust you to determine for me what a fair share of my money in your pocket is? I don’t know what you paid for the car, what it costs you to keep the car on the lot, or what kind of money/bonus you’ll get from the manufacturer when you sell it to me.

I have zero knowledge of your financial situation—except for the fact that you want to maximize your profit on the car you are trying to sell me. Which is absolutely groovy and above board given this wonderful free market society we live in. But don’t expect me to like it when your profit comes from my (non-self imposed) ignorance.

Yes, ignorance. Despite the plethora of pricing information on vehicles available online, there’s absolutely no way for the buyer to be aware of what a car costs you, and thus, what a fair deal for you would be.

A quick aside: while we’re all busy celebrating and abiding by that wonderful capitalist free market system, let’s not look too far behind the curtain at all those laws you passed in your state legislature to make sure that you were the only way I could continue to get my fix on those shiny dollops of addiction we call new cars.

If I never know what kind of a deal I got then I don’t know if I can trust you and if I don’t know if I can trust you then I’m not going to feel comfortable in my dealings with you and if I’m not going to feel comfortable in my dealings with you you’re either going to have to learn to deal with all the negative backlash that’s thrown your way or find a better way to do business and I guarantee you the only thing longer and more painful than this run-on sentence is the truth of said same.

I’m tied to you for new car sales and warranty work and the only ones who want it that way are you. That sucks. You suck. I’m done. We’re done.

In response to Jack Baruth’s editorial, Mike Stone writes:

I have been making the same 60-mile round trip commute for many years, my route consisting of rural 2 lane roads and expressways. During the course of every winter, regular as clockwork, I see 5 to 10 vehicles that have run off the road in icy, snowy or wet conditions. Some of these are clearly a result of excessive speed but on two occasions, I have been behind a vehicle that was travelling at or below a safe speed when it simply lost control. What could cause such a thing? A clue lies in a well-documented statistic that 93% of all traffic accidents are the result of human error.

Although cars have been with us for more than 100 years, driving a motor vehicle is an inherently foreign environment because the human brain was not designed to travel faster than running speed. Our “fight or flight” mechanisms become overloaded in panic situations when behind the wheel because we are not equipped to handle the rapidity of events. The result is often a situation where the brain is unable to process the inputs and send the appropriate messages to the body quickly enough and we “freeze” or we make an instinctive, possibly inappropriate, response.

The “brain freeze” condition is well known in military organizations where long periods of boredom can be punctuated by short spells of terror. The counter is to instil a series of automated responses (conditioned reflexes) so that individuals are able to respond appropriately to a given threat. The New York Police Department has 36,000 officers and in 2006, the force encountered 60 instances where officers had to fire their weapons in response to a threat.¹ This means that each officer has a 1 in 600 chance that he/she will be involved in a shooting incident in a given year. Despite this low probability, officers undergo regular firearms and threat response training in order to reinforce their conditioned reflexes and override brain freezing. Airline pilots carry out the same type of conditioned reflex training to meet emergencies that most will likely never encounter in their entire careers.

Driving a motor vehicle has some similar characteristics to the high-risk professions noted above—long periods of boredom and mundane tasks occasionally punctuated by short periods of unexpected stress. Yet the training that most drivers receive tends to concentrate on the mundane, mechanical aspects of operating a vehicle and we develop conditioned reflexes that may be completely inappropriate in emergencies.

In 2006, there were 250.8 million passenger vehicles² in the U.S. and 5.2 million³ were involved in a collision of some description. This means that each vehicle had a 1 in 48 chance of being in a collision—12 times more likely than a NY police officer had of firing his/her weapon! Viewed from this perspective, it seems almost reckless that the average driver can only count on brain freeze and possibly inappropriate conditioned reflexes to deal with unexpected or stressful situations.

Advanced driver training is designed in part to instil revisions to our conditioned reflexes under certain conditions so that we are better able to handle emergencies and to refine our typical driving behaviours. A note of clarification here, advanced driver training in this context is limited to defensive driving and winter driving courses. I specifically exclude autocross, high-performance and track courses because the skills learned have almost no application to everyday driving.

Advanced driving courses teach situational avoidance and embed the continual, almost subconscious use of “what if” scenarios while driving. A driver has the opportunity to “feel” the dynamics of a vehicle in a controlled environment. How does a vehicle behave just before it loses adhesion with the road and how is adhesion restored? What does it feel like when two wheels on the same side leave the road or lose their grip? It is infinitely better to answer these questions in the safety of a course environment than on a public road. Once these situations have been experienced, the driving input corrections readily become conditioned reflexes and much of the potential for panic is removed if/when they occur in real world driving.

There is a suggestion that driver training can lead to overconfidence and more aggressive driving. This abstract is difficult to prove or disprove although a countervailing argument would be that a naturally aggressive driver who attends a course might simply become a more knowledgeable aggressive driver.

If airline pilots invest hundreds of hours training to handle a statistically unlikely situation, it is plain common sense for the average driver to invest a relatively short time preparing for a distinct possibility.

What to do with all of GM’s brands? That’s one of the big questions that will vex the Presidential Task Force on Automobiles, as it makes its final determination on Chrysler and GM’s fates. Robert Farago’s branding guru Al Ries thinks The General should give Buick, Saab, Saturn, HUMMER and Pontiac their discharge papers. Keep Saturn for entry level cars, Chevy for the mass market, Cadillac for luxury cars and GMC for trucks. Coincidentally, while RF was talking to his marketing maven, I was exchanging emails with Paul Earle, president and founder of River West Brands. Earle specializes in revitalizing distressed, orphaned and ghost consumer brands.

River West’s properties include Coleco, Bonwit Teller, Underalls and Brim, among others. River West and similar companies (e.g., the Himmel Group) identify strong brands whose current owners have allowed them to languish or lie dormant. They buy or license the distressed or orphaned brand, resuscitate it, manage it profitably or sell it, sometimes back to the original owner.

If any company has squandered brand equity it’s General Motors. I asked Earle what he’d do with GM’s brands. Interestingly, he disagrees with Al Reis and thinks that GM shouldn’t dump the majority of its brand portfolio.

Earle said that he’d seen a lot of articles and remarks about discontinuing Buick and selling off Saab. The challenge for GM shouldn’t be having an “attic sale,” but rather how to manage the company’s intellectual property, specifically its brand names and trademarks. He thinks the current crisis is “an innovative development opportunity” and that GM’s brands “could be great platforms for learning labs for new concepts.”

Instead of thinking about which brands to keep, which to sell and which to kill, GM should be thinking about what opportunities there are to repurpose those brands down the road. GM needs to identify which are its core brands and which are non-core brands and then use the non-core brands as “springboards to new ideas.”

Using an existing albeit dormant or moribund brand for a new idea provides consumers with comfort, familiarity and trust. Introduce a new concept with a familiar name. Once the idea is proven in the market, you have data points to work with. The concept can be transitioned to the core brand.

With Earle’s model, GM may have been wiser to make the Chevy Volt a Pontiac or Buick. If successful, the electric/gas hybrid could have helped revive these distressed brands. GM could then have moved the cutting edge technology to its core nameplate (Chevy) or its premium brand (Cadillac).

I asked Earle if he was euphemizing. Were GM’s “distressed” brands actually “damaged”? “Not per se,” he answered. “GM needs to identify what each brand is on it’s own, what each brand is as a member of a family of brands and how those brands can enhance technologies . . . GM still has a treasure trove of IP in terms of brand marks, designs and technology. GM can leverage that IP with partnerships inside and outside the auto industry.”

Earle strongly disagrees with the idea of killing off any of GM’s eight US brands. “Killing off a brand means walking away from an asset.” Earl says the value of the brand may be diminished without the core industry, but any brand with name recognition has intrinsic worth, whether that’s inside or outside its home territory (e.g., Buick in China) or within or without its core products area (HUMMER camping equipment).

Earle notes that introducing a new Chinese or Indian automobile brand to North America would be a far greater/more expensive marketing challenge than restoring the Buick or Pontiac brand, whether that restoration is done by GM or by someone else. Lest we forget, it’s taken Hyundai and Kia 15 to 20 years to establish brand names in the US, at a cost of billions of dollars.

By the same token, even orphan and ghost brands long off the market still have brand equity. Earle says automotive brands may have even longer shelf lives than consumer products. Studebaker and Packard are still recognized by consumers 50 and 60 years after they disappeared from the US market. Though Chrysler does nothing with the IP, since buying American Motors and Jeep, it’s continuously maintained the trademarks on Willys.

Brands are valuable things even if squandered. Killing a brand can create uncertainties about trademark ownership as well. Earle thinks it’s prudent to maintain doing commerce with a brand to avoid losing IP rights.

Many people believe that brands like Saturn, Pontiac, HUMMER and Buick are irreparably tainted. Earle, on the other hand, would relish the opportunity to revive them. It’s something Rick Wagoner, Congress and/or a bankruptcy judge should keep in mind.

Perusing the February 23rd issue of AutoBiWeek brought to mind Frank Sinatra’s final concert series. My thought at the time: can someone just shoot this guy? One of the greatest singers of all time couldn’t hit a note with a blunderbuss. In AutoBiWeek’s case, we can skip the paean to their heyday (for obvious reasons) and highlight WeatherTech’s two-page spread on the inside cover. It’s only a matter of time . . . . Meanwhile, Ford’s ponied-up to advertise their pony car. As Chrysler and GM embark on their “You Paid for It” farewell tour, one wonders if the ad for Ford’s greatest hit remix signals a dramatic return to form, or the end of the end.

“DEFIES TIME. AND MOST EVERYTHING ELSE.” You can almost hear the scree of marker on whiteboard, as the agency and marketing guys compete to see how many levels of meaning they can ascribe to a vague, mundane come-on.

Defies time! Eternal appeal! Defies time! Like the old bastards who still want to buy a Mustang. Defies time! Like the time it takes to accelerate from zero to sixty! Defies time! Like “Why is Ford still making this thing?”

Yes, there is that. The Mustang is still a two-plus-torture coupe; a toy at a time when nobody’s got a plug nickel for toys.

Don’t get me wrong: I adore the current-gen GT despite the fact that the interior’s made of recycled toothbrush handles and the on-the-limit handling makes me shout (at the appropriate moment) Live! From the rear axle! It’s the end of my life!

Never mind. The Mustang is as iconic as a coke bottle and the V8’s eargasmic. Only . . . you can hardly find a Coke bottle anymore and the GT is a niche within a niche.

To its credit, Ford knows the entry-level Mustang’s back is up against the wall. Hence the “AND MOST EVERYTHING ELSE” part of the headline.

You can almost feel the embattled resolve. The 2010 Mustang defies federal fleet-wide fuel economy regulations. Defies anodyne Toyondissan styling. Defies the end of Detroit. Defies the wife, who’s freaked that we might end up on the soup line (and BTW we’re $15K backwards on our current auto loan).

I’ve yet to drive the new base Mustang. But I doubt it will defy my expectations; I’m sure it’s vastly better than the model it replaces. The new EcoBoost (born TwinForce) V6 should provide some driving pleasure where, previously, there wasn’t any. And . . . that’s about it.

The Mustang’s exterior modifications are strictly forum fodder, the interior still looks so cheap it Hertz (even though it probably isn’t) and Ford refused to bite the Bullitt and put an independent rear axle out back. Oops! I guess someone forgot to defy the beancounters.

But the real problem with the new Mustang (the killer app in the literal sense) is the marketing.

“COMPLETELY CHANGED,” the body copy shouts, in its own small-font-size sort of way. “INSIDE AND OUT. BUT THE FEELING IN THE SAME AS EVER.” Translation: IT SUCKED BEFORE BUT WE CAN’T SAY THAT BUT ANYWAY YOU LOVE THE WHOLE MUSTANG THING, RIGHT?

The Mustang’s “Same as it Ever Was” magazine ad is just one example of The Blue Oval Boys’ po-faced approach to marketing. Appealing to muscle-minded Mustang motorists with a message of eternal life is all very well and good in a preaching-to-the-choir kinda way. But Ford needs to win new converts via a major “come to Crazy Henry” moment, saving souls with a charismatic product born of bad ass branding.

Yes, The Blue Oval Boys finally whittled down their four tag lines. They’ve gone from “Drive Smart, Drive Safe, Drive Green, Drive One” to “Drive One.” Which is, without doubt, the worst possible choice (out of four less-than-inspiring options). Drive One is bland, unimaginative, insipid and entirely forgettable.

Ford may be completely changed inside and out, but the feeling amongst consumers remains the same: meh. Or, to put it in a corporate context, the company’s branding sucks. No, it’s worse than that. Ford doesn’t have any branding.

And that’s a shame because Ford makes some terrific products. The Explorer is a tremendous vehicle allowed to die without a fight. The Freestyle—sorry, “Taurus X”—was another potential winner that flew so far under the radar it crashed into an anthill. The F-150 is one hell of a truck whose virtues have never been properly tied to other Ford products. The Fusion handles like a dream . . . that no one’s ever had.

Mark my words (Fields): Ford will die unless it distills and disseminates a coherent brand message. F. Scott Fitzgerald famously opined, “There are no second acts in American life.” Read in context the line means that most Americans skip directly from act one to act three. Ford had better get a move on, or, one way or another, it will be forced to leave the stage,

Public relations people say the darndest things. Shills for the car companies that chose to speak to the press at the 2009 Dallas Auto Show were no exception. The folks at Chevy are still “excited about the Camaro” a full three years after they excitedly announced the product. What impressive stamina they have. Buick intends to “shatter the myth that Buick only builds sedans for old people” Good luck with that. Chrysler Corp. claims twenty-four new cars and trucks are under development. “If taxpayers can support us, we’ll have some sweet products for you to test drive.” Goodie, maybe I’ll get to drive another redesigned Sebring. That’d be super sweet! But the biggest story coming from the show is what the PR refused to talk about.

“We’re here to talk about product,” the Dodge mouthpiece declared. “Any questions ’bout the company will be referred to Corporate.” This was a common theme. GM’s hackles shot up when a writer asked whether the new Lacrosse would be marketed in China, where the interior and electronics were designed and tested. “We can’t comment on what GM plans to do or not do in China,” the PR hack tersely said, cutting off the questioner. The phrase most oft uttered at the Ford, Buick, and Dodge press conferences: “We’re not prepared to comment on that.”

Other automakers simply didn’t even bother to speak to the press at all. This year’s itinerary of scheduled press conferences was only six manufacturers long and concluded by lunchtime. In recent years we have heard from Toyota, Cadillac, Nissan, Lexus, Hummer, Aston Martin, Saleen, Infiniti, Honda, and Subaru. All of these manufacturers were all present at the show (except Saleen); they just had nothing to say to the press corps.

Furthermore, the first two press conferences, Ferrari and Lamborghini, weren’t press conferences at all. The media assembled at the Ferrari display but there was no presentation so everyone dissipated. It wasn’t until later that I realized that one of the individuals gathered there was actually a soft spoken Ferrari rep. Ditto Lamborghini. Don’t the Italians have anything to tell the public about their cars, how their product is evolving, and all of the rest of the PR drivel that is communicated in a proper press conference?

But enough of all that. Here are the 2009 DAS winners and losers:

Winner: Buick Lacrosse. I’m not saying that this car will save Buick or GM or that it will even sell well. But The General certainly put his best spit-shined boot forward with this car. American styling built by Canadians on a new European developed platform with Chinese innards, this is truly an international car. The car bests Buick wannabes from Toyota and Lexus with dynamic styling and matches them with an outstanding interior. If this car drives half as well as it looks, it could be a contender. Buick claims to be in the midst of a “design renaissance.” That bit of hyperbole might actually be true.

Loser: Acura. Would somebody light that car a cigarette? The grille blighting every new Acura has the expression of Iron Man aglow in post-coital ecstasy—not something I want to see.

Winner: Ford Taurus SHO. Ford designer Earl Lucas shows that Americans can design a mature and subtle executive’s performance sedan. The car possesses the power and elegance of an NFL linebacker in a tuxedo. The D-sized sedan had the press mob drooling on the SHO’s exclusive Atlantic Green paint.

Loser: Chevrolet Camaro. The car is beautiful. The power is impressive. The price is right. The timing is awful. Look for the 2010 Camaro to makes its debut later this year. Its launch coincides with Transformers: Revenge of the Fallen, the sequel of the movie that it starred in two years ago (along side the lovely Megan Fox and the dopey Shia LaBeouf). The Camaro has been so prominent at auto shows and in GM advertising for so long that it’s already due for redesign.

I sat on the front row in the Buick press conference admiring the contemporary look of the 2010 Lacrosse. As I did so I realized that GM could not have produced a car of this caliber ten years ago. Neither could Ford. Life or death competition has forced these companies to break from many of the lazy and lardy practices of their past.

It might be too late for GM to right its ruptured and sinking ship, but the positive and constructive influence of free market pressure is in full display in their latest products. On the other hand, Chrysler remains distinctly unimproved. For every one thing they do right, they are doing five things wrong. This is about the same ratio of incompetence that they operated under two decades ago.  No amount of marketing spin masks that.

It’s a bright Thursday morning on Interstate 95. I’m hammering my black Phaeton down the left lane at an indicated one hundred and twenty-three miles per hour. In the back seat, my brother and sister-in-law are sound asleep. Next to me, my wife idly flips through the pages of a month-old magazine. “I think the Wilderness Lodge is the worst hotel at Disney… of the acceptable ones, you know,” she says. Before I can respond I notice that we’re closing in on what looks like a high-speed multiple-car freeway accident. In progress.

There are five lanes. The middle three are occupied by a tractor-trailer which is slewing sideways in true action-movie fashion. The right lane is unreachable at my current closing speed, so I dismiss it. The left lane and most of the shoulder is filled with cars swerving left and right before colliding into the mass of stopped traffic. The “pop-pop-pop” of the hits arrive through the double-pane glass just a moment after I see each set of rear wheels leave the ground upon impact.

With a solid shove of the left foot, I’ve engaged the ABS and there’s a scream from behind me as my sister-in-law is simultaneously awoken by the sudden deceleration and choked by her safety belt. Down to 70mph or so, foot off the brake, and now we’re in the thick of things. I choose to drop two wheels off the left shoulder and thread the gap. There’s a solid SLAM that fills the cabin as the tractor-trailer finally makes contact with something.

A blue Buick LeSabre ejects itself from the mess backwards and crosses our path in an eyeblink. The driver’s mouth is open; his hands are off the wheel. In a flash he’s upside-down and tumbling across the grassy median. Back on the throttle to lift the nose, climb the shoulder. I pick up the phone to call 911 and report what’s just happened.

This incident was the masturbatory fantasy of every “driver training” and “active safety” advocate: a mildly skilled vehicle operator avoids a deadly accident in a [conveniently European] sedan while SUVs drive mindlessly into a steaming pile. A couple of problems with the scenario…

First, my car, passengers, and cargo totaled well over 6000 pounds. The only inputs I applied were hard braking and slow steering. I could have done the same thing in an Escalade. The second is that it wasn’t skill that got me through; it was luck. I happened to find the empty spot, but that spot wasn’t empty a moment before and it wasn’t empty a moment afterwards. Only timing and the hand of Chance/Fate/insert your chosen Deity saved me from hitting stopped cars at seventy miles per hour. Had I closed my eyes and slammed the brakes, I might have made it through just as well.

There is no convincing evidence that skill-based driver training reduces automotive-related fatalities in this or any other country. While a recent IIHS study claims that mandatory ESC will reduce fatalities, the biggest benefit appears to come from reducing the risk of oscillation-based rollovers. Put it another way: if the reaction of every driver in this country to a potential accident were to simply stand on the brakes and prepare for impact, fatalities might well be reduced.

The Active Steering now available in BMW and Audi products recognizes this. When a panicky driver saws at the wheel, Active Steering drastically reduces the size of the input, thus ensuring that the car hits nose-first rather than with a far less well-protected door or B-pillar. Nor is this technology aimed exclusively at bumbling untrained Americans; the oh-so-superior European market apparently orders it as often as we do.

No amount of stricter licensing, pre-license training, or post-license testing can adequately prepare the average person for the wide variety of dangerous situations he or she is likely to face in a lifetime of driving, nor can a few open-lapping days or skidpad sessions significantly increase a driver’s readiness to cope with an on-road challenge which may happen years or decades afterwards.

If training doesn’t save lives, what does? Drive less, drive slower, drive sober, take the bus, ride the train. But if you must drive, don’t kid yourself that being a racer, autocrosser, or self-proclaimed “good driver” will save you. Had I been unlucky that sunny day in Florida, I had the comfort of knowing that I, and my family, would have met that impact in a 5200-pound, multiple-airbag, comprehensively crash-engineered premium automobile—precisely the type of car derided by others as a “rolling padded cell.”

When your family’s life in on the line, it won’t be the reflexes of the moment that decide who lives and dies. Instead, it will be that dimly remembered moment of purchase, months or years previous.

[Ed.’s Note: If you disagree with Mr. Baruth’s views, we extend to you an invitation for a counterpoint editorial. Please keep it to fewer than 800 words and keep it professional. If we receive more than one article, we will condense the most salient points into one article. Send it to editttac@gmail.com, sil vous plait. Carry on.]

[Editor’s Note: This is the last part of a four-part series by Dr. Rob Kleinbaum. Here are parts 1, 2, 3. A PDF version of the entire editorial is available, courtesy of Dr. Kleinbaum, here.]

Serious consideration needs to be given to a radically different organization that would give people overall business responsibility and accountability and increase their contact with markets and the external world. The current direction is to move away from integrated business responsibility by creating strong functions with weak business units, and the problem is compounded by making the transition slowly, so there is continual confusion and conflict over who is responsible for what. The company is doing this to “leverage its global strengths” but the real effect is to create an organization where fewer and fewer people are actually running a business or have contact with the outside world and control is becoming more and more concentrated in a few people.

Education and training need to be made part of everyone’s life, from the most junior to the most senior. This becomes even more important in times of stress, as it demonstrates long term commitment to people and, more importantly, to the future. A portion of this education should take place outside of GM to increase exposure to people outside the industry. In the scheme of things, the costs of education and training are truly negligible. If someone asks to calculate the ROI, it should be used as a litmus test for determining candidates for structural cost reductions.

GM’s decision making processes need serious revamping. Despite improvements, most meetings are still exercises in procrastination, rubber stamping or idea killing, without anything that would pass for genuine debate and dialogue. Dealing with complex issues requires genuine discussion, feedback, and intellectual engagement. Changing the people, along with the structure, should help enable this key cultural change but there must also be a conscious choice among the leadership that they want to make this transformation.

These modifications would also disrupt patronage relationships and should permit merit to become more important, especially if there is an influx of outsiders and overseas managers. Also, in the same way that having an African American become president of the United States will change many American’s notion of what it means to be an American and what can be accomplished, having someone who is genuinely “different” will help many people in the company see GM differently. If the competent people in Brazil see that there is a real chance they can reach the top, it will change their level of engagement and the company will be much better for it.

Implementing these changes piecemeal will not be enough to make meaningful changes in GM’s culture, because they are all necessary to reinforce one another to grow a different and progressive culture that is self-sustaining. The more challenging question is whether they would ever be implemented in the climate of crisis by the people currently running the enterprise.

They are certainly intellectually capable of doing so, but seem wedded to the momentum plan and believe that their main task is to get through the current crisis and to re-negotiate its labor contracts, trim its dealer body and brand portfolio, and lower its cost structure, not deal with cultural drivers. The mainstay belief is that all will turn out well if only they have the chance to implement their plans, starting with the much heralded Volt. Then they will consider turning their attention to considering these types of “secondary” issues.

What you believe about this position depends on your level of confidence in the company’s ability to execute its plans, which have always sounded good and well reasoned. These operational issues are absolutely critical to the future of GM. The importance of dealing with the culture is that unless there is a substantial change in the company’s beliefs and values, the most likely outcome is that, once again, too little will be done too late.

The very real crisis the company is in would permit GM to make the cultural changes that would be very difficult in “normal” times and provide a once-in-a-generation opportunity to transform GM back into a global powerhouse. GM has so many talented people in it and almost certainly has the potential to turn around, but not until it develops a culture that lets it be truly progressive rather than one that continually defers the hard choices, holds it back, stops talented people from making contributions consistent with their ability, and prevents its plans from becoming reality.

USA Today’s car coverage is normally a fairly sensible part of a fairly sensible newspaper. But the Motown meltdown has created major distortions in the force. USA Today’s piece “Readers tell us why they stand by their American cars” is odd, from any angle. Clicking on the “enlarge” button of a homo-erotic picture of a guy in combat pants posing in front of a Buick Riviera is only the beginning. Right from the start of the article, it’s clear that scribe Chris Woodyard is so far out of the news loop he might as well check if Elvis is on the moon with him. Either that or he’s having a bad flashback, man. How else can you explain his bell bottom jeans-era take on American cars?

To admirers, the American car is the ultimate expression of freedom, a terrestrial comet skimming across a barren highway.

To detractors, the American car is a fuel-gulping beast, a steel behemoth that symbolizes industrial decline.

Love it or hate it, no other consumer product ignites as much passion or has had such a profound impact on every aspect of American life.

Yet the fate of the American car is unsettled. The nation’s three homegrown automakers — Ford Motor, General Motors and Chrysler — are running on fumes, victims of a miserable economy, changing consumer tastes, a few painful mistakes and the pressure of foreign competition.

A few painful mistakes? I’d would LOVE to see that list. But no, I’ve got to wade through edited sound bites on American car fanatics. To his credit, Woodyard realizes he’s going to have to completely redefine the term “American car” before he unleashes the vox pop– if he’s not going to look like a total ass.

Now the definition of “American car” has shifted to a definition of American car style.

And what is that style?

“A relatively large, easy-to-drive sedan or crossover.

“You can’t find them anywhere else.”

Americans say they would rather buy domestically made products. Three-quarters of 537 car shoppers surveyed on its website by Kelley Blue Book in December said they prefer to buy U.S.-made products.

A third remain loyal to Detroit’s Big 3.

Whoa dude. Nice transition! But you’d kind of hope that a journalist examining an industry hoovering $97b from American taxpayer’s wallets would want a sample size slightly larger than one you could fit into a high school football stadium.

From there… Hey, who asked this guy to write so many words? Words are not Woodyard’s friends. But at least he can find some flag-wavers whose words back-up his uninformed, interminable rant, right?

Give up on the U.S. automakers and you give up on what makes up the “American spirit.” You join hands with the Southern senators, some of whom have never been in manufacturing, in cutting the legs off the backbone of this country.

Speaking of area 51… Seriously though, either Ronnie Schreiber’s brainwashed Madison Heights Dodge Caravan owner Mary Ellen Hoerig, as above, or she’s a great American. Or Wayland’s put words (there you go again) in her metaphorical mouth.

I have always driven a Ford, Chevy, Buick or Pontiac. Mainly because I don’t buy new cars, so I buy an American car because I feel they are cheaper to maintain.

My wife and I feel the quality of the U.S. cars is equal to that of the foreign cars.

Feelings? Nothing more than feelings? Which are way cool when you’re going for non-scientific random samples to back up a pre-existing prejudice. And then, out of the blue, things turn NASTY. “Why I drive foreign cars.” Uh-oh. Who let the dogs out, who?

First, fuel efficiency is important to us as a young family, both as an economic preference, and because we prefer to consume as responsibly as possible. In this respect, American cars have really let us down.

It’s not as if we set out not to buy American. But Toyota and Honda have long outstripped the Big 3, producing cars with responsible EPA gas mileage estimates (while) American automakers were touting the Hummer.

Can someone tell me the advantages of trotting-out uncorrected ignorance on BOTH sides of an issue? No?

We now purchase almost exclusively based on Consumer Reports reliability ratings. So when Honda came out with its first full-size king-cab pickup, we purchased one. With 80,000 miles on our Ridgeline, we have had zero extra maintenance costs.

In tough economic times, my husband and I can no longer purchase based on national pride. We have to have the most reliable, best gas mileage, highest resale option in the class, or we are throwing away money.

And there you have it: another highly contrived piece of non-journalism on the automotive industry that fills the otherwise blank space between ads. There is one remaining question: what does muscle man John Colletti think about American vs. foreign cars?

It was my last meeting with Saab. The new marketing director had decided that we were just too difficult to work with, and wanted a new team. When his predecessor introduced us to the new guy, he had no idea that we’d be working together again soon, for Lexus Europe. Meanwhile, he’d be moving on inside GM to work on the launch of the new Cadillac platform, and the later Lexus work would bring us into contact with the man who is presently heading Bentley’s sales and marketing. The car world is a small world. Back to the meeting. New guy is drawing a very sketchy car on the whiteboard.

My Saab journey had been part thrill, part misery. The thrills: First worked on the international launch of the 900 cab, where I met the designer Einar Hareide, which led to my sitting on the board of his design company some years later. Was then brought in to work on the 9-5 launch by a brilliant Finnish creative director and designer whose car credentials cover Audi-Porsche-Saab-Lexus. Jari Ullakko and I enjoyed frequent trips to Trollhättan, long discussions with the engineers, and the general joy of being in a company with spirit and soul – still not beat to pulp by GM.

My encounters with ENGINEer Per Gillebrand were thrilling (if GM then had used a quarter of the engine improvement ideas he and his team cooked up …) I spoke with the geniuses who designed the crash protection in the 9-5, they laughed with pride when describing they could open the doors of the first prototype crashed in a test – the survival space intact.

The first 9-x concept, not the BioHybrid PR rehash, but the first one. I rode shotgun with a Saab stuntdriver along a donkey-trail in Almeria, at 200 km/h, two meters from the edge, heading for a steep cliff, where he did a 90 degree sliding turn and straightened out the car just before we went over. Thrills.

The misery: Realizing that GM didn’t get the car, and didn’t want to. New guy is at the whiteboard. Yes, definitely sketching a car – looks like a Volvo. Figures, he was brought in from Volvo to head up international marketing. “My goal is to move the metal!”

How about moving minds and souls? How would that work out for you? See, to move metal, you must first move minds and souls. GM managers would rotate in for two years, just enough to begin getting the car, before scooting off to the next brand.

GM wanted Cross-Platform Synergies, and didn’t pay much attention to the individual brands. Just look at www.gm.com – I hate that place – they still think there is such a thing as a GM-car, at the expense of the individual brands, and they’re never going to abandon that mindset.

“I have looked at your advertising. The cars are too small in the spreads. I want to fill the pages with the cars.” New guy has a strategy, he thinks.

GM killed the “Saab versus …” campaign after a year – they had tested it in the new markets they wanted to enter (Texas), oblivious to the fact that it was a huge success with established customers and with Saab enthusiasts. “It’s too intellectual. Fucking high-brow stuff doesn’t sell cars.” Saabish people still remember that campaign.

New guy is clueless that no one will remember any of the ads he will be signing off on, since they’ll look like all bland car ads out there. In desperation, at the end of the run and when it’s too late, they’ll grasp for Born from Jets, after GM having nixed Saab’s aircraft heritage for fifteen years. GM: “That’s not appropriate for the luxury segment.”

New guy is drawing a rectangle tightly around the Volvo he has sketched on the whiteboard in the Saab conference room. Ah, it’s a two-page ad. He tries to draw the “chicken with a party hat” logo in the bottom right-hand corner. Looks like a pineapple.

“This is how much I want the car to fill the pages. To move the metal, we must show the metal.”

We presented our last attempt to move Saabish minds. A commercial with a 900 cab flying on ice, powder rising like a contrail, and stopping next to some ice fishermen. The top opens. Grey haired father with son, the father with his leg in a cast. He is greeted by the other fishermen, and then drills a hole in the ice next to the car. Spot ends with father and son fishing, seated in the car.

“There is no luxury in this,” says new guy.

That was my last day working for Saab.

[Stein X Leikanger is a brand conceptualizer, brought in by brands to create their communication platforms. His advice is often ignored, yet handsomely rewarded.]

[Editor’s Note: This is the third part of a four-part series by Dr. Rob Kleinbaum. Parts one and two are still available.]

What is fascinating about GM, and offers some hope, is that it really has two cultures. The one described above is an accurate depiction of the culture in North America and Western Europe but there is another in the rest of the world that is very different. The culture of GM’s operations in Asia, Latin America, Africa and Middle East, Russia and Eastern Europe, is much more progressive and it is in these areas that GM is doing very well. On almost all of the measures listed above, they would come out on the progressive side. Working for GM in Asia Pacific, Latin America or the Middle East, you would think you were in a completely different company. People are very forward looking, they are capable of making the tough decisions, they are business focused, debate is tolerated but discipline is enforced, relations with their labor force and dealers are usually positive, and authority is genuinely dispersed to the smaller business units within each of the regions.

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Since the beginning of Detroit’s slide into federal dependency, TTAC’s Best and Brightest have applied their razor-sharp wit to this sad, sad situation. But the bailout boondoggle beggars belief—overwhelming any attempt to subdue it with sardonic humor. To wit: the TTAC meme called American Leyland. On a scale from absurd to certifiable, the marriage of the two ailing American automakers comes pre-wrapped in a straitjacket. Earlier today, I suggested it was too stupid a concept to fade from federal consideration. And the more I think about it, the more it seems inevitable.

Bob Corker spent a part of this day having a chin wag with Reuters. The Senator from Tennessee told the news agency “there’s little hope that Chrysler can remain a stand-alone company.” The outspoken bailout critic advised “those advocating consolidation [which would be, uh, him] should realize that a tie-up might involve foreign ownership.” In other words, the guy on the “no way Jose” end of the bailout “debate” wants his colleagues to realize that a Chrysler-Fiat merger is OK.

I repeat, a republican is calling for the feds to approve Chrysler’s “plan” (I’m running out of quotation marks) to surrender Chrysler—an automaker that’s already into Uncle Sam for $9b—to a foreign owner. Fiat, no less.

The fact that Fiat has sworn on the grave of its sainted mother that it will not give Chrysler a plug nickel seems to have escaped Senator Corker’s attention. Or has it? Are we at the point where the feds are crying “will someone rid me of this troublesome automaker?” Sure. Absolutely. Will it be Fiat? Nope. Never.

Did anyone notice that Fiat reported a 69.8 per cent drop in its 2008 fourth-quarter profits? You can attribute that corporate cratering to the global economic meltdown all day long, but there’s a reason Fiat has pledged zero dollars to this matrimonio del fantasia, and it isn’t because they’re saving money they don’t have for a rainy day that’s already here.

The Fiat deal’s real “value” (found a pair in the back): it paves the way for the end of Chrysler as an independent automaker. Psychologically, it makes the break. In fact, Chrysler’s imminent demise and subsumption is like the old punch line “we’ve already established what you are; we’re just haggling over price.”

The thinking is clear enough. If we don’t want to hand over Chrysler to the Italians, then we gotta PICK SOMEONE. I know! what about . . . GM! You know, the other automaker suckling on the federal teat. We could put all our automotive troubles in our old kit bag, bend over and smile, smile, smile.

Don’t get caught up in the branding insanity or logistical nightmare this nutso plus plus proposal would engender. We’re WAY beyond that kind of fact-based rational analysis. It’s a good idea simply because it’s an idea; the unthinkable (a ChyrCo dissolution) is, of course, unthinkable.

Even more frighteningly, GM is actually good at this. Adding Chrysler’s Jeep, Dodge and house brands to GM’s “core portfolio” present no more challenges than The General faced when it brought Saturn, Saab and HUMMER into la famiglia.

Three brands go, three brands come. No biggie. The vehicles produced by this new “American Leyland” (I’m almost out) would be no better or worse than they are now. Who would buy the fruits of this unholy alliance? No one of course. Well, no one as in no person. The feds’ll have ’em. The money’s already lined-up (thank you America!).

Search “vehicle” on this United States Mayors’ “Ready to Go” bailout wish list. Tucson, AZ: 30 cars ($1.3m); Freeport, NY: 20 electric cars ($1m); Burlington, VT: 8 cars and 4 staff for “CarShare” program ($450k); Oakland, CA: 30 cop cars ($1.74m); West Hartford, CT: “vehicle replacement” ($400k); Hialeah, FL: “Vehicle purchase” ($2m); Pembroke Pines, FL: “vehicles for personnel” ($600k). And on and on and one to the tune of billions of dollars.

What are the odds that the feds will stipulate that bailout bucks allocated for government vehicles must be spent on products from taxpayer-supported automakers? Sorry. Automaker? It’s a dead certainty.

Obviously, government fleet purchases are still not enough to sustain this gigantic, theoretical American Leyland. The new company would continue to shed share and burn bailout bucks. But that’s not the point.

The bottom line is that the bottom line is no longer the bottom line. Chrysler and GM no longer have to make a profit selling cars. They need only please their new paymasters: politicians. And your duly elected representatives will buy anything American Leyland makes. Or nothing, as the case may be.

By combining Chrysler and GM into American Leyland, politicians will refashion the automakers in their own image. American Leyland will be slow, insensitive to the market and deeply, hopelessly unprofitable. In other words, it’ll be business as usual. Only you’ll have to pay for it, whether you like it or not. To quote Tommy DeVito, what do you mean funny, funny how?

[Editor’s Note: This is the second of a four-part series by Dr. Rob Kleinbaum. Read the first part here.]

The scholars Lawrence Harrison, Samuel Huntington and their colleagues have addressed the fundamental question of whether culture “matters” in how societies develop and make a compelling case that it matters a great deal.  They have also outlined the specific traits that lead a society to progress or prevent it from doing so and their work provides a rigorous way to think about culture that is based on substantial evidence. These traits seem applicable to a private enterprise, especially one that is larger and older than many countries.

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[Editor’s Note: This is part one of a four-part series. The author writes: I have been a consultant for GM for 15 years and an employee for 9 years prior to that, and have worked at one time or another in almost every region and function. This paper has not been endorsed or supported in any way by anyone at GM; I suspect it will be harshly rejected (or simply ignored) at the senior levels but will strike a deep chord a few levels down. This is written out of the deepest affection for the company and it is an attempt to deal with a fundamental issue that has kept the company from success and is now critical to its long term viability. The people who do care about GM—there are many—and who think a future is still possible need to stand up and try to make a difference, regardless of the short run costs.]

GM has developed a plan, currently before Congress, which is supposed to demonstrate its long run viability. The company is looking at its products, brands, manufacturing footprint and capacity, health care, and “structural costs,” while negotiating with the UAW to further reduce labor costs. All this is well and good but it is almost certain that GM is not addressing an issue that, in the long run, could be more important than all these others: its culture.

Mentioning the “C” word makes eyes roll, as it is seen as too “soft” to deal with in a meaningful way and does not matter anyway once the “real” stuff has been taken care. But to a long-run observer of the company, it is apparent that unless GM’s culture is fundamentally changed, especially in North America (its true heart), GM will likely be back at the public trough again and again until the public finally grows weary and allows its demise. It is unlikely to achieve sustained profitability unless it fixes its culture and it may even be true that once the culture is fixed the business will take care of itself.

Culture means the “values, attitudes, beliefs, and underlying assumptions.”¹ The importance of culture is that it forms the foundation of the business logic brought to any specific decision or problem; there is little chance something will be done that violates the culture, as it would mean contradicting fundamental beliefs. The success of many companies, including McKinsey, P&G, and Pixar, is attributed to their cultures, and a recent study of Toyota concluded its success is due as much to its culture as the Toyota Production System.² Sometimes societies may change their culture in response to a major disruption, as Germany and Japan did after World War II; and companies have as well, such as GE, IBM and Alberto-Culver³, after their own near-death experiences.

But in all of these cases there was a consensus among the leadership that the culture needed to change and serious efforts were put in place to implement those changes. It is fairly apparent from their behavior and statements that GM’s leaders in North America do not believe there is anything fundamentally wrong with the company’s culture; indeed, they seem firmly convinced that they were well on their way to recovery but were overtaken by events beyond their control (specifically the large spike in energy prices and the collapse of the credit markets) that have led to the current recession.

GM’s current response seems to reflect its fundamental beliefs about the way the world works and it’s almost identical to what it has been doing for the last 30 years: cut “structural costs,” wait for future products to bring salvation, and count on cash from the other regions (and, now, the government) to help prop things up in the meantime. But they effect no truly fundamental changes in the business, its structure or the people running it (as they are clearly the best and brightest, know how to manage things in a serious way, and have a sound plan).

The proposed changes are touted as “profound” and “fundamental” but are really the minimum change from status quo the company believes it can get away with. There is a profound reluctance to make hard decisions that would cause short term pain but would lead to fixing the problem in the long run; instead there is a continual compromise of action that leads to “too little, too late” but defers immediate catastrophe. This is reflected in every aspect of the enterprise, from decisions on manufacturing, which never bring capacity into line with market realities, to people, where almost no one is ever fired for poor performance. This has not worked before and it is difficult to believe it will work now.

[To be continued . . . In Part Two, the author discusses the traits that characterize progressive cultures and how these traits (or lack thereof) affect General Motors.]

The viability plans presented by Chrysler and GM to the US Treasury and the public yesterday signaled the end game. The plans amount to nothing more than begging for enough cash to stay afloat until the market turns upwards. Not only are the automakers’ arguments based on flawed assumptions about the US car market, but they singularly fail to address the fundamental problems that brought Chrysler and GM to their knees. The fact that anyone would take these pleas seriously indicates the simple triumph of fear and over common sense. You’d have to be willfully ignorant not to see these plans as the worst kind of cheap fiction. Well, maybe not so cheap . . .

Of the two submittals, Chrysler’s plan was worse. It was a non-plan. To start, Chrysler pointed to its reduction in warranty claims, its lower rate of recalls, and other “proof positive” of a turnaround in quality which justifies further Federal money into the money pit called Chrysler. Too bad all the quality rating folks like JD Power and Consumer Reports still rank Chrysler at or near the bottom.

And when the total number of rigs on the road sold in the last few years goes down, warranty payments should be reduced as well. Funny thing, Chrysler’s total sales have dropped about as much as their warranty claims in the last three years.

As for future vehicles? Nothing but speculative hype about future cars from Planet Gullible. And by the way, ChryCo’s cutting three vehicles previously destined for death (Aspen, Durango, and PT Cruiser). But there’s a new Grand Cherokee coming! And Fiat with its “not ready for American prime time” Euro cars. Perhaps Fiat should be talking to the Saturn dealers instead?

Chrysler’s first lien bank lenders have not agreed to any cuts whatsoever. Why would they? They’ve got priority over the government loans already. The UAW hasn’t agreed to the cut in the health care VEBA for retirees (same goes for GM too). And by the way, Chrysler needs an additional $5B to keep going.

The coup-de-jour: Jim Press said that the dealers stepped up in February and ordered 78k rigs—thanks to $2k of dealer cash. And who do you think paid for this channel stuffing? Hey, Jim, what happens in March when your 150-day supply of cars becomes 180 days? How big will the bribe be then?

GM’s plan was too late. It’s the plan that should have been implemented in 2005. Saab will return to Sweden—if the government there forks over the 17 kroner necessary. Otherwise Saab will be toast by the end of the month. Saturn and HUMMER will wither and die—unless Chindia gets tired of waiting for a C7 liquidation.

Don’t think so. India’s auto tycoons aren’t stupid; they’ve watched Ratan Tata drive Land Rover/Jaguar straight over the metaphorical bridge to nowhere. Mahindra & Mahindra has stopped making noises about entering the US with rough and tumble SUVs and chicken tax surmounting mid-size pickups. China may buy a US brand or they may not. If they do, GM will get pennies on the dollar, if not actually having to pay someone to make Saturn, Saab and HUMMER go away.

In fact, no matter what, GM’s going to have to pay to make its excess brands disappear. Wagoner faced the cameras yesterday and blithely assured reporters that GM would fight terminated dealer franchise dealer lawsuits on a state-by-state basis. All together now: who’s paying for that? And speaking of money . . .

GM said they need another $18B (on top of the $13B already received) to make the plan work. And that’s before we get to the UAW retiree health care issue, the cost of mopping-up Delphi, guarantees to suppliers, and god-knows-what-else. That doesn’t include the Section 136 loan money (none given so far) authorized and appropriated for “viable” auto companies and parts suppliers to improve fuel economy.

When does it stop? Or is that where? GM is also holding a gun to Europe, Canada, Britain, Thailand and Australia, extorting money to keep its operations going.

Truth be told, we don’t know the total bailout funding required. Figure $40B-$50B dollars as a lowball estimate. And that’s just short term misery extrapolated over five years (Comrade). Let’s not forget the US pension contributions due in 2013/2014. Or shall we?

This is bad craziness. Never mind the cost. Or the fact that the bailout is doomed to failure. Government money provided to private enterprise on this basis completely distorts the function of the marketplace. It rewards incompetence. It perpetuates incompetence. The bailout does nothing to address GM’s fundamental inability to sustain car brands with class-leading products. Nor can it. It is not the government’s responsibility to pick a winner in a free market. Nor is it the government’s responsibility to “save” a loser.