Category: Editorials

By on May 25, 2006

 When Bob Lutz launched the new-ish Chevrolet Tahoe, GM's Car Czar claimed the SUV and its platform partners would sell to a core group of customers who need (or at least desperately want) the size, power and towing abilities of a traditional American truck. At the same time, Lutz acknowledged that overall SUV's sales were shrinking. Unfortunately, the press neglected to explore the corollary: GM's ability to maintain SUV profits depends on conquest sales from existing owners. Never mind the Dai-san (Toyota, Honda, Nissan) or the "Crisis" Corporation. There's only one way GM can generate life-sustaining lift from this profit-rich segment: hit the weak man. Ford is Job One.

In fact, GM and Ford are locked in a Detroit Death Match. Both companies' finances are in tatters. Their market shares are shrinking. Layoffs and closings are spreading throughout their respective empires. A Delphi strike threatens to shutter their assembly lines. Impossible pension and health care costs are eating into profits. They pay thousands of workers not to work. The unions can't or won't play ball. There's not enough money to invest in new products. Their dealer networks are bloated. Ailing brands are dragging them down, but they can't afford to cut the deadwood. It's like the old joke about the man fleeing a bear who nearly trips over his companion, who's putting on a pair of running shoes. "Are you crazy?" he yells. "You can't outrun a bear!" "I don't have to outrun the bear," his former friend replies. "I just have to outrun you."

Ever since The General's bankruptcy stopped being a paranoid fantasy, GM CEO Rick Wagoner has insisted that Chapter 11 is not on the horizon, or even in play. While GM could use Chapter 11 to cut pay, pensions, health care, brands and dealers, Wagoner claims the move would fatally damage GM customers' trust (such as it is). But, if Ford went to the wall first, broke the UAW's back in court and jettisoned its excess dealers, GM could demand the same treatment from the unions and the courts. GM would enjoy most of the benefits of "re-alignment" without damaging its reputation AND scoop-up market share from its prostrate rival.

Seen though this lens, it's possible that Rick Wagoner's otherwise inexplicable "steady as she goes" strategy reflects a deeper understanding that GM is fighting a war of attrition against its cross-town rival. If so, the sides are evenly matched. Ford has a better pickup, arguably a better car line and better foreign brands (all solid except for ailing, arthritic Jaguar). GM has better SUVs, a more robust luxury line and sheer size. At the end of the proverbial day, these two automaking giants are in such similar straits that Ford (and to some extent Chrysler) feels obliged to equal or better every GM incentive, discount and sales gimmick. Employee discounts, gas cards, zero per cent financing, cash back– the hits to the bottom line keep happening.

Of course, these incentive wars are a dangerous game of "chicken.' The endless discounting has not only damaged all hope of profitability, it's dragged GM and Ford deep into discount car company territory, shattering their once-proud reputations for high-quality products. What's more, the campaigns are only working relative to each other; while GM and Ford (and Chrysler) fight each other over scraps, Dai San continues their slow, inexorable increase in overall US market share. The rot may become so bad that neither company could find their way back– even after bankruptcy levels the playing field.

Besides, the "what's good for the goose is good for the gander" principle has no basis in law. Who's to say a Ford Chapter 11 would force the all-powerful labor unions to be more conciliatory towards GM when their contracts come up for renewal in '07? Why would the myriad of state courts involved in dealership agreements allow a solvent GM to dump its dealers just because a federal bankruptcy judge bestowed this advantage upon a stricken FoMoCo?

If Wagoner and his team are thinking Who Laughs Last, they may have it exactly backwards. The first domestic carmaker to file for bankruptcy could well be the first company to fully recover. Ford as much as admitted this when its quarterly statement listed GM's bankruptcy as a potential competitive threat. So why hasn't either company simply bitten the bullet and filed first? As always, it's about character. Rick Wagoner sees himself as GM's savior. He doesn't want to be the captain who went down with the ship. Billy Ford feels the same way. But events (and their own incompetence) are conspiring against them. Sooner or later, both men are bound to learn that pride goeth before a fall.

By on May 25, 2006

 Once upon a time, wealthy people didn't just pop down to their local Ferrari dealer, pick-up an Enzo and ask for their change in F430's. They commissioned a coachbuilder to add bespoke sheetmetal, fixtures and fittings to a suitable manufacturer's underpinnings. This trend created some wild ass whips, usually ascribed to the builder who provided the greasy bits. Not only is ex-BMW, ex-Ford designer Henrik Fisker determined to resurrect the whole coachbuilding thing, but the man wants name brand recognition. Well, fair enough. But would you buy a reskinned Merc or Bimmer for north of $300k? Answers on an email please. Or wait for part two, tomorrow.

By on May 23, 2006

Henry Ford and the Model TI once read that a person with experience caring for horses knows more about what it meant to be a human in the last thousand years than anyone without. Similarly, anyone who's driven a Model T knows more about what it felt like to be an American in the first half of the 20th Century than anyone who hasn't. History records the Model T as a two-fold blessing: it created the American working class and it put them behind the wheel. Again, the map is not the territory. To fully appreciate the Model T's impact on American psychology, you have to get behind the wheel.

Easier said than done. It takes a slim person to squeeze between the Model T's steering wheel and driver's seat. Most modern operators have to enter from the passenger side and slide over. Once there, only the Model T's helm works like a contemporary car's controls. The Flivver's throttle is on the column. Forward speeds are moderated by an unfamiliar lever and pedal combination. Another foot pedal shifts the car into reverse and doubles as a second brake. Before any of this, drivers of Model T's built before 1926 face the daunting prospect of using the 'Armstrong Starter' or hand crank. A second lever on the column retards the spark timing; which makes the starting procedure a bit easier and safer. (Broken wrists and arms eventually led to the development of the electric starter, and many older cars were retrofitted with the device as soon as they became available.)

A car that could break your arm without a class-action lawsuit.Once modern passengers crest 20 mph in a Model T, many conclude that the car is a fragile and dangerous Rube Goldberg device. Not so. The Model T was a fully realized automobile built to cope with the challenging conditions of its time. Ford produced more than 15 million of the so-called Tin Lizzies. And while they clatter and squeak interminably, the car could take a real beating. Even the roughest patch of modern roadway is a blessing compared to the nominal 'roads' that T's ably traversed.

Taking the wheel of a nearly 100-year-old car puts one in a museum gallery frame of mind; you expect the machine to behave as carefully as you do. But a Model T is not as hesitant as its novice driver. One would not suppose that 4-inch-wide tires propelled by a 20hp 2.9-liter four-cylinder engine could keep up with a lawn mower, let alone snap your head back on take-off. But Henry Ford knew what he was doing. While it's no quarter-mile champ, a 'T' is unexpectedly quick-– a fact emphasized by the open-air cabins found on most of the early models.

Seat belts?  I don't think so.The Model T has three speeds – faster, slower and reverse. With time, the modern driver's mind recalibrates, confidence grows and the little car starts to seem quite nimble and fun. You begin to understand why the Model T was such a beloved vehicle. They were incredibly versatile machines that integrated themselves into their owners' lives in surprising ways. After a few years on the road, many T's found work in the fields as hardy and affordable farm tractors. (The conversion could be done in the barnyard.) And for a car famous for its uniformity– any color you want so long as it's black– most Model T's were highly customized with dozens of available accessories.

Ford produced the Model T from 1908 to 1927. Its impact on American society is impossible to overstate. For example, the Model T helped America win World War One and Two. While German soldiers were often forced to abandon their exquisitely engineered tanks and trucks, millions of American soldiers could fix their internal combustion-powered equipment, thanks to their hands-on experience with the Model T. Writer and essayist E. B. White mourned the Model T's gradual disappearance from the American landscape, saying that "the old Ford practically was the American scene." For better or worse, the Model T changed the world.

15 million customers served, and a country changed The reality of this history is almost lost in the mists of time. But not quite. Although we can't understand what it was like to glimpse a Model T for the first time, that same sense of wonder and freedom still greets the Model T driver when they take the wheel. I don't know how many of the 15 million T's produced are still on the road. But if you can finagle a drive, seize the opportunity with both hands. You'll make a personal connection with one of the most influential and important Americans in our national history.

By on May 22, 2006

 When Ford unleashed their new Fusion late last year, the American automotive press raved. Car & Driver's Csabe Csere predicted that the front-wheel drive sedan will "truly put Ford back in the car game." Road & Track's Matt DeLorenzo declared the Fusion was "Just the recipe for shaking up the midsize car market." Automobile said "Ford is serious about kicking its way back into the mid-size-car business." No wonder The Blue Oval is pleased with the Fusion and continues to advertise the car heavily. Strange, then, that the Mexican-built sedan was not the product that wore the mantle of the first financial quarter's "best selling Ford passenger car." That honor belongs to the Taurus.

Sorry, I should have said "belonged." That's right: the swoopy Taurus is finally dead. After 21-years on the showroom floor, despite outselling the Five Hundred and Fusion– combined– in the last quarter, The Blue Oval has pulled the plug on its ageing family four-door. The last retail unit has left the Atlanta assembly line. The final fleet car will disappear any day. It's the end of an era for American-built Fords, and a vehicle that was the best-selling US passenger car from '92 – '96.

 Ford claims Taureans have/will migrate to the smaller Fusion or the slightly larger Five Hundred. Maybe they did, maybe they didn't. Maybe they will, maybe they won't. Even if you discount fleet sales (so to speak), Ford's Taurus replacements don't seem to be picking-up the slack or setting the sales charts on fire. Is it possible that buyers preferred the Taurus to Ford's best and brightest? If so, that's a sad commentary on the current state of Ford's product development process. It also tells us– if not Ford's management– how to build a popular sedan.

When it was launched in '85, the Taurus was a ground-breaking car. Ford's sleek, freshly-designed Taurus boasted a stiff chassis, a choice of V6 or I4 engines, optional ABS brakes and a practical, comfortable interior. The Ford faithful flocked to the sensibly-priced motor, at a time when Ford flockers were nowhere to be seen. Many credit the model's sales for saving FoMoCo from an ignominious slide into insolvency. There's no question that the Taurus helped Ford recover valuable market share and delivered profits that allowed the company to develop other, even more profitable vehicles, like the Explorer and Expedition.

 The Taurus' stellar success sparked a number of books by Ford "insiders." While the accounts credit various Ford designers, engineers, managers and marketeers for the model's triumph, there's a common theme throughout the narratives: innovation, risk-taking and, most importantly of all, commitment. Author Mary Walton's "Car" chronicled the development of the second generation Taurus (which debuted in 1996). She reveals that the Taurus program managers' mantra was "beat Toyota". Their goal wasn't "equal Camry", or "come close to Camry", but 'beat Camry.' Possunt quia posse videntur. (They can because they think they can.)

Enraptured by SUV sales and profits, the Taurus slowly slipped from Ford's mind. After the second-generation Taurus– whose launch in '92 marked the model's zenith at 409,751 sales– Ford's mainstream motor failed to keep pace with the Camry. While Ford jelly-beaned the shape and revised the mechanicals, Toyota subjected the Camry to a regular, ruthless and relentless series of mechanical and sheetmetal upgrades and refreshes. The Taurus fell further and further behind, until it was no longer Ford's signature car or profit center. Finally, when even Ford could see that the SUV craze had begun to peak, the company realized that their ageing warhorse had fallen too far behind the competition to save.

 Ford spent huge amounts of time and money to create the Taurus' theoretical replacement. The Five Hundred is built on Volvo's SUV platform; it's both longer and taller than the Taurus. This sedan's extra cabin room and "SUV-like" elevation were supposed to be the new model's key selling points. Buyers stayed away in droves. The underpowered Five Hundred is just a little too big. The Mazda6-based Ford Fusion arrived to hit the sweet spot. Alas, the fine-handling Fusion seems just a little too small for American sedan buyers. In retrospect, the Taurus was a Goldilocks special: perfectly sized for middle America's taste and budget.

Billy Ford should have the last Ford Taurus placed in the lobby of his company's headquarters. The final "new" Taurus would serve as a fitting tribute to a model that helped keep the lights on during some of FoMoCo's darkest days. The Taurus could also serve as a stern warning to Blue Oval product developers: develop the products we already have, as well as they ones you think people want. If not, both our products and our company face the same extinction shamelessly inflicted upon this worthy machine. I'd also suggest the following inscription: there are old cars and there are bold cars, but the best cars are old, bold cars.

By on May 21, 2006

 Blasting down the autocross track at the Las Vegas Motor Speedway in a BMW M3, wringing that mad motor to the max, I still couldn't catch the rat bastard in the car ahead. My Teutonic ride had more than enough juice to gain ground during the straights. But the second a twist appeared my target slipped away like a thief with a knife. At some point, courage got the better part of valor; I switched off the DSC and drove well beyond what any rational human would call "safe." Wrong answer. Without Bimmer's Nanny riding shotgun, my car control disintegrated. The Dodge Neon SRT-4 pulled away, leaving me in the dust.

Before spending two-days at the Skip Barber High Performance Driving School, I was convinced I was a reasonably skilled driver. I had no idea how bad I sucked. Lucky for my ego, I wasn't the only one to make this realization. Wealthy sports car owners from all walks of life swaggered into the Vegas heat full of piss, shit and corruption; convinced they could pilot Bimmers, Porkers and a Viper with confidence and élan. One-by-one, Skip Barber's Neon-driving instructors disabused them of the notion. As we struggled through a tire-smoking orgy of spinning, understeering, knocking over cones, missing turn-in points, choosing the wrong gear, braking at the exact wrong time and place, we all came to the same conclusion: none of us could drive for shit.

 Skip Barber teaches you how to steer a car with your feet, master the art of progressive trail-braking (to both induce and correct oversteer), pick the proper line through a corner, shuffle steer, heel-and-toe downshift and not to freeze-up and/or lose it when all Hell breaks loose. While it would be easy to see these high-speed Skipcapades as nothing more than a fun day out for testosterone-crazed pistonheads; or a wrong-headed indulgence for members of Hoonatics Anonymous, every single tip and technique we learned applied to real world defensive driving.

For instance, shuffle steering, where you feed the wheel from one hand to the other, ensures that no matter how the car is pointed, your hands are in the most advantageous position (9 and 3 it turns out, not 10 and 2). The technique also prevents the airbag from knocking your crossed wrists through your skull. Trail-braking ensures that you have loaded the vehicle's weight onto the front tires (the ones that do the turning), making emergency maneuvers safer. Proper heel-and-toe allows you to get away from an impending accident. Even understanding the proper race-line means that your car will be more stable at speed. Five AM coke binge or not, this is life-saving stuff.

 By the end of the Two Day High Performance School, we were all… better. More importantly, we'd gained a measure of much-needed humility. In fact, it's too damn bad Skip Barber's class costs nearly three grand (plus travel and accommodation). Once upon a time, only rich bastards could afford cars with more than 200hp. These days, anyone with a reasonable credit rating and a day job can buy a Dodge, Chrysler, Pontiac, etc. with 400hp. And, of course, they're killing themselves. Oh sure, the media focuses on the Ferrari-halving Erikssons and the SLR-compatibility testing Prince Naseems. No one talks about the average schmoes running their performance cars into a tree. Nor for that matter, soccer moms in 400hp 'Slades slamming into the rest of us.

As I spun the Viper through a ragged 720, a thought occurred to me: US driver's Ed blows. It's the automotive equivalent to abstinence-only sex-education. Does anyone seriously think that knowing how to parallel park a car is more important than learning how to correct a skid before you slam into a tree? How many driving instructors spend their entire time in a fruitless attempt to convince hormone-crazed teens to drive slower, when they should be teaching them how to drive faster better? What's more critical to ensuring a new driver's survival: a viewing of the gory automotive fatalities featured in the "Red Asphalt" film series, or caning Mom's SUV through some cones?

 The current system is, of course, all about money. In Germany, it costs 80 billion dollars to get a license. In the US, our free market simply wants as many people buying cars, paying for insurance, servicing their rides and sucking as much gas as possible. You can take the written exam in Farsi, for fuck's sake. Think hard; have you ever met a soul who was denied a driver's license? Me neither. Corners are cut, poor decisions are made, lives are lost. While safety campaigners talk about enforcement and passive safety and compatibility, the truth is that it's all post-horse escape, barn-door closing bullshit. If we want to stop 40k civilians dying on highways every year, there's only one way to do it: real-world training like Skip Barber's.

[The <a xhref='http://www.skipbarber.com'>Skip Barber Driving School </a> waived its $2695 tuition fee for this article.]

By on May 20, 2006

 Rabid Rick Wagoner lacks self-esteem. Why else would GM's CEO submit himself to triple presidential humiliation? First, Bush tells GM to take a hike– even before Rick shows-up with his begging bowl. Then, despite the slight, the head of the world's largest automaker sets-up a meet with the Commander-in-Chief (presumably to engage in a vigorous debate about the definition of a "relevant" vehicle). Then Bush cancels the meeting. George heads for the border; Rick detours to Congress to promote corn juice– and reschedules the presidential pow-wow for June. To do what? How long does it take RR to take a hint?

The funny (peculiar) thing is that every time I run out of ways to make the case that GM's [lack of] leadership assures its oblivion, the company throws me a bone. On Wednesday, GM shit-canned– sorry, accepted the resignations of– Controller Paul Schmidt and Chief Accounting Officer Peter Bible. Given GM's recent decision to restate its earnings for the last FIVE YEARS; given the on-going Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigation into GM's payments to its suppliers, its purchases of precious metals (of all things) and a New York Grand Jury alone knows what else; you'd think the double golden parachute exhibition was enough craven media manipulation for one day. But no, GM went and hired Jay Alix.

Jay Alix of AlixPartners is what Reuters called a "distressed company financial advisor." No, he's not an anxious number cruncher; Alix' firm helps companies into, through and, sometimes, out of bankruptcy. We're not talking about your local car dealership, Oriental rug dealer or electronics chain store. AlixPartners has applied its consultancy skills to some of America's largest corporate meltdowns: Kmart, auto-parts maker Dana, the trading firm Refco and… Enron. If that last name doesn't trigger some alarm bells, AlixPartners was also hired by WorldCom, whose $11b accounting scandal earned CEO Bernard Ebbers a 25-year jail sentence and his company the title 'world's largest bankruptcy.'

GM Chief flackmeister Gerry Dubrowski was quick to slam anyone presumptuous enough to make a common sense connection between AlixPartners' extensive Chapter 11 experience and GM's future plans: "We're hiring them for their expertise in the accounting transition… We're not hiring them for help in the turnaround effort for our North American operations.' If GM was looking for a company to help sort out their "aggressive accounting" problem, why didn't they opt for a large and reputable firm like KPMG? The literal-minded amongst you may also note that filing for bankruptcy isn't exactly the same as helping a turnaround effort.

Meanwhile, as GM reaches into its threadbare pockets to pay for a Chapter 11 expert not to use his bankruptcy expertise, The General has launched a guerilla war to stop people like us telling people like you that people like Wagoner are running the company into the ground. As revealed by The Detroit News, GM's so-called "Arlington project" will deploy some 50 GM flacklings throughout 16 US cities. It's part of what the News called "attempts to secure favorable news coverage." Even discounting the recent bribery attempt by a GM PR firm on former US Labor Secretary Robert Reich (to ensure positive coverage of GM's worker buyout plan), this program smells of cowardice, desperation and dirty tricks.

For one thing, "Arlington" refers to The McGinn Group's home base. For those of you without a scorecard, The McGinn Group is GM PR Chief Steve Harris' old company. Presumably, financial self-interest had nothing to do with his choice of partners for this under-the-radar PR campaign. Presumably, Harris simply wanted to work with people he could trust– to keep their mouths shut. Anyway, there's another shadow over the project: Harris chose the 16 cities because they're "dominated by local media rather than national outlets that have hammered GM in recent months for its sales and financial losses." In other words, they're soft targets.

So, this is the tenor of the times inside Wagoner's GM: do whatever it takes to maintain the status quo. If it means being subservient to the President, so be it. If it means cooking the books behind closed doors, let's retire the people who did the dirty work (with a nice payout and full pensions) and hire a bankruptcy expert (not to mention a former SEC chief) to help us plead out with the feds. If it means doing an end-run around the national press, let's send our agents to corrupt local media mavens. Instead of confronting GM's issues head-on, Wagoner's mob are taking the path of least resistance.

When GM's bankruptcy plays out, we may eventually know the truth about the final days of Rick Wagoner's regime. Right now, there's only one man who knows the full behind-the-scenes story, perhaps more comprehensively than Rick Wagoner himself. And Jay Alix is not talking.

By on May 19, 2006

Benjamin Braddock (and Alfa Romeo) ran out of gas.According to Alfa Romeo's website, Henry Ford used to doff his hat whenever he saw an Alfa Romeo pass. More credibly, the Italian automaker claims Enzo Ferrari cried like a baby on the day his race cars finally beat Alfas'. Yes but– Alfa Romeo's distinguished portfolio of elegant motor cars and racing heritage may be glorious beyond compare, but that history also includes ignominious defeat. In 1995, after selling just forty-four cars to [long-suffering] American enthusiasts, Alfa withdrew from the US market. And now, once again, the company that gave Dustin Hoffman's graduate his getaway car wants back in.

Emboldened by Maserati's North American comeback, reinvigorated by GM's $2b payoff, corporate parent Fiat believes that the Alfa Romeo brand is finally ready to launch its own US re-invasion. Initially, Alfa plans to sell and service a small range of vehicles through some of its 40 former American dealerships and most of Maserati's current US franchisees (recently liberated from the Fiat's Ferrari dealers). Fiat management refuses to commit to a timetable for the move, which has been postponed three times since 2003. Rumor has it we could see Alfas stateside by late '07. But is there a seat at the table for Alfa? Where does today's Alfa fit in the world's largest automotive marketplace?

3.2-liter V6 Brera: 'puro spirito Alfa' on GM's Epsilon platformThe American car scene has changed a great deal since the mid-90's. Generally speaking, American automotive consumers have divided into four distinct camps: truck-lovers, horsepower-mad pistonheads, reliability fanatics and mileage-seeking tree huggers. Whether it's 5000lbs. towing capacity, 500bhp, five-year warrantees or 50mpg, all four market slices are well-served by all the major manufactures; from Ford's sublime F150 and Explorer, to DCX' brawny behemoths, to Honda's legendary Accord, to Toyota's frugal Prius. If Alfa Romeo thinks it's in a position to compete with distinction in any of these categories, they may be about to proven wildly, sadly mistaken.

Alfa's press release promises Americans the Alfa 159, Brera and Spider. Judging from the lineup's sporting orientation, the company is taking aim at US automotive enthusiasts. Again, it's a crowded market filled with highly-skilled, deeply-entrenched competition. Honda, Mazda, Nissan, Pontiac and Saturn all offer sexy mid-market drop-tops. BMW's 3-Series owns the $30K sport sedans (where Alfa's Quadrofoglio once struggled). For more than a decade, Infiniti and Lexus have failed to knock the Bimmer off its perch. What hope does a newcomer have?

Alfa Spider and GTV, reborn at the '06 Geneva auto showAlfa may have a peerless racing pedigree, but Americans are notoriously uninterested in such things. If mainstream US buyers think Italian sports car– and that's a big "if"– they think Ferrari; followed, perhaps, by Maserati. Alfa's adrenalin-oriented image builders will have to start from scratch– with front-wheel-drive cars whose relatively small engines are not likely to tempt US power mongers. As for the reliability side of the equation…

Alfa's build quality, fit, and finish may have improved since their departure, but their cars will have to overcome a great deal of residual distrust. Many Americans have vivid memories of Alfas that fell apart mid-route and/or rusted into thin air. What's more, Alfa will be facing some of the world's best-built products (thank you Toyota) in a litigious country (God Bless America) that expects a long, comprehensive warranty (kudos Hyundai) and distinctly non-Italian levels of customer service (all hail Lexus). In short, Alfa will have zero wiggle room for excessive panel gaps, condescending or indifferent dealers and the odd failure to start– especially in the all important $20K-$40K segment.

The Alfa Romeo 8c Competizione concept car. As for the "green" angle, Alfa's decision to leave its econoboxes and diesels on the other side of the pond pretty much takes them out of the running in that category. In short, there's only one way the Italians can possibly hope to compete in the US. It's the same way Jaguar manages to stave off oblivion: style.

If anything is going to drive customer to Alfa, it's sex appeal. Alfa's management's decision to restrict its US dealers to the company's most comely performance cars is a tacit admission that Alfas will have to trade almost entirely on their looks. It's also no coincidence that Alfa's relaunch will coincide with the '07 debut of their elegant new GTV and Spider. (Eventually, Alfa Romeo will bring forth the drop-dead gorgeous 8C Competizione.) It sounds crazy, but it just might work. All of these cars possess enough easily-identifiable Italian flair to attract automotive alphas who want to stand out, or simply distance themselves from Bangled excess or Japanese invisibility.

In fact, America needs Alfa Romeo. A healthy infusion of Italian style could be just the thing to wake-up risk-aversive US and foreign car designers, to lead them away from their bland, cookie-cutter sheetmetal, to push them towards a more artful and dramatic aesthetic. In fact, were they alive (and kept away from each other's throats), I'm sure Henry Ford and Enzo Ferrari would welcome the competition.

[Gunnar Heinrich publishes <a xhref='http://www.automobilesdeluxe.blogspot.com'>automobilesdeluxe.blogspot.com</a>]

By on May 18, 2006

 Last year, GM unveiled a funky retro-styled vanlet called the HHR (Heritage High Roof). Although the HHR has generated some much-needed action on Chevrolet dealers' lots, the vehicle's character and genesis is an ominous sign that all is not well within GM's product development process. For one thing, the HHR is a bin-engineered clone of its competitor, the PT Cruiser, designed by the same man who penned the Chrysler. For another, there was a five-year gap between the PT and the Me-Too. In other words, when it comes to creating products for the US market, General Motors is dim, cheap and slow.

To be fair, GM's current vehicles are generally 80 to 90% as good as the class-leading benchmarks. TTAC readers might not choose a Pontiac Torrent over a Honda CR-V, but there's nothing wrong with the Pontiac that automatically disqualifies it from consideration. Right now, that is. A few years down the road, things start to get ugly. When it's time to update a product– not just adding new options and colors, making significant mechanical and cosmetic improvements– GM has been known to let a new vehicle slip seven years or longer between refreshes. In contrast, The General's foreign competition is fully committed to a five or six-year product cycle. As a result, GM's products are falling further and further behind, until they become obsolete. For example…

GM introduced its first J-car, the Chevrolet Cavalier, in March 1981. Eight years later, the Cavalier and its platform-sharing partners (Firenza, Skyhawk, Sunbird, etc.) received curvier styling and some mild mechanical tweaks. Meanwhile, the competition moved in. The third AND fourth generation Honda Civic beat the J-cars first redesign by a year. Six years after that, GM finally unleashed a J-car update. The following year, the sixth generation Civic arrived. Even with a year's head start, GM had managed to put out just two redesigns against Honda's five. Fleet sales and other discounts soon damaged the J-cars so badly GM abandoned the entire model-range. The new Cobalt enjoyed just one year's grace before another new Civic blew it into the weeds.

The story of GM's minivans is even more depressing. GM entered the market in the late 80s with an innovative design (pre-Saturn plastic panels) and fancy Italian styling. Unfortunately, the four-cylinder engines made their vehicles slow, the design made them weird (dust buster) and the architecture was too narrow. Five years after introduction, GM finally ditched the plastic panels and funky nose, and fitted a better engine. Seven years passed before GM's next "update": a literal nose job, without any significant engineering improvements. Buick and Saturn were added to the fold, offering GM customers four variations on a narrow minivan with ten-year-old mechanicals.

Before GM's first minivan update, Chrysler "jelly-beaned" their people mover and added another door. Once again, Chrysler's product began to dominate the sector. Between the later two GM updates, Honda introduced, and then updated, their superb Odyssey. Honda scooped the cream of the segment from Chrysler, Chrysler was forced down market and GM was relegated to the fringes. More instructively, Toyota arrived on the scene in 1990, flopped spectacularly, tried again after eight years with an all-new vehicle (the Sienna), tried again after five years of minor success (with another total redesign) and then, finally, gained traction in this highly-profitable segment.

Toyota's tenacity highlights another problem with GM's product updates. Unless a vehicle is very successful or very unsuccessful, The General tends to hold off on expensive redesigns. With GM's [overly] extensive distribution chain, an "adequate" vehicle can sell for years. Unfortunately, these ageing vehicles aren't very profitable. Equally important, the non-competitive products are highly unlikely to tempt their competitors' customers, denying GM the conquest sales they need to gain– or maintain– vital market share.

GM's updates also tend to be far less comprehensive than their competitors'. They'll change the shell and maybe the engine (usually for another old pushrod). Remember: an 80% refresh of an 80% car creates a car that's only 64% as good as its more advanced alternative. By contrast, Toyota and Honda are ready, willing and able to change anything up to and including an entire vehicle platform– and still manage to beat GM's update by one or two model cycles. The end result of GM's lethargy is a car in need of a complete re-build (and usually a new name).

Designing and improving cars is hugely expensive. Given The General's current cash crunch, there must be enormous pressure for product developers to cut corners wherever possible. As it is, the endless procession of eighty percent vehicles and too-late refreshes is sending GM's market share into terminal decline. Remember that the Chevrolet Cobalt and the Saturn Relay were designed when GM was flush. Imagine what will happen if they have to skimp.

By on May 18, 2006

 All I remember about my driver's ed class was a film (remember film?) about a nerdy mid-Westerner who performed all these ridiculous pre-flight checks ('Lights working Dad!') and still managed to kill himself and his entire family by overtaking a slow moving truck straight into an even larger truck. These days, it's the 'Red Asphalt' series, and it's all online. Makes sense to me, and Gary Tsfirin of driversed.com.

By on May 15, 2006

 In the run-up to our June re-launch, The Truth About Cars is proud to present a new feature: the TTAC Daily Podcast. The 10-minute recordings will feature interviews with our correspondents, industry folk and enthusiasts. If you have a product, service or event to promote; or an axe to grind, contact me via email to arrange a call. We'll have more news on the new site soon…

By on May 15, 2006

The longest journey starts with a single car. I never met a pistonhead without a fully-stocked fantasy garage. Unfortunately, the ones who try to bring the dream to life learn a Buddhist lesson: that which you own, owns you. The Langoliers of depreciation decimate the dream from day one. Registration fees, taxes and insurance take their toll. The hassle and expense of service and repair suck. Four years and 12K miles later, the per-mile expenses are astounding. And then, inevitably, the enthusiast's eye begins to wander; their piston passion runs as hot and cold as a cheap motel shower. Another round of this automotive folly would be insane. Unless…

The car share club concept took root in London in 1996, with Formula One World Champion Damon Hill's P1 Prestige and Performance Car Club. The basic idea is simple enough: P1 buys and services a portfolio of high-priced heavy metal; England's well-heeled petrolheads pay a fee to drive them. No finance payments, depreciation, maintenance, storage or tax. Just drive, dump and go. Of course, P1 membership is only cheap relative to ownership, and there are plenty of rules dictating which car you can drive for how much and when. P1 has an elaborate points system that involves a joining fee, an annual fee, a sliding points scale for best to worst times and cars, and mileage restrictions. But it's all about the hassle– or lack thereof.

Brian Buxton and a Porker you can buy, but not share. Having successfully ensconced England's petrolheads in a bevy of exotics, P1 and its imitators spread throughout the Eurozone. The car share club recently washed ashore in Chicago, New York City, Las Vegas, Los Angeles and now… Evansville, Indiana. Brian Buxton is the President and owner of Buxton Motorsports, a highline luxury and sports car dealership. When one of Buxton's major clients suggested they partner-up, LuxShare Auto Club was born.

LuxShare members pay a $7,250 annual fee. Their seven-and-a-quarter large buys them 1000 points. Members spend their points in one to four-day chunks, with an 850 mile limit (unless "special arrangements" are made). The car's desirability and the time of year (this can be snow country) determine the number of points each reservation deducts from the total. Buxton claims an average member can expect between 28 to 45 days of driving per year. They can also buy a more points-laden deluxe membership, or purchase extra points as and when.

If you constantly see flashing lights here, you may not qualify.Members must be pass an insurability check, have an acceptable driving record and carry a liability umbrella policy. As a driver fortunate enough to meet all three criteria, Buxton let me loose in the club's first (and currently only) whip: a brand new black-on-black Porsche Cayman S. It was a bit like a coke dealer giving you a bag "on the house." I'm sure we talked about the advantages of this and that and LuxShare's plans for expanding the fleet to include a Roller, Ferrari, Merc and more Porsches, but honestly, who was listening? All I heard was the wail of the Cayman's mid-mounted six.

The truth of the matter is that many of these new car share clubs are chicken v. egg non-starters: the club can't afford to buy exotic cars before they have members, and they can't get members before they have exotic cars. I wouldn't counsel a wealthy enthusiast to sign-up for a car share club before they catch sight of a well-stocked [non-fantasy] garage of pristine machines. I'd also ask to see the titles. And I'd rather be one of the later members than an eager early adopter. That said, in this case, Buxton has a solid rep; his foray into the field is no fly-by-night venture. As always, carveat emptor.

Ownership's end or the beginning of a beautiful friendship?Legal disclaimer and due diligence aside, there's a lot of sense in the car share concept. Six Franklins per month buys or leases you a distinctly ordinary set of wheels. That same $600 won't even buy you two days in a 911 from Scottsdale's Rent-a-Vette ($349 a day, plus .49 a mile after the first 100 miles). And what could be better than driving a half dozen white-hot cars for six bills and no hassles? The bottom line is the amount of control you exert over your carviar addiction: once in a while or every day?

If you're a pistonhead with a Zymöl Princess in your garage, a car share club may provide the perfect mistress: a cheap, discreet and ready-to-get-sweaty alternative to perfection. If you're an undercarred pistonista reaching upwards in the automotive pantheon, a car share club is more like a house of prostitution. One drive may be enough to hook you but good, and running-up those membership points could end-up costing as much as buying a new Cayman S. (Fantasy never comes cheap.) In any case, be guided by the Buddha: "A good path is free from torture and groaning and suffering." Not to mention depreciation.

[Other than Dr. Weir's free ride, no financial consideration was made by <a xhref='http://www.luxshareautoclub.com'>Luxshareautoclub.com</a>]

By on May 14, 2006

 As any good debt counselor will tell you, paying down your debt isn't enough. You need enough cash on hand to deal with ongoing expenses and extra funds for any major bills. Otherwise, you end-up scrambling to borrow more money and digging yourself into a deeper hole– until you can't. The same rules apply to General Motors. They need to pay their workers, dealers and suppliers on a regular basis, and they need extra money for large, one-time expenses (e.g. worker buyouts). Although GM claims to have enough money to stay the course, the truth is they are only one "exceptional expense" away from Chapter 11.

According to GM's recent quarterly statement, The General has $17.4b in cash, $1.4b in marketable securities and useable assets of $2.8b in their VEBA (Voluntary Employee Beneficiary Association) trust. That works out to $21.6 billion– an increase of around $1.2b from the prior quarter. The financial markets were heartened by the resulting black ink– even though the increase was more a reflection of accounting practices than a healthy increase in income. Despite this optimism, GM's situation is just as precarious as it was throughout '05; the Delphi dilemma remains dangerously unresolved.

The General's bean counters estimate that Delphi's Chapter 11 filing leaves GM with a contingent liability (a.k.a. a bill) between $5.5b and $12b. That's a pretty big range. It's also a curiously precise amount; why $5.5b? Why not $6b? The number reflects the amount of money GM has set aside to deal with their Delphi exposure. Why didn't GM set aside more money? According to the company's quarterly statement, "It is unlikely that a Chapter 11 process will result in both a termination of Delphi's pension plan and complete elimination of its OPEB (post-retirement health care and life insurance) plans."

There are two other possible reasons. First, GM doesn't want to provide an opening for Delphi and the bankruptcy court to raid GM's corporate larder. Second, they ain't got the dough. So, if GM has to shell out at an additional $6.5b to cover its Delphi liabilities, where will they get the money? According to GM, "If any [payments] are required under the benefit guarantees, GM would expect to make such payments from ongoing operating cash flow and financings…" In other words, GM asks us to believe it could finance any and all additional Delphi-related expenses above $200m per year out of its operating cash flow.

Discounting GM's health-care cost shift, GM earned $200m-plus this last quarter. Do the math: profit gone. If the worst case scenario occurs, if there's a mass retirement or layoff of pensioned Delphi workers, GM would be on the hook for far more than their estimate of $224m per year (the amount Delphi paid-out in fiscal year 2004). The $224m figure doesn't take into account the expenses GM would incur from the release of an additional 30,000 laid-off Delphi employees– each with benefits and pension liabilities. That would cost The General an estimated $2.1b per year.

Still, that leaves GM $21b and change to work with, right? Subtract $8b in operating expenses for the revolving fund (so they can continue to build cars), deduct $5.5 to $10b for the Delphi thing, remove $2b to $3b for debt payments (which look to be spiraling upwards after the Fed Reserve Board announced the up-tick in rates this week), take away $3b for the early retirements package, leave off the $3b – $4b in overseas funds (which GM can't bring over without tax repercussions) and you've got just enough money to pay for… well… nothing.

GM may soon find itself with zero cash reserves. In fact, there are some on this site who point to the recent sale of assets and change in GM's accounts payable policy (to 55 days) and suggest that the world's largest automaker is already running on fumes. In any case, there are plenty of ways GM could find itself with a big bill it simply can't afford: a sudden pull-out by the banks guaranteeing rental car sales, a Delphi strike, suppliers demanding cash up front, a continuing drop in SUV sales due to rising gas prices and more.

A careful reading of GM's quarterly report reveals that GM isn't sure that it can get any more money under its existing line of credit (which is currently being re-written as a secured line). If GM needs more cash… there might not be any. Meanwhile, GM can't afford to pay-off and shed excess dealers. It can't afford to invest heavily in new, domestically produced vehicles. It can't market its vehicles properly. If GM's income doesn't rise, it grows steadily, inevitably weaker. At some point, perhaps soon, one unforeseen bill may make Chapter 11 General Motors' best– if not only– option.

By on May 13, 2006

 I've never run a multi-billion dollar multi-national car company. But I've driven hundreds of cars, and every car I drive tells me everything I need to know about the company that builds it. Literally. What do I need to know about GM's product development process that I can't glean from the Solstice's fiddly roof? What can Daimler-Chrysler's flackmeisters tell me about the company's strategy that I can't appreciate by hammering an SRT-8? What does BMW have to say that their X3 doesn't? And how can I be expected to take Ford's "Bold Moves" campaign seriously after driving a Ford 500?

Someone forgot to tell Billy Ford that everything– sales, service, marketing, the money in his pocket– starts with product. First you build cars, trucks and SUV's that do one thing better than anyone else, THEN you market them according to their unique selling point. If you want to sell ultimate driving, start by making damn sure all your vehicles ride and handle better than anything else in their segment (Boxster-beater my eye). If you're selling safety, begin by building cars that get five stars in all crash categories (S40 four-star rollover rating my toches). If you're starting an American revolution, it's probably best to sell cars built in America. And if you want to be known as bold…

In one Ford TV ad, a mother and daughter jump into a swimming hole. After affirming their generational courage, they motor off in a Ford Escape– a vehicle so generic I wouldn't be surprised to find one for sale at Costco. The Ford 500, Explorer, Fusion, Freestar, Freestyle, Focus, Crown Victoria, Sport Trac, F150 and even the spiffy new(ish) Mustang GT are about as far from bold as you can get without hiding behind a rock. (The Ford GT was Starbuck's bold blend bold, but they killed it.) You could argue that that Ford's current management team inherited this less-than-audacious product portfolio, and that the Bold Moves campaign is more of a promise than a come-on. But you don't have to be a Times Square pimp to know you don't talk the talk before you walk the walk.

In fact, Ford's Bold Move message borders on self-parody: be bold and buy a vehicle from a car company struggling for survival. Anyway, we've been here before. Back in November, I suggested that Ford's customers want an innovative vehicle (the automaker's last marketing mantra) about as much as they want an innovative toaster. What bright spark at FoMoCo suddenly decided that the company's core clientele have moved on, from a non-existent desire for technological gee-whizzery to an equally fantastic desire for personal attention? Hey, I'm all for car companies taking risks. But I'm the kind of guy who lusts after a '71 Buick Riviera 'boat tail;' a machine whose bold design did nothing whatsoever to revive Buick's fortunes.

I understand the genesis of Ford's BM. It started with new Ford boss Mark Fields' "Red, White and Bold" shtick. Somewhere between the focus meetings and the Kool-Aid filled water cooler, the campaign's patriotic thrust got ditched for the "There's only way we're gonna get out of this mess: take some chances." Which is fair enough. Ford's survival does indeed depend on losing their 'play it safe and fail upwards' mentality. They need to take a chainsaw to their stifling bureaucracy and moribund product line. But they're a mainstream motor manufacturer, not friggin' Ferrari. Their customers are deeply, fundamentally, inherently, genetically conservative people whose prime motivation is to avoid risk, not make bold (i.e. risky) moves.

You want bold moves? Kill Jaguar. Kill Mercury. Sell Volvo. Sell Mazda. Sell Land Rover. Cut half the remaining models and plow money into the ones that survive. Re-invigorate your rear-wheel drive, box-frame car with new sheetmetal, a bad-ass motor and a killer cabin. Build a world-beating Lincoln luxury sedan. Make the Ford Focus the world's best small car. Get the Explorer's mileage into the mid-20's. Develop a more powerful engine than the Hemi and stick it into everything– including a new minivan. Set SVT loose on the entire model line-up. OWN quality interiors. Don't badge engineer ANYTHING.

Lose the glass fishbowl; redesign Ford showrooms to look like a modern retail outlet. Trim the dealer network and sell cars on the web. Undercut everyone's price with every vehicle. Interact with every single customer on a regular basis via internet. Institute no-haggle pricing. Make financing cheaper. Drop 80% of your print budget and dominate the web. Do it all, and do it all at once– regardless of cost. Then sell value for money. Ford: the best car money can buy.

I'd like to think that these ideas are on the table at Ford. I like to think that Billy Ford has the juice and the courage to reinvent his family business. And then I drive a Ford 500 and despair.

By on May 12, 2006

 Growing up near Flint, everyone's dad worked for GM. Not all of our fathers brought home a GM paycheck, but we all lived on GM money. If your dad was a plumber, a shopkeeper or a mortgage broker, GM's wages paid the bills. If your dad was a dentist, GM's health plan paid his patients' bills. That's just how it was. GM was one of your parents, the UAW was the other. We had no idea we were destined to become orphans.

My dad taught shop at Flint Central High School. Since everyone's dad worked for GM, everyone took shop. It was the ideal time and place for teaching drafting, auto repair, woodworking, metallurgy, welding and other productive skills. People believed in those fields. People respected those talents. In the beginning, his classroom was a shrine to hard work and craftsmanship. His students knew they were opening the door to a comfortable life. By the time Dad retired in 1991 the promise had become an empty shell. The excitement and the discipline had simply drained away.

The GM era officially ended for my family in 1980. That was the year Dad brought home a new Volkswagen diesel, even though all his previous cars had been Detroit steel. Buying a Rabbit was the kind of radical move that could get you branded a traitor in Flint. Even so, it was a car town. People were intrigued by the German import. Their interest was a sign of things to come. You still find more American autos on the road in Michigan than you do in most other states, but their supremacy has faded even here.

Over the years, going into downtown Flint became vaguely sinister, like entering a foreign country. Despite what you might think, it's easy to ignore news reports proclaiming your hometown one of the most dangerous places in America. Eventually, though, the decay becomes so obvious that you can't deny it. And then you start noticing people's reaction when you tell them you grew up around Flint. They wince or grimace, and tell you they haven't been there in years. They're not surprised that you don't live there anymore.

Flint's emigrants took something with them: hope. Can you imagine what it's like for a guy to come off the assembly line after 15 years at $20 an hour and generous health care benefits, only to be told that his skills are useless and that he'll have to retrain for a $12 job? That the $12 job might not even be there? That he might have to leave behind the life he's always known and look for a job, any job, any place he can find it? Multiply that by thousands. It's as if someone repossessed our future, packed it up in the middle of the night, and left. As Bruce Springsteen wrote, "these jobs are going, boys, and they ain't comin' back."

And now GM may go bankrupt. Whether or not GM dodges that bullet, the damage is done. Forget about off-shoring. More jobs are lost to technology and automation than to cheap Chinese and Indian labor. The new plants build twice as many cars with half as many workers, and no protectionist scheme can change that. Even assembly line vets are beginning to accept that the unions can't keep the ship afloat with all hands on deck, and there's no way our collective strength can turn back the clock. It's every man, every family, for themselves.

With the number of victims growing daily, some still refuse to acknowledge the possibility that it's over. To allow that heresy to creep into their collective conscience is just too painful. GM was the rock our lives were built upon. It's too big to crumble, too hard to crack, too important to fail. It's impossible, isn't it? In fact, Flint has a front row seat to the shredding of America's socio-economic fabric. We're watching the working class culture that's lasted more than 100 years get violently upended, with little idea what – or who – can replace it. If we didn't have the leadership to salvage what we already had, where will we find the leadership to start again from scratch?

I remember Phil Donahue coming to Flint in 1990 to discuss the lay-offs and associated hardships documented by Michael Moore's "Roger and Me." Folks recognized that Flint was in a tough spot. They reacted to the film and the resulting attention with a mixture of anger, embarrassment and wounded pride. That was a long time ago now. Things are worse today than they were then. The anger's been replaced by resignation. GM, Ford, Electrolux, Steelcase– Michigan is supposed to be about making things. If GM does go down, you may as well rename the whole state, because it won't be Michigan anymore.

By on May 10, 2006

 Mitsubishi Motors is on the ropes. US sales are in the basement. Aside from the new Eclipse and the niche-market EVO, they haven't got a winning product in sight. A line of forgettable sedans and me-too SUVs does not a viable car company make. DaimlerChrysler's decision to pull the plug on future financial aid doesn't bode well either. In fact, Mitsubishi is knocking on the door of bankruptcy. Desperate times call for desperate measures. It's time for them to build a "real" pickup truck: a Mitsubishi Freightliner.

Despite the recent surge in gas prices, the US pickup truck market remains relatively robust. And even if it's contracting slightly, the profits aren't. The average profit on a pickup is $13,000 per unit. No wonder Nissan threw their hat in the ring with the Titan, and Toyota's promising all-new Tundra is due out next spring. Mitsubishi's entry, the Raider, is a badge engineered Dodge Dakota, but not nearly as memorable. It has some of the right stuff, including a V8, but cowers in the darkest corners of the marketplace, ignored and little missed. To make the grade and mint some money, Mitsubishi needs a full-size competitor to the Ford Super Duty.

Despite its connection to DaimlerChrysler, Freightliner isn't doing so well. Demand for their medium and heavy trucks has been soft for some time. Their foray into vans, the re-badged Mercedes Sprinter, is aimed at a narrow market niche– a niche that's even narrower now that there's a Dodge-badged Sprinter. But Freightliner's reputation as a maker of tough trucks is undiminished. Their Century Class trucks set new standards for comfort and luxury in heavy truck cabs. Freightliner's Sterling (formerly Ford) trucks are probably the most efficient and durable medium and heavy trucks on the planet.

Mitsubishi and Freightliner should pool their resources and build a new, heavy-duty, full-size pickup truck, designed to compete head-to-head with Ford's Super Duty. Freightliner has the design and engineering capabilities to create the truck. The Mitsubishi version could be sized and optioned like a Ford F250HD and F350, and the Freightliner version could cover the F350 and F450 range. Make sure it's big enough, has all the truck amenities and a really aggressive front end, and buyers will flock to the showrooms. A real Freightliner for the price of Dodge imitation? Hard to resist.

Freightliner doesn't make engines, and Mitsubishi doesn't have an engine suitable for a large truck. As we've discussed here before, there are plenty of first-rate American parts makers who can feed aspiring automakers suitable components. Freightliner is a major customer of Cummins. The new Mitsubishi Freightliner could run on the same Cummins diesel engine used in the Dodge Ram. Alternatively, Navistar (International) has developed a new 4.5-liter V6 diesel for Ford's F250– that The Blue Oval abandoned. Navistar has the engine and the plants to build it, but no customers.

"All Diesel, All the Time" would be a great marketing slogan. Mitsubishi could be the only company with a line of all-diesel trucks. A buyer could get a truck capable of F350 performance with the gas mileage of a gasoline powered F150 and the ruggedness of a Freightliner (at no extra charge). A tie-in with the bio-diesel business could make buyers feel good about driving a huge pickup truck, and wrest the green crown from Toyota. (Tundra pickups belch greenhouse gasses in a big way.)

Freightliner and Mitsubishi each have a suitable marketing channel for the truck. Freightliner could offer the product to fleet buyers who need a pickup to complement their semis and/or delivery trucks. Buyers could have the truck financed and serviced by the truck professionals at any Freightliner outlet, where employees know the commercial truck business inside out. No more hanging out at the Ford dealer waiting for mechanics to finish changing the oil on a minivan before getting to your work truck. Freightliner could also market a truck chassis in this class to motor home and ambulance builders; a market that's currently locked-up by Ford.

Obviously, Mitsubishi's distribution channel caters to the average consumer. Since most pickup trucks are sold for personal use, a Mitsubishi dealership would be a logical place to offer a Freightliner pickup truck for the masses. The presence of an attractive full-size truck would act as a halo vehicle, bringing buyers into the showroom (most for the first time) to see Mitsu's other offerings. A premium truck would also have a premium margin for both dealer and manufacturer, something both companies need desperately.

The US automotive market is in flux. Only those companies willing to consider new ways of doing business are going to survive. Will Mitsubishi and Freightliner see the next decade? That could very well depend on whether or not they realize that a problem shared is a problem halved.

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