Both Toyota and the remains of its joint venture known as NUMMI have sued the remains of “Old GM” for breach of contract according to two separate reports in the Wall Street Journal [sub]. NUMMI is seeking $365m, claiming GM caused the collapse of the joint venture by unilaterally pulling out as it collapsed into bankruptcy, sticking Toyota and NUMMI with the bill.
Those decisions breached … commitments to Nummi and sounded its death knell,” said the lawsuit, filed last week. And unlike Toyota, GM’s bankruptcy estate “has refused to contribute to Nummi’s deficit during the wind down”
Toyota, meanwhile, is suing for some $73m in development costs for the Pontiac Vibe, a vehicle that GM was supposed to sell for another two years.
GM’s stock may be hovering near its IPO price of $3/share, but the UAW doesn’t need much more growth to cash out with every penny it wanted from GM. The UAW’s VEBA account has banked $3.4b in stock sales so far, and Forbes reports
The VEBA will break even on its investment if it can sell the remaining 206 million shares at an average price of $36.96.
Taxpayers, meanwhile, need GM’s stock to top at least $52/share in order to break even on the bailout that it funded. Because it’s just not a bailout unless the least deserving benefit the most. Meanwhile, with its accounts once again flush with cash, the UAW is turning South in hopes of accomplishing what it has never accomplished before: unionizing at ransplant auto factory in a right-to-work, Southern state.
Don’t thank us GM… thank George W. Bush. Also, do we remember what happened when Chrysler tried this? History seems to indicate that paying back every penny is the best “thank you” of all.
Ever since the auto bailout began, the majority of Americans have opposed the government’s efforts to fund and restructure the auto industry. As recently as July, polls showed that 56 percent opposed the bailout, according to the Detroit News. But now a new Rasmussen poll shows that opposition has fallen to 46 percent with 38 percent in favor and 16 percent unopposed, the first time a poll has found less than 50 percent opposition to the auto bailouts. 70 percent of Americans now believe GM will still be in business a decade from now, and 50 percent believe the government is either “somewhat” or “very” likely to be repaid by GM and Chrysler. Of course, the Treasury still believes that it will lose some $17b on the auto bailout, but then you don’t exactly hear that trumpeted by the White House.
What you do hear about the auto bailout is an increasing tone of triumphalism, an endless repetition of the phrase “the critics were wrong.” And yes, the auto bailout has certainly progressed better than some of its harshest critics here a TTAC might have imagined. But if, over a year after the bailout ended, some 46 percent of America still opposes the government’s intervention in GM and Chrysler, marketers for both of these companies (not to mention the politicians) should sit up and take notice. After all, the “success” purchased with that $80b still depends on the goodwill of the American people, and if the bailout-haters never drop their grudge, GM and Chrysler’s already-overblown “success” won’t last. And for all the “Mission Accomplished” moments since GM and Chrysler emerged from bankruptcy, we still haven’t heard a compelling pitch to the resilient anti-bailout plurality.
General Motors went public at $33/share today, generated huge trading volume (452m shares traded) and ended the day at $34.19. Automotive News [sub] reports that the government stake in GM “could” be as low as 33 percent post-IPO. Only five percent went to “large foreign investors,” including one percent to the Chinese bête noir SIAC, which hinted at future cooperation with The General on “exploration of overseas markets.” The only bad news? Had the Treasury sold its entire stake at the closing price today, it would have been down $9b. Now GM’s stock price needs to hit $48.58 before taxpayers make good on their investment. But with a market capitalization of about $63b, GM is at least worth more than the taxpayers put into it. Which, using a variation of Project Car Hell logic, is a real accomplishment.
If you read one thing today, read “Ghosts Of The Old GM” by Paul Clemens in today’s NY Times. At a time of increasing triumphalism over the “success” of the Auto Bailout, Clemens unflinchingly reminds us of the terrible price we’ve paid to bring America’s auto industry back to halting life. From deserted plants, to the world of “surplus industry service providers” (yes, taking apart industry is an industry), Clemens chases down the the truth with tenacity:
For General Motors, divided into its “Old” and “New” halves, there’s an inescapable paradox: the only possible route to future profitability is to create, through plant closings, monuments to past unprofitability. Old G.M. may have gone away for the purposes of the stock offering, but it didn’t go away in what might rightfully be called actuality.
Let me say this as clear as I can, I do not think there will be any concessions in 2011. People want to reward our members and it will be a key component of the 2011 bargaining. When the industry comes back, just like we’re sharing in the downside we’re going to share in the upside. That’s a key foundation of what we’re doing in 2011.
UAW President Bob King gives his best “we will fight them on the beaches” impression, telling Reuters that his union has sacrificed enough, thanks. And though the people who want to reward UAW members are notably absent from public debate, that assertion wasn’t nearly as double-take-worthy as King’s opinion that
There’s no competitive gap between Ford, GM and Chrysler right now
As an automaker and union-funded think tank, the Center For Automotive Research often run afoul of TTAC during the bailout debates of 2008-2009. CAR is to Detroit’s apologists what CAR has long maintained that a failure to bail out GM and Chrysler would have resulted in the total destruction of America’s entire industry, and based on that questionable assumption, it’s latest report [PDF] is claiming that the auto bailout saved the federal government $28.6b over two years. The study is an update of a report CAR issued in May which
produced estimates for two scenarios, as well: a quick, orderly Section 363 bankruptcy (which is what happened), and a drawn-out, disorderly bankruptcy proceeding leading to liquidation of the automakers.
Because those were the choices. A messy, marginally-successful intervention (with demand for GM’s IPO “through the roof”, the firm will still be worth only about what taxpayers put into it) or utter complete annihilation of the industrial Midwest. But if, as CAR takes as gospel, a halfway “normal” restructuring weren’t an option, it was only because the managers of both GM and Chrysler refused to even contemplate the possibility of a bankruptcy filing until it was far too late. And here’s where the long-term impacts get scary: by taking GM and Chrysler under the taxpayer wing, the Government may have saved some money in the short term, but it created a dangerous precedent for the future. Given the events of the auto bailout, why would the leaders of any other failing industry take the difficult path through restructuring when, with the help of think tank apologists, they could simply collapse into a publicly-funded do-over?
We’ve heard a lot of arguments on all sides of the bailout, but we had yet to hear anyone call for prolonged government ownership and involvement in General Motors… until now. What follows is a letter from Ralph Nader, former NHTSA boss Joan Claybrook, Center for Auto Safety honcho Clarence Ditlow and Public Citizen president Robert Weissman, urging the Obama administration to suspend GM’s IPO and take firmer control of the government-owned automaker’s decisions on a number of issues including lobbying, employment and the environment. Because, despite appearing to be stuck in the 70s, Nader and company have never heard of British Leyland. Taste the madness below.
Dear President Obama,
The U.S. government bailout of, and acquisition of a majority share in, General Motors was anexceptional action, taken in response to exceptional circumstances. The U.S. stake in GM obviously poses novel managerial challenges to the government. The appropriate response to those challenges, however, is not to run from the responsibility through passive ownership and premature sale at a loss to taxpayers.
Er, not here… you have to go over to retailroadshow.com for the non-embeddable presentation pitching investors on the new General Motors. But since retailroadshow doesn’t have a comments section, make sure to surf back to TTAC when you’re done taking in the pitch. Meanwhile, consider this: Saudi Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Bin Abdulaziz Alsaud, a major investor in Citi, EuroDisney, The Four Seasons, AOL, Apple, News Corp, and more has said his investment firm would look “very seriously” at buying into GM’s IPO. Oh yes, and the White House has reiterated its confidence that all the money it invested in GM’s bailout would be repaid. Even though GM pushed against the higher IPO price ($30/share) requested by Treasury, which would have slowed future appreciation of the stock, but would have given the government a higher initial payback. Also, it seems that UBS has been dropped as an underwriter of the IPO after one of its large-cap, non-automotive analysts sent an email that disclosed information restricted by the SEC.
Perhaps one of the least-covered elements of the auto industry restructuring has been the numerous tax advantages GM has earned as a government-owned automaker. Unlike most bankruptcies, GM was allowed to hold onto some $16b of net operating loss credits (tax-loss carry-forwards), which can be used to offset future tax bills. Typically, companies that restructure in bankruptcy lose existing carry-forwards as the price of wiping out debt, but because the government is invested in GM, it decided to allow old tax losses to flow into the new company even as debt was left behind. In the latest update on this story, The Wall Street Journal notes that some $18.9b of GM’s carry-forwards were from the old company, and that the firm has a whopping $45.4b in future tax savings. And because carry-forwards can be banked up to 20 years before they are spent, GM will have to make massive profits before it starts actually paying taxes to the federal government. The government’s position:
the profit-shielding tax credit makes the bailed-out companies more attractive to investors, and that the value of the benefit is greater than the lost tax payments, especially since the tax payments would not exist if the companies fail
Which is all well and good, but the reality is also that this practically doubles the taxpayers’ cost of bailing out GM. As a policy this makes sense for the reasons given (assuming the bailout was a foregone conclusion), but it would be nice if this “hidden charge” were at least noted on the bill.
Today is election day, the time when good Americans process all the negative advertising they’ve seen over the previous months and decide on the lesser of several evils. But the best thing about election day isn’t the sense of civic pride or even the knowledge that you’ll be able to avoid political ads for at least a few months afterwords. The greatest thing about elections is that, for one moment, the nation gets a snapshot of itself, a picture of what really matters to us as citizens. So this seems as good a time as any to ask you, TTAC’s Best And Brightest, how you feel about the potency of the Auto Bailout as an issue. After all, the bailout is currently caught in limbo; impossible to undo, at yet still far from resolution, good or bad. If anything, the latest indicators show that the GM bailout was fairly compromised, in the sense that the new company will be worth about what the taxpayers put into it (in the $50b range).
But does it matter at all how much taxpayers get out of GM’s (and eventually Chrysler’s) IPO? And if so, is it important that GM repay the taxpayers completely, or do the bailed-out firms need only to be sustainable for a certain period to make the bailout a success? As I see it, the question isn’t so much one of politics. After all, the rescue is hardly the definitive political issue for any citizen not directly affected by it (a relatively small group compared to the American electorate). The real issue seems to be whether political opposition to the bailout will affect sales at GM and Chrysler, and whether achieving certain financial or taxpayer payback goals will eliminate any such political impacts on sales. Do the bailouts affect your relationship with GM and Chrysler, and if so, what do you need to see in order to leave the bailout in the past?
As Automotive News [sub] reports, GM has gone ahead and finalized the 500 dealer cuts that made up its bankruptcy-bailout-era dealer cull, despite resistance from some 22 members of the US House of Representatives. And despite the congressional pressure, a damning SIGTARP report, and an ongoing criminal investigation, GM hasn’t changed its tune about cutting dealers, telling AN [sub] that delaying dealer cuts
would only divert our collective attention at a critical time and would ignore the independent decisions of arbitrators and individual settlement agreements between GM and its dealers
Meanwhile, just what affect has the dealer cull had on surviving dealerships? Are they thriving? Well, not exactly… Read More >
Reuters has followed up its look inside the Government’s involvement in GM with a breaking report on the specifics of The General’s IPO. According to Reuters sources, the IPO will include 365 million common shares for $26 to $29 each, for a total of between $9.5b and $10b. The Treasury is expected to sell between $1.5b and $2b of its 61 percent stake in GM, likely to “four or five sovereign wealth funds,” bringing its stake down to 43.3 percent. The Canadian and Ontario governments are expected to sell down their stake from 11.7 percent to 9.6 percent, while the UAW VEBA trust-owned stake is likely to to drop from 17.5 percent to 15 percent. A Reuters source concludes that
The IPO would likely value the entire company at close to $60 billion, below the $67 billion needed if U.S. taxpayers are to break even on the common stock held by the Treasury
At the midpoint of the proposed price range, GM’s stock outstanding, including warrants, would be worth about $50 billion, roughly the same level as Ford Motor Co. The IPO’s underwriters are hoping to sell at the top end of the range, and for the stock to rise 20% or more when trading begins. At that level, GM could be worth $60 billion or more.
Ever since it became clear that the government would rescue General Motors and Chrysler, the Treasury Department has made it clear that it would stay out of “day to day” decision making at the rescued automakers. Allowing the rescued firms to operate independently was a political calculation based on the desire to keep politics from affecting sales at the two rescued automakers, but according to a Reuters special report, Treasury has not been able to keep its hands completely out of important decisions concerning the future of the two firms. Particularly in terms of setting up GM’s Initial Public Offering, Reuters found that the Treasury made important decisions affecting
its speed and size, the fees paid to the bankers and the potential involvement of offshore investors
Though this has kept the IPO out of election season and all of its potential for political problems, there is some downside to the Treasury’s involvement, particularly because it will not be exiting its equity position in GM until about 18 months after the IPO. As a result, analysts predict problems securing investors in a firm that may still be subject to ongoing government control. Morningstar’s David Whiston tells Reuters
I’m sure that there will be some institutional investors, and even some individual investors, that it scares away
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