Last week, BMW flackmeister Dave Buchko banned The Truth About Cars from access to BMW and MINI press vehicles. Mr. Buchko wanted to be clear: the company was not responding to TTAC's criticisms of its products. The decision represented "a general concern about the tone and tenor of the site." More specifically, BMW objected to my characterization of the Subaru Tribeca's grill treatment as a flying vagina and our "inappropriately harsh" review of the Lexus IS350. So, BMW doesn't mind us calling the new M5's shifter the world's worst gearbox, but we can't mention female anatomy or wail on their opponent. Are you getting this?

I'm disappointed. I was looking forward to launching a retaliatory campaign based on our right to call it like we see it. You know: 'BMW can't handle The Truth!' But how do you fight a company that cuts you off from its press fleet because its corporate leaders object to the word vagina, and the fact that we preferred their products to their competitors'? Following Mr. Buchko into the rabbit hole, I tried to negotiate a solution to this bizarre situation. During our most recent phone call, I told Mr. Buchko we wouldn't use the words "vagina, penis or testicles" in any future posts and [almost] promised to shower Lexus with love the next time 'round.

No deal. The best Mr. Buchko could offer: BMW would "monitor the site" and "get back to us." I rejected the non-offer and, well, vagina. While I do not for one moment suggest that BMW has any obligation to provide The Truth About Cars (or anyone else) with press cars, these guys are both arrogant and insane. That fact was pretty obvious before the ban– when Mr. Buchko gave me a vigorous tongue-lashing for suggesting that iDrive was the worst thing to ever happen to a BMW (this was pre-M5). But now, by banning us over word choice and a Lexus review, BMW has conclusively proved that they don't understand PR, the new media or their customers.

Hold that thought. What's wrong with the word vagina? It's not one of the seven words you can't say on TV; it's a perfectly acceptable term for a female's primary sexual organs. And what's wrong with comparing the grill treatment of the Subaru B9 Tribeca to a flying vagina? Ever since Sigmund Freud's "Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie" met Jaguar's E-Type, journalists have called sports cars phallic symbols. Is the BMW organization so repressed and patriarchal that it can't tolerate the mere mention of female genitalia? The fact that Buchko couldn't bring himself to say the word 'vagina' indictates the full extent of the roundel's psycho-sexual problems.

C'mon guys, the vagina is ground zero for every human that's ever walked planet Earth. It's a place of beauty and pleasure for billions of people. [FYI: Hawaiian legend contains a story about a flying vagina or 'kohe lele."] I reckon the Subaru B9 Tribeca should fly its vagina with pride. And anyway, you'd think that BMW has more important things to do than obsess– for ten months– about a sexual reference on a relatively obscure website. Oh wait; TTAC published the Lexus IS350 review during this interregnum (on December '05). And what was our unpardonable sin there? Dunno. The Lexus review applied the same level of critical examination to the IS350 that we'd previously and subsequently applied to BMW's graciously-loaned press cars: the M5, 325ix Sports Wagon, 325i, 750i, M3CS, 645i Coupe, 645ci Convertible and 530i.

I find it inconceivable that a German car manufacturer would risk public disapproval to punish a website for using a "bad word" and protect their arch rivals. [Note: Toyota didn't object to the IS350 review, and continues to provide TTAC with press cars.] In fact, if you want a textbook example of how not to run a PR department, this is it. BMW is now on record as the company that freaks-out at the word "vagina"– inviting both ridicule and indignation from their highly-educated core clientele. The ban also reveals BMW as wimpy competitors, or paternalistic saps. Does anyone seriously think Toyota would return this unsolicited favor?

This thing is three kinds of stupid. In a free country, BMW can't stop a website from publishing the word "vagina," criticizing whomever it pleases and finding other ways to get behind the wheel of one of their products. This we will do. And rest assured that we will not review these cars any more harshly than we did before the ban. The Truth About Cars will not compromise its basic principles for anyone, ever. Meanwhile, I'd like to ask you a simple question: do you feel comfortable doing business with a company that behaves this way? Please send your answer in an email to <a xhref='mailto:dave.buchko@bmwna.com'>dave.buchko@bmwna.com</a>. CC us here, and we'll publish the most entertaining and informative examples.

Remember Maserati's mid-80s offerings? The Biturbo looked hotter than Christie Brinkley in a Ferrari 308, but was awful in every other way a car can be. The boxy yet steroidal Quattroporte was a stunner– whose name still pops-up as an antonym for reliability in Microsoft Word. By 1991, even barge pole-toting Italian car lovers wouldn't touch Maserati's heavy metal. The company's empire collapsed. Twelve years later, Maserati re-entered the US market bearing gifts: a studly, gutsy two-door and then, a swaggering, voluptuous four-door. And?

Maserati's new rides have found a warm welcome amongst wealthy American car collectors. In 1998, Maserati sold 518 cars worldwide. In 2005, the company sold 2114 cars in the US alone. While it would be premature to conclude that these figures indicate that Maserati has slain the mechanical gremlins that chased them off the North American continent, England's What Car magazine recently awarded all three Maserati models three out of five stars for reliability. (Wassup JD?) Equally reassuring (at least theoretically), Maserati now submits every single US car to a final, final inspection. And they're adding another $19m to the brand's expanding quality control program, on top of the $50m they've already spent in the pursuit of perfection.

More empirically, I joined a dozen other auto-journos at Road Atlanta to beat the hell out of dozens of Masers in 95-degree Georgia humidity. Aside from a busted speedometer, all press cars performed perfectly. To reiterate, my caravan of four GranSport GT's decelerated from 125mph to ten miles per hour for two hours apiece, without any failure of any sort. Two decades back, the preceding sentence would have been the prelude to a punch line.

The junket also launched the company's new flog-a-rific driving school: "Master Maserati." Upscale pistonheads know the drill: skill building exercises (lane change, slalom, skid pad, etc.), follow-the-leader laps, hot-laps in some monster machine piloted by a cruel psychopath (a.k.a. driving instructor) and a chance to humiliate yourself with psychoburger riding shotgun. Unlike Bondurant or Barber, Maserati shelters, feeds and inebriates its customers in the style to which journalists should never become accustomed.

So, is it all good news for the Trident's resurrection? Er, no. In automatic-mode, Maserati's transmission system is a dog. Drifting around Deliverance country in a Quattroporte (QP), making them tires squeal like a pig, the DuoSelect gearbox seemed hung-over. On an uphill section of the racetrack in the two-door GT, with my right foot planted, the damn thing upshifted. Manual mode works just fine; it blipped the throttle for me on downshifts and rocketed through the gears when asked. But I've come to the conclusion that all modern sports cars deserve a DSG paddle shift or a stick.

Although the Quattroporte's depreciation has been known to give its owners nosebleeds, the Sport GT variant should help reduce the initial collapse. The tighter-handling QP looks, feels, smells and sounds like a $155k sedan– which is roughly $40k more than it costs and the first year's hit. Anyway, the Sport adds more of what Quattroporte drivers are looking for: control. It's like a Shrinky Dink. The more you scorch it, the lighter and smaller it feels. One misstep: a two-inch tall piece of blingy-brightwork reading "Maserati" visible to the rear passengers. It's about as classy as those greasy adverts inside fast food joints. I'm not a big fan of carbon-fiber interiors, either. They look… w/cheese.

Perhaps the Quattroporte's most amazing attribute is the fact that it's already here; one generation ahead of Porsche's Panamera and Aston Martin's Rapide. If imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, Maserati should get tooled-up to assassinate the foreign pretenders to its throne. The car needs to ditch its tortuous gearbox and install a modern, seven-speed automatic. Which is the brand's next move, bless their Machiavellian little hearts.

Unfortunately, a tranny transplant will not save the Maserati GT Coupe. Compared to anything in its price range, it's a distinctly enigmatic choice. It costs twice as much as the equally powerful C6 Corvette, it's 500 pounds fatter and a lot uglier. Compared to a Porsche 911, the GT drives like a block of ice. No wonder Maserati is dumping the decade-old two-door for an all-new machine. The upcoming 'DuoPorte' should have more power (from a bigger V8), better everything else (DSG?) and a sexy body from Pininfarina.

After spending some quality time in the Quattroporte Sport GT, I can state without hesitation that Maserati will be selling cars stateside for many more years to come. While the Coupe plowed the field for the brand, the QP is the corn that's as high as an elephant's eye. The Quattroporte shows us Yanks that Maserati has what it takes to mix it up with the big boys. Benvenuto mi nuovo amore.

Photos courtesy Richard Dole/Maserati North America.

[Maserati paid for Mr. Lieberman's round-trip airfare from LA to Atlanta; local transportation, accommodation and meals. They did not, however, give him a $277k Audemars Piguet Millenary MC12 Tourbillon timepiece.]

Why is GM's stock rallying to a six-month high? Delphi's Sword of Damocles still sways above The General's head. Their market share and sales continue sliding towards Hades, with Cerberus waiting to lock the gate behind them. Oh right, I remember. On Wednesday, Merrill Lynch analyst John Murphy upgraded GM's stock to "buy." He made the move in light of the fact that 20k GM employees have decided to take advantage of GM's worker buyout program. So a bunch of rats leave a sinking ship, someone says well done and the crew breaks out the champagne. This thing stinks.

Lest we forget, until February 7th, the Chairman and CEO of Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. served on General Motors' Board of Bystanders. When Stan O'Neal resigned from GM, the exec cited time constraints and "limits on my ability to act as a GM director because of potential conflicts with matters in which Merrill Lynch is involved." This limitation didn't stop O'Neal's firm from buying 32m shares of FIAT stock for $1b while O'Neal was on GM's Board– immediately after GM wrote off the value of its FIAT stock for $2.1b. Be that as it is, there's clear evidence that Merrill and GM are deep into each other's pockets.

On June 1st, 2004, Merrill elected John Finnegan to their Board of Directors. Finnegan is the former Executive Vice President of General Motors Corporation and former Chairman and President of General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC). On June 23rd, 2005, Merrill elected Armando Codina to their Board of Directors. Codina is a Florida real estate maven who's been on GM's Board of Directors since 2002. So, despite O'Neal's concern over conflicts of interest, Merrill's board is rife with ex and current GM'ers, and The General and Merrill still have interlocking directorships. Now, let's get to the nub of the matter….

Again, GM's stock price surge was triggered by John Murphy. In his report "Buy on buyouts and other options" the Merrill Lynch analyst flagged three keys to GM's turnaround– downsizing production, securing a new labor deal and reinvesting in product. 'There appear to be early signs of these steps being taken,' Murphy claimed. His primary justification and main piece of supporting evidence: the 20k take-up on GM's worker buyout plan. Murphy predicated the program would save The General about $2.3b in pretax cost and $1.8b in cash per year and… that's it. Buy!

OK, sure, Murphy's report cautions three times that "Risks include a low buyout rate [in case the workers suddenly change their mind], a Delphi strike, market share losses, rising gas prices, pricing, cyclical downturn, residual erosion, and dealer body risk." And Merrill's man pegs GM's "defensible market share" at a dealer-indefensible 19%. But hey, what's all that compared with the buyout plan's theoretical addition of $2.48 per share! In fact, once GM gets some relief from "negative sentiment" (are you talking to me?), their share price should rise to $37. Hang on; has TTAC's Death Watch being blowing smoke all this time?

Nope. While Murphy's analysis acknowledges the obvious hurdles, his conclusions ignore their implications. GM is not an earnings story but a cash flow story. GM's cash flow is negative and will remain so as they unwind plants, pay for worker buyouts and write-off all the other items on the debit side of the corporate ledger. Thus, earnings may appear positive, but there are underlying cash calls– both actual and potential– which require extreme funding. For example, any non-strike resolution of the Delphi debacle will require GM cash, and lots of it. And while we're at it, Murphy's calculations must assume that GM can cut costs to keep margins in line or better in light of declining sales.

Yes, there is that. The launch of GM's "gas price protection" promise in California indicates that income is slowing. Refreshed SUV's or no, GM has too much inventory on dealer lots going into the season of high gas prices. While it might be 100k units less than last year, GM's sales have also fallen. It's only a matter of time before The General is forced to do something, anything to move the metal. Whatever it is, it'll come straight off the bottom line.

OK; Merrill's man has both the means and the opportunity to inflate GM's stock price (ipso facto). What's the motivation? Pump and dump. The report could be a favor to The General and its management, designed to drum-up banking business and let share-owning employees come up for air. Or it could be a favor to Kirk Kerkorian, to drum-up banking business. Or it could be a way to generate business for the Merrill retail network. (GM's erstwhile recovery is an easy story to tell to naïve retail customers.) Or it could be all three. Remember: this is the same firm that paid an $80m fine for fraud relating to Enron's collapse, and more than $200m in penalties for systematically hyping stocks on behalf of their investment banking clients. No wonder S&P and BoA Securities still say sell. They tell the truth.

Rabid Rick Wagoner lacks self-esteem. Why else would GM's CEO submit himself to triple presidential humiliation? First, Bush tells GM to take a hike– even before Rick shows-up with his begging bowl. Then, despite the slight, the head of the world's largest automaker sets-up a meet with the Commander-in-Chief (presumably to engage in a vigorous debate about the definition of a "relevant" vehicle). Then Bush cancels the meeting. George heads for the border; Rick detours to Congress to promote corn juice– and reschedules the presidential pow-wow for June. To do what? How long does it take RR to take a hint?

The funny (peculiar) thing is that every time I run out of ways to make the case that GM's [lack of] leadership assures its oblivion, the company throws me a bone. On Wednesday, GM shit-canned– sorry, accepted the resignations of– Controller Paul Schmidt and Chief Accounting Officer Peter Bible. Given GM's recent decision to restate its earnings for the last FIVE YEARS; given the on-going Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigation into GM's payments to its suppliers, its purchases of precious metals (of all things) and a New York Grand Jury alone knows what else; you'd think the double golden parachute exhibition was enough craven media manipulation for one day. But no, GM went and hired Jay Alix.

Jay Alix of AlixPartners is what Reuters called a "distressed company financial advisor." No, he's not an anxious number cruncher; Alix' firm helps companies into, through and, sometimes, out of bankruptcy. We're not talking about your local car dealership, Oriental rug dealer or electronics chain store. AlixPartners has applied its consultancy skills to some of America's largest corporate meltdowns: Kmart, auto-parts maker Dana, the trading firm Refco and… Enron. If that last name doesn't trigger some alarm bells, AlixPartners was also hired by WorldCom, whose $11b accounting scandal earned CEO Bernard Ebbers a 25-year jail sentence and his company the title 'world's largest bankruptcy.'

GM Chief flackmeister Gerry Dubrowski was quick to slam anyone presumptuous enough to make a common sense connection between AlixPartners' extensive Chapter 11 experience and GM's future plans: "We're hiring them for their expertise in the accounting transition… We're not hiring them for help in the turnaround effort for our North American operations.' If GM was looking for a company to help sort out their "aggressive accounting" problem, why didn't they opt for a large and reputable firm like KPMG? The literal-minded amongst you may also note that filing for bankruptcy isn't exactly the same as helping a turnaround effort.

Meanwhile, as GM reaches into its threadbare pockets to pay for a Chapter 11 expert not to use his bankruptcy expertise, The General has launched a guerilla war to stop people like us telling people like you that people like Wagoner are running the company into the ground. As revealed by The Detroit News, GM's so-called "Arlington project" will deploy some 50 GM flacklings throughout 16 US cities. It's part of what the News called "attempts to secure favorable news coverage." Even discounting the recent bribery attempt by a GM PR firm on former US Labor Secretary Robert Reich (to ensure positive coverage of GM's worker buyout plan), this program smells of cowardice, desperation and dirty tricks.

For one thing, "Arlington" refers to The McGinn Group's home base. For those of you without a scorecard, The McGinn Group is GM PR Chief Steve Harris' old company. Presumably, financial self-interest had nothing to do with his choice of partners for this under-the-radar PR campaign. Presumably, Harris simply wanted to work with people he could trust– to keep their mouths shut. Anyway, there's another shadow over the project: Harris chose the 16 cities because they're "dominated by local media rather than national outlets that have hammered GM in recent months for its sales and financial losses." In other words, they're soft targets.

So, this is the tenor of the times inside Wagoner's GM: do whatever it takes to maintain the status quo. If it means being subservient to the President, so be it. If it means cooking the books behind closed doors, let's retire the people who did the dirty work (with a nice payout and full pensions) and hire a bankruptcy expert (not to mention a former SEC chief) to help us plead out with the feds. If it means doing an end-run around the national press, let's send our agents to corrupt local media mavens. Instead of confronting GM's issues head-on, Wagoner's mob are taking the path of least resistance.

When GM's bankruptcy plays out, we may eventually know the truth about the final days of Rick Wagoner's regime. Right now, there's only one man who knows the full behind-the-scenes story, perhaps more comprehensively than Rick Wagoner himself. And Jay Alix is not talking.

I've never run a multi-billion dollar multi-national car company. But I've driven hundreds of cars, and every car I drive tells me everything I need to know about the company that builds it. Literally. What do I need to know about GM's product development process that I can't glean from the Solstice's fiddly roof? What can Daimler-Chrysler's flackmeisters tell me about the company's strategy that I can't appreciate by hammering an SRT-8? What does BMW have to say that their X3 doesn't? And how can I be expected to take Ford's "Bold Moves" campaign seriously after driving a Ford 500?

Someone forgot to tell Billy Ford that everything– sales, service, marketing, the money in his pocket– starts with product. First you build cars, trucks and SUV's that do one thing better than anyone else, THEN you market them according to their unique selling point. If you want to sell ultimate driving, start by making damn sure all your vehicles ride and handle better than anything else in their segment (Boxster-beater my eye). If you're selling safety, begin by building cars that get five stars in all crash categories (S40 four-star rollover rating my toches). If you're starting an American revolution, it's probably best to sell cars built in America. And if you want to be known as bold…

In one Ford TV ad, a mother and daughter jump into a swimming hole. After affirming their generational courage, they motor off in a Ford Escape– a vehicle so generic I wouldn't be surprised to find one for sale at Costco. The Ford 500, Explorer, Fusion, Freestar, Freestyle, Focus, Crown Victoria, Sport Trac, F150 and even the spiffy new(ish) Mustang GT are about as far from bold as you can get without hiding behind a rock. (The Ford GT was Starbuck's bold blend bold, but they killed it.) You could argue that that Ford's current management team inherited this less-than-audacious product portfolio, and that the Bold Moves campaign is more of a promise than a come-on. But you don't have to be a Times Square pimp to know you don't talk the talk before you walk the walk.

In fact, Ford's Bold Move message borders on self-parody: be bold and buy a vehicle from a car company struggling for survival. Anyway, we've been here before. Back in November, I suggested that Ford's customers want an innovative vehicle (the automaker's last marketing mantra) about as much as they want an innovative toaster. What bright spark at FoMoCo suddenly decided that the company's core clientele have moved on, from a non-existent desire for technological gee-whizzery to an equally fantastic desire for personal attention? Hey, I'm all for car companies taking risks. But I'm the kind of guy who lusts after a '71 Buick Riviera 'boat tail;' a machine whose bold design did nothing whatsoever to revive Buick's fortunes.

I understand the genesis of Ford's BM. It started with new Ford boss Mark Fields' "Red, White and Bold" shtick. Somewhere between the focus meetings and the Kool-Aid filled water cooler, the campaign's patriotic thrust got ditched for the "There's only way we're gonna get out of this mess: take some chances." Which is fair enough. Ford's survival does indeed depend on losing their 'play it safe and fail upwards' mentality. They need to take a chainsaw to their stifling bureaucracy and moribund product line. But they're a mainstream motor manufacturer, not friggin' Ferrari. Their customers are deeply, fundamentally, inherently, genetically conservative people whose prime motivation is to avoid risk, not make bold (i.e. risky) moves.

You want bold moves? Kill Jaguar. Kill Mercury. Sell Volvo. Sell Mazda. Sell Land Rover. Cut half the remaining models and plow money into the ones that survive. Re-invigorate your rear-wheel drive, box-frame car with new sheetmetal, a bad-ass motor and a killer cabin. Build a world-beating Lincoln luxury sedan. Make the Ford Focus the world's best small car. Get the Explorer's mileage into the mid-20's. Develop a more powerful engine than the Hemi and stick it into everything– including a new minivan. Set SVT loose on the entire model line-up. OWN quality interiors. Don't badge engineer ANYTHING.

Lose the glass fishbowl; redesign Ford showrooms to look like a modern retail outlet. Trim the dealer network and sell cars on the web. Undercut everyone's price with every vehicle. Interact with every single customer on a regular basis via internet. Institute no-haggle pricing. Make financing cheaper. Drop 80% of your print budget and dominate the web. Do it all, and do it all at once– regardless of cost. Then sell value for money. Ford: the best car money can buy.

I'd like to think that these ideas are on the table at Ford. I like to think that Billy Ford has the juice and the courage to reinvent his family business. And then I drive a Ford 500 and despair.

Now that General Motors is poised on the brink of disaster, the smallest setback could send the The General sliding into bankruptcy. What will be the straw that breaks The General's back? Most of the world has focused their attention on New York federal bankruptcy court. They're waiting to see if Judge Robert Drain voids bankrupt parts supplier Delphi's union contracts, and what effect that will have on GM. After all, there's so much to think about…

Will the United Auto Workers (UAW) react to the judge's ruling with an immediate strike at Delphi, starving GM of vital parts and driving The General into Chapter 11? Or is UAW boss Big Ron Gettelfinger secretly scheming to use the judge's decision to scare his members into accepting an otherwise unpalatable 15th hour compromise? Does Big Ron still have enough juice to make it so, given that he's up for reelection in June? Will a more radical union leader emerge and convince members of the rank and file to stage wildcat strikes? Will the larger number of Delphi retirees overrule their hotheaded "active" brothers and sisters to save their health care and pension payments?

Will GM CEO Rabid Rick Wagoner buy back Delphi's US operations at the 14th hour to assure a supply of mission critical parts until GM's foreign outsourcing is complete– and then jettison the whole shebang before the UAW contract negotiations in '07? Does GM even have the cash to pull it off? Will the judge's ruling plunge The General's credit rating below the minimum needed for the sale of their GMAC mortgage unit to Cerberus, killing the deal and removing the cash needed to buy-out Delphi? Or is Rabid Rick simply hoarding Delphi parts and outsourcing as fast as possible in the hope that he can withstand a late summer strike at Delphi? Have Rick and Ron secretly agreed to a worst case scenario short strike? Could Ron deliver?

Yes, well, the Delphi situation is only one of the storms gathering above GM's head. Lest we forget, the company's suppliers are none-too-happy with their terms of business; GM could not afford a 'run on the bank' scenario. And if the banks smell trouble and refuse to guarantee fleet sales… Meanwhile, management bet all its chips on the gas-guzzling GMT900 SUV's. Although early sales have been strong, the canary in the coal mine– pickup truck sales– is looking decidedly punk. April sales of the four-wheeled flat-bedded cash cows fell 5.9% compared to last year. Not to put too fine a point on it, every day that gasoline prices stay at or hovers around $3 a gallon is another bad day for GM– and we haven't hit the so-called "summer driving season" yet. If gas prices head northwards from here, if America starts downsizing its fleet in a big hurry, the company's market share will go into free fall. Again. Still.

And then, today, I received an email titled "Quick Question." The correspondent asked "Can you offer your opinion on how GM troubles/possible strike would affect a new Chevy owner? I am strongly considering buying a Suburban next month, but don't know if this would be a good idea." It would be easy to blame me for this communication, dismissing it as the inevitable result of TTAC's ongoing "attack" on GM. I wouldn't recommend it. This is the first time I've been asked that question. It represents the "third front" in GM's fight for survival: consumer confidence. If the Delphi situation is allowed to fester, it could be the tipping point that spills GM into oblivion– even without a strike.

Analysts constantly underestimate the importance of all the bad will GM and its dealers have amassed over the years. I've got hundreds of THOSE emails– from a stricken motorist who was assured by an OnStar representative that there wasn't a Chevy dealer in Dearborn Michigan, to a lifelong Cadillac owner whose dealer experience was so awful he promises never to buy another GM product as long as he lives. In fact, "should I buy a vehicle from a wounded company" is more like "why the Hell should I buy a vehicle from a wounded company?" I reckon the media buzz about GM's bankruptcy is already taking its toll on a company that can not afford to lose a single sale. The smallest bit of bad news could be the sound of butterfly wings beating, drumming up the chaos that spells GM's doom.

While The General's flackmeisters will scream bloody murder about self-fulfilling prophesies, current events are the fulfillment of a prophesy made over thirty-five years ago, when GM and its fellow domestics responded to higher quality foreign imports with arrogance, derision and scorn. They had their chance to change by their own free will. Now change will be thrust upon them. The Death Watch continues.

Before you can buy a firearm in Rhode Island, you have to finish a gun safety course. My instruction consisted of a pot-bellied ex-State Trooper telling war stories about ballistic incidents and accidents. It was a strangely effective education. Not only did I learn that you shouldn't shoot a crack addict with a .22 ('It just makes 'em mad'), but I also had Rule Number One drummed into my brain: if you draw your gun, use it. Which is why I'm sure that The United Auto Workers (UAW) is about to bring GM down.

On Thursday, UAW Vice President Richard Shoemaker told all locals unions covering bankrupt GM parts supplier Delphi to conduct strike authorization ballots by 14 May. The chances of the vote going against the union's request are about the same as Zimbabwe's electorate voting out Robert Mugabe. In other words, 24,000 union workers are about to chamber a round in their Delphi destroyer. The first bullet was loaded by 8500 members of The International Union of Electrical and Communications Workers, who authorized a Delphi strike back in February. The next four rounds will come from the United Steelworkers, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers and the International Union of Operating Engineers.

Organized labor will de-holster this week, when federal bankruptcy Judge Robert Drain (yes really) accepts Delphi's motion to void its union contracts. As sure as Officer Krupke drew his weapon and plugged a hole in the aforementioned crackhead, the unions will strike. All the media punditry claiming that the prospect of mutually assured destruction would stay the union's hand will disappear. All those analysts who claimed that union management would do anything to avoid putting Armageddon on their resume will watch as union workers cheer these self-same officials on the picket lines. It won't be pretty, and it will be fatal, for someone…

The media has focused much of its recent energy on GM's worker buyout offer– as if this expense-trimming plan could somehow denude and neuter union intransigence towards Delphi's proposed salary and benefit reductions. GM's much-heralded early retirement package offered thirteen thousand Delphi workers a lump sum to get the Hell out of Dodge. The UAW reports that just 3620 Delphi workers have bailed. Although the payoff deadline has been extended to June 30th, it's perfectly clear this plan will have about as much effect on a strike vote as toothpick on a walnut. Not that any of the principals care. While all this has been going on, the UAW, GM and Delphi have all been preparing for war.

What happened to all that talk about GM assuming responsibility for the difference between what Delphi wants to pay its workers and what it currently pays its workers? Gone. Instead, GM's on-again, off-again "subsidy" on Delphi parts– delaying the supplier's contractual agreement to lower its parts prices in the first quarter of '06– is off again. At the same time, the General is stockpiling Delphi parts (including complete vehicles), reducing Delphi content and offering Delphi contracts to other suppliers (e.g. spark plugs now come from Denso, Honeywell and NGK). There is no question whatsoever that GM is racing to reduce its reliance on Delphi before the unions walk and its Tier One mission critical parts supplier's business hits triage.

Meanwhile, Delphi is readying itself to give the middle finger to both the UAW and GM. While GM accounts for roughly 60% of its total turnover, Delphi's US operations are the least profitable part of its business. If Delphi jettisons GM's less-then-enormously rewarding parts contracts, its US labor costs and all those damn lawyers' fees ($61m since filing), the supplier still has enough cash flow and foreign capacity– both actual and potential– to survive. Delphi's losses for March were half that of the previous month ($56m vs. $136m); it could be an indication that Delphi has already begun outsourcing its operations.

It's a domino deal. When the federal judge issues his ruling, the UAW and its fellow unions must strike. Surrendering salary or benefits would be tantamount to accepting the death of unionism. The unions may lose Delphi and GM, but they'll remain intact at Ford and DCX. When the UAW strike begins, Delphi must move its operations overseas. They can't survive with their current US cost structure. And when Delphi stops selling The General parts, GM must die.

The world's largest automaker won't be able to adapt under fire. GM's too Delphi dependent, their bureaucracy too slow and inefficient, their image too tarnished and their finances too precarious to cope. As my firearms instructor said when asked for the best course of action in an impossible scenario, "Gun or no gun, when you're done, you're done.'

What's worse than farce? Political correctness. When farce ends, people look around and say, "Wow! That was stupid." With political correctness, the stupidity never ends. It moves from stupid to bizarre to delusional to dangerous to destructive. Yesterday, the Attorneys General of California, New York, New Jersey, Maine, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island and Vermont filed a joint suit against the federal government, trying to increase CAFE (Corporate Average Fuel Economy) light truck standards. By doing so, they placed the entire fuel economy debate on the far side of the PC arc. First the science…

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) sets, monitors and enforces CAFE legislation. The agency does NOT, however, calculate the fuel economy figures. That job falls to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA makes its determinations by measuring the amount of carbon dioxide coming out of a vehicle's tailpipe. (The higher a vehicle's fuel economy, the less CO2 it expels.) The federal government does not classify carbon dioxide a pollutant. Environmentalists do. They consider CO2 a planet-warming "greenhouse gas." Now, the politics…

The environmental lobby would like the federal government to raise CAFE standards as high as humanly possible (if not higher), forcing manufacturers to increase fuel efficiency. For practical and political reasons, that ain't gonna happen. To win the war without fighting a losing battle on Capitol Hill (again, still), the aforementioned "Greenhouse Gang" decided to attack the new CAFE standards on the basis of CO2 emissions, rather than the fuel economy numbers themselves. Yes it's a distinction without a difference, but hey, you gotta work with what you got.

Only the environmentalists ain't got nothing. CAFE regulations prohibit states from regulating fuel economy. Despite the fact that the California Air Resource Board (CARB) sets tailpipe pollution standards for California, and thus the entire country, the Greenhouse Gang seeks dominion over federal CAFE standards as well. The lawsuit alleges that NHTSA failed to "fully take into account the new standards' impact on the environment and fuel conservation, as required by federal law." In other words, forget the failed Kyoto accord (aimed at reducing CO2 emissions), let's duke it out here.

The rhetorical battle has been joined. Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal loosed the most succinct opening salvo. "These rules shamelessly seek to short-circuit regulations in Connecticut and other states to curb greenhouse gas pollution. In the face of increasingly incontrovertible evidence, the Bush administration is not only denying the reality of global warming, but also seeking to block the states from addressing this deadly problem." So the feds are trying to short circuit the states, not the other way 'round. That makes sense– in a diminishingly inconvertible sort of way.

The truth is raising CAFE standards by a few more mpg's won't make any appreciable dent in domestic oil consumption. As Mr. Elton has revealed here, many car companies simply eat the CAFE fines as the cost of doing business. The fact that a 2002 National Academy of Sciences' report concluded that CAFE-triggered downsizing caused an additional 2000 road deaths per year is, I suppose, beside the point. Anyway, what IS the point? Unless US energy consumption is drastically reduced across the board– heating, cooling, appliances, manufacturing, agriculture, etc.– our growing economy will obviate any theoretical "savings" made by more efficient automobiles.

As for the harmful effects of CO2 gasses on our environment, I'll leave that to more (less?) scientific minds. Suffice it to say that the amount of "real" pollution coming out your tailpipe has nothing to do with fuel efficiency, and while new technology might reconcile America's quest for energy independence with environmental concerns, then again, it might not. While we're waiting for THAT debate, I reckon we should file this whole CAFÉ mishegos under "Bad Landing, Wrong Airport."

America is a country rich in resources, both financial and natural. The Bureau of Land Management estimates that three trillion gallons of oil and 362 trillion feet of natural gas lie just offshore, maybe more. We also have enormous coal shale fields, and coal fields, and nuclear power plant technology, and endless alt energy ingenuity. While we should be launching a massive and comprehensive push for energy self-sufficiency, a bunch of point-scoring politicians are pandering to tree-huggers getting high on self-righteous Bush bashing down at the low-CARB CAFE.

Of course, extracting our oil, coal and gas, or building nuclear power plants, or erecting enormous wind farms, could damage the environment. And a Manhattan-style energy self-sufficiency project would require bi-partisan political support (God forbid). I guess it's better to pay money to countries fostering terrorism and/or put our military in harm's way in the Middle East. Oh wait, that's not it either. Right, the politically correct answer is… driving cars with better fuel economy. You see, if that was farce, it would be funny.

You've got to wonder about the mood at RenCen these days. Watching the price of gas crest $3 a gallon must make GM CEO Rabid Rick Wagoner feel like the Captain of the Poseidon as he trains his binoculars on the dark horizon and spies a mountain of water heading his way. It's not just the horror of knowing what's coming that makes the moment so terrifying; it's the crew's utter powerlessness to alter events. Only the Poseidon just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. Wagoner and his mates have spent their entire time on the bridge steering GM into harm's way. And there's not a damn thing Rabid Rick can do about the gathering tsunami. To review…

For more than a decade, the Tahoe, Suburban, Yukon, Yukon Denali and Escalade have been the cash cows keeping The General in cream. As readers of this series know, when the winds of change gathered force, Rabid Rick called out "Steady as she goes!" Instead of developing new hybrids to capitalize on the growing anti-SUV gestalt, instead of spending money on refining and marketing the fuel efficient vehicles already in GM's vast fleet, Rick bet the company on a quick refresh of GM's gas-guzzlers. Last September, Maximum Bob Lutz launched the resulting GMT900-based Chevrolet Tahoe– between the two hurricanes that decimated America's gasoline production facilities. GM's "new" vehicles were born under a bad sign: $3 a gallon gas.

As always, Maximum Bob put a brave face on events, claiming that The General only sought to maintain its dominance over a shrinking market. Early indications were positive. The American consumers' notoriously short memory and sunny disposition helped them shrug-off rising gas prices as a temporary aberration, an Act of God. TTAC has since unearthed GM's carefully-guarded GMT900 sales numbers, broken-out by model year. In the first financial quarter, GM sold 19,739 new Tahoes, 5028 Yukons and 4228 Escalades. As you'd expect, these figures are dwarfed by sales of heavily discounted '05/'06's: 45,104 Tahoes, 14,398 Yukons and 8145 Escalades. Bottom line? GM pushed some 96k full-size SUV's out the door in Q1, adding about $800m to its balance sheet.

Without that profit, GM's would have lost over a billion dollars in the first financial quarter. But the second major spike in gas prices casts a long shadow over the GMT900's and GM's viability. The recent pump price escalation proves that soaring prices are tied to larger, less random forces than errant hurricanes. American drivers are beginning to cotton-on to the fact that the days of cheap gas are gone. If the price of gas crests $4 a gallon and stays there for the summer– as many analysts predict– the gig is up. Sales of GMT900's will tank, inventories will swell, discounts will follow and GM's descent into Chapter 11 will gather pace.

President Bush has directed the Environmental Protection Agency to temporarily suspend rules requiring different blends of gasoline in various cities (regulations designed to reduce air pollution). If state governments follow suit, losing the legal requirement for ethanol blending, gasoline supplies could be ramped-up and trans-shipped to help meet demand. Gas prices will fall and GM's SUV sales will be saved! That's a big "if." There are plenty of variables that could immediately and completely offset any legislative measures designed to free-up supply: conflict in Iran, Venezuelan nationalization, the summer driving season, a terrorist attack on supplies, distribution and/or refineries; etc.

In short, this might not be the best time to be building lumbering gas hogs. Or is it? The Arlington Morning News reports that GM's Texas factories have added overtime shifts to crank out as many GMT's as possible: about 900 per day. Rabid Rick Wagoner has publicly admitted stockpiling parts in anticipation of a strike at parts maker Delphi. GM's Just In Time manufacturing facilities are not warehouses; given the volatility of key components, the best way to store Delphi parts would be… a complete vehicle. Is GM is stashing GMT900's in the Texas sun? TTAC is investigating.

Meanwhile, the General's ability to provide its assembly lines with mission critical parts is under threat. The Financial Times reports that Tier One supplier Yorozu America recently threatened to stop making suspension components if the automaker didn't fork over $3.7m in disputed payments. More worryingly, Yoruza also demanded an irrevocable letter of credit for at least three times its average monthly turnover with GM, roughly $75m. Deep Throat reports that another, much larger US-based supplier is also demanding up-front payment from GM. As reported here, if this trend takes root, GM faces a 'run on the bank' scenario that would capsize the corporate mothership– whether they like it or not.

Clearly, GM faces dangers from all directions. Pity the poor passengers trapped inside the upside down world of GM.

The ancient Greeks knew the truth: character is fate. If Oedipus hadn't been such an asshole he wouldn't have killed his father, married his mother and kept psychiatrists busy for centuries. By the same token, if Rick Wagoner wasn't a corporate narcissist, he would've completed the Herculean tasks left by his predecessors. GM's CEO would have cleansed The General's stable of excremental vehicles, severed its eight-headed brand portfolio, subdued the UAW's cretinous bulls and sent Cerberus packing. Instead, we get to watch Rabid Rick's company sink into the mire, bribing a financial journalist and engineering a sports car whose roof flies off at 60mph. To wit:

Robert B. Reich is a journalist and commentator who once worked for President Clinton in the Labor Department. He currently enjoys a regular slot on NPR's nationally-syndicated "Marketplace" program. On Wednesday, Reich announced that he'd been approached by a "public relations firm working for General Motors." Reich said the flack asked him to praise GM's buyback deal for its workers. He then offered to pay Reich "remuneration" for a positive story "out of respect" for his reputation. Reich declined the unspecified offer.

The man attempting to bribe the twenty-second United States Secretary of Labor was Richard Strauss of Strauss Media Associates of Washington, DC. According to the company's website, Strauss Media uses its "integrity, perseverance, and skill" to help clients "realize the power and influence of radio." The PR company's client roster includes Nike, Eastman Kodak, Coca-Cola and General Mills. Although Strauss Media Associates doesn't list GM as a benefactor, a description of recent projects includes work on the Saturn brand's Second Annual National Donor Day.

Marketplace's host Kai Ryssdal confirms the connection. In a phone interview with TTAC, Ryssdal said Richard Strauss personally set-up a recent radio interview with GM CEO Rick Wagoner. When I asked if the show's producers investigated Reich's claim that he'd been bribed, Ryssdal said they had. According to Ryssdal, Strauss backpedaled furiously; calling the offer a "misunderstanding." Ryssdal also said the program had spoken directly to GM's new PR Supremo, Steve Harris. Harris said he never authorized payments to "sympathetic journalists." When Reich's damning piece aired, GM and their Washington PR firm remained silent.

So, The General's own PR firm didn't have enough confidence in the value of GM's employee buy-out plan to let a journalist draw his own conclusions. Clearly, the General's generals feel embattled and desperate. And why wouldn't they? What has their imperious leader said or done that would lead them to believe that GM is a company that deals with its problems head-on?

Meanwhile, on the same day, Sprite2005 posted two pictures of his semi-decapitated C6 on a Corvette forum, with an accompanying explantion. "I still can't believed this happened. Had just shifted out of first @ around 6900-7000k, hit 2nd and hear a loud crack, pull over and my roof is missing…" Sprite2005 is not alone. On the 23rd of February, GM sent out tech bulletin number #05112A, which states the following.

"On certain 2005-2006 Chevrolet Corvette vehicles, the painted roof panel may separate from its frame in some areas if it is exposed to stresses along with high temperature and humidity. The occupants of the vehicle may notice one or more of these symptoms: a snapping noise when driving over bumps, wind noise, poor roof panel fit, roof panel movement/bounce when a door or hatch is closed, or a water leak in the headliner." Dealers should "apply adhesive foam to ensure proper adhesion, or in a small number of vehicles, replace the roof panel."

Although the defect doesn't appear to affect the Corvette's structural integrity, an airborne roof panel raises some pretty major road safety issues. Equally important, the situation does nothing to bolster GM's supposed reputation for improving build quality– or the company's willingness to accept responsibility for customer concerns. Notice that the notice says the roof may become separated 'in some areas,' blames "stress, high temperature and humidity" and recommends replacing the roof panel "in a small number of vehicles." If that attitude isn't familiar to disgruntled GM owners, perhaps this [unedited] response is:

"I can't believe how many of you people are actually defending this and saying its not that big of a problem," writes forum member Sweetvet. "The mans roof flew off his brand new $75K car- thats a pretty big friggin deal to me- I would be livid, and would ensure this car was bought back by GM, and would never buy another GM product again. God, I'll be glad when my corvette is sold so I can get back into something with build quality- something (anything) German"

GM's first quarter losses less than last year? So what? As long as Rabid Rick Wagoner is tempting the fates, GM's is sealed. Ipso facto.

At yesterday's New York International Automobile Show, Bob Lutz provided the hook for GM's PR counterattack. Of course, the Car Czar's rallying cry wasn't planned. As usual, the former Marine aviator simply greeted the press, opened his mouth and OoRah! came out. 'GM has the worst behind it.' Whatever else you can say about Maximum Bob Lutz, the man is an idiot. While GM's first quarter results will be a lot less bad than last year's annus horribilis, Lutz' statement flies in the face of the growing, looming, unresolved, irresolvable conflict over at bankrupt parts supplier Delphi; the fact that GM's gas-guzzling SUV's are heading straight into a $3 a gallon shit storm; and a shoal of dangers so extensive that GM CEO Rick Wagoner has taken to calling it "stuff." But wait; there's more!

"Soon all will be revealed,' Lutz said. 'I can't mention figures, because I'd get in big trouble." So, Mr. 'Don't Tell Mommy' wants the nattering nabobs of negativity vulturing GM to believe that his company's management team (whom MB has just placed in harm's way) has a secret plan to pump-out GM's umpteen flooded compartments and restore the company to preeminence. Well, profit. Never mind that GM watchers have been waiting for an aggressive restructuring plan since 1973, or that every time Rabid Rick Wagoner steps up to the dais these days and says "Ta Da!" he's closing, cutting and/or buying out something or someone. If we're looking for company-saving revelations, what could possibly top the still only potential sale of 51% of GMAC for $14.1b? The mind boggles.

Or maybe I misunderstood. Maybe Maximum Bob's saying that GM's financials are about to get better. That would be odd. In March, GM's market share tumbled from 26.5 to 23.3%. Car and truck sales fell 15%. As for new product, The General has shot its wad, placing its bets on gas-guzzling GMT900's. Although Bob and his Booster Brigade are cheered by the supposed surge in sales of these brand new-ish Tahoes, Yukons, etc., it's best to remember that GM books fleets sale on "allocated preference" (i.e. when they're scheduled for production) and/or as soon as an SUV ships to the dealer. Also, Rabid Rick's publicly admitted stockpiling parts in preparation for a Delphi strike; perhaps Bob's optimism is based on "phantom" figures…

In fact, GM might be teetering on the brink of financial collapse. No one outside the company knows how low GM's US cash hoard has gone between balance sheet dates. And while Maximum Bob was busy entertaining the press corps, GM's purchasing guy publicly stated that The General is stretching its account payables to 55 days, essentially financing itself on the back of its vendors. That's not good. Nor is the recent revelation that the GMAC sale will NOT improve GM's credit rating and WILL slaughter GM's cash cow, starving The General of ANY dividends for five years. As one correspondent put it, "This deal does nothing to facilitate a restructuring of North American operations, but rather lets them keep the lights on until the UAW calls the end game."

I reckon the light at the end of Bob's tunnel is the headlight of an oncoming General Motors FP59 diesel-electric locomotive. But hey, that's just me. And Bob thinks I'm full of shit. 'Most of the analysts living in New York don't even own cars, and have never even visited one of our dealerships,' Maximum Bob proclaimed. 'At some point, I start to question whether they're holding short positions on the stock.' (FYI: This writer owns a car but not GM stock. And thanks to GM blacklisting, I've visited several GM dealerships for test drives.) As Detroit News reporter Brett Clanton pointed out, Lutz' analytical anti-Christs are the same effete intellectual snobs who heard GM predict that the company would be solidly profitable in '05– the year it lost $10.6b.

But Bob's not done playing the dozens with us financial and media mavens, announcing that "The imminent bankruptcy at GM is a myth created by Wall Street and our beloved media." It's nice to be loved, however sarcastically, but this website has been begging to differ on the Chapter 11 front for over a year now. Bob's said nothing to change our perspective and plenty to reinforce it. Sure, Maximum Bob's blend of feistiness and anti-intellectual, anti-media paranoia played well with his dealers and GM's decimated, dispirited troops. Maximum Bob's force of will even gave GM's beleaguered (not-to-say overvalued) stock a temporary boost. Be that as it may, Lutz is, at best, guilty of premature recapitulation. At worst, he's completely divorced from reality. Bob says "the last skeptic in America will [soon] be convinced that we are well on the way to recovery. GM has its best days ahead of it.' We say, well, good luck with that.

I wonder what Billy Durant would have made of Rick Wagoner. GM's founder was a man of great honesty, intelligence and drive. He was also a high school drop out who started the company with a $1000 loan– and ended-up penniless. Twice. Perhaps that's why historians tend to credit General Motors' epic growth to the man appointed president in 1923; about whom an observer wrote, 'The manufacture of correct assessments, not physical products, is what most gratified Alfred Sloan.' Billy was the "car guy." Alfred was the "bean counter." The history of GM is the history of the struggle between these two opposing forces: passion and, um, accounting. Rick Wagoner is, of course, a Harvard MBA.

I suppose Durant would have liked Wagoner well enough, at least at first. Durant's legendary charm was based on a simple but effective strategy: "Assume that the man you are talking to knows more than you. Do not talk too much. Give the customer time to think. In other words, let the customer sell himself." Rabid Rick is pretty good at selling himself these days. With a new PR guy pushing the buttons, Wagoner's making the rounds, defending his chairmanship on CBS' 60 Minutes and Face the Nation, and in the pages of The Wall Street Journal and other carefully-selected publications. So if Rick and Billy were schmoozing about GM, Wagoner would have done the talking.

What would Billy have thought if Rick repeated his recent kvetch to Newsweek? 'It's not so easy to do stuff, particularly if you can't do it yourself, if you've got to do it in cooperation or in conflict with unions, if you do it with Delphi, if you need partners to consider a partial sale of GMAC. What has been done in the last six months borders on unprecedented accomplishments and advances. This stuff didn't happen because somebody decided on Jan. 15, why don't we do stuff? This stuff happens because we're working on it, we're ready to do it, we're talking to people, and then when we have it ready, we announce it.'

Durant would have been alarmed at Wagoner's use of the word "stuff." Billy may have been the yin to Alfred's yang, but he was every inch the detail man. He knew every nut and bolt of every vehicle, every nuance of the production process. Durant would not have been pleased with a GM CEO who spoke with such thinly-veiled buck-passing imprecision. As a risk-taking deal maker extraordinaire, Durant would've also wondered why Wagoner hadn't already united GM's "partners," or taken the bold action necessary to avoid GM's current morass. Equally important, as a man who lost his company to conservative-minded "insiders" (twice), Durant would've also had problems with Wagoner's "company men know best" hubris. To wit:

"These are sophisticated problems with historical tails that run back 80, 90 years. The chance of someone coming in and not understanding our business, making the right calls and doing them in cooperation with key constituencies like dealers and unions, is absolutely microscopic. That would be the biggest risk I've ever heard of." Risk? What does a man who's never worked a day outside Generous Motors (its former CFO no less) know about risk– except how to avoid it at all costs? Even so, Durant would have kept his trap shut. And then, at some point, Billy would want to go for a ride.

Durant believed that great products make great companies, and vice versa. GM began when Durant was so impressed by a horse-drawn buggy's innovative suspension that he bought its manufacturer: the Coldwater Cart Company. One wonders which vehicle Wagoner would choose for Billy's test drive. A Corvette would certainly swell Durant's heart with pride. Anything else and… there would be questions. Why doesn't this Tahoe have a hybrid engine? What makes a Pontiac G6 better than a Toyota Corolla or Honda Civic? Why isn't the Cadillac STS as good as/as expensive as a Mercedes S-Class?

Durant would have listened to Wagoner's responses thoughtfully and concluded that GM's CEO had an answer for every objection, every fault, every danger; and the answer was always the same: we're working on it. Things are getting better. We'll sort out the jobs bank, the quality gap, the Delphi situation, the GMAC finance deal, our car sales, this car, all of it, everything, later, soon, sooner or later. In that sense, Durant might have seen something of himself in Wagoner. Like his father before him, Billy squandered his fortunes on stock market speculation. Gamblers understand denial. They know that some men will always believe– no matter what– that their salvation, their resurrection, is only a deal away.

So, if William C. Durant were Chairman of GM today, would he fire Rick Wagoner? Truth is, Billy never would have appointed Wagoner CEO in the first place.

[For more info., please read 'Billy, Alfred, and General Motors' by William Pelfrey.]

Chasing Robert Berry's Enzo up Equinox Mountain in a Lamborghini Murcielago, I remember thinking there's no way I'm going to keep up with this guy. As the Ferrari's exhaust note ripped through the Murcie's windscreen like a shotgun blast through fiberboard, I set my priorities: no dying, no crashing, no humiliation. The big bull proved equal to the task. Every time I over-cooked it, the Murcie's front tires juddered and… we're back! Every time Berry slowed for a turn, the V12 supercar closed the gap. The experience gave me a profound respect for Lamborghini. And then I drove a Gallardo.

As reported here, the Gallardo is as cohesive as a first grader's art collage. While the four-wheel drive supercar cuts corners like a bankrupt builder, the Gallardo's over-wrought sheetmetal, humdrum cabin, relatively feeble brakes, lack of low-end grunt, questionable high-speed stability and point and clunk paddle shift gearbox wouldn't pass muster in an entry level Porsche or, for that matter, a garden variety Audi. Well exactly. Audi has owned Lamborghini since 1988. The Gallardo (né '03) should have married German precision and Italian passion. Instead, it joined German flair with Italian fastidiousness.

Given the parade of eccentrics who've owned Lamborghini since the Arab oil embargo first forced the former tractor maker into receivership– Georges-Henri Rossetti and René Leimer (Swiss investors), the Mimran brothers (Senegalese-born French food tycoons), The Chrysler Corporation (recovered US bankrupt), 'Tommy' Suharto (son of the former president of Indonesia, now serving 15 years for murder) — Audi deserves credit for saving Lamborghini from oblivion. But at what cost? Lamborghini's build quality may now, finally, match that of an average Ford, but the company's entry level model fails to embody the marque's well-established brand values. It's a sure sign that the venerable nameplate is, once again, heading for disaster.

Let's be clear about this. Automotive identities are not half as mystical as the fees brand consultants charge to divine them. In fact, if you can't sum-up a car company's core values in four words, the chances are it doesn't have any. By the same token, any marque that sells models that don't embody those values is in deep shit– whether they know it or not. Jaguar: sexy looks, smooth ride. BMW: impeccable ergonomics, superb handling. Toyota: faultless build, cheap price. Cadillac: ummmm. Mercury: errrr. Lamborghini: sexy body, monstrous power. Almost every Lambo ever produced conforms to this recipe (even the mid-engined Miura). The Gallardo does not.

Lamborghini's failure to stick to the knitting highlights an insidious force that destroys valued brands: cash. With a few exceptions (e.g. Saturn), automotive manufacturers start as bootstrap operations. The lack of resources forces them to be focused, creative, dynamic and driven. As venture capitalists and dot bombers have discovered, the more money you plough into a small company, the less efficient it becomes. When Lambo's budgets were tight, managers had to sweat every investment, every sale, everything, all the time. When investors like Audi backed the Brinks truck up to the company gate, suddenly, anything was possible. Paint bubbling? Panel gaps visible from outer space? Sorted. Hey, I know! How about we get a Belgian to design a small Lamborghini and give it a torque-deficient V10 engine? Increasing possibilities increases the possibility of mistakes– and doubles the difficulty of rectification.

Just because you CAN do something doesn't mean you SHOULD. Unless management protects a car company's core values, focus is lost. From there, short term gain's siren song seduces the company into building brand-betraying products. There are plenty of examples: Lincoln Zephyr, Buick Terraza, Saab 9-7x, Jaguar X-Type and more. Cash-rich companies fool themselves into thinking they have to do everything– reliability, safety, performance, style, comfort, packaging, fuel efficiency, etc.– and do everything well. Their survival actually depends on creating cars that do one or (at the most) two things better than anyone else.

It's all part of the automotive equivalent of the Big Bang. In the early 1900's, hundreds of tightly-focused car companies exploded onto the scene. The consolidations that gave birth to GM and the rest of today's limited universe of multi-branded automotive conglomerates continued until the century's close. Now, the entire system is collapsing in on itself, leaving a handful of major players. Eventually it will implode, leading to another explosion of small manufacturers (aided by globalization and new technology).

In that sense, the brand-busting Gallardo is a sign of the times. Whether or not Lamborghini ultimately withstands Audi's stewardship is an open question. But energy is never lost. As long as there are wealthy drivers who crave the howl of a big-bore V12 encased inside an in-yer-face Italianate wrapper, Lamborghini has a future. As for all the other emotive car brands currently sheltering under the wing of a multinational conglomerate, well, the road to Hell really is paved with good intentions.

At 9:30am this morning, a group of lawyers representing bankrupt auto parts supplier Delphi will appear in front of Federal Bankruptcy Judge Robert Drain. The lawyers will file legal motions for Sections 1113 and 1114. It's a legal request to void Delphi's current collective bargaining agreements with the United Auto Workers (UAW). The moment the judge says the word "granted," he will terminate the wage structure, post-retirement health care and life insurance plans for the company's 33k US hourly workers. The UAW will respond with a strike against Delphi. Starved of its former subsidiary's parts, GM's assembly lines will fall silent. The General will begin its final slide into Chapter 11.

There will be a gap between Delphi's filing, the judge's final ruling (May 9th) and industrial action. During this highly fraught interregnum, Delphi President Steve 'Quotation Marks' Miller may make a fourth wage and benefits offer to the UAW. The proposal would fall somewhere between the workers' current compensation ($27 per hour) and Miller's last last stand ($16.50 per hour). As we've said before, the UAW will accept nothing less than the status quo, and that's somewhere where Miller won't go– at least not without GM footing the bill. Common sense says if GM CEO Rick Wagoner was going to ride to Delphi's rescue, he would have done so already. Chances are he can't.

Analysts estimate that the General's got about $20b lying around. Take away the $10b GM needs to run its business, add in its line of credit, discount its line of credit (the company just got locked-out of $5.6b worth of previously available funds), add in recent and upcoming sales of overseas assets (including Isuzu), discount the cost of recently announced worker buyouts and plant closures, add back the cost of worker buyouts (it's unlikely that many workers outside the infamous jobs bank will take-up GM's offer), discount ongoing losses from its automotive operations, ponder the possibility of more "accounting adjustments," throw your hands in the air regarding the possibility of GM selling majority interest in its GMAC finance unit (The General's only remaining lifeline), and you'd be forgiven for wanting to check Rabid Rick's wallet.

GM's inability/reluctance to pay off Delphi's UAW work force may be the clearest indication of The General's true financial situation. In fact, despite a stock price still hovering around $20 a share, the world's largest automaker could very well be worthless. I write that with some trepidation. I'm aware that any large institution in extreme financial crisis is susceptible to the fatal effects of negative perception. So much so, it's entirely possible that GM's fate will be sealed somewhere well away from federal bankruptcy court, by someone who simply loses faith in The General's future. For example…

Although The General has pledged to reduce sales to rental car fleets, the automaker still sells as much as 15% of its US production to these volume/discount buyers (roughly 600k vehicles). All of the purchases are financed by large banks, who lend money to the fleets based on the strength of GM's buyback guarantee. All of these banks have industry analysts who now admit (if not actually forecast) the possibility of a GM bankruptcy. Should the banks suddenly decide that GM's buyback guarantees are meaningless, financing for GM products would dry up quicker than the Mojave Desert after a light drizzle. Without rental sales, well, as TTAC's Deep Throat eloquently puts it, GM would soon be Tango Uniform.

Alternatively, GM's suppliers could be its ultimate downfall– a poignant reversal given how harshly The General has treated its parts-providing "partners." While GM's biggest suppliers aren't anywhere near as short-sighted as the UAW (i.e. they know better than to kill the golden goose, no matter how pitted and pathetic it may seem), a smaller, mission critical, non-GM dependent supplier could look at the lay of the land, get up its gumption, and refuse to give GM credit on terms. GM would have to put cash up front for its parts. Once news of the deal got out, all of GM's suppliers would seek similar protection. GM couldn't survive this "run on the bank" scenario.

And so it goes. As anyone who's been following this story knows, we're at the point where if it's not one damn thing, it's another. Critics who call for Wagoner's head are missing the point. GM has expended all its capital: political, creative, financial, moral and, now, psychological. When I started this GM Death Watch, TTAC was one of the few places where the words "GM" and "bankruptcy" appeared in the same sentence. Those days are gone, and it's not our fault. Time and time again, GM had their chance to do the right thing. To stand up, admit their failures and change their business. Now, it's too late.

As predicted, the American Family Association (AFA) has renewed its boycott of the Ford Motor Company. The move comes after The Blue Oval reneged on a private pledge to the AFA to stop advertising in gay and lesbian media, and end direct financial support to gay and lesbian events and organizations. When the story broke back in December, Ford denied the AFA deal. They claimed the decision to pull Jag and Land Rover ads from gay-oriented publications was "strictly business." When that didn't fly with the gay, bisexual, lesbian and transgender (GBLT) community, Ford reversed itself and kept the cash flowing. Thus the AFA's retaliation for their alleged betrayal. Now what?

This time 'round, Ford has taken a sensible line on the AFA's boycott: ignore it and hope it goes away. Yesterday, Blue Oval Spinmeister Kathleen Vokes issued a written statement more generic than store brand soap. 'Ford is proud of its tradition of treating all with respect, and we remain focused on what we do best — building and selling the most innovative cars and trucks.' Ignoring Henry Ford's vicious anti-Semitism and the brand's spurious claim to technological supremacy, the official pronouncement left little doubt about Ford's current perspective on the AFA's goals. Not to put too fine a point on it, Vokes' words were multi-national corporate PR speak for "fuck off and die."

That's not likely. Like many such crusades, the AFA's Ford boycott is largely the result of one man's zeal. In this case, it's Donald E. Wildmon, a United Methodist minister operating out of Tupelo, Mississippi. In 1977, Wildmon formed the AFA's predecessor, the National Federation for Decency. His subsequent boycott and protest march against Sears Roebuck and Co. convinced the doomed retailer to pull its ads from 'Three's Company' and 'Charlie's Angels.' The action might seem quaint by today's moral standards, but Ford underestimates Wildmon's resolve at their peril. Wildmon is a veteran campaigner whose scored many high profile victories in the last twenty-nine years– including Procter & Gamble's decision to remove its sponsorship from 50 TV shows in 1981 and chain stores' banishment of Playboy and Penthouse magazines in 1986.

Again, Wildmon is something of a one man army; it's highly unlikely that the AFA has anywhere near the 2.2 million supporters it claims. But the main point remains: the Mississippi minister is a tough, shrewd, organized and persistent opponent– who knows the fine art of media spin. While the GBLT community likes to present the AFA as a group of right wing fundamentalist extremists who revile and reject alternative lifestyles, Wildmon and his followers are not so easily cornered. According to the AFA's official statement, "Ford could have easily avoided this boycott had they desired to do so by simply remaining neutral in the cultural battles."

Wildmon has a point. While the AFA is rightly reviled for demanding an end to Ford's advertising in homosexual-oriented publications, FoMoCo's financial aid to GBLT pressure groups plants the corporate flag on one side of a highly contentious issue. Ford has made large cash contributions to the Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation, the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force and the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Campaign. More specifically, the Ford Motor Company Fund donated $250k to the Affirmations Lesbian and Gay Community Center in Ferndale, Michigan. More explosively, Ford sponsors a great many GBLT events (e.g. the London Pride parade) that generate images bound to offend mainstream sensibilities.

Does the average American Ford buyer care that his or her car payments support these GBLT organizations? I have a sneaking suspicion we're going to find out. Wildmon is an Internet savvy activist with a strong core constituency. He's ready, willing and able to spread his message of protest to the general public. In stark contrast, the GBLT community cut Ford a great deal of slack when it was revealed that the Blue Oval Boys had been playing footsie with the AFA. They pointed to the company's policies towards their GBLT workforce, took a meeting with Bill and let the incident slide. If it comes down to it, I reckon the AFA's steadfast determination will surprise its opponents and hurt Ford's reputation, but good.

It promises to be a nasty scrap, but that doesn't alter the fact that this is a debate worth having. While all fair-minded people support the GBLT community's right to fair treatment under the law and Ford's right to advertise its products where it pleases, the AFA raise a pertinent question: why is Ford donating money to gay and lesbian activist groups? Surely the company should take a politically neutral line in ALL its charitable contributions, restricting their largesse to apolitical organizations like children's hospitals. Either Ford has a deep moral committment to homosexual rights, or, more cynically, they thought that spreading corporate cash throughout the GBLT activist community made good business sense. If that's the case, Wildmon may be about to prove them wrong.