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Nissan ReviewsThe Nissan name was first used in 1933, but the company's history goes back much further. Originally known as Kwaishinsha Motorcar Works, the company produced its first automobile, the DAT, in 1914. DAT later became Datsun (son of DAT) in 1931 and Datsuns went on to become the first mass-produced vehicles in Japan. Americans got their first look at the Datsun in 1958 - the 1200 Sedan. The Datsun 240Z was released as a 1970 model and it became the best selling sports car in the world, selling 500,000 units in less than 10 years. |
It’s not news per se. After all, we knew that Wilmington was on GM’s “endangered plant” list. But the idea that GM will somehow attract a buyer for a factory that builds a dead-in-the-water sportscar is laughable. After all, Chrysler still hasn’t found a home for its Viper nameplate, a brand that carries far more heritage and prestige than the Skystice. So what to do with Wilmington?
Some vehicles are doomed from the start. Take the Acura RDX: a not-inexpensive CUV with aesthetically challenging looks nestling amongst Honda’s “Huh?” brand. The RDX seems carefully designed to appeal to the few, the proud, the pistonheads. You know: enthusiasts who absolutely must have a willing engine, a chassis that’s a suitable dance partner and the elevated driving position of SUV—all at a price that’s significantly higher than more sensible (if dull) alternatives made by brands whose street cred didn’t die with the Integra. You see how that doesn’t work?
3/5 Stars 
So the United States finally gets the Nissan Cube, a funky, cool box. From initial impressions, it provides a unique and entertaining driving experience. Meanwhile, here in Western Europe, we get the Nissan Note, a Micra front-ended, Renault Modus-derived piece of crap. To say that I longed for a basic Ford Focus after driving this from Trier all the way to Maastricht, down to Luxembourg, and then back to Trier says a lot. The Note made me angry, so angry in fact that I actually contemplated sabotaging the thing so Sixt Car Rental would replace it. But then I realized they’d probably hand me the keys to yet another sour Note.
Saving Chrysler is just stupid. There isn’t one shred of pure economic logic—never mind basic business sense—to rescue this company from liquidation. Yet, here we are watching tax dollars garnered from real earners (individuals and corporations) tossed into a swirling morass circling the drain of history. It’s time to speak up against this misbegotten adventure. And, well, here I am.
My argument against saving Chrysler springs from one basic business premise: risk taken should be compensated by adequate reward. It should be intuitively obvious that all the capital invested into Chrysler since Daimler’s acquisition back in 1998 and Cerberus in 2007 has never earned an adequate return. So why should we think that the US Government will be smarter than a successful German automaker or a wealthy private equity firm? Does it really make sense to pour (past and future) $12 billion or more of taxpayer dollars into the same hole?
Let’s review. Daimler acquired Chrysler for $36 billion or so and spent billions more trying to make a go of it. Sure, Chrysler had some profitable years in the interim. But by the end, Daimler recognized that there would be no future and effectively walked away from the mess. The decision matrix in Stuttgart came down to this: there would never be a return on the investment in Chrysler. It was an experiment in globalization gone seriously awry.
Despite public announcements to enhance and restore an American icon (hey, Steve Feinberg, you don’t look so good in that American Flag outfit), Cerberus had no intentions of making Chrysler into a real company. Rather, it would be a strip and flip operation by reducing expenses, fobbing off vehicle development to others (Nissan, Mercedes, and anyone else) and make money from financing customers’ wheels. We know how well this business strategy worked. Cerberus lost $7 billion of someone’s money (we still don’t know whose). All gone forever.
And now the American taxpayer has become the next sucker in the game of Chrysler. What is the ante at the table so far? Some $6 billion and going higher. And for what? To continue the fallacy that Chrysler in the last two decades has been a great American icon? Even President Obama can’t polish that pig.
The lawyers in bankruptcy court have argued about absolute priority, lenders tainted by TARP funds, and diminution of value without a quick sale. But it’s really irrelevant. The fact remains that any dollars plowed into Chrysler will never provide an adequate return.
Let’s review the government’s plan with Chrysler . . . With a quick asset sale, a modified UAW labor agreement, Italian management today, small cars tomorrow, and perfecto! We’ll enter into an automotive utopia of profits and cash flow. Will someone please dial 911 to the White House and clue the Administration into reality please?
There are NO good assets of Chrysler cobbled together in any fashion that can be considered as a going concern. Recall that Chrysler has had little retail success in the past several years with its product line. Fleet sales likely made up at least 40% of all sales. Guess what? The New Chrysler will have the same product line. Does the President really believe that American consumers will now wake up and buy Chrysler products all of a sudden? If so, he’s sadly mistaken.
Some will argue that the New Chrysler has a competitive labor agreement. Yea, so what? Labor makes up less than 10% of the total cost of running a car company. And GM and Ford get the same deal—which matches mostly what all the transplants already have. No real advantage there.
But the coup de grâce rests with faith in the Italians to do a better job running this mess. C’mon now! Fiat is and always has been a second-tier automotive player in Europe. Its product reputation hasn’t brought it accolades. And why would Americans even consider small cars from Italy being superior to Ford’s new Fiesta (a raging best seller in Europe) or cars from Honda or Toyota already here? And small cars just don’t make the same profits. Go ask the Japanese for the truth on that one.
The bottom line should be clear. Putting money to work in Chrysler, even reconstituted as a new company, makes no sense. Pitting the same product line, same weak brands and future Italian-mobiles against strong competitors in the USA today just doesn’t compute. Not for the capital invested. In fact, no venture capitalist would do this deal. No private equity players show any willingness to take this on the come. And not one other automobile manufacturer wants to buy the rotting corpse of Chrysler. Only the American government—an entity already proven incapable of running its own shop successfully—has stepped up to the plate.
This will not end well.
Bloomberg reports that Renault/Nissan is looking at partnering with Penske Automotive Group to make a bid for the Saturn dealer net, according to “people familiar with the matter.” Nissan wants to use more of its North American capacity to build Saturn-branded vehicles based on either Nissan or Renault products. Penske would distribute the vehicles through existing Saturn dealers, using its “plug and play” model already in use with Smart dealerships. In this arrangement, Smart takes customer orders and deposits via a Web site, allowing dealers to keep fewer cars in inventory. Would this work with a larger model line? Does Nissan/Renault really want to compete with itself? Does GM really have another month to solicit offers (as it plans to) for Saturn? Will those offers improve over the next month? Er, maybe, apparently, no and definitely no. Still, if Penske and Nissan want to pull the trigger, it’s hard to see how GM could say no. And maybe, just maybe, Saturn could once again become America’s most innovative dealer network.
The Wall Street Journal reports that GM is in talks with Renault over the future of the Saturn dealer network. GM has already given up on the possibility of receiving any kind of cash consideration for Saturn; a deal with Renault would see Saturn essentially handed over to the French firm. According to the WSJ, Renault is considering Saturn as an American-market brand for its Renault and Samsung Motors products. Why Renault wants to compete with its sister-firm, Nissan, in that brand’s biggest market isn’t immediately apparent. Maybe Ghosn doesn’t like Marchionne hogging the spotlight. Meanwhile, Chinese automaker Geely has submitted a bid for GM’s Saab “division” (it’s more at brigade strength currently). Unfortunately, nobody is sure if this bid is for real or if it’s just a gambit to pressure Ford into accepting Geely’s Volvo bid. Or maybe Geely has just fallen for all things Swedish. We’re told to expect a Saab deal in “early summer,” and with bankruptcy looming, look for Saturn to be offloaded post-haste as well. (Thanks to rod panhard and Mr Sparky for the tip.)
In a follow up to E. Niedermeyer’s previous post, details have emerged about the scheme to give rebates to buyers who trade “clunkers” for new, fuel-efficient vehicles. FT.com (Financial Times) reports that the program will cost taxpayers about $4 billion and will spur, according Brian Johnson, an analyst at Barclays Capital, the sale of 3 million units in the “near term” (whatever that means). With the US’ SAAR projected at approximately 9 million, this is a very optimistic prediction.
I drove a Toyota Camry for 12 years and 239k miles. My two brothers also drove Camrys. My mother drove a Camry. Even my father drove a Lexus that was just a gussied-up Camry. All these Camrys were bought because there was a time when Toyota offered a car that truly few others could match. Quality, longevity, durability. They seemed to always be two clicks above the competition in virtually all respects. But now, it’s a very different story.
Proponents of Chrysler’s current reinvention often refer to the exercise as a “surgical” bankruptcy. OK, who’s the surgeon? As far as I can tell, the people in charge of deciding how to cut-up Chrysler are Chrysler. “Physician heal thyself” is a nice sentiment, but it doesn’t normally involve a scalpel. Second, speed. When a patient is bleeding to death, time is of the essence. Chrysler is hemorrhaging red ink. It’s one thing to stop the bleeding (as Uncle Sam adds multi-billion dollar cash infusions). It’s another to attempt to cure the patient with a knife. And after the health care recipient leaves the theater, well, who expects an amputee to run a marathon? In other words, the operation may be a success, but the patient will still die.
The counterpoint: synergy. Or, to call it by its rightful name, “wishful thinking.” In the course of human history there must have been two huge companies working in a hideously complicated manufacturing enterprise who were able to integrate with each other and prove that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. A partnership that delivered cost reductions though combined “back office” functions. More efficient and creative product development. Better sales and marketing. Streamlined management. A more productive workforce. It’s just that I can’t think of any.
[Renault – Nissan? The fact that this partnership works at all—and the jury’s still out—is down to the fact that the two companies tend to stay out of their each other’s way.]
It’s ironic that the American carmaker that forged a company-killing merger with a German automobile manufacturer almost eleven years ago to the day now wants US taxpayers, suppliers, creditors, workers, the media, etc. to accept the idea that Chrysler’s future is best served by merging with an Italian automobile manufacturer. To borrow an adjective from the non-TARPies court filing, that’s “incomprehensible.” Unless you try really hard to believe that someone isn’t stripping assets from someone else. To wit: The New York Times.
Fiat and Chrysler have much to offer each other. Chrysler desperately needs Fiat’s small cars and fuel-efficient engines to balance an aging lineup of S.U.V.’s.
For Fiat, Chrysler offers an instant dealership network for its return to the United States. They can also benefit from savings on the $46 billion worth of parts and materials they would buy as a combined entity.
The whole “ChryCo needs small cars” meme flies in the face of any realistic appraisal of commercial reality. Stateside, small cars a small part of a shrinking market; Chrysler needs small cars like a man dying of thirst desperately needs a shot glass of low-alcohol beer. Chrysler needs a mainstream model that generates enough profits to sustain their credibility the next time they call on the public purse. I mean, to repay their “loans.” Something like the Chrysler 300. Only a lot better.
The merger’s small car justification violates a pseudo-military maxim: go where they ain’t. Trying to sell small cars in a mature marketplace against highly-developed, well-entrenched competition is a Sisyphusian endeavor. GM’s failure to recapture its automotive mojo in its North American and European home markets—even while it succeeded outside of North America and Europe—proves the wisdom of the advice.
Besides, Chrysler already has small cars. Yes, they’re crap. But fixing ChryCo’s crap cars would be a lot less expensive and time consuming than hitting reset. Again. And that’s without adding Fiat’s cultural dissonance to the mix.
Clearly, there’s a political subtext to this supposed “desperation.” ChyrCo’s political overlords and their camp (not in the Batman TV series sense of the word) followers have a hard-on for American-built small cars/hybrids. To use an Obama-ism, they believe it’s “the right thing to do.” But even The Gray Lady understands that it’s probably not the most profitable thing to do; hence the SUV “balancing” remark.
As for the joint savings on parts, somebody somewhere’s smoking one. Three years after assuming control of Ford, CEO Alan Mulally still hasn’t fully realized his plan for parts worldwide parts commonality. Similarly, GM’s “world car” program has been a spectacular failure, delivering unto the world a seemingly endless stream of badge-engineered failures (e.g., Cadillac BLS), non-starters (e.g.,Pontiac G8) and nichemobiles (e.g., Chevrolet Camaro).
Just for S&G, figure Fiatsler will save ten percent on its $46 billion parts and materials tab. Split it two ways. That’s a $2.3 billion cost reduction. Which is not even half of Chrysler’s current cash burn. Or the United States government’s outstanding “loans” to the Auburn Hills zombie. This theoretical saving might pay for the bureaucracy needed to organize the two automakers’ parts integration. It might not. if history is any guide, any such attempt would end up costing money and delaying production.
So where’s the beef? Nowhere. The Chrysler – Fiat deal is one of those veggie burgers that only looks good—and then only to vegetarians. It sounds crazy, and it just won’t work.
Once again, TTAC has received an embargoed press release. Once again, please don’t send us anything you don’t want us to publish before you want us to publish it unless we agree beforehand (which we won’t). An agreement requires two parties. And party they might down at your local Buick dealer’s service department. A Consumer Reports (CR) survey of 349k vehicles (full methodology unavailable upon request) reveals that, “Among the top scoring in dealership maintenance satisfaction were Lexus, Buick, and Acura, with 85, 83 and 82 percent satisfaction rates, respectively. At the other end of the spectrum, Volkswagen, Suzuki, Jeep, and Nissan owners were far less satisfied with dealer service at 67, 69, 70, and 70 percent respectively.” But wait! There’s more! “Despite the turmoil surrounding the American auto industry, six American automakers (Buick, Saturn, Mercury, Cadillac, Lincoln and Oldsmobile) ranked among the top ten in terms of customer satisfaction with dealership maintenance.” Pay no attention to the word “Oldsmobile.” Notice the word maintenance. Not repair.
“G.M. is very different than Chrysler,” said Rahm Emanuel, President Obama’s chief of staff. “But I suppose the one lesson for G.M., and all the other players, is that this is a moment when a Democratic president said, ‘I am really willing to let a company dissolve, and there’s not going to be an open checkbook.’ There’s got to be real viability.” Huh? I was under the impression that this was the moment when a Democratic president said “I am NOT really willing to let a failed automaker dissolve. Uncle Sam’s checkbook is as open as a hooker’s gams. For the sake of political expediency, there’s got to be pretend viability.” Of course, it’s much worse than that. The White House has caught Detroit disease, where stupid decisions vie with no decisions for supremacy, leaving the status quo bruised and battered, but triumphant.
Like the Motown moguls that the Presidential Task Force on Autos (PTFOA) protects, all the president’s car guys’ dementia began with an idee fixee. Unlike Chrysler and GM execs, the PTFOA’s starting point had nothing to do with ensuring that they could afford to fly first class to Gleneagles for a round of golf and a hot stone massage for the Mrs. It was a simple question: “How do we save these failed companies (a.k.a. union votes)?”
At that point, the PTFOA developed a massive hardon for federal intervention that’s lasted a lot longer than four hours. Bad craziness was a given.
For example, the bureaucrats running GM’s car business—giving a thumbs-up or thumbs-down on any transaction over $10 million—swear up, down and sideways they don’t want to run a car company. PTFOA boss Steve Rattner has publicly declared that his employer will not “interfere” with GM’s decisions about brands or products. This at the same time that the PTFOA is planning to convert $22.8b of GM’s federal “loans” (so far) into a controlling stake in a newly reconstituted GM. Even The New York Times wonders WTF that’s all about.
Members of Mr. Obama’s auto task force say that even after the government owns a majority of the company, it will have no role in management. That, they say, will be farmed out to professionals, the work supervised by government-appointed members of a new G.M. board.
That doesn’t even make sense. The federal government won’t be involved in GM’s management, but the federally appointed Board of Directors will. And that’s totally different because they’ll be independent, right? Even though they’ll serve at the government’s pleasure. Anyway, I guess we can be thankful that the PTFOA has no desire to farm out GM to amateurs—although God knows I’d put my money on my fellow armchair executives before I’d “invest” a single dime on a GM suit. You know; if I had a choice.
I’m completely confused by the PTFOA’s reluctance to roll up its sleeves and tell GM how to build what for whom, where, what brand to sell it under and how to sell it. I don’t want the feds to run GM. But if they are running it—and they are—how can they do so without getting down to brand and product-related decisions?
Truth be told, the car business is about . . . wait for it . . . cars. If the feds are “protecting the taxpayers’ investment” in GM, they should start by firing all the people who had anything to do with GM’s current brand and product plans—before they make any more. How in the world does anyone expect Fritz “the Wagoner Clone” Henderson to make the correct pre- and post-bankruptcy car-related decisions when the ex-CFO has shown no ability to do so in the past?
By the same token, not firing marketing maven Mark LaNeve is proof positive that the lunatics are still running the asylum. This is the man who ran eight GM brands into the ground, destroying any and all brand equity through a massive miasma of mixed messages. I wouldn’t let LaNeve write a Craigslist ad for my minivan, never mind control a $3 billion ad budget. Why has no one rid GM of this troublesome man?
Again, I’m not in favor of Uncle Sam running GM. Clearly, they don’t have the appetite or the aptitude for the job. But as the Brits say, it’s time for the PTFOA to piss or get off the pot. Either the quango should take full responsibility for GM’s product-related plans (please, God, no) or offload this entire mess on someone else (liquidation or cough-Nissan-cough).
Either way, an immediate palace putsch would be a damn fine idea. Given that the PTFOA has already shit-canned GM’s CEO, there’s no reason to delay a more thorough housecleaning. Every day that the PTFOA allows GM’s current management to chart the automaker’s course makes reversing their lunacy more expensive. And less likely.
Seems like our old pal Jerry York is back in play. You may remember Mr. York as the turnaround expert, ex-ChryCo exec, rep for aspiring GM owner Kirk “The Lion of Las Vegas” Kerorian and former activist member of GM’s Board of Directors. It’s the penultimate of these which applies here: Captain Kirk’s main man tried to broker a deal between GM and Renault back in the summer of ’06. The merger fell afoul of then-GM CEO “Red Ink” Rick Wagoner, who’s now shivering in hell (albeit without any financial worries). Our sources tell us that Nissan wants to be GM’s Fiat. In other words, it’s looking for the US government to give it a controlling share in GM for no-money-down, putting Carlos “I told you so” Ghosn at the head of the unencumbered GM. I mean GNR (GM – Nissan – Renault). This one makes a lot of sense. Uncle Sam doesn’t [really] want to run GM, and the Fiat deal will [they hope] provide a template for the GM – Nissan thingie. And, lest we forget, the maxim “everything either grows or dies” applies to both GM and Nissan. Hyundai-Kia just passed Nissan for sixth place in the US new car market.
Nikkei [sub] brings the cheery weekend news that Japanese new car sales are at their lowest level in the last 41 years of recorded history. Nipponese bought only 284,035 units in April, a drop of 23 percent on the year. Last month, the Japanese government launched tax breaks for fuel-efficient cars, but they kept consumers unimpressed and clutched to their wallets. Even sales of minivehicles, which had been strong for a while, got more diminutive. The Japan Mini Vehicles Association says they sold 117,670 units, down 13.4 percent. Demand for midgetmobiles has suffered double-digit contractions for two straight months, dwindling to an 11-year low. Scratch that as a savior. Got the stomach for details?
Newsday reports that New York City has purchased 40 Nissan Altima Hybrids for its police fleet. NYC Mayor Michael Bloomberg pointed out that the Smyrna, TN-built Altimas enjoy a patriotic advantage over the Canadian-produced Crown Victorias and Chevy Impalas that comprise most of the NYPD’s fleet of 2,400 patrol vehicles. “It is an added benefit that buying these cars helps create jobs in America,” says Bloomberg. According to the report, some traffic enforcement agents have been using Toyota Prius hybrids since 2002, and police duty captains, who respond to major incidents, have already been using GMC Yukon sport utility vehicle hybrids. “We’ve had no downside,” says Police Commissioner Ray Kelly of his force’s hybrid use.
No, really. The Detroit News reports that prior to its Chapter 11 filing, Chrysler sought to sell off parts of the company to everyone. “Chrysler sent letters to parties, primarily in China, whom we thought would be potentially interested in purchasing our assets,” writes ChryCo’s Tom LaSorda in a bankruptcy filing affidavit. “Over the next two months, several companies, including Beijing Automotive Industry Holding Co., Tempo International Group, Hawtai Automobiles, and Chery Automotive Co., expressed interest in purchasing specific vehicles, powertrains, intellectual property rights, distribution channels and automotive brands.” But guess what? Not even these ambitious firms were tempted to spend a dime on Chrysler’s alleged assets. And the major OEMs in the global auto game? Chrysler’s efforts to form alliances with Nissan, GM, Volkswagen, Tata Motors, Magna, GAZ, Hyundai, Honda and Toyota “have been determined and undertaken in good faith but have met uniformly without success,” admits LaSorda.
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