Saving Chrysler is just stupid. There isn’t one shred of pure economic logic—never mind basic business sense—to rescue this company from liquidation. Yet, here we are watching tax dollars garnered from real earners (individuals and corporations) tossed into a swirling morass circling the drain of history. It’s time to speak up against this misbegotten adventure. And, well, here I am.

My argument against saving Chrysler springs from one basic business premise: risk taken should be compensated by adequate reward. It should be intuitively obvious that all the capital invested into Chrysler since Daimler’s acquisition back in 1998 and Cerberus in 2007 has never earned an adequate return. So why should we think that the US Government will be smarter than a successful German automaker or a wealthy private equity firm? Does it really make sense to pour (past and future) $12 billion or more of taxpayer dollars into the same hole?

Let’s review. Daimler acquired Chrysler for $36 billion or so and spent billions more trying to make a go of it. Sure, Chrysler had some profitable years in the interim. But by the end, Daimler recognized that there would be no future and effectively walked away from the mess. The decision matrix in Stuttgart came down to this: there would never be a return on the investment in Chrysler. It was an experiment in globalization gone seriously awry.

Despite public announcements to enhance and restore an American icon (hey, Steve Feinberg, you don’t look so good in that American Flag outfit), Cerberus had no intentions of making Chrysler into a real company. Rather, it would be a strip and flip operation by reducing expenses, fobbing off vehicle development to others (Nissan, Mercedes, and anyone else) and make money from financing customers’ wheels. We know how well this business strategy worked. Cerberus lost $7 billion of someone’s money (we still don’t know whose). All gone forever.

And now the American taxpayer has become the next sucker in the game of Chrysler. What is the ante at the table so far? Some $6 billion and going higher. And for what? To continue the fallacy that Chrysler in the last two decades has been a great American icon? Even President Obama can’t polish that pig.

The lawyers in bankruptcy court have argued about absolute priority, lenders tainted by TARP funds, and diminution of value without a quick sale. But it’s really irrelevant. The fact remains that any dollars plowed into Chrysler will never provide an adequate return.

Let’s review the government’s plan with Chrysler . . . With a quick asset sale, a modified UAW labor agreement, Italian management today, small cars tomorrow, and perfecto! We’ll enter into an automotive utopia of profits and cash flow. Will someone please dial 911 to the White House and clue the Administration into reality please?

There are NO good assets of Chrysler cobbled together in any fashion that can be considered as a going concern. Recall that Chrysler has had little retail success in the past several years with its product line. Fleet sales likely made up at least 40% of all sales. Guess what? The New Chrysler will have the same product line. Does the President really believe that American consumers will now wake up and buy Chrysler products all of a sudden? If so, he’s sadly mistaken.

Some will argue that the New Chrysler has a competitive labor agreement. Yea, so what? Labor makes up less than 10% of the total cost of running a car company. And GM and Ford get the same deal—which matches mostly what all the transplants already have. No real advantage there.

But the coup de grâce rests with faith in the Italians to do a better job running this mess. C’mon now! Fiat is and always has been a second-tier automotive player in Europe. Its product reputation hasn’t brought it accolades. And why would Americans even consider small cars from Italy being superior to Ford’s new Fiesta (a raging best seller in Europe) or cars from Honda or Toyota already here? And small cars just don’t make the same profits. Go ask the Japanese for the truth on that one.

The bottom line should be clear. Putting money to work in Chrysler, even reconstituted as a new company, makes no sense. Pitting the same product line, same weak brands and future Italian-mobiles against strong competitors in the USA today just doesn’t compute. Not for the capital invested. In fact, no venture capitalist would do this deal. No private equity players show any willingness to take this on the come. And not one other automobile manufacturer wants to buy the rotting corpse of Chrysler. Only the American government—an entity already proven incapable of running its own shop successfully—has stepped up to the plate.

This will not end well.

TTAC’s very own David Holzman writes:

How high could a Prius or Insight climb before the battery would run so low as to cease contributing to horsepower? In other words, If I lived at the top of Skyline Drive and worked in Palo Alto (or had a similar commute somewhere else), would the electric boost cut out on the way home? How much elevation could either car cope with? And once the battery has bottomed out, how weak is the car going to feel? I’m guessing not nearly as bad as my then-8-year-old ’62 Falcon, which I could barely push over 30 in second, climbing the mountains in Wyoming, Utah, Nevada, and California. Still, would someone with this sort of commute want to avoid a hybrid?

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Consumer Reports drops a sly wink at the irony-free Daimler-Chrysler tagline while revealing that (surprise!) Fiat’s reliability is little better than Chrysler’s. Of course, pre-retreat American Fiat records speak for themselves. Usually in acronym form (Play It Again, Sam, as the old folks say). But even 21st-century Fiat ranked only three places higher than Chrysler in Britain’s 2008 Which? Car reliability survey. Did we mention Chrysler took last place? Honda and Toyota in first, etc. But CR plays it cool. Real cool. “By the limited indication we have, it looks like reliability may be a challenge,” is the money shot. Way to represent the data!

In a follow up to E. Niedermeyer’s previous post, details have emerged about the scheme to give rebates to buyers who trade “clunkers” for new, fuel-efficient vehicles. FT.com (Financial Times) reports that the program will cost taxpayers about $4 billion and will spur, according Brian Johnson, an analyst at Barclays Capital, the sale of 3 million units in the “near term” (whatever that means). With the US’ SAAR projected at approximately 9 million, this is a very optimistic prediction.

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In German politics or the corporate world, the secret weapon to destroy any progress is the feared “12 point program.” Any similarities to a 12-step program of substance abusers are purely coincidental. Since there is no way that all 12 points will ever be met, the project languishes and dies on its own with nobody having killed it.

The German government has increased the mega-tonnage of its secret weapon and presented Fiat’s Marchionne with a 14-point program as he visited Berlin on Monday to meet government and union officials. His intent: Secure political (and financial) backing by the end of this month for a dream. Marchionne wants to combine Fiat, Chrysler and Opel/Vauxhall to a car group that cranks out more than 7 million units a year and has combined revenues in excess of $100 billion. Second to Toyota. Bigger than Volkswagen. (That should make the plan popular in Germany.) Not so fast:
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I drove a Toyota Camry for 12 years and 239k miles. My two brothers also drove Camrys. My mother drove a Camry. Even my father drove a Lexus that was just a gussied-up Camry. All these Camrys were bought because there was a time when Toyota offered a car that truly few others could match. Quality, longevity, durability. They seemed to always be two clicks above the competition in virtually all respects. But now, it’s a very different story.

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I don’t know what the hell to do. I’ve got an old Lexus SC400 that’s getting a new amp and I’m trying to figure out what adapter out there can make it work. Circuit City is shuttered. I should know that since I got a video camera there for nearly bupkis a few months ago. Other than that, well, I guess I’m kinda screwed. Nobody nearby replaces amps and has that friggin’ adapter. Which reminds me . . .

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Nikkei [sub] brings the cheery weekend news that Japanese new car sales are at their lowest level in the last 41 years of recorded history. Nipponese bought only 284,035 units in April, a drop of 23 percent on the year. Last month, the Japanese government launched tax breaks for fuel-efficient cars, but they kept consumers unimpressed and clutched to their wallets. Even sales of minivehicles, which had been strong for a while, got more diminutive. The Japan Mini Vehicles Association says they sold 117,670 units, down 13.4 percent. Demand for midgetmobiles has suffered double-digit contractions for two straight months, dwindling to an 11-year low. Scratch that as a savior. Got the stomach for details?

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Honda moved 101,029 units last month as sales declined 25.3 percent compared to April 2008. Truck sales led declines, dropping 36.3 percent while car sales fell only 18.2 percent. Insight sales fell well short of Prius at 2,019 units, although Accord (-15.6 percent), Civic (-23.2 percent) and Fit (-30.3 percent) fared better by percentage than their Toyota competitors. Acura saw a 32.3 percent fall in sales, with the TSX (-6.6 percent) helping and the RL (-64 percent) and RDX (-55.7) hurting. Element and Ridgeline contributed the most to truck sales declines, logging 65.6 and 71.5 percent declines, respectively.

Toyota sales (press release via earthtimes.org) declined a whopping 42 percent from last April, as the big T recorded only 126,540 unit sales last month. And the bleeding comes from all over the lineup. From bread-and-butter Camry and Corolla (down 36.7 and 42.9 percent, respectively) to the entire Lexus line (LS down 61.6 percent, GS down 70.2 and IS down 48 percent) and from trucks (Tundra down 54 percent)  and SUVs (4Runner down 69.3 percent) to compacts (Scion xD sold only 880 units) it’s ugly all over. Toyota sold more Priora (8,385) than Yaris (8,118) while the RAV4 (11,126) sold better than Venza (3,793) and Highlander (5,595) put together. Other than RAV4, the only bright-ish point in an otherwise forgettable month was RX which sold 6,237 units (including hybrids) and was reportedly the top selling luxury vehicle in America last month. Total hybrid sales hit 12,223.

Newsday reports that New York City has purchased 40 Nissan Altima Hybrids for its police fleet. NYC Mayor Michael Bloomberg pointed out that the Smyrna, TN-built Altimas enjoy a patriotic advantage over the Canadian-produced Crown Victorias and Chevy Impalas that comprise most of the NYPD’s fleet of 2,400 patrol vehicles. “It is an added benefit that buying these cars helps create jobs in America,” says Bloomberg. According to the report, some traffic enforcement agents have been using Toyota Prius hybrids since 2002, and police duty captains, who respond to major incidents, have already been using GMC Yukon sport utility vehicle hybrids. “We’ve had no downside,” says Police Commissioner Ray Kelly of his force’s hybrid use.

It doesn’t seem that long ago that General Motors was pouring billions of dollars into Cadillac in a bid to create a line of world-class luxury cars. American enthusiasts rejoiced. Now, with GM on the verge of bankruptcy, all signs point to a full-scale retreat. Assuming GM pulls through, within the next five years it will kill Buick outside China–or at least kill its Lexian aspirations—and shift Cadillac downmarket into a “near luxury” position.

Cadillac’s bid for a return to greatness met with an early success. The 2003 CTS’ angular styling might have polarized opinions, but it made a strong statement and grabbed everyone’s attention. The car’s performance suggested that GM was capable of developing a first-rate rear-wheel-drive sport sedan.

The Escalade sold well, but its pushrod powerplant and antiquated chassis did not fit Cadillac’s new mission. A DOHC-powered, independently suspended crossover would be much more fitting. Problem was, in the late 1990s it was hard to tell what would make for a successful crossover. Should the proportions be those of an SUV, or more like those of a station wagon? Cadillac opted for the latter, while the market opted for the former. Combine wagonesque proportions with a BMW-like price, and the 2004 SRX flopped.

The 2004 XLR roadster was sharply styled, but insufficiently luxurious and (like the SRX) over-priced. Perhaps emboldened by the CTS’ success, Cadillac convinced itself that it could give subsequent models Teutonic prices from the start—a bad move. Both Toyota with the original LS 400 and Hyundai with the Genesis recognized that new entries must start low. If they sell, then you can raise the price. So the XLR became strike two.

The CTS had carved out a spot vis-a-vis the BMW 3-Series. Could a rear-wheel-drive Seville replacement do the same against the 5-Series? First, newly hired car czar Bob Lutz delayed the STS. Not a fan of Cadillac’s new look, he ordered that the STS’ greenhouse be redone to add tumblehome—even though such a major change late in the process cost tens of millions of dollars.

Though perhaps an improvement, the revised design both failed to be beautiful and failed to make a strong statement. The interior, though more luxurious than that of the CTS, was still not luxurious enough for the STS’ richer target market, and its styling was boringly conventional. The market yawned, and stuck with the imports. Strike three.

Hyper-expensive supercharged STS-V and XLR-V variants were little more than a distraction. If the basic product isn’t a winner, adding power isn’t going to make it one.

Lutz’ desire to offer a production version of the gargantuan 13.6-liter Sixteen? To those thinking with their heads, the Sixteen seemed overly ambitious and a poor use of corporate resources. Before it could realistically attempt a statement like the Sixteen, Cadillac first needed to succeed not only with the STS but with a never approved S-Class competitor. In retrospect, this embodiment of the Detroit executive ego seems downright ridiculous.

Back in the real world, Cadillac’s upmarket adventure was dealt a fatal blow when the STS failed to carve out a beachhead north of $50,000. In the aftermath, Cadillac couldn’t decide what to do next. Plans to replace both the STS and DTS with a large rear-wheel-drive luxury sedan wandered this way and that, then died. The V8 that would have powered this car met the same fate. Hyundai could field a competitive DOHC V8. Detroit would not.

Yes, the redesigned 2008 CTS has been a hit and deservedly so. But you can’t base a luxury brand on one $35,000 model.

At the same time, Cadillac can’t simply return to where it used to be. The DTS has solidered on, but sales have slowed to a trickle. With the Zeta-based replacement canceled, and no new large front-wheel-drive platform in the pipeline, Cadillac could simply abandon the large luxury sedan segment. With the collapse of the conventional SUV market, the Escalade also seems unlikely to live on in its current form.

So, whither Cadillac? With the foray into Teutonic territory one for four, and no funds for another round, Cadillac’s target must shift from the Germans to entry-level Lexus. For 2010, the SRX switches to an Equinox-related front-wheel-drive platform. Next up: a LaCrosse-based sedan. After that: perhaps a Lambda-based Escalade.

In short, Cadillac’s new focus will be Buick’s current focus: front-wheel-drive-based, comfort-biased vehicles with transaction prices in the thirties to low forties. If the two aren’t to overlap, Buick will either have to shimmy closer to Chevy or become China-only. Among the many casualties of GM’s meltdown, this forced acceptance of Cadillac’s second-tier status could be the saddest. Even Lincoln, which beat a similar retreat post-Nasser, could emerge with a stronger product line.

Want to remember Cadillac at its final zenith? Buy a 2009 CTS-V.

One of our Best and Brightest pointed us to these “back of the envelope” calculations on the relative costs of running GM’s dealer network. [The comment was originally posted on the DealersEdge website. We’ve republished it here with the author’s permission.]

In a very limited attempt to figure out the savings, I’ve come up with a quickie comparison of just the cost of “reps”, with a number of assumptions. Comparing GM and its 6400 dealers to Toyota and their 1200 dealers (both of which sell almost the same amount of cars). Assuming 2 Reps (one Sales one Fixed) for every 10 dealers (for both manufacturers) and a 1:10 ratio for Supervisory positions of those reps (for both manufacturers) and for the sake of easy calculations, assume 100K Salary average for everyone.

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No, really. The Detroit News reports that prior to its Chapter 11 filing, Chrysler sought to sell off parts of the company to everyone. “Chrysler sent letters to parties, primarily in China, whom we thought would be potentially interested in purchasing our assets,” writes ChryCo’s Tom LaSorda in a bankruptcy filing affidavit. “Over the next two months, several companies, including Beijing Automotive Industry Holding Co., Tempo International Group, Hawtai Automobiles, and Chery Automotive Co., expressed interest in purchasing specific vehicles, powertrains, intellectual property rights, distribution channels and automotive brands.” But guess what? Not even these ambitious firms were tempted to spend a dime on Chrysler’s alleged assets. And the major OEMs in the global auto game? Chrysler’s efforts to form alliances with Nissan, GM, Volkswagen, Tata Motors, Magna, GAZ, Hyundai, Honda and Toyota “have been determined and undertaken in good faith but have met uniformly without success,” admits LaSorda.

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There were plenty of entertaining moments on last night’s Autoline After Hours. Fortress Detroit’s ugly bunker mentality proved at every turn what people (specifically, former GM consultants) mean when they accuse the American auto industry of problems of culture (with footnotes!). But TTAC is here to help. And our first suggestion to those feeling threatened by the collapse of their comfortable, familiar world is to read more. Seriously. “You don’t think Toyota makes any money on their hybrids do you?” asked one torpid apologist. Unless the Nikkei (via Green Car Congress) is part of the dreaded “we hate Detroit” conspiracy, it turns out that Toyota does make money on their hybrids.

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