Category: Editorials

By on May 29, 2007

vwscirocco.jpgDuring one of my first job interviews, the HR guy threw me a curve ball. How do you define quality? The question stopped me cold. I’d just read Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, in which the main character went insane trying to answer that same question. I don’t remember what I said, but thus began a long-term intellectual exploration. I know this website has tried to define this seemingly nebulous term many times, but here’s what I’ve been thinking.

In software engineering, ISO 9126 defines quality according to six characteristics: functionality, reliability, usability, efficiency, maintainability and portability. Domestic automakers use similar design, performance and longevity parameters to bible stack swear they’re building quality products (these days).

And yet American consumers ain’t buyin’ it (literally). They continue to believe that The Big 2.8 have lower quality automobiles than foreign or transplanted product. The domestics dismiss the apparent discrepancy as a “perception gap.”

Clearly, there is a semantic disconnect. Part of the problem: when it comes to cars, there are hundred of ways to measure “quality.” Is quality determined by materials, acoustics, ergonomics, design, dynamics, reliability or some combination of these and other factors? In what order? Without a specific definition, quality becomes a meaningless term. For example…

My 1988 VW Scirocco 16V had a splendid black leather interior, drove beautifully and consumed transmissions and Pirellis on a regular basis. I also owned a 1995 Ford Escort GT. It never broke down, the seats were living hell and the car drove like a Maytag washer. Both of these car had similar performance characteristics (horsepower, acceleration, grip).

The Volkswagen offered a superior driver-machine connection and curb appeal, with limited reliability and expensive repair costs. The Ford was dynamically inferior, but reliable and cheap to maintain. They were both high quality; they were both low quality.

And what of relative (does it beat the competition) and absolute quality (does it get the job done)? In other words, automotive quality is both subjective AND individual. What, exactly, do you want the vehicle to do? Can you tolerate breakdowns? What are your specific requirements for things such as cost, fuel efficiency, seating capacity and performance? What about the feel of the leather or the amount of steering feedback?

The Biz school def of quality may be our best guide. They define quality as a product or service’s ability to satisfy its customer’s desires. Using this formula, relative satisfaction determines relative quality. If a car “delights” the customer (a nauseating MBA term for sure), it’s considered a “higher quality” vehicle than one that just gets on with the business of meeting expectations.

Most automakers miss the overarching implications of this definition. They obsess over vehicular reliability– the numbers of defects and cycles until failure– because they believe (rightly) that customers find the maintenance process an unpleasant experience. Any subsequent loss of transportation and cash results in a dramatic loss of customer satisfaction, thus lowering perceived quality.

It’s generally acknowledged that the world’s largest carmaker keeps its customers happy by building the most reliable cars. And the automotive media’s fascination with quantifiable comparisons certainly fans the flames of this objective data OCD. But preventing pain is not as important as creating happiness, and again, happiness is the key to automotive quality.

My Escort-owning experience proved (at least to me) that subjective happiness is a better measure of perceived quality than a lack of pain. A car may not break down once during an owner’s tenure (the automaker’s Holy Grail), but an owner may still consider it a POS after five years.

And yes, you CAN engineer-in happiness. Depending on the consumer’s predilections, an exterior that delights them throughout their ownership experience is as important a measure of quality as a reliable engine. 

By the same token, after-sale service is an extremely important determinant of an automobile’s perceived quality. A given Lexus may break down more than a given Cadillac, but a bad (or just ugly-looking) dealership can easily instantly obviate the Caddy’s (theoretical) mechanical advantage.

It’s seems bizarre that carmakers leave overall customer happiness to the vagaries of profit-oriented dealers, mechanics, service stations and other third parties of the automotive service industry. But they do.

You could even say that automakers relentless pursuit of quality is headed in the wrong direction. Instead of obsessing over the hunk of metal and plastic on the floor, they should be looking at the amount of customer happiness. And not just at day one, but at day 3,650 and beyond.

Manufacturers seeking to produce quality cars should commit themselves to delighting customers throughout the entire ownership experience, at every single point of contact: dealership, internet, everywhere. Trying to quantify quality may be enough to drive anyone crazy, but focusing on customer happiness will keep a car company– any car company– in business.

By on May 27, 2007

caddy16.jpgThere is no greater symbol of GM’s branding woes than Cadillac. During its formative years, the marque’s products stood at the pinnacle of automotive excellence. As The Grateful Dead would say, what a long strange trip it’s been: from coachbuilder to maharajahs to supplier of Chevrolet clones to America’s mid-market motorists. In a world of $30k Rolex watches and $500 wine, Cadillac no longer deserves to be called a luxury brand. Its failure epitomizes all that went wrong with GM’s branding.

Cadillac was formed from the ashes of the first Ford Motor Company. When Henry’s early backers asked Engineer Henry Leyland to appraise the failed business’ assets, the Vermont native convinced them to resume operations using his 10hp one-cylinder engine. In 1902, Cadillac was born.

Leyland applied his experience as a gun maker to spectacular effect. The company’s fanatical attention to parts quality and interchangeability created an extraordinarily reliable vehicle. When three model K Cadillacs aced a series of English reliability tests (including scrambling key components from three cars and then rebuilding them), Cadillac earned its reputation as the “Standard of the World.”

GM bought the innovative automaker in 1909. From the start of the century into the roaring twenties, Cadillac pushed the engineering envelope. The automaker introduced the first electric starter, safety glass, V8 power, synchronized transmission and more.

When Alfred Sloan reorganized GM according to his principle “a car for every pocketbook,” Cadillac occupied the top berth, above Buick. Sloan then pushed the brand into the auto-stratosphere.

Caddy’s 1930 portfolio included the LaSalle, V8, V12 and the V16 (fully the equal of the Rolls Royce, Duesenberg, Packard and other coach-built cars of the Classic era). Prices ranged from $3295 to $9700– roughly $80k to $300k in today’s money.

The Depression killed the V16, and almost took the brand with it. In 1932, GM contemplated shuttering the division. Cadillac’s president Nicholas Dreystadt presented an alternative: sell the brand’s less stratospherically-priced products to America’s nascent African American upper class.

Opening its doors to this neglected market saved Cadillac from oblivion, but subjected the brand to a new threat. As Sloan’s once-sacred pricing structure eroded, Cadillac’s top-of-the-pile price premium shrank. In 1940, the cheapest Cadillac was 150 percent more expensive than the most expensive Chevy. By 1950, it was 65 percent. By 1960, it was just 30 percent.

The fifties and early sixties were Cadillac’s second golden era. America’s income distribution was the most compressed it had ever been; a brashly styled Caddy was a commonly-shared icon representing the American dream.

While Caddy’s prices continued to fall in this era, their models were still a fantasy for the typical working-class family. Factory workers were known to pool resources to buy a Cadillac on a time-share basis.

During the ‘60’s, America experienced an explosive growth of Median Household Income (MHI). Cadillac chased the booming mid-market, losing touch with its rapidly fading luxury remit. In 1960, a basic Cadillac cost 87 percent of MHI; by 1970, it was down to 64 percent. In 1971, the Calais cost only 25 percent more than a Caprice.

GM singularly failed to do the right thing: take Cadillac back up-market to cater to the rapidly growing ranks of wealthy and near-wealthy, and enhance Buick and Oldsmobile to take Cadillac’s place in the lower-premium market.

Product wasn’t the problem. In a 1965 Car & Driver luxury car comparo, Cadillac finished a close second (just behind the three-times more expensive Mercedes 600) and handily beat Roll-Royce, Lincoln, Imperial and Jaguar.

C&D hit the nail on the head: “Among enthusiasts, the Cadillac is probably the most underrated car in the world, although in some ways, it equals or excels the Mercedes 600. In our estimation, Cadillac’s great sales success is all that hurts its ‘image’ as a prestige luxury car.”

Cadillac’s fit, finish and build quality went downhill from there, as the high-volume, low price strategy meant cheaper materials and rushed assembly. In 1964, nobody would have confused an Impala for a DeVille. By 1971, the Caprice and DeVille were precariously similar in both style and build quality.

GM’s destruction transformation of a globally-respected, technologically-superior luxury brand into a tarted-up Chevrolet for middle class buyers was complete.

America’s upper-income classes abandoned Cadillac for Mercedes, whose sales began a long expansive period around 1970. In 1973, Cadillac sales enjoyed a brief explosion (stealing from Chevrolet?). Sales exceeded 300k in 1973, peaking at 350k in 1978. And then Cadillac began its near-terminal decline.

Today’s Cadillacs have established a precarious foothold where Buick once lived: at the top end of the ‘near luxury’ automotive market. Talk of a new V16 to reposition Cadillac higher up in the food chain has faded, leaving the brand with the prospect of more mediocrity. Badge-engineered SUV’s, price-conscious sedans and an uncompetitive roadster portend a bleak future for Cadillac, and GM.

By on May 26, 2007

vermont-cops.jpgWhen it comes to police roadblocks designed to catch drunk drivers, the public is conflicted . On one hand, there are plenty of people who believe that any anti-drunk driving law enforcement practice that saves even one life is fully justifiable. On the other hand, many Americans consider a police roadblock a quasi-fascist police tactic: an unconstitutional violation of their legal right to travel without facing [what they consider to be] indiscriminate search and seizure. Guess which way the American Beverage Association (ABI) comes down on the issue.

In these politically correct times, you might think the ABI would support ANY anti-drunk driving initiative, no matter how draconian. Nope. On the cusp of the traditional Memorial Day drink-driving law enforcement crackdown, the restaurant trade association “dedicated to protecting the on-premise dining experience” voiced their vehement opposition to random roadblocks.

“These police anti-drunk driving roadblocks target responsible adults who drink legally and responsibly before driving,” prnounced spokesperson Sarah Longwell. “They are all too easily avoided by the repeat offenders and chronic abusers who make up the overwhelming majority of today's drunk driving problem."

The ABI's press release cites a National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) study concluding that roving police patrols are almost three times more effective at apprehending drunk drivers than “random” roadblocks. In a telephone interview, Longwell said her organization’s anti-roadblock stance is more than a matter of stats. It reflects simple common sense.

“Which sounds more effective,” Longwell asked. “Putting cops on the streets and the highways who are trained to look for drunk and impaired drivers, or pulling them off the streets, making them stand at one place, and just check everybody who comes through to see if they may or may not be drinking.”

Longwell denies the suggestion that the ABI is trying to protect members whose customers may not drink due to possible police roadblocks– which would reduce the restaurant owners’ profits. She says her organizations’ “sober training certification program” proves that restaurants are doing their best to stop drunk driving.

“Our program teaches bartenders, waiters and waitress, the people on the ground, how to not over-serve, and how to spot people who are overly intoxicated and appear to be driving… A lot of it is about cutting off the service at a certain time or calling cabs, ensuring that they don’t get in the car if they’ve had too much.”

The ABI’s efforts to stem drunk driving at the source are to be commended, but their anti-roadblock arguments may be less compelling than they seem. Their press release quotes stats prepared with what can only be called fuzzy logic. For example: “The 11 states that do not operate roadblocks experienced 91 fewer alcohol-related fatalities collectively in 2005 compared to 2004.”

What’s more, TTAC could only find one recent NHTSA alcohol-related study: “Creating Impaired Driving General Deterrence: Eight Case Studies of Sustained, High-Visibility, Impaired-Driving Enforcement.” While the ABI may have crunched NHTSA’s numbers independently, the report does not conclude that roving patrols are three times more effective than roadblocks.

There’s also persuasive evidence to suggest that police roadblocks ARE successful at deterring drunk drivers. According to a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) report published in the December 2002 issue of Traffic Injury Prevention, police implemented “sobriety checkpoints” decrease alcohol-related car crashes by about 20 percent.

The CDC review was based on 23 “scientifically-sound” international studies. The results were roughly identical, regardless of whether or not police checkpoints were short-term “blitzes” or operated continuously over several years.

No matter how drunk drivers are apprehended, the ABI believes that not offenders are alike. Unlike zero tolerance crusaders like Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), Longwell’s organization lobbies for graduated penalties: ankle bracelets for hard core repeat offenders, less severe penalties for infrequent or less intoxicated drivers.

In this, the ABI is swimming against the tide. State laws against drunk driving are becoming increasingly severe. Many states (e.g. Kansas, Indiana and Georgia) have adopted “Habitual Violator Laws” that impose felony penalties for three DUI convictions, including the permanent loss of the violator’s legal right to drive and more limited prohibitions against voting or owning a firearm.

According to the Department of Justice, in 2005, police arrested nearly 1.4m drivers for driving under the influence of alcohol or narcotics. In that same year, 16,885 people, some 39 percent of all traffic-related deaths, were killed in alcohol-related motor vehicle crashes. And a CDC report found “insufficient evidence” to recommend the use of designated driver programs.

All of which leaves us where we started, with police roadblocks aimed at preventing/stopping drunk drivers. While you can understand the ABI and civil-rights-minded citizens’ distaste for police roadblocks, the questions must still be asked: what have we got to lose?

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By on May 26, 2007

van.jpgI followed the old maxim: “go west young man” to its ultimate conclusion: the California beach. I guess I missed an exit. I was looking for an opportunity to start a career. What I found instead was the clothing-optional Black’s Beach near San Diego. After spending two months watching pelicans skimming the waves and hang-gliders surfing the breeze off the cliff tops, I had a great tan. But I was broke. So for the last time in my life (fingers crossed), I defaulted to driving for a living. Read More >

By on May 25, 2007

1938-buick-y-job-courtesy-seriouswheelscom.jpgBuick was the special child in the GM family: the beautiful and temperamental second-oldest daughter that somehow always got the most attention from Daddy. Sure, oldest daughter Caddy got to wear the family jewels and formal gowns, but Buick was lavished with style. Whether it was Harley Earl or Bill Mitchell, GM’s top stylists always blessed Buick with their best efforts. For decades, Buick was maintained in the style to which she had become accustomed, and remained America’s fashion-conscious upscale buyers’ wheels of choice. And then, not.

Scotsman David Dunbar Buick founded his eponymous automobile company in 1903. The following year, the inventor of the overhead valve engine sold the struggling concern to James Whiting, an ambitious wagon builder. Whiting turned to William Durant to help jump start Buick.

With an excellent product to sell (the Model C), Durant’s energy, affability and marketing genius ensured Buick’s ascension to profit and glory. Durant used Buick’s revenues to acquire dozens of other automakers and form General Motors.

Right from the get-go, Buick was GM’s anchor brand. Durant capitalized on the company’s engineering excellence and reputation to expand sales around the globe. In 1926, Buick sold a then-staggering 260k cars.

The Great Depression hit the brakes but good; annual Buick sales plummeted below 40k. GM President and future CEO Alfred Sloan used the downturn to rationalize GM’s brand portfolio. He slotted the consummate “doctor’s car” between affordable Oldsmobile and unapproachable Cadillac.

Priced at around $40k to $65k in today’s dollars, pre-war Buicks were the Lexi of their time: refined, smooth, powerful, elegant and built to last. They were the consummate “doctor’s car.”

By the late thirties, GM’s inter-brand demarcations had begun their inexorable erosion. Buick’s product line overlapped a significant portion of Olds’ and Pontiac’s price range. As internal competition intensified, Buick cultivated two selling points to stay ahead: performance and style.

Throughout the ‘30’s and into the ‘40’s, Buick espoused its General Manager’s “more speed for less money” maxim. In 1936, Buick had a brand-new 320-cid 120hp straight-eight, designed for the large and heavy Series 80/90. When the company shoehorned the big eight into the smaller and lighter Series 40, it was dubbed Century, for its readily attained top speed. Thus the first factory production “hot-rod” was born.

When Harley Earl joined GM in 1927, he created the Arts and Color Section: the car world’s prototype styling studio. Earl used the Buick brand to showcase his most significant creative output.

Earl’s Buick Y-Job of 1938 was the world’s first dream-car. Unlike the European salon specials sold to exclusive buyers, the Y-Job’s was created to build excitement for future GM products, and showcase their styling direction. The Y-Job succeeded brilliantly; it solidified GM’s global styling leadership. And Buick’s.

The 1951 Buick LeSabre and XP-300 dream cars initiated the GM Motorama era, a grand traveling carnival of GM-think. Until 1961, Motoramas showed Americans a tempting glimpse of the (ever better) good life to come, from cars to kitchen appliances. And GMAC would finance the dream.

The consumer era was now in high gear, and Buick style led the way.

Buick enjoyed its greatest market-share success in the mid-fifties. From 1954 through 1956, Buick was America’s third most popular automotive brand. During those heady days, models like the Century, Super, Roadmaster and Special defined affordable American automotive luxury, class and power.

In ’57, Plymouth’s radical models pushed Buick back to number four. But it was Buick’s horrendously overwrought ’58 models that really hurt. Renaming 1959’s Buick entire line-up (LeSabre, Invicta and Electra) didn’t help. By 1960, Buick’s market position had tumbled to ninth.

Buick desperately needed a new make-up artist, and found it in Bill Mitchell. The 1963 Riviera coupe was Mitchell’s tour-de-force: one of the most beautiful American cars of the post-war era. It had the class, cachet and authenticity of a Mercedes CL or Bentley Continental. The Riviera’s halo effect worked; by 1965, Buick was back to fifth place.

Fast forward a decade, and Buick’s hot new coupe is the execrable Skyhawk, a clone of Chevy’s Vega-based Monza. Alternatively, Buick intenders could contemplate the Skylark, a padded landau-roofed version of Chevy’s Nova.

The preceding and ensuing string of badge-engineered disasters were unleashed at the exact moment when Buick needed to strengthen its roots– style, performance and quality. Up-scale import competition from Mercedes, BMW, Audi and later, Lexus, stole traditional Buick customers by the tens of thousands.

Buick’s subsequent decline is too painful to describe in detail, especially during the mid to late eighties. After that, it was either too little too late, or another kick in the groin, like the Rendezvous.

No wonder Buick packed her bags and slipped away to China, where she’s once again adored and idolized. All she left behind moldering in American showrooms are ghosts, pale shadows of her former stylish self. And plenty of beautiful memories.

By on May 25, 2007

hummerh2.jpgWas the Hummer brand really born four years ago? The Army-inspired H2 now occupies a fading mindspace. It’s a relic from a time when America’s foreign policy problems were out there, somewhere. When gasoline was like Gatorade: a cheap, endless commodity that hydrated the hopes and dreams of a nation. Post-911, post-Katrina, post-Iraq, the H2 somehow remains. But not for long. According to our spies, GM has slated the gas-gargling mondo-SUV for termination. What’s THAT all about?

Disappearing buyers. Since its debut in 2003, H2 sales have fallen faster than George W’s approval rating (if only just). The macho model’s popularity peaked in its first year, sinking not-so-slowly but entirely predictably thereafter.

In 2006, GM sold less than half as many H2’s as it did in 2003. If the trend from the first four months of this year carries through to its gruesome conclusion, the H2 will rack-up just 12K annual sales, down 65% from its debut. Unless the 2008 makeover– upgraded interior, six-speed gearbox, 6.2-liter V8– rekindles faded ardor, it will be the model's last hurrah. Or raspberry.

On a deeper level, the Hummer’s decline reflects the political temper of our times. While the H2 is no less fuel efficient than any other gi-normous SUV (e.g. the now discontinued Ford Excursion), its inherently impolite dimensions and unabashedly militaristic demeanor made it a lightning rod for environmentalists and anti-war protesters alike. For these left-leaning activists, the H2 was/is the automotive equivalent of the ugly American.

H2 owners know the drill. Even before the Iraq war lost momentum, driving an H2 in a blue state urban area meant running a gauntlet of middle finger-flashing anger. Like a crew cut on a Vietnam-era conservative, trip-wire liberals clock an H2 and immediately assume its owner possesses a right wing political perspective and supports America’s foreign military operations.

It’s an entirely understandable if simplistic assumption that puts H2 owners on the defensive from the git-go. The model’s decline is at least partially attributable to the fact that only so many SUV drivers are ready, willing and able to run an endless gauntlet of unabashed antipathy.

No question: the H2’s rugged military persona was the key its downfall. It provided detractors with plenty of ammunition (so to speak) for self-righteous feelings of revulsion and disgust.

For example, while anti-SUV campaigners could almost forgive the cataclysmic damage wrought by a full-size SUV on a smaller vehicle as an unintended consequence of its owner’s understandable (if selfish) desire to protect their progeny, they viewed the Hummer as a four-wheeled metaphor for unbridled arrogance:  “F.U. and the compact car you drove into me on.”

Contrary to popular belief, very few Hummer H2 buyers were motivated by a desire to make a political statement. While there’s no escaping the H2’s GI Joe fantasy factor, a large number of consumers chose the Hummer based on its off-road capabilities. And it’s true: plenty of H2 owners deploy their machine as government contractor AM General intended. While the 6400 lbs. SUV is a bit jumbo-sized for many off-road trails, in the main, she can “git ‘er done.”

Yet many Hummeristas remained oblivious to the fact that the H2’s exterior places the off-roader's terrain traversing chops into a distinctly sinister context. Most full-size SUV’s seem to say “One day, I may take my family off-road to commune with nature.” At best, the Hummer’s take-no-prisoner exterior proclaims “Survivalist on board.” At worst, worse. 

Now that the Hummer H2 is on its way out, environmentalists/peace campaigners will have a hard time finding an equally obvious and (let’s face it) easy target. This despite the fact that the Hummer isn’t really dead; the model was replaced by the smaller, more frugal, cheaper-to-produce and less aggressive-looking H3.

In its first year of production (2005), the H3 accounted for 58 percent of Hummer’s sales. By 2006, the figure rose to 74 percent. So far this year, GM has sold 13k H3’s— more than the entire anticipated annual run of H2’s.

Even so, the total number of Hummers due to be sold in ‘07 is significantly less than that of a single Chevy model– which hardly seems sufficient to sustain an entire GM brand. As the H2 leaves the battlefield, one wonders if there will still be a Hummer to kick around four years hence.

I reckon the Hummer brand’s survival depends on two factors. First, GM must avoid bankruptcy. Second, Hummer must develop products that sell military prowess without projecting military arrogance or aggression. Either that or America’s armed forces’ fortunes must change abroad, to the point where it’s once again OK to drive a vehicle that celebrates our troops’ mucho macho can-do spirit. None of these possibilities seem likely.

Meanwhile, the Smithsonian Institution should find an early H2 to place into their permanent collection. No other machine so perfectly captured and distilled the gestalt of its time as the H2. Loved or loathed, GM’s lumbering leviathan deserves to be remembered for what it was: a uniquely American icon.

By on May 24, 2007

toronado1.jpgOf all of GM’s domestic brands, Oldsmobile most accurately represents everything that went wrong with GM’s divisional structure. Historically the most innovative GM division, its twilight years were spent pathetically proclaiming “This is not your father’s Oldsmobile.” Olds rode a roller-coaster in the sales charts, hitting glorious peaks before its final, fatal free-fall. But the tragedy of Olds is that it could have been the instrument of GM’s redemption.

Ransom E. Olds founded his eponymous automobile company in 1897. In 1901, the Curved Dash Oldsmobile was the world’s first mass-produced automobile. Although expensive in absolute terms, it was the lowest priced machine of its day.

But Olds wasn’t Ford. By the time GM bought Olds in 1908, the brand had moved upmarket. Two years later, Oldsmobile unveiled The Limited, a stunning but expensive ($4600) achievement.

When a Limited won a famous race with the Twentieth Century Limited locomotive, Oldsmobile found its marketing niche. From then on, glamour, power and speed defined Oldsmobile’s appeal.

As part of his brand ladder strategy, GM boss Alfred Sloan knocked Olds down a couple of pegs, placing it right between Pontiac and big brother Buick. While Chevrolet and Ford fought for supremacy at the bottom of the market, GM’s Buick, Olds and Pontiac (BOP) line-up proved a formidable formula. It gave The General a seemingly unassailable stranglehold on America’s automotive mid-market.

When GM’s price structure began to compress in the forties and fifties, Olds embarked on a course of safe, predictable and increasingly boring GM fluff. Although the brand earned its keep with several popular products (e.g. the Rocket-powered 88), as the middle child, Oldsmobile felt the pricing squeeze most acutely.

It wasn’t long before Oldsmobile fielded essentially identical line-ups with both Pontiac and Buick. Style became one of the few distinguishing factors. Olds faired relatively poorly in GM’s inter-divisional beauty contests; the ’58 models are particularly loathsome examples of garish Detroit baroque.

As Pontiac and Buick expanded into Olds’ once happy hunting grounds, the division struggled to make a living in brand limbo. Oldsmobile had to find something substantive to sell, independent of pricing and fashion.

Technical innovation was the answer. Building on a reputation for mechanical creativity– sealed with the Hydramatic Drive of 1940– Oldsmobile became GM’s “experimental division.”

The Rocket V8 of 1949 was a perfect example; it was the first popularly-priced high-compression V8. The engine turned the light-weight Oldsmobile 88 into the first modern performance car, and ushered in the horsepower race. Olds went on to pioneer front wheel-drive (Toronado, 1966), turbo-charging (Turbo Jetfire, 1962) and air bags (1974).

In the ‘70’s, Oldsmobile finally hit its stride. The success of the Cutlass helped Olds leapfrog Pontiac and Plymouth to become America’s third most popular automotive brand.

In 1977, Oldsmobile ran afoul of GM’s increasing predilection for parts sharing. A shortage of Rocket V8’s led to the substitution of Chevy engines instead— on the down low. GM’s response to the uproar was to add the label “GM cars are equipped with engines produced by various GM divisions”. It was another milestone in the terminal decline of divisional brand identity.

With GM’s BOP price strategy in tatters, with the last vestiges of inter-brand mechanical differentiation cast aside, with Oldsmobile dealers demanding (and receiving) badge engineered copies of the genre of the moment (minivan, SUV, compact, etc.), Oldsmobile was on autopilot to oblivion.

In the mid-late eighties, Olds crashed and burned, as America’s mid-market tastes shifted towards imports. The inadequately-developed Olds diesel V8 spewed more fuel on the flames of GM’s quality woes. Between 1985 and 1990, Oldsmobile sales plummeted by 60 percent.

In 1985, GM desperately needed innovative design, engineering, production, quality control and customer service. Oldsmobile coulda/shoulda been the home of plastic panels, or hybrid propulsion, or flexible manufacturing, or any number of potentially liberating technologies.

Instead, GM Chairman Roger Smith spent billions creating an entirely new domestic brand: Saturn. The upstart start-up replaced Oldsmobile as GM’s innovative, experimental division, effectively sealing Olds’ fate.

On April 29, 2004, GM produced its last Oldsmobile: a cherry-red Alero GL. While the model has its defenders, the badge-engineered Pontiac Grand Am was still an ignominious end for a 110-year-old brand, whose powerful and charismatic eight cylinder engine inspired the world’s first rock and roll song.

Oldsmobile’s death taught GM an important lesson: it couldn’t afford to shutter its other moribund divisions, restore order to its brand portfolio and rationalize its business. Strict state-enforced automobile dealer franchise laws punished GM for pulling the plug– to the tune of over a billion dollars. Olds’ death also demonstrated that shuttering one amorphous GM division does nothing whatsoever to help the remaining brand’s sales.

And now Saturn is in the same boat as Olds was during the eighties: competing with its corporate siblings with platform-engineered cars and fighting for limited development and marketing dollars. What’s so innovative about that?

By on May 23, 2007

65_gto.jpgGrand Prix, GTO, Firebird, LeMans, Catalina 2+2, Bonneville. The names evoke automotive magic— provided you were an enthusiast between six and sixty during the ‘60’s. For today’s pistonheads, these storied names; indeed, the entire Pontiac brand has lost its adrenal association. Even the drop-dead gorgeous Solstice can’t rescue a marque now known for budget-priced, badge-engineered mediocrity. Pontiac’s fall from grace may not be the worst (best?) example of GM’s branding cataclysm, but it’s one of the most emotive. Read More >

By on May 22, 2007

chevrolet490.jpgDuring the American car industry’s formative years, entrepreneurs started car companies left and right, jostling for quick profits and market share. Flint Rock native William Durant had a meta vision: agglomerate the best of the new automakers to create an empire called General Motors. This he did, through endless charm and clever financing. But Durant gambled too much too often, and lost control of his brainchild. The Chevrolet brand was born out of wedlock, to fund Billy Durant’s comeback. Read More >

By on May 22, 2007

ractingcarpot.jpgYou heeded our call. You nominated the cars you considered the best of the best. Without fear or favor, TTAC’s tenacious tribe of telic keyboard tappers selected twenty vehicles from your list of over a hundred superlative automobiles. You voted for 10 of them, creating our first annual Ten Best Automobiles. The voting was often extremely close, but the end result was never in doubt: a selection of ten automobiles that any self-respecting motorist would be proud to own, and delighted to drive. Ladies and gentlemen, raise your tea mugs as I present to you: TTAC’s Ten Best for 2007.

By on May 21, 2007

cadillacv16.jpgImagine a different GM from today’s confused and embattled automaker. A General Motors where each division has a clear and coherent brand, universally known and recognized by automotive consumers. Where each division’s image and related price range is unique, without overlap. Where each division is the dominant brand– or at least highly competitive– in its respective market segment. Welcome to General Motors circa 1930. Read More >

By on May 20, 2007

bolero2.jpgNine countries in the world have nuclear weapons. Oddly enough, that’s the same number of nations that design and build their own cars from scratch. The two accomplishments don’t have all that much in common, except that the former may indicate just how much scientific and engineering prowess the latter requires. India is one of a handful of states on both lists. The West tends not to think too much about the country’s carmakers because the world’s largest democracy has spent the last 50 years making cars for India, and India alone. That’s changing. Fast.

India’s automotive market is booming. While U.S. automobile sales stalled in April, India’s rose 11.8 percent year-to-date (105,962 units vs. 94,771). In 2006, local and foreign firms combined to manufacture 1.4m vehicles. Sure, experts estimate that China’s vehicular population will hit 10 million in 2007, but India’s growth rate is even more spectacular. They’re expected to double automotive output by 2008, and keep going from there.

The Indian car industry’s explosive growth reflects three main trends: a huge jump in the living standards of India’s middle class, an increase in their disposable income and regulatory liberalization. The latter includes the relaxation of the foreign exchange and equity restrictions, reduction of punitive import tariffs, and reform of Byzantine banking policies (to allow consumer financing).

The changes have created a vibrant sector. There are currently 41 automobile companies operating in India, from Ashock Leyland to TVS Suzuki. There are native companies, foreign partnerships and foreign subsidiaries. They offer a wide array of automotive products, from the (plug in) all-electric Reva Standard, to the once import-protected and now embattled Hindustan Ambassador, to the Lamborghini Murcielago.

The country has a “Big 2.5” and they’re on a roll. Last year, Mahindra & Mahindra earned $3.2b in gross profits from its car and truck branch. Maruti Udyog Limited, a subsidiary of Suzuki and Indian automotive industry leader, sells about 50k cars a month. Tata Motors also sells just under that amount AND brags of a 19 percent rise in sales for ‘06.  

Western automakers are betting on India. Mercedes' new Indian factory is set to produce 5k cars a year (up from 2,121 vehicles in 2006). Ford India plans to open 135 new dealerships this year, capitalizing on its 45 percent year-on-year sales growth (41,797 vs. 28,840 units). GM recently declared it wants 10 percent of the Indian market by 2010 (200,000 units). To that end, they have just launched the 309k rupees ($7,300) Chevrolet Spark.

Toyota’s also shooting for 10 percent of India’s automotive business by the same deadline. India is reported to be ground zero for the Japanese automaker’s new global small car platform, which will be modified for local tastes and budgets. The GM and Toyota products will go up against Mahindra & Mahindra’s sub-$3k car and Tata’s planned 33 horsepower, $2500 four-door.

Fully assembled cars are only part of the story. Successful parts manufacturers have sprouted up alongside the assembly plants throughout India, contributing to the industry’s overall health and wealth. The main reason BMW opened an assembly plant in Chennai: access to quality suppliers.

All these Indian operations require local labor and management. Necessity has proven the mother of talent. A new cadre of educated automotive professionals has emerged.

Dilip Chhabria is a prominent example of India’s new breed of auto industry insiders. Chhabria began his career as an automotive designer working for General Motors in the States. It was not the best fit (or finish) for him. "I was not going to design door handles and hub caps for 20 years before I got a shot at designing cars," he told Businessweek.

Chhabria set up DC Design in ’93. The company now claims 300 employees and over 500 automotive designs (OEM, custom and prototyping). Dilip Chhabria decided to take his stake in India nascent automotive industry to the next level, and share his intellectual capital.

This August, the eponymous DC College of Automotive Design will welcome 1500 students. DC is working with Italy's Polytechnic di Turino to develop engineering courses, and the Istituto Europeo di Design for creative curriculum. DC will offer undergraduate and two-year postgraduate programs on automotive styling, transportation design, and engineering. By the time the first students matriculate, the Indian automotive industry may already be operating on the next level.

As American gas and labor prices continue their inexorable rise, demand for well-made yet cheaply-produced gas-sippers has blossomed. While all eyes are on China, it's only a matter of time before Ford, GM and other Western automakers use their Indian assets to design, build and export inexpensive and frugal ‘captive imports’ stateside.

After that, who knows? If Korea’s Hyundai can move its products upmarket, so can India. The United Auto Workers had better watch out. If they dig in their heels, domestic automakers are sure to use the nuclear option.

By on May 19, 2007

newlook.jpg

It was the mother of all drifts. Forty feet behind me, the back of the passenger bus was coming around fast, threatening to wipe out a block’s worth of cars parked across the street. By the time I caught the first slide, I had overcompensated. My arms were a whirling dervish on the giant steering wheel, flying back and forth, until the bus straightened out. No need to stop for coffee THAT day; I was wide awake on a triple-shot of adrenalin. Read More >

By on May 17, 2007

antara.jpgAs GM tosses the last pieces of furniture into the cash conflagration burning down their house, you are going to see some seriously weird shit. Saturn’s new tagline is the most recent anomaly from the End of Days department: “Rethink American.” Given that the new Saturn Astra will be built in Belgium and the new Saturn Vue will be built in Mexico, you’ve got to wonder what bright spark (no concept car intended) OK’ed an ad campaign based on post-modern irony. Oh wait; they’re serious. They want customers to equate Saturn's Opelized lineup with American patriotism. How bizarre is that?

Rivet counting readers know that Chevy’s tagline– “An American revolution”– ignored a Korean-made car in that brand’s stable. And a Canadian Impala. And a Mexican Avalanche, Silverado, Suburban and HHR. They might also be aware that every car in Saturn’s new lineup will soon be based on European Opel designs– save the Outlook and Sky, which both entered Saturn’s orbit via the time-honored GM tradition of badge engineering.

Business-oriented readers might wonder why Saturn would play the American card when the corporate mothership has staked its future on “world cars” built on shared platforms. Or how an ad agency named Deutsch (which is German for “German”) figured that a Saturn ad campaign appealing to American patriotism would work when Chevy’s “My Country” ad campaign did sweet FA for the Silverado.

If you’re not a member of either camp, how about this: Dan Keller, Saturn’s marketing director since January, explained his brand’s new approach by claiming Saturn was free to re-invent itself. Why? “We don't have all the baggage the domestic car companies have.” So the marketing director responsible for an American-themed re-branding campaign forgot that Saturn is a division of the largest car company in the U.S.? Weird.

In fact, the division GM CEO Roger Smith Saturn founded to be GM’s “import fighter” is now using imports to fight cars built by foreign-owned companies in the United States. Go figure.

Meanwhile, as I said, GM is throwing pieces of its [former] American Empire on its own funeral pyre. The General is now looking to sell its medium-duty truck unit to truck and engine maker Navistar International Corp. The news comes hot on the heels of the revelation they’re trying to unload Allison Transmissions.

While medium trucks are a relatively small business for GM (last year they sold 59k vehicles under various nameplates), Allison is a large and thriving concern. The division currently adds about $500m cash flow to The General’s coffers. And yet GM wants to unload the company for about $3b. Wants or needs? While the spinmeisters talk about “focus,” we’re keeping an eye on the cash.

As, no doubt, are the private equity vultures who’ve been circling GM for some time. And now that Cerberus has thrown open the factory gates of Hell over at Chrysler, it’s only a matter of time before someone, somewhere figures out a way to extract financial value from GM by carving it into pieces. You don’t have to be a frustrated Corvette intender or a Hummertainment Center owner to know that there are significant bits of GM with latent value– if only someone could sever the bureaucratic umbilical cord.

Truth to tell, even Saturn would be better off on its own. Rethink American? What the Hell’s wrong with American? And what the Hell was wrong with Saturn? Not so long ago, Saturn built an innovative, home-grown product (with union labor). The brand offered no haggle pricing and delivered an unparalleled dealer experience. Saturn had some of the highest customer loyalty in the history of car retailing ever. From the git-go, Saturn was a hit. And then GM killed it.

Through neglect, indifference and in-fighting, GM murdered Saturn’s product line and disbanded their design team. They even took away Saturn’s corporate offices. GM’s “different kind of car company” became the same old “nothing very special but here we are, still nice people, still selling cars, if only just.”

Yes, you’ve gotta credit GM’s Car Czar and Co. for switching Saturn’s product lineup from famine to feast. But stuffing a bunch of products (however excellent) into Saturn showrooms without having a coherent, unifying reason for them being there won’t resuscitate the brand. In a hyper-competitive market, you need more than a few good products. You need a raison d’etre.

In fact, it’s painfully clear that GM’s overpaid execs don’t have a clue about branding. Not one. They don’t understand that all brands are built on trust: a promised fulfilled. Spinning tales about your product that are patently or even subtly false breaks the brand’s promise. At that point, you’re done. At that point, it’s time to sell all your worldly goods and disappear. Which is exactly what GM is doing.

By on May 17, 2007

vette.jpgMy father is a car guy in his late fifties, One day, he decided to buy a sports car. Anyone who’s clocked the age of the men in the Viagra ads should realize this isn’t an unusual phenomenon. Men fifty-and-over are the heart and soul of the U.S. sports car market. And the Chevrolet Corvette occupies the bulls-eye center of that prime demographic. The ‘Vette is also one of GM’s few bright spots: the only world-class car in Chevrolet’s showroom of mediocrity. Anyway, my father tried to buy a Corvette– and failed.

My Dad’s shopping list included several German cars, a couple of Japanese roadsters and the C6 Corvette. There was only one problem with his domestic selection: he couldn't get a test drive. A little wheel time in a box-fresh Porsche Cayman? No problem. To Infiniti and beyond? Right this way. A quick cut and thrust in GM's halo car? Forgeddaboutit. Not one of the Chevy dealers in our suburban New York county would give my Dad five minutes of Corvette wheel time– unless he bought the car first.

Dealers had three explanations for this “no test pilots need apply” rule. First, “it’s not our policy to allow people to test drive a sixty thousand dollar car.” Second, “people who buy these cars don’t want any miles on them.” Third; hey, you gotta understand: we get a lot of joy riders.

Obviously, Chevy dealers have been scraping the bottom of the barrel so long they can't distinguish between "time wasters" and serious customers. Or perhaps they simply don't want to distract their highly professional sales force from far more important jobs like flogging Aveos, Cobalts and other marginally profitable machinery.

Or maybe they're just lazy, short-sighted, arrogant, amoral opportunists. Why work hard to sell a car you don't need to, or you ain't got?

How much effort would it take for Chevy dealers to create a proper 'Vetting procedure, so potential customers like my father could get behind the wheel, realize the dream of a lifetime and buy a damn Corvette? My Dad's experience– or lack thereof– highlights Chevy dealers' complete insensitivity to the over-arching importance of long-term customer relationships.

Of course, VIP ropes around hot new models are one thing. Price gouging is the next.

When the Solstice and Sky fell to Earth, Pontiac and Saturn dealers had a field day. “Market adjustments” and “demand pricing” were deployed to gouge both regular customers AND those who hadn't darkened a Pontiac or Saturn dealership in decades. Many dealers slapped a new price sheet next to the official window sticker, adding markups of three to five thousand dollars.

You’d think Pontiac dealers would have learned their lesson when the Aussie-built, suppository-shaped GTO went from hero to zero in less than year. (There are still untitled 2006 and 2005 GTO's sitting on Pontiac dealer lots.) In a sense they did: grab the cash while the grabbing's good, 'cause it'll be back to [no] business as usual in no time.

I don’t mean to pick on GM. Chrysler dealers jacked-up the prices on the first highly-horsed SRT8 variants (Charger, 300C, Magnum, and Grand Cherokee). Ford dealers added extra profit on the new Thunderbird, Mustang GT, Shelby ‘Stang and Ford GT.

And American manufacturers aren’t the only car companies hoarding hay when the sun shines. For almost a full year after production, the Mercedes SL55 AMG couldn't be had less than $60k over sticker. The short-lived BMW Z8 also commanded premiums so high you had to be high to pay them.

And yet there are some important differences between the domestics’ price gouging and that of their Euro-counterparts.

For one thing, Mercedes and BMW already have plenty of footfall for their entry level and mid-market products. For another, they tacked a premium onto premium products. Someone who can afford a $120k Benz can probably swing $160k. Try applying that logic to the Pontiac Solstice. A customer shopping for a $24k car can afford $29k? Maybe, maybe not.

In fact, it's highly likely that a dwindling number of fifty-something Ameribrand die-hards are the only customers willing to pay premiums on sexy low-end domestic models. Do they care that the extra money's destined to disappear at trade-in time? Who knows? Can the domestics afford to risk punishing their most enthusiastic customers? I think not.

From a buyer''s point-of-view, there's only one way to beat a dealer's narrow-minded "you can't touch this" refrain and price gouging. Tell them to piss off, and then send a few tell-all emails to the corporate mothership AND the dealer group HQ. Keep calling until you find a dealer willing to play ball, shop used, buy something else or just wait for reality to return to the marketplace (as it always does).  

As for my old man, he couldn't do it. He simply couldn't drop 60 large on a new sports car without a test drive. And GM wonders why it’s losing market share.

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