Category: Editorials

By on March 14, 2007

intimidator.jpgAfter a bleak January, February offered Detroit automakers a whiff of spring. The Chevrolet Impala had a 60’s sales flashback. Thousands more customers went fission for Fusions. And Chrysler Wrangled plenty of loot from new Jeep owners (boosting their bottom line to help Daimler get the Hell out of Dodge). While The Big 2.5’s supporters may conclude that the numbers presage Motown’s long-awaited recovery, starting a Deathwatch Deathwatch may be a bit premature.

Scanning the February figures, looking at year-on-year comparisons, some models just plain took off. Sales of the Chevrolet Impala rose 43.9 percent. Sales of the GMT900-based Silverado increased 26.5 percent. Avalanches were up a whopping 109 percent. Over at Ford, 46.1 percent more folks fixed on a Fusion. Thanks to the new Wrangler four-door, the model moved 62.9 percent better than ‘afore.

Overall, Ford’s sales slipped 21.5 percent on the car side, 9.9 percent on trucks. Even with red hot Wranglers, Chrysler’s truck sales fell 4.6 percent, while car sales tumbled by 15.6 percent. Silverado sales pulled The General’s trucks up an eight percent incline. But steep declines in every division save Chevy and Saturn yanked car sales 2.7 percent lower.

To avoid premature recapitulation, you gotta factor in product freshness. For example, if you look at a February vs. February comparison for the new Avalanche, it looks like the model’s a solid sales success. However, this February’s buyers can sign away their life for a box-fresh design; last year’s buyers had to make do— or not— with a five-year-old design. The Silverado’s increase may conform to the same principle; “intenders” kept their powder dry until Chevy released the new truck. When Mellencamp’s motor hit the showroom floor, the pent-up demand created an initial sales surge.

By the same token, sales of the current gen Ford F-150 experienced a generous up tick for several months following the new model’s introduction. Now they're down 12.1 percent from last year. GM’s supposed salvation, the GMT900-based Chevrolet Tahoe, also started well. It’s down 24.4 percent. At some point, the Silverado’s momentum will require conquest sales and casual shoppers. With competition from Toyota’s new Tundra, rising gas prices and Ford’s new marketing push, it’s gonna be tough.

How did the “other side” (i.e. the foreign-owned automakers) do in this battle for domestic market share? Feb on Feb, Toyota Camry sales– benefiting from an '07 refresh– rose 17.5 percent. The increase seems to pale next to Impala’s 43.9 percent jump— until you clock the raw numbers. The Camry outsold the Impala by 14k units. The killer Camry also outpaced the Ford Fusion by almost 36k sales. The Honda Accord was Camry’s closest market segment competition– and it trailed the Camry by 7400 units.  

Inventory levels are staring to look good across the board. Production cuts and incentives have brought supply and demand into a better balance. Many beleaguered automotive divisions showed double-digit drops in inventory levels from January. Saturn went into “Like Never Before” mode, quickly moving from a deeply worrying 153-day supply of product to a merely troubling 93 day inventory. OK, yes, it’s still a far cry from the 60 day ideal, but Saturn dealers must be happy with the big drop in carrying costs.  

Formerly minimalist U.S. Porsche dealer lots are beginning to look a bit lebensraum challenged. The Sultans of Stuttgart’s inventory levels have jumped from an unassailably delicious 42-day supply to a “come on down” 70-day level. Blame fading sales of Porsche’s pricey Cayenne SUV. Even though the new, refreshed model is here to save the day (after skipping a model year), the SUV slump in general and Cayenne doldrums in specific raise the question automotive marketeers dread to hear: “Has everyone who wants one got one?”

America’s most available model (how great does that sound) is the Mazda B-series truck. Can someone please turn off the tap? Mazda dealers now have enough petite pickups to last 228 days. Ford’s Zoom without a Vue subsidiary would happily swap with Honda. The econobox-of-the-moment Fit and increasingly creased CR-Vs are smokin’ hot, with 19- and 20-day supplies respectively.

On the vital sales per dealer (SPD) numbers, nearly everyone’s up from January. Even tumbleweed infested Buick dealers showed a slight increase, adding two sales per dealer (to a not-so-grand-national total of six). Saturn scored the highest increase, adding 19 SPD in January (from 31 to 50). At Porsche– normally a sales tiger as the weather improves– SPD dropped by five. In raw numbers, once again, Toyota reigns supreme. The automaker hit 136 SPD in February, up 10 sales from the month previous. Lexus dealers ranked second, with a whopping 105 sales per dealer.

The automakers are hoping for some March madness. But with gas prices on the rise, the housing market on the slow and sub-primes all lent out with nowhere to go, the madness could get seriously crazy. Watch this space.

By on March 13, 2007

car-lot222.jpgDoes anyone other than a masochist enjoy buying a car? Any survey of loathsome experiences would rank car buying just below root canal surgery, slightly above cleaning hair out of the shower drain. I have yet to hear an adult say “I need a new car,” without dread and trepidation in their voice. So they turn to me, their local automotive alpha, for advice on makes, models, prices and features. Until recently, all my knowledge couldn’t protect them from the dreaded car dealer. Here’s what they faced… 

They walked into the dealership, inhaling that heady blend of fear, desperation, and volatile organic compounds. Depending on how they were dressed, they were either A) ignored until they tried to break into a locked vehicle or B) forced to sit in front of a sadist sales manager who had to know how, when, where and with whom they drove. And then it was time for a little one-on-one with a sales prevention officer.

There were a lot of ways this went wrong. There are car salesmen who will only speak to a female customer’s boyfriend or husband, or vice versa. Salesmen whose definition of product knowledge includes improvisation, science fiction and outright lies. And self-righteous sales associates who think it’s acceptable to treat their customers with condescension, contempt and disdain. 

Occasionally, my car shopping friends encountered a good car salesperson: someone who didn’t smell like he was one missed payment from foreclosure. The salesman knew exactly what he was selling, handed them the keys, shut up and let them drive. That said, the chances of encountering one of these rare birds was about the same as finding an Ecuadorian Pale-Headed Brush Finch snacking on french fries under the Big Chicken in Marietta, Georgia. 

I always told my acolytes and referrals: if you don’t know anything, neither a listener nor an inquisitor be. Later, when these advice insensitive car buyers realized they’d been talked into a piece of junk– my strong-willed sister’s adoption of a Suzuki Verona springs to mind–  they only had themselves to blame. (As if.)

Anyway, once the test drive was over, the salesman sequestered them in the little room I call AHA (Abandon All Hope). After proffering false interest in their well-being (must get fives on that CSI survey), the salesman wrote numbers on disposable sheets. The potential customers were interrogated until they revealed exactly how much money they were willing to “invest” per month on a new car, and whether or not they were willing to transfer Junior into Community College to cover any shortfall.

Ludicrous words were spoken. “This car won’t be here tomorrow,” and “This is a one-time deal only.” As deep-vein thrombosis set in, the salesman invoked the specter of cold-hearted sales managers and their own bare-footed children.  The next thing they knew, my charges were either driving away in their old car, relieved at having escaped the lion’s den, or signing a sheaf of papers they were too tired to read. Either way, their underwear was in their pocket.

If they didn’t buy the car, they winced inwardly, knowing they had to lather, rinse and repeat until they encountered a salesman desperate enough not to stiff them.

Is it any wonder so many people I sent to dealerships threw in the towel and bought something, anything, just to stop the madness? Most consumers simply don’t have the time or stamina to physically explore their options. The salespeople know this. And once customers are on their turf, the dealer’s designate controls the tempo of battle. And prevails.

After a particularly gruesome negotiation session at one of Atlanta’s more notorious VW dealers, I saw the light. I surfed the Internet and requested price quotes online. A quick responder offered me invoice on my chosen mount. We negotiated back and forth over e-mail. A couple of days later, I walked away with the car I wanted for a fair price. I didn’t have to reveal my husband’s favorite sport or miss another episode of South Park. Bliss.

I realized that the $500 under invoice, no haggle, test drive, sign and go deal was the future.

So now, when friends and family ask me about a new car, I hit the net. I do 95% of the work for them: surfing for the right spec., price and dealer, and then showing them how to cut the deal before they darken the dealer’s door for the make-or-break test drive.

Clearly, the car sales paradigm is shifting. By the time I’m done with them, “my” people know exactly what they want and how to get it. Equally important, they know precisely what they don’t want: to waste their time battling with pushy, obnoxious salesmen. If car buyers can cut the traditional salesman out of the loop, why wouldn’t they? Thanks to me and I’m guessing you, now, they do.  

By on March 13, 2007

1stcorporate22.jpgPeople in business for a quick buck give everyone else in their field a bad name. They fully deserve the reputations they receive. More than a few CEO’s and their boards have ruined— are ruining– their companies by combining short term thinking and personal greed. To expedite their demise, more people should vote with their feet, and avoid mindless profiteers. That said, take it from the manager of an average sized Honda store: not all car dealers are crooks. 

Before I argue my point, take a look at Honda invoice prices at KBB and Edmunds (our customers do). Clock the difference between dealer invoice and what the site says you should pay. Then consider the cost of opening a dealer’s doors every day; from heat and light to payroll to bathroom tissue. Running a car dealership— even one as successful as ours– makes a savings account look like a sweet investment.  

Our geographical area is currently experiencing astounding growth rates. Despite the enormous amount of footfall on the showroom floor (and the need to keep the wolf from our door), despite the temptation of making hay while the sun shines, we stick to our basic values. Respect the customer. Don’t swing for the fences; if you miss, you’re out, and you look like an ass in the process. Play it straight, play it safe and get on first. Put another way, a little of something is better than a lot of nothing. 

When a hot product like the Civic Si or new CR-V hits the showroom floor, I do not allow the sales staff to charge over the Manufacturer’s Suggested Retail Price (MSRP) to customers who “gotta have it now, no matter what.” We only accessorize showroom cars for the sake of selling; we don’t cram high-profit dealer add-ons down peoples’ throats.  On the finance side, our staff has been trained to educate and discourage customers who want to borrow for more than sixty months.

It’s easy to understand why some car dealers lose faith and jettison their dignity. The traditional adversarial relationship between a dealer and the customer leads many customers to feel it’s OK to “screw the dealer back.” We have to put wheel locks on cars with alloys since they seem to walk off on their own. We get burned from time to time by unscrupulous customers who trade in vehicles with smoked transmissions, or the engine knock that gets masked by adding axle oil into the engine. 

I feel sorry for the domestic dealers faced with cynical customers, saddled with large inventories, surrounded by closely placed dealers of the same line/make. The temptations to cut corners are many; only personal integrity and long term thinking will stay a desperate dealer’s hand.

In college, I drove a Dodge Ram Van. Something on the front of the engine puked; I don’t remember what. But what I’ll never forget what happened next. The mechanic tore the front of the engine apart to replace said part– and failed to notice the drive belts were starting to dry rot.  Two days after I picked it up, the alternator belt snapped. 

I brought the Ram back, showed my receipt and asked why I wasn’t told I needed belts. I would have bought them without question if they replaced them the first time. The dealer replaced all the belts for free without hesitation. And I was willing to pay. Dealers face those sorts of decisions every day. The good ones make the right call. The bad ones don’t.

It must be said that bad dealer service often starts with a dysfunctional relationship between dealer and manufacturer. If you look at sales figures, the brands who grow consistently are the ones who share a partnership mentality with their dealers and vendors.  The ones who don’t, well, if it weren’t for state franchise laws, what would have happened to all those Chrysler/Dodge dealers who refused to accept the goofy vehicles sitting in the infamous “sales bank?”

Those of you who call for disbandment of the franchise system should click on the link to Dealer Magazine below, and see just one of the challenges U.S. dealers face when working with manufacturers. That said, there’s no question that a dealer’s biggest enemy looks out from the mirror each and every morning. They must decide whose interests are paramount. They must decide who they are, and what they stand for.

I believe that my reputation is worth more than the almighty buck. I live by those words, and the words of author and sales trainer Dave Anderson. "Are you just making money or are you making a difference? Focus on making a greater difference and you'll find yourself making more money as a result." Before you download your dirty dealer stories, remember this: we’re not all greedy bastards.

Click here for link to Dealer Magazine article 

By on March 12, 2007

opelgtcconcept04222.jpgI’ve said it before, I’ll say it again: GM Car Czar Bob Lutz is a gift. To the media– not GM stockholders. The General’s Vice Chairman of Global Product Development feels free to make it up as he goes along, paying scant regard to the current state of the world market or his own company’s plans. Lutz proved the point, again, at his Swiss birthplace. Speaking to reporters at the Geneva auto salon, Lutz outlined his vision for Cadillac. Unfortunately, Cadillac’s General Manager was at the same show. 

So, Mr. Lutz, Caddy’s flagship sedan, the DTS. The model accounts for 25.6% of the brand’s U.S. sales. Does it? I’m not surprised. Yes, well, moving forward, front or rear wheel-drive? Rear wheel-drive. That’s the way we’re going with all our mainstream– I mean, upmarket cars.

Jim Taylor, General Manager, Cadillac. DTS. Front or rear-wheel drive? Good question. We could put the DTS on the Zeta rear wheel-drive platform– which we’re using for the new Pontiac G8– or merge it with the STS line. Or keep it in its current form. So no decision yet? No decision yet.

Mr. Lutz, what about a small Caddy? You guys sell the front wheel-drive Cadillac BLS in Europe, South Africa and Mexico. Any plans to bring it to the States? We don’t want a front wheel-drive Cadillac in the domestic market. As for a small rear wheel-drive car, "there's certainly an opening, whether we choose to fill it or not." 

Jim, you on board with that? "We're not going there. We're a $30,000-to-$40,000 player, not a $20,000-to-$30,000 player."

Even now, I find it astounding that a company as large as GM is run by people who don’t know the first thing about competitive strategy. Strike that– who don’t HAVE a competitive strategy. Or if they DO have one, the people in charge of implementing it have no idea what it is. How could the two men determining the fate of GM’s flagship brand have various, nebulous plans for its future?

No wonder GM is getting its ass kicked.

Even a cursory glance at Toyota’s success tells us the company’s top executives have read, understood and implemented Sun Tsu’s “The Art of War.”  To wit:

“The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy.” Think Camry.

“He wins his battles by making no mistakes. Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated.” Think Toyota’s rep for reliability and their limited product line.

“Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly to places where you are not expected.” Think Prius.

“We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up into fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy's few.” Think Toyota’s three divisions.

Need I go on? The really depressing bit is that you can read Sun Tsu and marvel at all the ways GM has violated virtually ALL of the principles set forth by the master military strategist.

GM’s seemingly endless strategic failure seems preposterous, given the fact that Maximum Bob Lutz is a former Marine aviator. Surely a top flight military man should understand the rudiments of armed conflict enough to formulate something akin to a coherent plan for victory.

But then, Lutz served from 1954 to 1965, before Colonel John Boyd changed Marine fighting strategy to reflect Sun Tsu’s principles. Lutz was trained to execute what Boyd called "hey diddle diddle, straight up the middle.” In other words, Lutz and Co. still believe in a direct assault on Toyota, using strength of numbers to overwhelm the enemy.

Why else would GM even entertain the idea of buying Chrysler? Even though it’s clear to anyone with a modicum of common sense that the last thing GM needs is more cars, workers, bureaucrats, divisions and dealers, the fools running the company couldn’t immediately see that the concept offered nothing more than a corporate suicide pact. How many examples of ruined conglomerates do you need to see before you realize that “synergy” is another word for insanity?

If GM had some genuine mental firepower at the top, could they turn the company around? Absolutely. But they’d need to adopt Sun Tsu’s final strategy: if all else fails, retreat. Many see GM’s successful expansion into foreign markets as its final hope. Others do not. As Cadillac’s lackluster lineup proves, GM needs to regroup, conserve its remaining resources and marshal them for the fight on the home front. Otherwise, all will be lost. 

By on March 11, 2007

mercy.jpgAs you’ve no doubt noticed, things they are a-changin’ on The Truth About Cars. Our new look is evolving, several new writers have made the scene and a whole lot of new readers/commentators are joining us every day. With all that going on we thought we’d better answer a few of the questions we’ve been getting (and throw in a few more we just made up). 

What is The Truth About Cars?

The Truth About Cars provides no-holds-barred, take-no-prisoners automotive reviews and industry-related editorials. Our writers call it like they see it, and pull no punches. We also provide a comments section for readers to voice their informed and passionate opinions in a atmosphere of mutual respect.

How did the site get its start?

About four years ago, Robert Farago was a freelance writer living in the UK. After Autocar blacklisted Farago for slating then Editor-In-Chief Steve Sutcliffe (for boasting about driving a Lamborghini with his eyes closed), Farago started posting rants on www.pistonheads.com. Despite (or because of) Fahrenheit 451 temp replies, he created a regular series called "The Truth About Cars." When Farago moved to the U.S., he started TTAC.

How are you different from other automotive sites?

The Truth About Cars prides itself on its editorial independence. Even though we accept advertising, the ads do not influence our editorial content. We also believe in full disclosure. Any time we receive a car loan or travel considerations from a manufacturer, we state the fact in the review.

What is going on with the web site?  Why does it look so… uh… plain?

As they say in the construction business, pardon our appearance. We’re making improvements to the site; many of which were suggested last Sunday (we haven’t forgotten). Due to budgetary constraints, the changes are incremental. Rest assured, Farago's OCD guarantees that TTAC will return to its Zen garden aesthetic– cleaner, sharper and brighter– once the remodeling is done. Meanwhile, thank you for your patience and understanding.

Why haven’t you reviewed a _________?

TTAC’s a small but feisty site. As far as access to manufacturers' press fleets is concerned, that's a lethal combination. Our poorly-paid, single-minded reviewers must beg, borrow and go to dealerships to drive a car. Mind you, there are advantages: we tend to drive the same car you can buy, rather than carefully prepared press cars NB: If you're a TTAC supportive manufacturer, dealer or owner who would be willing to provide a TTAC scribe with a test drive of something new we haven't reviewed yet (we're nationwide), please contact us ASAP.

I can’t see the comment I just entered.  What happened?

Normally, when you enter a comment it’ll show up as soon as you submit it. If your comment contains certain flagged words or several web links or comes from a questionable-looking domain or looks like comment spam (we've received thousands of them), the WordPress spam filter may trap your comment. And there it sits, waiting for manual approval. If there’s a legitimate comment in there we’ll rescue it (and edit it if necessary) before we delete the real spam. Meanwhile, patience.

Why can’t I enter a comment? 

To enter a comment you have to be registered on the site, and signed in.

What's TTAC's comments policy?

TTAC has a strict policy for posting comments:

1. No flaming the website, its authors or fellow commentators  "Flaming" means personally insulting. For example, you are free to suggest that a TTAC editorial should consider Toyota's green policies, but you are NOT free to say "we've got it in" for domestic automakers (or anyone else). You are free to argue that a reviewer should take the new Jeep Patriot off-road, but you are NOT free to call the writer biased or unfair. You are free to say Ford makes reliable vehicles, but you are NOT free to question a commentator's right to recount his personal history of unreliable Fords.  

2. No trolling "Trolling" means making comments deliberately designed to encourage flamers. For example, you are free to suggest that TTAC should consider Toyota's green policies, bit you are NOT free to say "Toyota's a bunch of lying scumbags." You are free to argue that a reviewer should take the Patriot off-road, but you are not free to say "anyone who doesn't take a Jeep off-road is a wimp." You are free to say Ford makes reliable vehicles, but you are not free to say "people who don't love Fords are lousy drivers."

Any commentator who flames or trolls receives email notification that the comment was edited or deleted. If the comment is deemed excessively offensive or mean spirited, the commentator also receives a warning. After the second offense, the commentator will be banned from posting on the site. Permanently. I repeat: there is no coming back. Ever.

If you encounter an offensive comment, do not respond in the comments section. Send an email to Robert Farago or Frank Williams and we’ll take care of it. 

And one more thing. There can be a fine line between passionate commentary and flaming/trolling. If you have any doubts, err on the side of civility. Or write an editorial.

How can I try my hand at writing for TTAC?

Email us for a copy of TTAC’s Writers’ Guide. It’ll give you the proper format and procedure for submitting articles or reviews.

What’s coming down the pike?

Once the site redesign is complete, we’ll have a lot of new features. Old time readers will remember the ratings and stars for each review; these are coming back. We also hope to have links to specifications and pricing data on the cars reviewed. And we’re in negotiations with a purchasing service to get the best deal possible for our readers who are in the market for a new vehicle. Through all of it, we will continue to provide the finest fully independent automotive journalism on the web.

Frank Williams

Managing Editor 

By on March 10, 2007

220se-again.jpgAs an immigrant back in the days of the “melting pot,” I was as eager to assimilate as a wide-eyed frat pledge amongst his potential brothers. I tried to forget German, made futile efforts to learn baseball and remained deeply smitten by American automobiles. I repressed memories of my abandoned European flames: Porsche, Mercedes and Jaguar. But my jilted lovers found me hiding in Iowa, and began to torment me with their seductive powers. Read More >

By on March 8, 2007

buycostumescom.jpgGM CEO Rick Wagoner was once the automaker’s Chief Financial Officer. So why has GM twice delayed filing its 10-K financial statements (reporting their earnings for the fourth quarter and the ‘06 financial year)? You’d think that they’d be ship shape by now. "These are big complex businesses,” Wagoner told a reporter in Geneva yesterday. “When you do transactions at the end of the year it adds additional complexity." Fair enough. But Wagoner’s no dummy. The real reason for the delay is a fight over cash.

On November 30, 2006, General Motors sold 51% of their finance unit, the General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC), to Cerberus Capital Management. Actually, Cerberus bought the net asset value of a large number of GMAC’s financial securities, with little value ascribed to the enterprise itself. Equally important, GM didn’t realize $14b. So far, GM’s net payoff is around $5b. This lump sum will soon be less.

Even as Cerberus was negotiating their GMAC purchase, the U.S. housing boom was going bust. So the money men at Cerberus included a “valuation period” before the closing statement. This last loving look at GMAC’s books will determine the final purchase price for Cerberus’ 51% GMAC buy-in.

Suffice it to say, things have not gone in GM’s favor. In the last six months, the U.S. housing market has tanked. In January, new house sales fell 16 percent. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that GMAC put $57b worth of its eggs– some 77 percent of its loan portfolio– into subprime mortgages. The current default rate: around 14 percent.

Fourteen percent of GMAC’s money is not about to disappear; the loans are collateralized against bricks and mortar. But all that defaulting does nothing for GMAC’s profitability. To wit: GMAC’s subprime subsidiary, Residential Capital, is laying off 1000 employees.

All of which means GM’s 10-K filing delay isn’t so much an accounting issue as a Mexican standoff. Cerberus and GM are locked in a dispute over the exact amount of “blowback” GM owes the investment group. There’s Wagoner’s “complexity.” 

Lehman Brothers analyst Brian Johnson reckons loan-loss provisions and mortgage securities write-downs could end up costing GM $900m to $950m in cash charges– in the first half of this year. The easiest and most likely way for GM to pay off Cerberus: surrender more GMAC shares to Cerberus. TTAC’s Deep Throat estimates another 10% should do it.

But even after the dust settles and GM’s accounts are finally filed, the dust may not settle. Lest we forget, GM still owns 49% of GMAC. A sustained housing market downturn would eventually reduce GMAC’s once bounteous cash to a trickle. Eventually, because GM gets its GMAC money in the form of dividends, and the GMAC sale eliminated dividend payments for two years post-sale.

If you’re beginning to get the idea that the GMAC transaction has turned into something of a headache for one of the “partners,” consider this.

You know those “zero percent to anyone with a pulse” finance offers GM’s used to move the metal? To “buy down” the obvious risk on these deadbeat deals, GM has made as-yet-unspecified payments to GMAC (an amount that probably begins with a “b”). You can bet that Cerberus will be taking an even closer look at these car finance deals in the days ahead, looking to further limit their exposure and protect their profits.

Meanwhile, GM Car Czar Bob Lutz has been predicting that one of his cross-town rivals is about to go belly-up. He’s not wrong. But GM’s determination not to file for Chapter 11 will take a major hit when The Glass House Gang seeks the court’s protection. FoMoCo will restructure its dealer network, shed its OPEB (Other Post-Employment Benefits) and force a new deal on the UAW. The disruption to parts provision and the Blue Oval Boyz’ huge cost advantages would eventually force GM to follow Ford into bankruptcy court.

Is waiting out Ford the “real” plan? Not according to Maximum Bob. "We're approaching the end of the beginning of the transformation of GM," Maxi Bob proclaimed.

I don’t think so. Yes, GM’s cut about as much fat as they can from their cost structure. Yes, their earnings will improve. But this year’s cash flow will remain negative. To stave off Chapter 11, General Motors needs many things to go right and, more importantly, nothing to go wrong. A GMAC meltdown, a strike at Delphi, a sudden gas price hike, a Ford bankruptcy, a supplier revolt– The General simply doesn’t have the financial strength to withstand a major attack on its cash reserves.

Like a sub-prime borrower looking at the loss of their home, GM is at the end of the line, hoping that its luck will hold out long enough for it to climb out of a hole– of its own making.   

 

By on March 8, 2007

merrie232.jpgIn 2002, Toyota sued Chinese automaker Geely for copying the Japanese automaker’s logo. In November 2003, a Chinese judge threw out the case. He claimed China’s trademark office had to reject Geely’s logo before Toyota could seek civil damages. The verdict provided yet more proof that China isn’t willing to lay down– or enforce– its copyright law. This lack of legal resolve is a clear and present danger to foreign automakers, and a stark warning of things to come. 

Until roughly 30 years ago, the concept of private property was an anathema to The People’s Republic of China. When the country’s communist leaders decided to abandon Soviet-style central planning for a “mixed” (i.e. controlled) market economy, they eventually allowed individuals to own property and commercial enterprises. Shortly before joining the Word Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, these rights expanded to include intellectual property (IP). 

Since then, the number of IP cases in China has increased by some nine percent a year. A large number of these disputes involve China’s nascent automobile industry. And no wonder. China is now the world’s second largest new car market (having passed Japan in ’06). It’s expanding at about 17 to 25% a year. Tens of millions of Chinese are trading two-wheeled transportation for four.

Given the lack of copyright enforcement and the cost of developing a new car for sale– versus the cost-effectiveness of “borrowing” designs, manufacturing, parts, brand names and logos– it’s no surprise that the country’s native automakers are flooding the Chinese market with unabashed, automotive knock-offs.

For example, the [GM] Daewoo Spark and the [Chinese] Chery QQ are sheetmetal homonyms with, get this, interchangeable parts. (Rumor has it that Chery used the Spark with a Chery logo glued on to pass government crash tests.) Even when the running gear differs, Chinese manufacturers feel free to “riff” on trademarked designs. The Honqi HQD sedan looks like an ugly[ier] Rolls Royce Phantom– for about half the price.

Again, there’s very little incentive for a Chinese automaker to avoid building this sort of “homage.” According to China’s "Supreme Court Patent Trial Provisions," copyright thieves face a maximum statutory damage of 500,000 yuan (roughly $64k). And as Toyota discovered, “creative jurisprudence” makes attempting to legally right these wrongs a difficult bordering on pointless enterprise.

Further complicating matters, Chinese law stipulates that any foreign-owned automobile manufacture must share 50% of its Chinese division with a Chinese “partner.” The pattern of intertwined ownership works in the thieves’ favor. For example, GM held off suing the publicly listed Jiangling Motors for stealing one of The General’s designs. Jiangling Motors is partially owned by SAIC, GM’s Chinese partner. Nuff said?

While China’s foreign owned automakers wrestle with copycats and clones, trying to defend their technological investments and local brand equity, Chinese automakers are busy ramping up their export business. Last month, 500 Brilliance BS6s sedans left Dalian for Bremerhaven. This week, HSO Motors Europe announced it will distribute Brilliance vehicles in France and Switzerland.

Although Geely’s exports are currently restricted to Syria, Egypt and Latin America, the Chinese automaker plans to export 400k cars by 2010. The company’s recently announced deal with Chrysler to import a small Chinese-made car into the American market should account for a large amount of that business.

While many foreign manufacturers are willing to look the other way regarding IP infringement inside China, the advent of Chinese automotive exports threatens to bring the issue of IP rights to a head.

Later this year, Great Wall will export a small vehicle called the Peri to Italy. The machine looks an awful lot like Fiat's city car. With its Chinese ambitions and the obvious legal limitations within The People’s Republic, Fiat has been hesitant to take action against the Peri. But the arrival of a cheaper Panda clone on their home turf may well force their hand. It remains to be seen if a potential export backlash could dampen Chinese automaker’s “flattery.”

There is a darker side to these developments. The Chinese government’s willingness to turn a blind eye to cheap copies of foreign-designed automobiles may reflect their longer term strategy. At some point, when China’s joint venture automakers get up to speed, the government may give foreign automakers the boot, and allow their Chinese partners to assume full control. The student will become the master.

China's State Economic and Trade Commission’s tenth “Five-Year Development Plan for the Automotive Industry” predicts/dictates that "there will be two to three large automotive groups that have considerable strength in international competition. The domestic-market shares of products will exceed 70%, with some for export.”

How does that shake-out square with foreign interests? It doesn’t. Any foreign automaker that imagines itself as one of China’s Big Three better take a closer look at those clones. They may be China’s future. 

By on March 7, 2007

dead-end.jpgThe Big Three entered the 1980’s in typical Three Stooges fashion. GM (Moe) knocked the other two automakers’ heads together, and then gloated over the market share he’d stolen– oblivious to the imports stealing it right back from under his nose. Mild-mannered Larry (Ford) scratched his professorial pate, and cooked up a brilliant scheme to avoid getting hit in the coming (import) brawl. And buffoon Curley (Chrysler) lay on the floor, doing his dry-swimming antics in a desperate attempt to draw attention to his only product: K cars.

GM’s ability to outspend Ford and Chrysler in the first round of seventies-era downsizing paid off, Big Style. In 1978, GM enjoyed a 48% share of the domestic market. During the eighties, Uber-Moe Roger Smith (of Roger and Me fame) staged one of the greatest tragi-comedy acts in industrial history. By 1989, GM’s market share fell to 35%.

GM’s efforts to re-invent their compact cars crashed. Literally. The company claimed their 1980 front wheel-drive X-Bodies (Citation, Phoenix, Omega and Skylark) offered “BMW-like performance and handling.” Note the omission of “braking.” Bereft of a $14 weight-sensing proportioning valve on the rear brakes, X-Bodies were known for their tell-tale kamikaze rear-tire screech– and the subsequent crunch as they found their next victim. Smart buyers/drivers gave them a wide berth.

Two years later, GM introduced their J-car sub-compacts (Cavalier and clones). Chevrolet General Manager Robert Lund announced their arrival with characteristic pugnacity. “We’re tired of hearing how the domestic auto industry let the Japanese take the subcompact business away from us. The whole Chevrolet organization is spoiling for a fight.”

Yes, well, the Cavalier’s design wasn’t particularly hot or competitive; pitting it against the increasingly sophisticated imports was like bringing a rubber band to a knife fight. Keeping it essentially unchanged for 23 years was like watching that same fight on an endless loop.

Mid-decade, GM embarked on an unprecedented act of auto self-mutilation. In the first bloody stroke, the Cadillac DeVille, Buick Electra and Oldsmobile 98– The General’s grandest luxury sedans– were reduced to Camry size, and fitted with front wheel-drive, 125 hp, 14” tires and tinny fake-wire hubcaps.

The Seville, Eldorado, Toronado and Riviera were next. GM reduced them to puny “eunuch-mobiles” (Oxenado?). The $27k Eldorado was now virtually undistinguishable from a $9k Buick Somerset compact, in both styling and size. Build and interior quality were equally miserable. The Cavalier-based Cimarron, Skyhawk and Firenza destroyed any remaining premium value of the once proud Cadillac, Buick and Oldsmobile divisions. Enter Lexus, BMW, Mercedes and Infiniti.

During the eighties, Ford was Camelot. CEO Donald E. Peterson was a smart, modest and plainspoken “car guy”. He motivated the Ford troops like no one since, instructing his minions to focus their efforts on higher quality, smaller, more efficient cars.

Peterson gambled the precariously-weak Ford farm on the pioneering aero-look ’83 T-Bird and ’86 Taurus. The T-Bird soared again and the Taurus went to the top of the charts– to become the bulls-eye for the Japanese darts Camry and Accord.

Ford also introduced a dumbed down version of their first “global-car” (the diminutive Escort) and the Tempo. While both models were forgettable, they sold well enough.

When Peterson left Ford in 1990, Ford’s Big Boss expressed grave concerns about the future of the U.S. auto industry. A reporter wrote “The word survival came up a lot [in our discussion]. It’s no joke to ask how much of our home-grown auto industry will exist in a generation from now.”

Peterson’s successors dropped the ball. By 1992, Ford’s lackluster line-up led the company into a $7.39b loss and a potential Chapter 11.

The 1979 government bail-out left Chrysler a shell of its former self. Development budgets evaporated. The K-car, Omni-Horizon, and the ancient hold-over RWD Diplomat (nee Volare) were the only toys in Lee Iacocca’s box. The seemingly endless stream of photo-chopped variants gave testimony to his fertile but tasteless imagination.

Fortunately for Chrysler, its “K-car in a box” (a.k.a. the Caravan/Voyager mini-vans) were an instant hit. In 1987, Iacocca went two-for-two, spending a measly $1.1b to buy AMC/Jeep.

And yet, by the end of the decade, the import brands were devouring The Big Three’s passenger-car lunch. The Three Stooges didn’t really care. By that time, the domestic market had become SUV and truck mad; the profits were phenomenal.

Once again, Detroit thought themselves triumphant. They failed to realize that they’d been lucky; cheap gas and the marketplace had evolved in their favor, rather than the other way around. When safety, rising gas prices and environmentalism eventually convinced American buyers to abandon the SUV genre for smaller, more efficient alternatives, Detroit suddenly found itself at an evolutionary dead end.

GM, Ford and DaimlerChrysler are now looking abroad, trying to marshal their global resources to develop passenger car salvation to their union-influenced domestic woes. Live or die, the past has finally caught up with Detroit.

By on March 6, 2007

02_ft-hs_concept.jpgDriving through Switzerland makes you feel like a million bucks (the annual salary required for comfortable residency). In early March, the Alps are still covered in snow, but the sun’s warm enough to shelter a scribe savoring a steaming cup of coffee and slice of rueblitorte by the shores of Lake Geneva. The fresh air! The dictators’ money! The tidiness! And then it’s time to contemplate the effects of global warming and enter the hallowed halls of Geneva’s seventy-seventh International Auto Show.

The Toyota FT-HS Concept is a hybrid. OK, it’s a hybrid hybrid, a Synergy-driven car combining the blood-drawing creases of Ford’s old Edge design language and the wraparound glamour of the vaguely art deco cinematic Batmobile. As a Cadillac flack might say, it’s art and science fiction.

The FT-HS isn’t just another “gotta have one/ain’t gonna happen” pistonhead tease. The car raises an important question: why can't more cars have wheels that look like exotic flowers?

fcx_concept_hes101.jpgKeeping to the theme of keeping the planet cool (hot?) for humanity, the Honda FCX Concept is a confidently competent future barge. Or is that competently confident? In any case, the hyrdogen fuel cell powered FCX finally makes the creative leap from SUV nosecone (a la Civic) to whale mouth. Honda proves once again that they are the masters at blending high tech and high touch, what with an interactive floor that uses lighting to indicate changes in cabin temperature.

How come the French have enough time (or the inclination) to eat cheese before coffee AND after lunch? And how is it that Italians manage to convince everyone else to struggle to speak their native language, instead of them struggling with their English like everybody else? And can the British ever learn to get down with their bad selves?

jag5.jpgThe CX-F is Jaguar’s S-Type replacement concept (i.e. the ready to be gelded, denuded and watered down version). It’s swoopy, sporty and strong; with a hint of Quattroporte and a clean Lexus LF-A aftertaste. It’s also utterly serious minded, a slap in the face of pace and grace. I’ll take two (for obvious reasons).

honda.jpgHonda’s Small Hybrid Coupe breaks the usual Batman concept car template for a nostalgic trip to Tron. While the car’s design has nothing to do with Honda’s corporate image, it will do Honda’s corporate image no harm– if only because its rear window is an ode to the old CRX and its gigantic wheels relieve Honda tuners’ SUV wheel envy.

a5070020_large.jpgThe strangely spaced Walter de’Silva says the new Audi A5 is one of his best designs. The Italian originator of the German brand’s big mouth bass look has devised a coupe that’s elegant, understated, grown-up yet young and thrusting. It’s the perfect Jaguar, best imbibed with a bold cab.

40269_3-4-anteriore4.jpgMaserati finally trades its dorky coupe for something altogether more desirable– in the same sense that Adriana Lima might make a nice bit of arm candy for the Oscars. The GranTourismo coupe is twice as sexy in the flesh as it is in the photos, in the same sense that Adriana Lima looks more fetching across a dinner table than in a catalogue.

cc.jpgBeing within sniffing distance of the world’s best numbered bank accounts, the Geneva auto show is the spiritual home to small carmakers who brew that heady mix of sleek sheetmetal and monster engines. The Swedes at Koenigsegg threw their hand-built CCX-based CCGT (Competition Coupe GT) FIA-homologated GT1 racer into Geneva’s alphanumeric soup. True to the show’s theme, they also promised a bio-fuel powered CCXR. Make that the BFP-CCXR.

spykerzagato_auto.jpgThe Dutch-built Spyker C12 Zagato may forfeit the rocket-inspired name game, but the VW-engined coupe proves that scissor doors are still an excellent way to liberate tasteless enthusiasts from their drug money discretionary income. The Zagato takes Spyker’s nascent design language and throws it into the wood chipper. When a supercar starts to look like a TVR Chimaera– a car designed by the [then] company’s owner’s dog– there’s bound to be trouble down the mine.

brooklands.jpgMeanwhile, mine owners won’t mind the Bentley Brooklands. Oblivious to the whole planet saving thing, the German-owned English carmaker is emerging from their highly lucrative Phaeton phase to launch a more traditional gas-guzzling Bentley behemoth.

The Brooklands boasts “classic British proportions”– a claim which does nothing for the self-esteem of Britain’s female population. To propel this Balmoral-on-wheels, The Bentley Boyz pulled out all the organ stops. We’re talking a 530hp 6.75-litre V8 with so much torque the company feels compelled to list it in Newton meters (1050Nm). Very PC, I’m sure.

Back into the gloaming as a young girl strolls past the show without even glancing in its direction. What did the Swiss Miss miss? A show dedicated to environmental responsibility, stuffed fulll of toys. How great is that? 

By on March 6, 2007

vega22434.jpgThose of us who lived through the 1970’s have thrown out, remodeled or psycho-analyzed away any lingering echoes of those economically, socially and politically divisive years. But the decade of pet rocks, big hair, anti-war protests, moon landings, presidential pardons, drug-addled introspection, Middle Eastern war and convulsive oil shocks left the Big Three’s collective psyche permanently altered. In some ways, they never recovered.

The Big Three entered the bushy-sideburns decade with the super-size-me version of the formula they’d been frying up for decades. Mega-full-size cars (longer than today’s Suburban), double-pattie mid-sizers, and quarter-pounder “compacts” were deemed the ideal diet for “real Americans”. And for those financially challenged unpatriotic import lovers: a barely-edible gruel of half-baked Pintos, Vegas, and Crickets.

If you had to pick a moment when The Big Three’s hegemony ended, it’s October 17, 1973. On that day, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) initiated an embargo that effectively doubled the cost of crude oil. And the resulting price shock tipped the U.S. economy into recession. Even worse, Americans experienced massive gas shortages.

Overnight, the American gas guzzler ceased to be an unassailable statement of personal prosperity. For many, it became a symbol of individual and national vulnerability, irresponsibility and weakness. Without warning, The Big Three’s big car dreams had become a nightmare.

As big car sales plunged, the federal government began tightening safety and emissions regulations. CAFE regulations were born. The rules uglified bumpers and choked the life out of Detroit’s V8’s. Imports, especially Japanese, flooded into the U.S. And this time the cars were well-built, durable, efficient, and backed by nationwide dealers. There was no getting around it: Detroit’s way of thinking was under serious attack.

The General launched a wave of Vegas and badge-engineered clones, and derivatives: Pontiac Astre and Sunfire; Buick Skyhawk, Chevy Monza and Oldsmobile Starfire. The engine choices were an abomination: Vega’s shake, rattle and blow four, Buick’s “odd-firing” V6, and a small-block Chevy V8 sleeved, de-stroked and strangled to 110 hp. All these H-Bodies came with a 24 month “will-rust-through” guarantee (36 months in CA) and a crow bar to pry out rear-seat passengers.

GM’s answer to the Toyota Corona and Datsun 510, for buyers looking for an economical 4-door compact? The not-so-small Nova and its clones the Pontiac Ventura, Buick Apollo, and Olds Omega. Just the ticket, especially with the 5.7 V8 and 16 EPA-optimistic miles per gallon. A practical wagon version? No such luck.

Ford (predictably) imitated GM’s genetic-engineering experiments. Unfortunately, their stem-cell line was no more distinguished than GM’s. The Pinto was cloned (Mercury Bobcat) and genetically-modified (Mustang II) with unpalatable results.

Chrysler’s Omni-present daydreams about a small, modern FWD car were still on the far Horizon. In the meantime, their desperation-driven hook-up with Mitsubishi set a pattern for the Big Three’s “if you can’t fight them, hop into bed with them” anti-Japanese import strategy.

Or was it a reverse Trojan horse deal? While the arrangement put Japanese-made Colts into Dodge showrooms, Mitsubishi eventually hung out their own shingle. Ditto for Suzuki, Isuzu and Mazda. These tenuous trans-pacific affairs wouldn’t be resolved for decades, but it’s pretty obvious who walked away smiling from the inevitable divorce.

Nineteen seventy-six saw two significant car introductions: Honda’s Accord and Chevrolet’s Chevette. They weren’t direct price-range competitors, but they were prescient examples of their respective manufacturer’s best shots in the small-car arena.

The Chevette arrived in celebratory red, white and blue bi-centennial bunting. Its only claim to fame: it single-handedly created (and dominated) a new category– pizza delivery vehicle. Chevette-amnesia became a national phenomena in the 1980’s.

The Accord threw down a gauntlet that literally shocked everyone– including Toyota– with its sophistication, refinement and poise. The Accord set the enduring template for the modern American car.

Suffering from rapid-onset ADD, GM was distracted by its big-car problems. In the largest US industrial investment since WW II, GM and Ford retooled their factories to “downsize” their range of cars. Chrysler, the perpetual poor relation, couldn’t match the spending spree.

Their solution: kill the big cars, and transfer their names unto the mid-size range. This shell-game strategy landed them on the Capitol steps with hands outstretched.

GM’s first round of downsizing was relatively successful, especially with its full-size models. Case in point: the new 1977 Impala was within inches and 200 lbs. of the classic ’55 – ’57 Chevy. The Impala looked clean and handled well. And it became an evergreen– until the 1991 “blob-mobile” Caprice reverted to old habits.

The economic recovery of the late 70’s and GM’s enormous downsizing investment paid off (for a few short years). In 1978, GM reached its all time US market share high of almost 50%, and the Feds were seriously talking about splitting up the company. Once again, cigars were passed. Kool-Aid drunk. This time Chrysler abstained.

By on March 6, 2007

2007_ridgeline_rtl_6722.jpgConsumer Reports has released the 2007 edition of its “Annual Auto Issue.” For the second year in a row, all CR’s “Top Picks” come from Japanese makes. For some industry observers, that’s a problem. They believe the magazine’s results indicate a hidden bias, especially against vehicles produced by domestic manufacturers. Which both is and isn’t true.

Consumer Reports’ road test engineers subjected every test vehicle to a thorough evaluation, using a pre-established set of criteria and weights. For example, emergency handling might get ten points, front seat comfort might receive eight and “feels like a Honda” might be worth 37 (just kidding— I hope). Whatever the formula, when the magazine totaled-up the points, they ended up with a list composed entirely of Japanese cars.

This process leads to an obvious question: what criteria and weights– what formula– does Consumer Reports use to rate any given vehicle? The press and Consumer Reports have a policy in this regard: don’t ask, won’t tell. 

At the last Detroit auto show, I asked a Consumer Reports road test engineer why the magazine doesn’t publish its formulas. After all, nearly every enthusiast-oriented magazine does when conducting a comparison test. “It’s policy,” he replied. He went on to suggest that he didn’t make the policy, he didn’t necessarily support it, but as a Consumer Reports employee, he had no choice but to follow it. 

It's time for Consumer Reports to declassify its formulas. Two days ago, someone made the same request on their forum. The moderator’s response was revealing (or not):

“Thank you for your comments. These forums are designed to help subscribers in selecting and buying a car. They are intended to be primarily peer to peer, with our Auto test experts helping out when available.“If you find errors we will be glad to look into them and make corrections, but we just don’t have the time or resources to engage in lengthy debates here.

“You can channel your inquiries through Customer Service. There is a link on the bottom of every forum page, and at the top of every CR on-line page. You are also welcome to visit our facilities when we hold an open house and speak directly with our test staff at that time.”

As an automotive data provider, I find Consumer Reports’ arrogance, intransigence and unaccountability completely unacceptable. Any company that depends on the public trust must strive for transparency. If you have nothing to hide, you hide nothing. That’s why I respond to any and all questions about TrueDelta’s methodology. Besides, engaging in open public debate can teach data providers better ways to do things.

The Consumer Reports moderator’s non-response indicates that the magazine doesn’t see how knowledge of its overall score formulas could further improve anyone’s ability to find the right car. These formulas are divulged on a need-to-know basis, and as far as they’re concerned car shoppers don’t need to know.

Sorry, but it just isn’t so. To keep things simple, let’s assume there are only two criteria, ride and handling. Let’s further assume that Consumer Reports’ editors have decided that ride quality is twice as important as handling when evaluating a minivan. Keeping the overall score formula secret implies that any reasonable minivan buyers should also weight ride quality twice as heavily as handling.

This is just plain wrong. There is no objective way to arrive at one best formula for everyone. For some minivan buyers handling is twice as important as ride quality, and there’s nothing inherently superior about either set of weights. These are necessarily subjective value judgments. The Toyota Sienna is Consumer Reports’ “top pick” among minivans. But a buyer who values handling above ride quality will be happier in a Honda Odyssey.

This is not to say that overall evaluations are necessarily useless. If the formula was provided, our minivanista could determine that giving extra weight to handling would tip the decision in favor of the Honda.

But the formula is not provided, so there’s no way for minivan shoppers to know how closely Consumer Reports’ criteria and weights match their own or how adjusting these might affect the decision. By withholding its formulas, Consumer Reports takes the stand that readers should let the Yonkers mob decide for them what matters most– and least– when choosing a vehicle.

It’s true that many, even most car buyers are intimidated by the process– to the point where they want an authority figure to tell them what to buy. But buyers truly interested in finding the best fit for their personal tastes are going to have to put forth more effort. Currently they’ll have to rely on sources other than Consumer Reports, since the magazine withholds information needed by people who want to think for themselves.

[Michael Karesh operates www.truedelta.com, a vehicle reliability and price comparison website.]

By on March 5, 2007

102homer16-3222.jpgWhen a chain smoker develops lung cancer after thirty years of habitual self-annihilation, their ill-health should come as no surprise to either the smoker or a casual observer. Likewise, The Big 2.5’s current tailspin is the direct result of bad habits stretching back some fifty years. Like a pack-a-day puffer, the Detroit automakers “felt just fine” for several decades. Eventually, inevitably, their dirty little habits caught up with them.

In the 1950’s, The Big Three rode America’s post-war economic boom to unprecedented profits. Their seemingly unstoppable success crowded out the domestic competition (Hudson, Nash, Packard, Studebaker). The Detroit capos reigned supreme, addicted to the high profits generated by a one-size fits-all strategy. So they cranked out nothing but full-size cars and trucks, counted the cash, paid off the unions, sat back and enjoyed the view. After all, why do anything different when the sun’s shining and hay’s being made?

The annual model change summoned forth more fins, chrome and horsepower– while hiding undersized drum brakes, marshmallow handling, numb steering and declining efficiency. While there were moments of brilliance amid the glitz and glamour, The Big Three decided Americans were suckers for sheer size and superficial flash.

Despite the eternal sunshine of Detroit’s spotless minds, European import cars started trickling into the domestic arena. By the late 50’s, the trickle had become a torrent. Corner car lots sold every conceivable (if obscure) European make: two-stroke DKWs, two-cylinder Lloyds, Renault Dauphines, Hillman Minx, Austins, Simcas, Peugeots, Citroens, VWs, Mercedes, Borgwards, etc. The Big Three launched their first counterattack in 1960.

Enter the Falcon, Corvair, Valiant and later, Chevy II. They were mostly seven-eighths scale full-size cars; vehicles that shared as many components with their bigger brothers as possible. The end result had certain relative merits, but import-style steering feel, handling and efficiency were not amongst them.

The new compacts sold well enough. Sales of “exotic” imports imploded in 1960– and no wonder. By then, most of the fragile machines were either dead or falling by the roadside. VW and Mercedes were a notable exception, importing robust cars within a proper dealer network. But the rest of them weird ferrin jobs couldn’t withstand American-style driving abuse—long distances and minimal maintenance. The lack of parts and service from fly-by-night dealers didn’t help.

The Big Three misread the tea leaves– they saw their compacts’ success and the collapse of import sales as complete vindication.

In Detroit’s mid-sixties’ euphoria, the domestics failed to notice that VW’s reputation and sales continued to grow. Soon, they were closing in on half a million sales per year. In fact, The Big Three’s compacts were stealing sales from the compact Rambler American and Studebaker Lark and their own land yachts– not the sturdy little German cars.

Anyway, the U.S. market was expanding so rapidly that the domestic compacts’ failure to stem the import tide was lost on their creators. Falling back on old habits, they put their compacts on a super-size V8 Juice diet.

By the late 60’s, Fort Detroit once again became aware of the foreign invaders. There were termites in the walls– VW bugs– and the sound of their collective chewing could not be ignored. At the same time, Toyota and Nissan put their heads over the parapet.

GM and Ford responded with a salvo of four cylinder compacts: the 1971 Chevy Vega and Ford Pinto. We’ll dispense with all the old jokes. Let’s just say that one nadir attracted another. Never mind the Pinto’s exploding gas tanks and the Vega’s self-destructing engines (aluminum block with cast iron head?), the terrible 2+2-some were packaging efficiency anti-matter.

At least the Vega handled well. Customers looking for a shrunken Camaro with a suicidal, gutless tractor engine, a three-speed stick (or two-speed Power-Glide) and interiors with all the ambience of a Rubbermaid storage bin loved it. Chrysler’s solution– The Plymouth Cricket (the imported English Hillman)– was no better, and a lot worse.

Meanwhile, Nissan had a hit with its Datsun 510, the “poor man’s BMW.” The Japanese import boasted a lusty OHC four, slick transmission, independent rear suspension and a practical but good-looking body. Toyota’s Corona was a little more boring (the company DNA?) but sturdy and fully equipped.

Never mind. The Big Three entered the 1970’s brimming with confidence. Their all-new ‘71 big cars were the pinnacle (and blow-out) of the American car’s evolution– from the 1200lb Model T to 5000+lb big-block barges longer than a Suburban.

Detroit firmly believed that the cute-as-a-bug Vega and um, inexpensive Pinto would finally show those nasty, cheap, tinny little imports what for. Once again, the big boys in and around Detroit convinced themselves that they had dealt with a problem that would eventually go away, just like the last time.

Cigars were passed. Kool-Aid drunk. A reckoning was on its way.

By on March 4, 2007

wdwc_mickeys_car22.jpg If patriotism is a scoundrel’s last refuge, American automakers and their domestic defenders have been fixated on the end game for decades. The Car Connection’s Gary Witzenburg is only the latest industry wag to try to wrap The Big 2.5 in the American flag. In a rehash of a November 2003 editorial for Automotive Industries magazine, Witzenburg offers gullible readers a lesson from his school for scoundrels.

Witzenburg’s polemic– "What's an American Car?"– starts with a proposition. “Say General Motors decides to build Chevrolets in Japan…” The former GM PR flack argues that you couldn't consider this theoretical, made-in-Japan GM product a Japanese car because it was built by an American-owned company.

Meanwhile, back in the real world, Chevrolet builds and sells the Epica and Spark in China. Buick builds and sells the GL-8 minivan in The People's Republic. GM builds Aveos in Korea and sells them at Chevrolet dealers across America. By Mr. Witzenburg’s standards these are all American cars. By anyone else’s, they’re Chinese and Korean.

In Witzenburg's world, a Honda Accord designed by American engineers, fabricated by American workers (paid in American dollars), built in America (Marysville, Ohio) with mostly (though not exclusively) American-made parts is… Japanese. Anyone familiar with multinational automobile manufacturing knows that today's world market simply isn’t simple enough to support Witzenburg’s simplistic logic fed by yo yo bento.

For example, how would the polemicist classify the country of origin for cars built at NUMMI, the joint venture between GM and Toyota? The California plant produces both the Toyota Corolla and Pontiac Vibe. Do their respective badges make the Corolla Japanese and the Vibe American, even though they share parts and roll out of the same assembly plant? Not even dancing Tony Tuttle would agree with that.

As Witzenburg’s rhetoric shifts into high gear, the contradictions raised by his position become increasingly obvious. The writer’s definition of American cars expands to include Chrysler products— even though the company is owned (at least for now) by Germany’s DaimlerChrysler. At the same time, Witzenburg labels Opel a German car brand– even though it’s owned by General Motors.

So the location of a car company’s headquarters determines its products’ nationality; or the citizenship of the people who screw it together; depending on Witzenburg’s personal preference.

Poor Witzenburg. He lives at a time when Australian Holdens become “American” Pontiacs and German Opels become “domestic” Saturns– which are sold in showrooms next to "true American” cars (many of which are built in Mexico and Canada). The Big 2.5’s global production model has removed any remaining justification for the writer's “America first” defense, who must serve at the pleasure of the president.

No surprise, then, that Witzenburg changes tack and adopts the hackneyed “what’s best for America” argument. He states “while some (mostly southern) states continue to battle each other with big incentives to attract new foreign-maker plants to gain two or three thousand jobs, other (mostly northern) states lose tens of thousands.”

Witzenburg seems unaware that these “mostly southern” states have been trying to attract the automotive industry for years. They were snubbed by the American automakers based in the “mostly northern” states. Now the same automakers are crying foul when southern states do whatever’s necessary to lure industrial facilities, using incentives to create jobs for their citizens. Just like Michigan.

“What they did not see, or chose to ignore, is that ‘creation’ of a few thousand plant jobs here and there would eventually destroy many more and better jobs elsewhere.”

What Witzenburg doesn’t see, or conveniently ignores, is that the jobs in question were destroyed by The Big 2.5's refusal to recognize and adapt to a changing market, and the way they rolled over and played dead for the UAW. The Big 2.5’s tunnel vision led to this situation, not the efforts of a few state governors to provide a better standard of living for their constituents.

Witzenburg then quotes Jim Allard, professional organist and president of the Ford-funded Level Field Institute. “Is it more important to the U.S. economy for someone to buy a Ford Fusion, although it's built in Mexico, from a company that employs 105,000 SUV-driving Americans than a Honda built in Ohio from a company that employs 27,000 sushi eaters?”

In a word, no. If Americans bought automobiles based entirely on the number of ignorant Americans an automaker employs– not upon the vehicle's quality or value– there'd be only one domestic manufacturer. We'd all be driving something truly nasty (e.g. Lada). What's more, if foreign consumers followed the same rule, they'd never buy an automobile from an American subsidiary.

The Big 2.5 have staked their future on their ability to leverage the world automotive market for domestic success. Their plan contradicts the knee-jerk patriotism they've promolgated– or at least tolerated– ever since the foreign "invasion" began. Ironically enough, Gary Witzenberg is paving the domestics' road to Hell.

[To read Gary Witzenburg's editorial, click here.] 

By on March 3, 2007

p100122822.jpgIt’s not just cars that are safer nowadays, but grown-ups too. Imagine telling your nine year-old, “Son, we’re sending you off to a farm to drive tractors for a family our cleaning lady knows.” That’s what my parents did, and I barely survived to tell the tale.  Read More >

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