Category: Editorials

By on December 14, 2006

rover_75_122.jpgWith cars and trucks piling up, it’s looking like the Daimler/Chrysler merger/takeover is on the skids. Mergers are always tricky in the auto business. It can work– if both sides put forth an effort. Unfortunately the DCX mess looks rather familiar…

There are three kinds of companies in the automobile industry: mass market manufacturers (e.g. Toyota and GM), niche players (e.g. Subaru or pre-acquisition Saab) and luxury automakers (e.g. BMW or Porsche). The first depend on volume, the second rely on selling a narrow product range at a premium price and the third must unload large numbers of high margin vehicles (or a limited run of extremely profitable products).

Obviously, mass-market makers have the most financial clout. They can afford to buy-up other companies; usually cash-strapped niche makers. Occasionally, one mass-market automaker will absorb a weaker one, either for marketing power or additional production capacity. These acquisitions usually work out– though the smaller party is completely dominated/ annihilated by the buyer (Toyota/Daihatsu, GM/Daewoo, Volkswagen/Skoda, etc). But there’s another type of acquisition: when a “mass-luxury” brand buys up a downtrodden mass-market player. BMW tried it, and the results were disastrous. 

In the early 1990s, automakers were flush with cash. BMW, one of the smallest independent world producers, was feeling vulnerable. (Car sales move in cycles; the lower end of the luxury market is always vulnerable to shrinking demand.) Without entries in the mass market, BMW felt a need to get in with a volume manufacturer. They approached Honda about a partnership– and were rebuffed. Barely changing tack, BMW went after the closest thing to Honda they could find: Rover.

The Rover Group was comprised of the remnants of several famous British carmakers. The company had been struggling since the late ‘60’s. It was on government life-support through the ‘70’s and ‘80’s.  At the time of sale, British Aerospace owned Rover (they bought it for a song from the British Government). It was profitable. Yes but– a closer examination should have set off alarms.

By then, Rover was selling tarted-up Hondas to counter their loss of market share. It no longer had the manufacturing capacity, overseas dealers or engineering staff to play in the mass market. BMW thought they were buying a cut-price Ford. What they got was a second-rate Acura.

After buying Rover from British Aerospace (and ousting Honda), BMW got down to cases and discovered just how deep the rot was. Rover’s only remaining mass-market cars were over 10 years old (and had never been world-beaters). The Honda-based units slotted just below BMW’s existing line, and several were due for replacement. Land Rover was at least famous and profitable, but quality problems were rife. Instead of being a window into the mid-market, Rover became a money-pit.

After a few years, BMW took the new MINI and ran. They sold Land Rover to Ford and “gave” the other new car– an up-market sedan called the Rover 75– to a group of investors along with a large “loan.” In the end, Rover died, Ford got Land Rover (still with quality issues) and BMW got one nice selling niche car with an English factory to match– but no mass-market presence and huge financial losses.

Daimler’s purchase of Chrysler is eerily reminiscent of Bimmer’s British misadventure. At the time of purchase, the “Crisis Corporation” and Rover both had shrunken market share, with profits depending on a few up-market vehicles. Neither had significant fleet or foreign sales (though being confined to the US market beats being stuck in England). Both had profitable niche off-road makers in tow. Both even had a Japanese “partner” (though Rover was dependent on Honda, Mitsubishi leaned on Chrysler). Neither company had a significantly profitable presence in the heart of their home market. 

Once bought, Chrysler developed a “hot” set of cars in high-end niches (the new 300 triplets) using previous-generation Mercedes technology. And then… nicht mehr. Although Chrysler and Mercedes will continue to share “unseen” parts and back office functions (until they don't), cross-brand platform sharing has been declared verboten. "A Mercedes will remain a Mercedes,” Daimler Chrysler’s head of development told a German union gathering yesterday. “And may not share a platform with anyone [save Maybach]."

Thus the new Chrysler Sebring is based on a warmed-over Mitsubishi platform, the company’s getting slaughtered in the small car market, the once profitable minivan segment is shrinking for want of innovative product and Dodge’s truck market is under siege (and just got news of layoffs). Through all this, despite their investment, Germany seems happy to watch its US “equal” tie an American made noose around its neck. In fact, it’s only a matter of time before Chrysler’s German masters sell off Jeep and/or the whole shooting match.

Of course, there is a wider lesson here: by the time a mass-market automaker is weak enough to be bought it’s too weak to compete. And eventually dies.

By on December 14, 2006

lutz222.jpgAbout three years ago, GM CEO Rick Wagoner made a critical decision about his company’s products. Rather than radically revamp The General's full-sized SUV’s or divert serious time, energy and money into small car development, Rabid Rick decreed that GM should rush through a “refresh” of their current Tahoe, Yukon, Suburban and Escalade. At the precise moment that these new[ish] four-speed gas guzzlers arrived, safety, environmental and fuel prices whacked the genre. Strangely, both pundits and PR flacks were nonplussed. These things are good. They’ll sell. How wrong can you be? Oh, I’m sorry. Didn’t you hear? The GMT900’s are a flop.

Perhaps you remember the hoopla surrounding the GMT900’s. I do. And I remember the scorn, derision and invective aimed at this website when we declared GM’s new[ish] SUV’s a mediocre misallocation of effort. Well read ‘em and weep. Some 120k full-size GMT900 SUV’s are out there, somewhere, waiting for customers willing to pay $5k or more below list. The Chevrolet Tahoe, for example, currently lingers on dealer lots for 77 days. Many of these are ’06 models. Hence GM’s decision to halt GMT900 production in January for two weeks. After that they’ll reduce throughput by over ten percent.

When the GMT900’s debuted, GM Car Czar Bob Lutz confidently predicted that his employer’s new[ish] behemoths would capture a profitable slice of the diminishing pie. So far this year, the SUV market has contracted by 24%. In that time, GMT-900 SUV sales fell 16.9%. (Toyota's large SUV sales fell 23.7%, but we're only talking about the difference between 40k and 30k units.) Meanwhile, overall, GM's light truck sales sank 11.6%, while Toyota's climbed by 12%. So… great landing, wrong airport.

And now Maximum Bob has become maxim Bob: the poster child for that old saw about repeating your mistakes 'cause you were busy dreaming of flying combat jets against the Ruskies when you should have been paying attention in history class. This time out, Maximum Bob’s telling the world that the automaker’s GMT900-based pickup trucks– upon which his boss said The General’s recovery depends– will rack up over a million sales this year, and more next.

Yes, the same man who tut-tutted the demise of the full-size SUV two days before Hurricane Katrina decimated the Gulf region’s gasoline production predicts that “pickups will pick up” a few hours before the Fed warned that the U.S. housing market faces a “substantial” cold spell. A significant housing slowdown is the pickup truck equivalent of a category five hurricane. And The Vice Chairman of Global Product Development still can’t see it coming.

Now don’t get to thinking Maximum Bob is spinning a tale to bolster his beleaguered troops/GM’s stock price. This man is deluded past the point of crazy-like-a-fox credibility. To wit: when pressed on the impact of the deep discounts offered on pickups produced by The Blue Oval and the Dodge Boys, Maximum Bob admitted "This level of discounting on the pickups is uncharted territory… But the good news is that incentives of $7,000 to $8,000 a vehicle is not sustainable.”

Huh? Is Maxi Bob saying his competitors are about to go under? Or that they’ll come to their senses, stop discounting and use their unsold vehicles for artificial reefs? OK, so what about next year’s debut of the new Toyota Tundra? Surely, that's going to put the hurt on GM’s pickup truck margins. “The Tundra will take share, but [it] will steal from the older Tundra and from the Tacoma," Lutz said. "I don't think we'll see that much switching from American truck owners to the Tundra." Now that’s what I call confidence! Or, more accurately, complacency!

Even if the Silverado and Sierra somehow manage to cling to their current volumes in a collapsing market, the General’s margins are about to get hammered. Neither Ford nor Dodge can afford to surrender market share; they’ll do are doing will continue to do whatever it takes to keep the pickup pipeline flowing. And Toyota didn’t build that truck plant down in Texas just for show. If they have to slice prices to move the metal, they can surely afford to do so. And by God they will.

This, folks, is Rick’s bad. Instead of holding off and building game changers– vehicles that can recover lost ground with undeniable, unassailable superiority, GM’s CEO thought it best to get the new shit out the door as fast as possible, regardless of its ability to wow the non-faithful.

One wonders what would have happened if Rabid Rick Wagoner had sat down with his execs and said “Build me a truck that gets 25mpg in the city, feels like an Audi inside, tows more than anyone else and outlasts Ron Jeremy. I don’t care if you have to stick a hybrid synergy drive under the hood. I don't care if we make a plug nickel. Just do it.” Or, alternatively, "Lutz, you're fired."

By on December 13, 2006

papayaraspbstack22.jpgI recently attended a product launch for a domestic automaker’s new vehicle. I soon found myself in the usual spot. Above me: the world’s most soothing shower nozzle. Below me: a four-star restaurant serving up the most delectable of Japanese fusion cuisine. While I’m not averse to junketeering’s sybaritic attractions, one question kept ringing in my mind: when? When will Ford realize that it’s time for the pleasure to stop?

I was in The City by the Bay, attending the official press launch for Ford’s new Edge. The event was the industry standard combination of first class travel, picturesque settings, box fresh press cars, fine food and an open bar. While inside the belly of the media beast, I made a car connection with a number of veteran junketeers. Business as usual lads? Yup. OK, one of my peers quipped that this was the first Ford sponsored trip that didn’t involve a stint on the automaker’s private jet. Well fair enough; you wouldn't want to deny Mark Fields the chance to see his family every weekend would you?

Don't get me wrong: I love pampering as much as the next underpaid writer. I’ve been fortunate enough to lay my head on some high thread count pillow cases in my time, dreaming of mirror smooth roads. But it struck me odd that Ford figures the show must go on.

To say that America’s fourth largest automaker is having some financial difficulties is akin to saying that OJ has an image problem. Ford’s dire straits are a product of product and mismanagement and corporate insulation and, well, you know the rest. The Way Fordward has taken its toll on almost every facet of their operation, from plant closures affecting tens of thousands workers, to white collar flight at the highest levels. So why hasn’t the supremely ridiculous exercise in excess known as the press launch been ousted from Ford’s advertising budget?

Do the math. Ford brought three “waves” of journalists into the Bay Area over a four-day period. During that time, Ford had to foot the bill for airfare (some of which was overseas), lodging (well over $400 a night), three to four meals, alcohol, swag, displays, the salaries of all the employees involved, etc. A million might not even cover it. Mutliply that by all the launches– MKX, MKZ, GT500, new Navigator, etc.– and you're talking about some serious wedge.

Ford has lost $7b over the course of 2006. They’ve given themselves three years to bounce back to the point where they can BEGIN to pay off the principal portion of their debt. They need a new, innovative small car a lot more than I need a new, innovative 42” plasma screen in my hotel room. They need to revamp their ancient Lincoln Town Car to broaden it’s appeal more than I need a first class ticket from, um, somewhere to broaden my horizons. Sure, it’s nice, but a ritzy press launch isn’t going to sway my opinion one-way or the other. Or is it? Aye, there’s the steak rub.

As this website has pointed out many times, there is an unspoken agreement between automobile manufacturers and the motoring press: you eat, drink and sleep the rock star lifestyle; make nice with our products in your publications and we’ll invite you back again. If Ford failed to provide the usual journalistic trough, they’d be breaking their end of the bargain.

There’s another potential downside. If Ford pulled the plug on their outrageously expensive press junketeering, journalists would begin to believe that FoMoCo really is in serious trouble. It’s one thing to read or even write the writing on the wall, and quite another to pick up your own check. At that point, the gestalt would change, and Ford’s rep could flounder.

Of course, Ford’s ad budget is the big ass stick behind the gently sautéed carrots. Lose the junkets and the muzzle might loosen, but not fall off. In any case, it’s time for Ford to make Bold Moves that actually LOOK like bold moves. Selling Jaguar, Land Rover and Aston would make a nice start. Killing the endless portions of papya cubed with raspberries would also send a clear message that business as usual is dead. Otherwise, Ford’s still fiddling while Rome burns.  

By on December 12, 2006

lovins222.jpgAmory Lovins makes his living studying energy use and efficiency. According to the physicist and cofounder of the Rocky Mountain Institute environmental think tank, the modern automobile uses just one percent of its energy to move its occupant hither and yon. The number is shockingly small, and it may point to big changes for future cars.

Lovins points out that a great deal of an automobile’s engine power does… nothing much. At idle, a car uses its fuel to power accessories and keep itself going. All of which take a friction-filled bite of its overall efficiency. In fact, Lovins reckons only about an eighth of a car’s fuel is burned to turn its wheels. Half of that simply heats up your tires and the air around the vehicle. When you depress the go-pedal, you’re using just six percent of your engine’s total output. 

On average– we’re not talking about a Prius or Hummer here– less than 20% of the energy of gasoline is actually used to drive the wheels of the car. That means very little of the gas you bought moves you down the road.  It’s like buying a twelve pack and taking one sip.

The numbers look absurd, but if you’ve been around cars long enough, you know they’re not completely ridiculous. You know not to touch the exhaust manifold after the engine’s been running. You know not to stand up in your buddy’s convertible. Combustion engines put out a lot of heat and the atmosphere is not nearly as pliable as it seemed when you were standing still. In every mechanical transaction, friction takes a vig.

Then there’s the weight. Basically, 75 percent of what your car’s doing is moving its own weight. Steel, glass and gas are heavy. The more weight you have to move, the more energy you need to overcome gravity and inertia.

It’s as tough to find fault with the physics as it is to accept the outcome. If you were getting one percent return on an investment, you’d move your money. If your employee worked five minutes a day, you’d hand him a box for his Happy Meal toys and mouse pad and change all the administrative passwords. And yet, we put up with one percent efficiency from our cars? Not for long. As the price of producing that single percentage point grows (in many senses), the pressure to improve our vehicles’ energy efficiency grows stronger.

Of course, physics is kind of nice ‘cause everything goes both ways. If three quarters of your fuel is spent on weight, shedding pounds gives you about a seven-fold energy return. Lower your drag and you can pick up some more. Fancy engines are another solution, but materials and design are where the really dramatic energy savings live.

For example, BMW has developed a process for mass-producing carbon fiber-reinforced plastics (CFP). CFP is up to 30 percent lighter than aluminum and 50 percent lighter than steel, without concession to strength. Although the cost of production and application currently relegates the technology to aeronautics and serious racing, new procedures have begun delivering the material to mainstream vehicles. OK, the M6 and M3 are not exactly what you’d call fleet cars, but it’s a start.

CFP is also easier to shape than its ferrous colleagues. Instead of pressing a hood and attaching hitches and hinges, a CFP hood can be extruded with all its doodads in place. Any manufacturer who could master mass production would see its vehicles’ number of parts– and related assembly time– plummet. CFP also offers designers the opportunity to use more complicated forms, to create shapes that can’t be [cost-effectively] hammered out of metal.

Reduced reliance on metal stamping would also lead to quicker refresh rates for styles, and more simultaneous choices. Seven different Scion TCs in the same model year. A WRX that screams I just graduated and one that whispers I was never here. Fins for some, no fins for others. Mass customization.

Greater control of vehicle design can also increase the slipperiness of vehicle, further improving efficiency and performance. Lovins believes a 66 mpg SUV is achievable, without compromising current space or driving dynamics. It could big, brutish, tow a small town and safer too boot. Americans can eat their cake and have it too.

Carbon fiber costs around $8.50 a pound, compared to $1 for the same amount of steel. Unless economies of scale can lower unit prices, it seems a hopeless mismatch. Think how much debate surrounds the commercial value of the current “hybrid premium.” If, however, you believe that oil will not dip below $70 a barrel, that global warming is not the liberal conspiracy that Mr. Limbaugh and his supporters suggest, or that a one percent return on your energy dollar is unacceptable, a little hike in sticker prices could represent a big bargain.

By on December 11, 2006

T’was two weeks before Christmas
And all through Detroit,
The car makers were hustling,
But they weren’t too adroit.

They all had such high hopes,
To end up the year,
With a good bottom line
To bring Christmas cheer. 

But GM Rick is floundering,
‘Cause his products are stuck,
Way back in the ‘90’s,
He’s plain out of luck.

Poor Chrysler is struggling
To sell what they can.
Doctor Z hasn’t helped them;
Guess he needs a new plan.

Across town at Ford,
All hope’s on Mulally,
But it’s looking quite doubtful
That his sales will soon rally.

Yes, things look quite grim
For the Big Two Point Five,
Yet we all keep on hoping
That they’ll somehow survive. 

When Santa hit town,
He just shook his white head.
He scoped out their products
And finally said:

“You know at one time,
American cars stood,
For innovation and change,
And all that was good,

For comfort and style,
And bang for the buck.
Now all I can see,
Are ladder frame trucks.

There’s front wheel drive Jeeps,
And Fords rebadged as Lincoln.
A Cadillac truck?
What have you been drinkin’?

The pistonheads begged me,
To come help all you guys.
I’ll do what I can,
But you must realize-

You’re in pretty deep;
There are no magic pills,
Just hard work and focus,
And leave off the frills.

You’ve let the beancounters
Make every decision;
Your products are suffering,
You need a new vision.

You’ve too many products,
You’ve spread yourselves thin,
Trying to cover all markets,
It’s time to reel in.

Platform sharing’s just fine,
It can help control costs,
But stop badge engineering,
To regain what you’ve lost.

Stay true to your brands
With unique product lines;
Make each vehicle distinct
And you’ll all do just fine.”

Then all three of them huddled
To discuss what they’d heard.
Could this be the answer?
They thought it absurd.

“No way!” they all said,
As they talked ‘mongst themselves.
“What could this guy know?
He should go back to his elves!”

So they told Santa “Leave!
And get out of this place,
We know more than you;
Now get out of our face!”

He shook his head sadly
As he climbed on his sleigh;
He just couldn’t believe them,
Then they all heard him say

“I gave it my best shot,
I tried what I could,
What you get, you deserve.
And you’ll get what you should.

My last bit of advice,
Since you don’t know what class is;
Get your big swelled heads out
Of your dumb corporate asses!”

By on December 10, 2006

2001fordtaurus232.jpg For the second time in less than two years, I’ve been relegated to rental car Hell. My normal ride is busy recovering from a second rear-end encounter initiated by a young driver in iffy conditions. Previously on “This Is Not Your Beautiful Car,” I sampled one of the last of the great V8 Interceptors– I mean, the Pontiac Bonneville. It was so large– on the outside– that I was constantly checking the rear-view mirror for Tomcats auguring-in for a landing. On the inside, it was plush and chock-full of gadgets. But it was also more cramped than an Olympic swimmer after a seven course meal. This time ‘round I got sentenced to an 05’ Taurus.  

While the Ford is definitely roomier inside than the plastic Pontiac, the Taurus lacks what anyone would call “style.” In fact, to complete the generic motif, it really needs the word “CAR” in black block lettering adorning its hood, roof and doors. Driving-wise, the Ford Taurus is about as close to a Porsche Boxster as a block of cement. The Taurus’ interior is cheap-looking, if hard-wearing (which may or may not be a good thing). But hey, this baby’s got a stereo, cruise-control, power windows and map lights. So, unlike Christina Aguilera, it’s not a complete stripper. And it’s got me thinking: the Taurus would make a great “first car.”

When I was growing up, “kids’ cars” were usually pre-abused sedans from the late ‘60s’ or anytime in the ‘70s’. These battle-weary Yank tanks or plus-sized rice burners were considered a pro-active solution to teenage driving. The reasoning was simple: put as much iron as possible between junior or little missy and whatever solid objects they might strike in some late-braking encounter. While these sofas-on-wheels were less nimble than k-fed after his tenth Long Slow Comfortable Screw Against the Wall, they’d shake off a lot of minor scrapes– especially if they were from the duck-billed 5mph bumper era. They were also dirt cheap to fix.

Of course, there were a few kids whose parents bought them something sexy and brand-new– and a replacement after they’d bent it. And others were forced by financial circumstances to share the family car. The practice was understandable but deeply unnatural; it implied that your money was going toward other things, like college.

Kids who received ratty wheels did what they could to be cool. They tinted the windows and blared the soundtrack from “Shaft” or other proto-hip-hop tunes. Thankfully, there wasn’t much anyone could do about these beaters’ underwhelming performance, save slapping on some serious rubber, and no one thought about tires until they were as bald as Kojak. Any performance-oriented body mod got the derision it deserved.

While it’s an ancient bit of iron (practically unchanged for 10 years), the Taurus is a decent car for post-permit progeny. ASs it's only slightly faster than a power walker, Ye Olde Understeer would never get a rookie driver in trouble. While the Taurus' handling isn’t particularly sharp (as in a butter knife), the car pretty much goes where you aim it. There’s just about enough acceleration to merge into traffic. It’s wide and low enough that rollovers are less likely than a rigged lottery draw. And if something did happen, the Taurus four-star crash protection would see you right.

On the economy front, Taurus mileage is a precocious twenty-something. The jelly mold Ford has never been known for reliability, but parts are cheap. Your kids should be able to keep one in gas, brakes, etc. on burger-flipping money. Forget about depreciation; chances are the Taurus will die in service. You can get a decent 50-60k unit with a few useful toys for less than five figures. Perfectly drivable examples of this rental mainstay cost as little as $3k to $4k. Prozac excepted, peace of mind doesn’t come any cheaper.

The main demerit: the Taurus’ commodious back seat. While I’m not concerned about prurient issues (lust will find a way), the Taurus can haul up to six people. It’s been scientifically proven that a teenager’s stupidity increases in direct proportion to the number of peers in close physical proximity. The sheer inattention and bravado of six teens with one brain between them is too staggering to contemplate. (Some states ban new drivers from carrying cohorts.) At least they won’t be drag-racing; the engine has nowhere near the power to haul 900 pounds of hormones at a non-humiliating speed.

Ending on a positive note, the Taurus is dull and ugly. Ford’s sedan teaches your child that if they don’t study hard and get into a good school, they can look forward to driving this sort of car for the rest of their life. Nothing focuses the mind like the prospect of a life full of rental hacks.  

By on December 8, 2006

ford_logo_old22.jpgNovember’s sales figures are out, and FoMoCo’s treading unfamiliar waters. For the first time since, well, ever, Dearborn’s darlings find themselves off the sales podium. The General, Toyota and both parts of the DCX German-American hybrid surpassed last year’s sales totals. Despite pre-Christmas gains north of the border, Ford’s U.S. sales sank nearly 10%. Their declining market share dropped them into fourth place by total sales volume. “This is an area, frankly, of disappointment,” George Pipas, Sales Analysis Manager for Four’d pronounced. “We had our sights set higher.” 

On the heels of November’s results, CEO Alan Mulally’s mob announced that an additional 15k units aren’t going to see their way off of Ford’s leveraged lines. If the slowdown was due to the void left by 38k clock-punchers as they punched out permanently, hey, no problem. But these cuts were made this month; before Ford’s assembly liners leave the building. To justify the increased production reduction, Glass House representatives reiterated their Chrysler anti-matter approach: match supply to demand. Or: we ain't gonna go out and "chase sales simply to pump up [the] volume."

Yes, well, a dozen more FoMoCo models equipped with an additional thousand in Mulally minted bonus bucks beg to differ. In an effort to, uh, chase sales and pump up the volume, Dearborn is using the only sales strategy with a hope in Hell of moving the moribund metal. Buyers can now score up to $7k in cash rebates on nineteen different models. Ford’s hoping bribed consumers will blow the dust off the over 90-day inventory and end Ford’s decade long market decline.

There are plenty of reasons why the situation sucks. Now that the long forgotten (by Ford designers) Taurus has met its matador, fleet sales no longer offer a buffer against retail implosion. What’s more, sales of the profitable Explorer have rolled-over and died. November was the worst month for the former mainstay since the SUV’s introduction in 1990– down some 55k units from 2005. And to be blunt, the Edge is arriving a day (or 365) late and a dollar short.

Even with all that leveraged capital keeping the company coffers full (for now), Dearborn’s December needs to show some positive market share movement– even if the net result is a negative bottom line. Banc of America analyst Ronald Tadross and friends indicate that every point of market share Ford loses behind the couch sucks a billion bucks in operating profits away from Ford’s ‘09 return to profitability target.

According to small Ron, “Anybody can close some plants and fire some people… Right-sizing is almost self-defeating if you don’t fix the business.” Mulally’s movements, while dramatic and sweeping, have not lead to the Glass House re-org that is badly needed to meet its profit obligations. Analysts call for public deadlines for global product integration, transparency regarding reducing purchasing costs, and an abandonment of incentive based sales (that render resale values lower than Ford’s S&P rating). As if.

One item on the money men's to-do list that may actually occur: the long awaited deconstruction of Ford’s overseas imbroglio: the Premium Automotive Group (PAG). Recently released Wall Street whiz kid Kenneth Leet is rumored to still be on top of the sale of Bond’s favorite Q-toy provider (his pockets awaiting relining). So much for Aston Martin. But what of Jaguar? Hidden within the legalese of FoMoCo’s disclosure: a clause that lets the cat out of the PAG.

In fact, Jaguar and Land Rover were one of the few Ford “assets” exempted from their recent collateral catchall (which includes their logo and Bill’s bronze desk sign). In Jaguar's case, this could be due to the fact that mortgaging nothing generally renders nothing. Still, flogging the feline to anyone willing to take it off Ford's hands makes a lot of cents. As the Brits say, when you’re in a hole, stop digging. Besides, a Jaguar sell-off would send a clear and welcome signal to skeptical observers (i.e. Ford stockholders) that the automaker is finally serious about getting its house in order.

The sum of all fears seems to be $4b. Although that's a bit low for a multinational automaker's mission critical operating liquidity, Ford is bound and determined to keep its head above this level. To keep on truckin’, Dearborn is quite literally risking it all. Ford’s beancounters have increased the company’s collateralized credit facility from $18b to near as dammit $23b. At the same time, the year’s largest bulk of stock-bond hybrids have hit the trading room floor.

While these bold moves have bought The Blue Oval Boyz a bit more time, it doesn’t do anything to change the fundamental problems challenges besetting Henry Ford’s legacy: products, brands, dealers and unions. Especially product. If Ford doesn’t find some automotive magic bullets, if it can’t build some tangible, tantalizing new toys in double quick time, the company’s new-found leveraged life could prove to be nothing more than borrowed time.

By on December 8, 2006

eh.jpg Germans don’t like the phrase “assisted suicide.” The preferred term is aktive Sterbehilfe (active assistance in dying). Apparently, it's not a crime. Euthanasia is a crime. Assisted suicide is not. However you slice it, it's clear that this “activity” is not unknown in Germany’s corporate culture. While DCX’ leadership keeps insisting they want to nurture the Chrysler group back to health, they seem Hell bent on helping it meet its demise.

DOA: Joe Eberhardt. In the summer of 2003, the Dark Lords of DCX appointed Herr Eberhardt Chrysler Group Executive Vice President – Global Sales, Marketing and Service. From the time he arrived, everything Jolting Joe did seemed to reflect a callous disregard for his employer's survival. In three years, Eberhardt managed to turn a company on the verge of a renaissance into an organization standing on the precipice.

For one thing, Eberhardt approved the two worst automotive ad campaigns in recent history. The cartoonish “Ask Dr. Z” commercials succeeded in making a fool of both his boss and his boss’ company, while the “WTF?” Dodge Nitro spots almost achieved the impossible: slowing sales of a hot-selling product. Joe was just getting warmed-up. When sales started tanking, Joe started banking. By reneging on Lee Iacocca’s promise not to build vehicles regardless of customer demand, Eberhardt’s Chrysler boldly went where Chapter 11-aversive executives fear to tread.

And then Eberhardt plunged Chrysler Group deep into rebate Hell. The company’s incentives are now double the industry average– and growing. And if that wasn’t enough to convince Chrysler’s German masters that it was time to confiscate Joe's belt and shoe laces, Eberhardt unleashed his pièce de résistance: alienating the entire Chrysler/Dodge/Jeep dealer network. Never a one for the subtle approach, Joe forced dealers to take vehicles they couldn’t sell, then insulted their sales abilities when they didn't sell them. No wonder the President of Southfield Chrysler said “Joe needs to work on his people skills a bit.”

In this case, there’s no need for the old “Did he jump or was he pushed?” debate. Think of Mr. Eberhardt’s corporate demise as aktive Sterbehilfe and call it good. But where does Jolted Joe’s departure leave the automaker with enough unsold inventory to give every person in the state of Wyoming a new vehicle (assuming they’d want a Chrysler product)– not including the suspiciously undisclosed number of vehicles they have stashed away in that infamous sales bank? Fleet sales!

When reporters asked Chrysler's [remaining] execs why they're offering both a soft top and a retractable hard top on the new Sebring, the expense accounters said the ragtop was a “lower cost alternative” for the rental market. You don’t have to be a Taurean to know that positioning a new model in the resale toilet from the outset isn’t a very smart move– unless you’re trying to make dumb ones. Hmmm.

While we’re second guessing management motivation, those of you who’ve wondered if Chrysler’s got a cunning plan to build up the sales bank as a hedge against UAW actions needn’t. If that were the case, the company wouldn’t be overproducing and backlogging Rams and Pacificas and other models that aren’t selling; models that will continue to wither against fresh models from GM, Ford and Toyota. If riding out an extended strike was the plan, Chrysler would be would amassing Calibers, Wrangler four-doors and other popular models.

How’s this for a theory: Daimler-Benz wants Chrysler to fail. There were plenty of German execs who thought the “merger of equals” sullied MB’s good name. Perhaps powerful factions within DCX denied Chrysler the resources it needed (e.g. advanced engineering) so that the American automaker and its German supporters would be hoisted by their own petard. Maybe they actively worked to destroy Chrysler so they could fill the power vacuum left by the automaker's eventual bankruptcy/sell-off. It wouldn’t be the first time that one part of a large company plotted against the interests of the other, in a fight to the death for control. 

Maybe it didn’t start that way, but I bet that's the way it is now, as executives scramble to diassociate themselves from DCX' all-American adventure. I mean, why did Dr. Z and his zealots stand around so long, watching Eberhardt drive Chrysler over a cliff? Surely someone above him should have yanked Joltin' Joe out of the game a long time ago. You could even say that Joe's superiors are as guilty as Eberhardt for Chysler's declining physical and mental health. Oh… that’s right. They can’t be guilty. That’s not a crime in Germany.

By on December 7, 2006

2006-cadillac-bls-fa-1920x1440.jpgI recently received a review of the Cadillac BLS by a South African scribe. While the writer responded to my revisions by retreating to the pub, I couldn’t stop thinking about the obscure object of his ire. The execrable BLS– a Saab 9-3 reskin with neither style nor grace– was born in the middle of GM’s so-called product renaissance. BLS sales projections started at 20k units per year, then fell to 10, then seven. And now I learn that instead of killing this poor-selling, po-faced, brand-defiling half-breed, GM has appointed one Wolfgang Schubert to “save” the BLS.

In case you thought GM might send in a car guy to make the BLS more competitive, please note that Schubert hails from GM's Brussels office, where he “coordinated European Union affairs.” According to The General, increasing the BLS’ fleet and leasing sales is the red tape wrestler’s main task. James Vurpillat, Cadillac's director for international marketing and brand development, confidently predicted that Caddy will sell 3k BLS’ to the fleet market– roughly twice the number of mock-Caddies Trollhatten will produce this year.

Many of the GM faithful will read this sad tale of misbegotten motorcars and misplaced marketing and condemn me as an eternal pessimist, blinded by a relentless search for the dark clouds inside The General’s silver lining. Why focus on one crap car [not] sold to Europeans and South Africans when there’s so much good news flying through the media ether? For example, GM has finally sold 51% of its GMAC financing unit, adding $14 billion to the corporate coffers over the next three years. The cash ought to give GM CEO Rick Wagoner’s turnaround some much-needed breathing room.

OK, Generous Motors’ current cash burn is producing neither heat nor light, the last piece of furniture has just been thrown in the fire and the temperature (i.e. market share) is still dropping. But hey, November sales are up six percent! We’re talking double digit increases in the sales of GM’s high profits trucks and SUV’s! OK, that’s compared to a cataclysmic ’05 and Toyota pulled further ahead with a 22.8% sales increase. But hey, the new Lambda-based crossovers are coming! OK, GM’s chances of conquesting a transplant customer with their me-too, late-to-the-party CUV’s are smaller than the decreased margins vis-à-vis GM’s full-sized SUV’s.

But hey, costs are coming down! Workers are leaving! Oh right, so is Kirk. Yes, there is that. When GM’s largest private investor says screw it, I’m out of here– banking a mere $100m to [partially] cover his lawyer’s fees– you’d be forgiven for thinking GM is a lost cause. Lest we forget, Kirk Kerkorian had his main man Jerry York on GM’s Board of Bystanders, snuffling through the books. Oh, and about those books… GM is still the focus of seven SEC investigations.

And what about that Delphi thing? You know; the bankrupt former GM subsidiary and current parts supplier that’s determined to suckle on GM’s tit even if it kills them, GM and the UAW. Despite enough legal extensions to add a couple of chapters to Kafka’s The Trial, it’s still not sorted. Experts reckon that if Delphi goes off-line for a month, the corporate mothership will founder. At the same time, a sharp up-tick in domestic gas prices would strangle demand for GM’s mission critical cash cows. But hey, GM’s products are getting better! Better interiors, better mileage, better design!

And where are these mainstream products that will kick the transplants’ collective ass and save GM? Coming. Now it’s dual-mode hybrids. Or was that plug-in hybrids? Hydrogen fuel cells? Flex fuel? Diesels? (No, not diesels.) Anyway, when the good stuff arrives, will it be better than the competition, or somewhere closer to just about as good? The truth is GM needs a series of grand slam home runs, and the hits ain’t happening.

You don’t need to drive a BLS to know that GM isn’t keeping up. In fact, Rick Wagoner’s administration has consistently bet on the wrong horses– from ill-advised foreign alliances, to poo-pooing hybrid technology, to putting all its eggs in an SUV-shaped basket, to gently refreshing rather than boldly re-imagining its products. While Wagoner is right to attack GM’s unsustainable cost base, all his company’s structural problems flow from product-related failures.

Maybe I am a pessimist. But the GM faithful need to read the following exchange and ask themselves a simple question: if GM’s turnaround is doing so well, why can’t the man at the helm spread a little love?

Automotive News: When would you realistically like to see North America return to profitability?

Wagoner: As soon as possible.

Automotive News: Do you have any kind of target that you'd like to share?

Wagoner: Not that I'd like to share.

By on December 4, 2006

hellsbells001.jpgWhen the new[ish] Chevrolet Tahoe SUV was released, reporters asked GM Car Czar Bob Lutz whether rising gas prices would discourage SUV buyers from jumping into The General’s gas-guzzling truck. ”Rich people don’t care about gas prices,” Lutz remarked. Yes well, it’s time for Maximum Bob to take a class in Remedial Marketing. It’s a five minute course that starts with the Bell Curve. 

Place potential car buyers along an axis showing unit price and you’ll get a big Bell Curve shaped hump in the middle. If you want to be the world’s largest manufacturer of automobiles– defined as the company that sells the largest number of cars per year– it really doesn’t matter what rich people think. There’s no way they can generate enough profits to make your nut. You have to play the law of averages.

The Big Three fell off the curve at the end of the ’80’s when they began chasing [imagined] high-margin niches filled with wealthy people. The more high-priced, high margin trucks and SUV’s GM, Ford and Chrysler sold, the less they cared about the millions of financially challenged customers who helped create their companies.

In this they were not alone. Even VW (Peoples’ Wagon!) neglected smaller cars in favor of big and expensive platforms. VW quality nosedived as the smart eggs within their organization set about building Phaetons, Touaregs and a limited edition ultracar, the Bugatti Veyron. Today they’re all fighting to claw their way back to the mean– before it’s too late.

Probably suspecting a trick (you’re ceding us the mass market?), Toyota and Honda took a good close look at the Car Customer Bell Curve and arrived at a very different conclusion. They asked: ”What if we offer affordable cars to the people right smack in the middle of the graph? A car range with just a touch better features, quality and service than similar servings from the domestics?” Rocket science!

We’re looking at two strategies here. Toyota: build affordable transportation for the masses at a quality level that slightly exceeds expectations relative to price. GM et al: build oversized, under-engineered and fuel inefficient cars for people who don’t care about money while palming off sub-standard cars on mainstream customers. Is it any wonder that the truck-crazed domestic manufacturers lost mission critical market share to the transplants? Lutz and his cohorts failed to recognize that the vast majority of potential customers were simply looking for affordable quality transportation.

Having taken their eyes off the chart, The Big Two Point Five are now paying the price. While they sent their best resources into an imagined land of promised gold, the transplants stuck to looking squarely at the needs of mainstream of car buyers. This focus also helped them gaze into the future. They asked themselves a question Detroit didn’t even consider: ”How do we keep our cars affordable as fuel costs and environmental pressures increase?”

Here’s Bob Lutz on the same topic back in 2003: ”It just doesn’t make environmental or economic sense to try to put an expensive dual-power train system into less expensive cars which already get good mileage.” Clearly, Maximum Bob’s take on good mileage is different from a Prius owner’s.  Lutz belief that gas would go back under $2 a gallon certainly didn’t help his ability to gauge GM’s ”new” target market. And then GM was forced to cough up gas rebates for Lutz’ hulks, covering the spread in gas prices over $1.99 to the tune of $1000. These days, Bob’s a hybrid convert– who’s short on product.

To get back into the real game, the domestics will have to party back in The Land of Averages– provided they want to remain on the list of the world’s top five automobile manufacturers (the last time I looked it was still a priority). In this effort, there are no shortcuts.

In Ford’s case, success will require an immediate  return to the reason behind Henry’s decision to create a Model-T assembly line: to build a ”reasonably priced, reliable and efficient car” that’s ”easy to operate, maintain and handle.” Hey; that sounds a lot like how people describe Toyota’s products today.

Mounting a convincing return to the essential mass market is going to be a lot harder than simply inventing imagined premium niches (I’m looking at you Chevrolet SSR). The domestics will have to make their cars both relevant and affordable in an age where everyone, including the supposedly oblivious rich, have woken up to the true cost of energy. An age where the competition is creative, well-funded and focused. But GM et al can only make a start if they stop applying yesterday’s problems to tomorrow’s solutions.

So, the lesson for today: you can’t please most of the people most of the time if you don’t even try.

By on December 3, 2006

cov_gm3_120106222.jpgGM’s investment in The People’s Republic of China presents two main dangers. First, it extends GM’s supply chain over an enormous distance. Second, it enmeshes The General in the economy of a non-democratic country. Frank Williams has already raised the alarm over the possibility of Chinese nationalization. We’ve also highlighted the chances of de facto nationalization; based on western automakers’ [mandatory] partners’ history of stealing Western designs and technology. In all this, we shouldn’t ignore the fact that GM’s money is propping up a communist dictatorship.

Make no mistake: GM’s Chinese operations depend on the country’s virtually endless supply of cheap labor, which depends entirely on government policy. In theory, all Chinese workers belong to the Communist party-controlled All China Federation of Trade Unions. Although there are locally-set minimum wages, international observers report factories ignore national guidelines– which are a fraction of US legal requirements. Strangely enough, the Chinese government shows little interest in policing wages, conditions or working hours. 

China’s HuKou or “household registration” system is the real engine of the country’s “economic miracle.” When any one of China’s 350m poverty-stricken peasants migrates to an urban area for a factory job, they must pay deposits and “permit fees” to secure a job (normally obtained via loans from employers). If a migrant wants to return home, they forfeit the money, equal to many months’ wages, and must pay off any company related debts. Equally heinous, immigrant workers are not legal residents in their new urban locations; they’re denied education, housing, health care and social services. They are, in effect, indentured slaves.

According to Columbia University law professor Mark Barenberg, HuKou lowers China’s manufacturing wages by 47.4 percent to 85.6 percent. Barenberg says the policy reduces the price of Chinese exports by 11 to 44 percent. Not to put too fine a point on it, the success of GM’s Chinese exports— including tens of millions of dollars of car parts headed for The General’s US automotive factories each month— reflects the Chinese government’s deeply-entrenched repression of peasants’ personal freedom: apartheid by any other name.

GM’s defense: it ain’t me babe. The claim a GM Chinese automobile production factory is a clean, well-lighted place. GM’s workers enjoy a safe work environment, a regulated work week and higher than average wages (for whatever that’s worth). Even if we assume that the parts makers supplying GM’s Chinese assembly lines adhere to GM’s elevated [for China] wage and safety standards, all GM’s migrant factory workers are subject to the same despicable Hukou system.

And you simply can’t get around the fact that GM’s contribution to China’s economic success supports the continuation of a repressive regime– even if the damage to human rights is done somewhere “off stage.” Apologists argue that GM and other western automakers are part of China’s modernization; once capitalism gains a foothold, political freedom will follow. So… where is it? Why are so many analysts convinced that China’s workers are continuing their “race to the bottom” in international labor standards? And then there's the moral relativist's redout: if we don't do it, someone else will.

That statement puts us smack dab in the middle of a wider debate over corporate ethics. However laudable their behavior at the factory level, whatever the competitive climate, should multinational corporations do business in countries with repressive regimes? Hardball players amongst you will argue that GM’s primary responsibility is to its shareholders, not Chinese or even American workers. Perhaps so. But it is instructive to realize that GM has a bit of history in this regard, and it ain’t pretty.

In an article published in this month’s Jewish Journal, writer Edwin Black outlines GM’s involvement with Germany’s National Socialist Party. According to Black, “GM and Opel were eager, willing and indispensable cogs in the Third Reich's rearmament juggernaut.” Black chronicles a pre-war meeting between GM’s overseas chief James D. Mooney and the Fuhrer, where GM's enthusiasm for Hitler's economic, military and social agenda was abundantly clear. (Mooney later received The German Eagle with Cross.) 

“The Wehrmacht, the German military, soon became Opel's No. 1 customer by far… Expanding its German workforce from 17,000 in 1934 to 27,000 in 1938 also made GM one of Germany's leading employers. Unquestionably, GM's Opel became an integral facet of Hitler's Reich.” Black also points out that Germany’s blitzkrieg depended on Opel’s "Blitz” truck and the tetraethyl gasoline formulation technology sold to the Nazis by a GM subsidiary.

Did Sloan know about Germany’s repression during this time? Black certainly makes a solid case for the assertion. Did Sloan care? “In a long April 1939 letter to an objecting stockholder, [Sloan wrote] that in the interests of making a profit, GM shouldn't risk alienating its German hosts by intruding in Nazi affairs. ‘In other words, to put the proposition rather bluntly,’ Sloan said in the letter, ‘such matters should not be considered the business of the management of General Motors.’” So what’s changed?

By on December 1, 2006

dr-z222.jpgHistorically speaking, Chrysler’s desire to keep pace with Ford and GM has kept the company perched on the brink of disaster. In his magnificent Motown expose “The Reckoning,” author David Halberstam devotes a couple of chapters to the "Crisis Corporation's" perennial woes. Halberstam describes the corrosive effects of the automaker’s sales bank, where vehicles were built, registered as sold and held in vast lots– until reality caught up with book-keeping. The practice was eventually abandoned. As you’ve just read, it’s baaaaack.

The idea of the “sales bank” is logical– in theory. Instead of constantly slowing and speeding production to meet varying demand, factories work at full capacity year-round. Any unsold cars are “banked” in storage lots until demand picks up. This supposedly eliminates carmakers two largest headaches: the need to run near full capacity (to maintain low unit costs) and the cyclical market. What made the bank deadly in practice: overstated sales projections. “Banking” just made things worse.

The problem with “holding” the cars– beyond the storage cost and resulting deterioration– was the way the practice warped Chrysler’s relations with its dealers. With a huge pool of cars to choose from, there was little incentive for dealers to place ordinary orders from the factory. Instead, they’d simply pick up their sales inventory when the manufacturer’s lots got too full– at fire sale prices. Unfortunately, selling worn vehicles did little to increase demand for cars, which led to more “banking.”

Lee Iaccoca killed the Chrysler’s sales bank shortly after he assumed power, helping shape Chrysler’s comeback. The new sales bank has been going on for about a year, under the not-so-watchful eye of Chrysler Group Prez and CEO Dieter Zetsche. While both Ford and GM have bitten the bullet– making major production cuts and jettisoning workers to [try to] match production to the reduced demand– Chrysler has continued running their factories and “banking” the excess.

There is a reason for Chrysler’s sales bank “renaissance.” Under present contracts, United Auto Workers (UAW) members are paid virtually the same whether they are working or not. Back in the ‘70’, they would have simply collected unemployment. What hasn’t changed: all the reasons the bank was a bad idea. In fact, the problem's gotten worse.

This time, Chrysler dealers aren’t cherry-picking for bargains. Current dealer inventories for The Big Two Point Five have been stuck at almost 100 days for months– when half that amount is seen as dangerously excessive. DCX has been stuffing “money in the trunk” on old and new vehicles, and the dealers aren’t even sniffing the bait. There are now TWO bloated inventories that need reducing: Chrysler’s AND its dealers’.

Demand for these vehicles is unlikely to increase anytime soon. The natural market cap for the 300/Magnum/Charger seems to have been reached (the initial rush is over). The Sebring etc. are being replaced (as soon as they can get the dealers to take some). Minivans and trucks have been DCX’s profit centers for decades, but the minivans have been feeling new pressure from Hyundai/Kia in the economy market (Toyota and Honda have already skimmed most of the cream).

As for the trucks and SUVs, the future isn’t rosy. The Durango gets Suburban-level mileage with sub-Tahoe utility, and it just got a posh sibling that made an Aspen of itself. Being number three (and oldest) in the pickup market is like wearing a bulls-eye to a shootout. In short, DCX is likely to continue to lose market share in the near future.

If the sales bank is such a huge mistake– all the problems of fleet sales without any of the revenue– why does Chrysler persist? One theory making the rounds: Chrysler’s German masters are loathe to admit that their hand-picked team can out-screw-up the Americans– at least until the evidence becomes impossible to ignore (instead of merely visible from low Earth orbit). Another theory: the current regime believes their own hype. The sun will come out tomorrow, the sales bank will dry up, new products will erase the memory of the old, and all will be well. 

The third and most intruiging suggestion is that the jobs bank is a not-so-secret stash of vehicles which allows Chrysler to play hardball with the United Auto Workers (UAW) in the run-up to '07 contract talks. This theory posits that when the UAW refused to grant the automaker the same [meager] health care givebacks it blessed upon Generous Motors– "pattern bargaining" up but not down– Chrysler began churning out product in preparation for a UAW strike.

If true, if The Dark Lords of DCX tell Big Ron's bluster boys to go sing, Chrysler would have half a year’s worth of product to keep dealers happy. Problem is, that’s not enough. Besides, when something looks like either a cunning conspiracy or simple stupidity, it’s usually stupidity. But wouldn't it be funny if a combination of stupidity and luck ended-up saving Chrysler's bacon?

By on December 1, 2006

jumper222.jpgJust a few years ago, Walter Chrysler’s namesake was riding high. The “partnership of equals” between America’s Chrysler Corporation and Germany’s Daimler-Benz bore fruit in the form of the critically acclaimed Chrysler 300 and Dodge Magnum. “Hemi” was the performance buzzword. “SRT” indicated the performance deal of the decade. Fast forward to ’06 and everything Chrysler’s doing seems strangely, willfully, specifically designed to push the automaker to the brink of self-annihilation.

Post-Katrina, when the market for pickups and SUV’s tanked, Chrysler’s management kept the production lines humming. As of early November, the North Jefferson Assembly Plant in Detroit (Grand Cherokees and Commanders) and the Windsor Assembly plant in Ontario (Pacificas, Grand Caravans and Town & Countries) were both working overtime shifts, producing more and more moribund vehicles. The result has been as frightening as it is predictable: excess inventory on an epic scale. We’re talking 500k unsold vehicles.

The ungainly Jeep Commander sits on dealer lots for 157 days before selling. The gainly Jeep Grand Cherokee remains welded to dealer pavement for 120 days. The answer to a question no one asked, the Chrysler Pacifica, stays put for 142 days. The once mighty Dodge and Chrysler minivans hang around 133 and 117 days respectively. In total, excluding fleet sales, Chrysler has 126 days of unsold inventory (compared to Toyota’s 30). And still the production lines keep flowing.

What’s worse, this super-abundance of slow-selling models joins a glut of last year’s models. Roughly 45 percent of the vehicles at Chrysler and Dodge stores are ’06 models. In comparison, ‘06’s make up less than 20 percent of GM’s and about 25 percent of Ford’s current inventories. But wait! This figure doesn’t include all the cars and trucks in DCX’ increasingly-infamous “order bank”: a repository of vehicles that dealers won’t/can’t accept, which drains DCX of hundreds of thousands of dollars a day in storage costs.

And the hits keep not happening. The majority of the machines in Chrysler’s sales banks are base-level vehicles without the equipment most buyers seek. In the words of the dealers, Chrysler is giving them “weirdly packaged minivans” and trucks spec’d-up with “every mismatched combination and permutation of features” they can make.

No wonder Chrysler is resorting to bribery to try and move the metal. They’re offering dealers $200 for every 2007 model they take above their normal allocation, and $400 for every 2006 model they accept from the sales bank. No sale; the payments don’t even cover dealers’ interest payments on the increased inventory. Chrysler Group is also attempting to bribe existing and potential customers with $1k coupons mailed to 3.4m consumers. Will a one percent response rate even cover the postage? Watch this space.

The payment may help ameliorate the negative effects of the company’s financing deals. Customers can now lease a fully-equipped ’07 van or truck for just a few dollars a month more than the lower-line ‘06 models. For another, they’re using bully-boy tactics to cram unsold cars down dealers’ throats. A $3m lawsuit in NY federal court claims Chrysler tried to force one of its larger dealerships to stock cars it never ordered, and then gave competing dealers unfair price breaks.

The situation is so horrific that industry and financial analysts are calling for DaimlerChrysler to divest itself of the Chrysler Group– before the American automaker destroys its German host. Despite Dr. Z’s repeated declarations that Chrysler is not for sale, several important investors agree: DCX should dump Chrysler as soon as humanly possible. OK, but— several analysts put the Chrysler Group’s worth at “zero or less.”  In the words of one investment banker, “No one would buy it… perhaps the Chinese would take it if they didn’t have to pay anything for it.”

Moody’s Investors Service has already downgraded DCX’ debt rating once and may do so again. “We would certainly consider a different rating… if Chrysler were no longer in the group.” JP Morgan remains convinced that management patience towards Chrysler has “worn thin and increases the likelihood that DCX will reduce exposure to Chrysler.” It’s the investment community’s equivalent of yelling “jump!” to someone standing on a ledge.

Clearly, Chrysler needs to reduce production until dealer inventories return to manageable levels, and rethink their whole product portfolio. At the same time, the UAW must agree to some contract concessions. If Chrysler can’t cut costs and quickly make production changes– including temporarily shutting down entire assembly lines– they’ll keep driving the company and their union workers into inventory bloated oblivion. Despite recent “cut and run to China” moves, Chrysler’s long-term survival ultimately depends on unpicking this Gordian knot.

Of course, leaving this difficult endeavor to DCX’ current executive team may not be a wise move; the entire situation reeks of mismanagement at the highest possible levels. Heads must roll (we’re looking at you sales chief Joe Eberhardt), or nothing will change. Meanwhile, Chrysler’s woes raise a troubling question: if DCX can’t turn this ship around, what effect would bankruptcy have on the rest of Detroit’s home team?

By on November 29, 2006

corporate_bill_ford_jr_ford_motor_co22.jpg Reporters love newsmakers who address their problems without buzzwords and spin. Such people are rare birds in the automotive industry, a veritable snake-oil pit of truth-stretching and delusional thinking. For car hacks desperate for quotes sans Kool-Aid, William “Bill” Ford has been a godsend. Whenever the Ford family scion addresses The Blue Oval’s challenges or an automakers’ responsibilities in a modern society, Mr. Bill speaks with clarity, vision and passion. Now that Ford’s new CEO Alan Mulally has gathered-up the reins of power, it’s a good time to assess Bill Ford’s tenure at the top.

To do so, you have to try to separate what Mr. Bill said and what Ford did– or didn’t do. For example, Mr. Bill publicly pledged to raise the company’s SUV’s gas mileage; but precious little was done to make it so. Mr. Bill promised to dramatically ramp-up production of gas – electric hybrids– only to bow to market reality and back off. Not to put too fine a point on it, Mr. Bill’s leadership at The Ford Motor Company yielded a great deal of sound bites and quietude signifying nothing.

In truth, turning around Ford’s fortunes would have required four accomplishments from Mr. Bill: peace in the boardroom, a far-reaching product plan, successful negotiations with Ford stakeholders and a zero tolerance campaign against bureaucratic in-fighting. As the duly appointed representative of the Ford family’s voting block, Mr. Bill had the boardroom battles covered. But Ford’s main man lacked the talent and insight to do the “vision” thing, and the patience and temperament to achieve consensus or kick ass.

Like most large industrial companies, automobile manufacturers are a viper’s nest of entrenched bureaucratic interests. Each company has its own special maze. GM’s is endlessly bureaucratic. Ford’s is personality driven. Right from the start, Bill Ford was strangely reluctant to force through necessary changes in product or production– perhaps in an effort to avoid “playing favorites.” As a result, America’s second largest automaker spent four years in the wilderness, with no overriding plan and little sense of priority.

As far as Mr. Bill’s strategic impact is concerned, it’s hard to discern a consistent theme running through FoMoCo's operations during his time at the helm. Replacements and new models arrived at the usual rate (e.g. slowly), with the usual hit or miss ratio. The Fusion appears to be a sales success (but may be cannibalizing the 500 to do so). The Five Hundred hit the market with a thud. Its Freestyle cousin lasted a year. Meanwhile, once-successful models like the Focus, Ranger, Crown Vic (and its derivatives) and Escape were neglected well past the point of return on investment.

Failing to provide new insights or product ideas is no crime for a chief executive. The last true pistonhead with the name Ford was Edsel, and Henry I was the only chief executive you could truly call a visionary (as well as anti-Semitic and crazy). A leader's real job is to find and nurture good ideas and people, and here Mr. Bill was completely out of his depth. William Clay Ford Jr. may have been born a king, but he never mastered the talents of a kingmaker.

Mr. Bill’s lack of leadership ability may reflect the collateral damage created during his ascendancy to the top job. Originally, Ford was to be the chairman of FoMoCo’s board while Lebanese-born Jacques Nasser (a.k.a. “Jac the Knife”) dragged the company into the multi-media age. Nasser had tremendous drive, a lot of ideas (some of which actually involved cars) and, of course, many enemies.

After a couple of bad financial quarters (which Ford probably wishes it could have back about now) and the Firestone-Explorer debacle, Nasser got the boot. Bill Ford got the nod because he was a Ford, and, equally important, he wasn’t Nasser. But without an “idea man” to lean on, Mr. Bill put his company on autopilot. (He was occasionally spotted cruising the aisles at Barnes & Noble.) If Mr. Bill saw the need for change, he didn’t have the moxie to get ‘er done.

The best thing that can be said about Bill Ford: he didn’t let his ego get in the way of what [he perceived to be] was best for the company that bears his name. When he finally realized that The Blue Oval needed a top-flight CEO/turnaround specialist, he went out and got one. We are now told that Mr. Bill has surrendered power to ex-Boeing exec Alan Mulally and stepped aside. His new role: Mulally’s champion, a corporate figurehead and the final protector of the Ford family’s financial interests.

We can assume that Ford’s recent $18b gamble on its future– mortgaging the farm for operating cash– received Bill Ford’s blessing. Ultimately, the impact of that decision will determine the success or failure of Mr. Bill’s administration.

By on November 29, 2006

edgbe222.jpgTo combat the commonly held (if accurate) belief that FoMoCo’s product pipeline is drier than a Vermouth-free martini, FoMoCo recently unveiled the “Showroom of the Future.” Ford ushered retirees, clock punchers and white collar grunts into the Cobo Arena for a glimpse at what may (or may not) be the “most important new Ford.” While they weren’t invited to sample Ford’s four-wheeled corporate Kool-Aid, the Detroit News reported that the attendees were suitably impressed. It may not have been enough to take the edge off the Edge’s delayed debut, but it did reveal a bit more about Ford’s immediate prospects.

The headline: Ford will [finally] re-enter the US small car market with a 1.8-liter four-door, four-pot B-segment vehicle. Amongst the sixteen other vehicles on display, notable Hail Mary passes included the not-so-secret Fairlane people mover, an in-yer-face F-150 refresh and an Explorer designed to not explore. Oh yeah, and some [more] pimped-out ponies.

Under product czar Derrick Kuzak, Ford’s new “global system” will ensure that these still wrapped presents make it to market faster than before. While that’s not saying as much as was perhaps intended, the Zephyr-driving twenty-eight year Blue Oval veteran revealed that the accelerated go-go gadget car process relied on CEO Alan Mulally’s global approach. By “eliminating redundancies, complexity and waste” the new system is set to shave eight to 14 months from the current gestation period.

Yes, well, this new system won’t be in place until the end of 2008. So Mark Fields’ year old promise of a bitchin’ B-car will come to fruition under a new US Prez. In fact, the hit of Ford’s secret show won’t grace population-reduced production lines until 2009 or 2010. It seems that learning (from the past or otherwise) is a slow and painful process for Blue Oval brass. With three to four more years of sales, the Japanese (and maybe even homegrown) competition will again have achieved– or, more precisely, cemented– segment dominance.

No surprise there. The Japanese have a long history of finding and then dominating markets their competition can’t see. For example, the transplants invented the CUV because they A) they lacked viable truck frames to create “proper” Gaijin SUV’s and B) Japan’s too damn small for them anyway. By the time the SUV-reliant domestics set their sites on the crossover market, the transplants had built a virtually unassailable lead in the hottest “new” segment.

SUV refugees currently have four dozen mostly Japanese cute-utes to choose from. Many more are on their way. As this segment is hitting its stride, Ford’s current most important new vehicle is the crossover-come-lately (in more ways than one). As before, while FoMoCo worldwide is re-tooling to become one nation under Al’s groove, the market will look to Japan, Korea or even China for the next big thing and leave Ford even closer to the Edge of bankruptcy.

In fact, segment leadership is becoming increasingly important to overall profitability. With slowing growth in the U.S. economy and the pinch of a housing slump being felt in mega-markets like California, automakers seeking a product led turnaround face a distinctly uphill battle. A Michigan based market research firm called IRN figures that 2007 could be the worst year for new car sales in a decade. They predict that roughly 300k less units will leave dealer lots, as the haves have less.

To combat slumping market trends, Ford recently introduced a massive buyout program, which expired Monday night. According to this morning's papers, 35k United Auto Workers (UAW) have decided to take Mr. Bill's money and run. This is excellent news. Trimming half of the company's active UAW workforce will bring FoMoCo's payroll in line with existing demand– provided the workers don't change their mind before the programs kick-in, and Ford's domestic market share doesn't [continue to] sink below their goal of a sub-Toyota 14%. 

Of course, that's down from 25%. And the mass exodus is an incontrovertible sign of just how bad things are down in Dearborn. While the departed (including as many as 10k white collar workers) will relieve much of the ongoing pressure on Ford's bottom line, the payouts will add legacy costs and still put a big old minus sign on Ford's corporate ledger– and soon. 

To bolster for this mega-hit and pay for the new “global system,” Ford done gone and bet the farm, using anything that was (or wasn’t) nailed down as collateral for $18b in new financing. While the severity of “all-in” asset restructuring indicates just how serious Dearborn’s darlings are about this turnaround, it’s still a huge gamble. Robert Barry of Goldman Sachs reminds us that most of these newly borrowed bucks will be burned by the Way Fordward.

Even with $38b in hand, Mulally’s Global Overhaul may prove to be too costly for a company that’s consistently late to the game. It’s entirely possible that the Ford showroom of the future will be a very empty place indeed.

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