Category: Editorials

By on November 28, 2006

suntzu22.jpgPlenty of pundits predict the world's largest automaker will jump down, turnaround, pick a bale of bucks and survive. We can debate this delusional supposition all day. You say new CUV's are a comin'; I say it takes two CUV’s to make the same profit as one old school SUV. You say union givebacks; I say dream on. But let’s face facts: GM is toast. Uber-investor Kirk Kerkorian knows it. GM CEO Rabid Rick Wagoner knows it (along with his in-house bankruptcy expert Jay Alix). The sooner GM throws in the towel the better.

Whether or not GM sells 51% of its GMAC finance unit, The General's NA operatives are set to burn through the company's remaining cash before it even gets close to posting a profit. Why wait? If GM files for Chapter 11 now, it can use its financial hoard to retain the people and plants it needs to become leaner, keener and more competitive. If it hangs on and files with an empty bank balance, The General faces the final curtain: dissolution and/or total annihilation under Chapter 7.

You can argue about who’s to blame for GM’s sky high labor costs and restrictive work rules (including the infamous jobs bank), but there's no question that GM needs to cut its labor costs across the board and re-structure its working practices. In bankruptcy, the United Auto Workers (UAW) couldn't frog march GM into a contract which would force the automaker to spend more than it can afford, or agree to terms that make it uncompetitive. If the union digs in its heels, the bankruptcy court can throw out the union contracts. In theory, GM could even up stakes and move its domestic operations into right-to-work states.

Each active GM worker currently carries 2.6 retired workers on their proverbial shoulders. Generous Motors' health care costs alone account for $1,525 per vehicle. Chapter 11 would allow GM to end what George F. Will called “the latest welfare state.” While the idea of cutting retired workers’ pensions and health care benefits is abhorrent to anyone who appreciates the value of keeping a promise to someone who's given you the best years of their life, common sense says it’s better to have some pie than none. Make no mistake: there is no “gentle” cure for this situation; Chapter 11 is the only way GM can shuck the beneficiary burden that’s dragging it into oblivion.

Under Chapter 11, GM can also cull its bloated dealer network. GM NA can’t sustain the enormous disparity between their decreased (and decreasing) market share and the huge number of dealers (and related internal bureaucracy) that the remaining business must support. Under US franchise law, GM can’t close up Buick, Hummer, Pontiac, Saab and Saturn stores and walk away. (Lest we forget GM is still paying costs related to Oldsmobile's demise.) Under Chapter 11, the dealer deadwood can be trimmed without razing the entire forest.

The ability to kill diseased brands is arguably the single greatest potential advantage of a GM bankruptcy. The need to feed The General’s eight US automotive brands with new[ish] products and mondo marketing dollars has been dragging GM’s design, engineering, production, sales and marketing creativity into the dumpster for decades. If a post Chapter 11 GM had three brands– Cadillac, Chevrolet and GMC– selling a limited range of products, the company would unleash all the talent locked up inside its bloated bureaucratic structure. It could finally take on its transplanted competitors with unfettered American grit, imagination and know-how.

To that end, a GM Chapter 11 would recapitalize the company’s balance sheet. Think about it: GM’s real problem isn’t debt. It’s negative working capital and crippling legacy obligations. Eliminating these problems under bankruptcy protection would allow GM to emerge as a lower cost producer (albeit with a smaller dealer footprint and sales). With lower costs and a tighter focus, GM could be what it’s supposed to be: a producer of high value vehicles for the general public– rather than an automaker that relies on steadily diminishing (if high profit) truck sales for its survival.

Rick Wagoner’s primary argument against bankruptcy: no one wants to buy a car from a bankrupt company. GM’s sales would tank beyond recovery. And yet millions of passengers have continued boarding Delta's jets since the airline filed for bankruptcy on September 14, 2005. Surely quality, price, service and warranty (which would not be affected) would remain customers’ primary concerns. That said, the enormous disruption to GM’s vast supply chain would cause massive headaches. So… best to get on with it. 

Not to get all Wall Street here, but the Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu said “There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.” GM has been fighting the inevitable for too long. It’s time for GM to file for bankruptcy, regroup, gain a competitive advantage, and start again.

By on November 26, 2006

rx7.jpgThe day my high school classmate flipped the bird at a Lincoln Continental was the day I learned that handling is more important than horsepower. VINNIE (as proclaimed by his vanity plate) decided that my erstwhile friend’s one finger salute justified our immediate extinction. His black Lincoln rammed the back of my Ford Pinto station wagon as I entered the highway on-ramp. Although I later learned that the Pinto tended to explode in such circumstances, even then I knew I had to drive as if my life depended on it. If only because it did.

If it wasn’t so ridiculous it would have been ludicrous: a gi-normous Lincoln luxobarge (Bill Blass edition?) trying to destroy the sine qua non of shitboxes. Vinnie had literally four times as much horsepower (210hp vs. 54hp) and twice the heft (5264lbs. vs. 2800lbs.). Ah, but I had Pirelli P-Zeros (hey, why not?). I was also blessed with better genetics (a guy named Vinnie driving a Lincoln in Rhode Island?) lots of experience driving at extra legal speeds (so now you know Dad) and all the adrenal acuity of a hunted fox. 

My only chance: cornering. I’d gained a little distance on Vinnie on the 180-degree on-ramp. He caught up with us in the straight and rammed us twice more on the highway, HARD. Luckily, there was an off-ramp only a mile away. I managed to get the Pinto into a residential area just across the river. I started taking corner after corner after corner as fast as I could, four wheel drifting my way around countless city blocks. Vinnie’s barge lost ground. Now all I had to do was… hide.

When I couldn’t see the big Lincoln in the rear view mirror, I looked for an open garage. I drove straight into the first one I saw– at speed. My friend and I ducked down. Vinnie sped past. Mission accomplished. Lesson learned: when push comes to shove, it’s better to be able to shove the accelerator to the carpet in a turn than get pushed into the Seekonk River by a guido in a Lincoln Continental.

Of course, I wasn’t entirely horsepower aversive. It’s just that I’d learned to associate hugely powerful cars with boat-like handling. Even my father’s Mercedes 300 SEL 6.3 conformed to the basic principle that you steer big engined cars with your right foot. For me, handling was all. (Well, that and beauty.) So when the moment finally arrived when I could finally afford something more like an automotive athlete– and less like a tubercular coal miner– I opted for a Mazda RX7.

As you probably know, to get the [first gen] RX7 to speed you had to wind up the pint-sized Waring blender (a.k.a. rotary engine) sitting in its nose to approximately one million rpm. Even then, you relied on The Big Mo (momentum) to fully exploit the genius of its wonderfully balanced chassis and superb (for its time) suspension. For a Pinto refugee? No problem. In fact, the only problem was that I soon developed a taste for street racing. Obviously, I’m not talking about drag racing. The RX7 only offered 46 more horses than my original FoMoCo “stallion.” It sewing machined from zero to sixty in 8.5 seconds (with the AC off). I’m talking about racing through highway traffic.

I realize this concept is about as politically correct as lighting up a stogie in a children’s cancer ward. But hey, that’s the way it was. We even developed names for maneuvers: the three lane Charlie (cutting across three lanes in one move), two lane Ralph (passing a car in the middle lane before the “hole” closed) and the ‘Frig (letting a car try to pass you on the right, then closing the hole; named after William “The Refrigerator” Perry). This unconscionable “sport” appealed to me because winning required tactics, timing and courage more than brute power.

I left the game in Atlanta. I was racing a Z28 on a six lane undivided highway. I was in the left lane. I’d boxed the Z in but good. To my horror he cut behind me and INTO THE ONCOMING TRAFFIC. He went to the left of two cars coming straight at him, missing a head on collision by feet, then cut back right ahead of me. I was done.

While I was OK with taking risks with my own driving, I hadn’t realized that my actions could cause other people to take innocent lives. If the Z28 had taken out one of those cars in the opposite lane, it would have been my fault, and I knew I couldn’t live with that. I learned that car control and self-control go hand-in-hand.

By on November 26, 2006

2004maxmon400222.jpgStarting next year, F1’s technical regulations will freeze engine development. This is the first time this kind of stricture’s been imposed since the inception of the World Drivers Championship. For many fans, this move represents an unconscionable about-face that goes against the F1’s basic ethos; they accuse the sport’s regulators of turning their backs on F1’s traditional role as motorsport’s technological pinnacle. And yet, the rules may end-up helping the sport– and not just by increasing competitiveness. The regulations may make it easier for the major players to justify their gigantic investment in the F1 circus.

Since the day when Gold Leaf Cigarette branding first adorned the Lotus 49, advertising sponsorship quickly became F1’s driving force, steering the sport’s modern progression. Today, the financial balance has shifted. The money provided by major automobile manufacturers has become the F1 team’s lifeblood (excluding the endangered privateers). As carmakers like BMW, Mercedes and Renault continue to pour phenomenal sums of capital into the sport, as Toyota joins the hunt (spending a reported $393m on their 2006 campaign), the demand for a return on investment beyond halo-polishing corporate glamor is bound to become ever-more pressing.

From an automobile manufacturers’ point-of-view, F1’s value has also created value through its contribution to the company’s technological research and development. Obviously, it’s a bit of a stretch to connect F1 with the “race on Sunday, sell on Monday” philosophy, but the sport has contributed a great deal to the advancement of basic automotive technology– from aerodynamics to turbos to paddle shift gearboxes. And yet recent developments in F1 racing engine technology– creative as they are– have little applicability to the manufacturers’ bread and butter, their road car lines. 

The regulations of the past few decades have collectively funneled engine development down a very narrow path. Limited to naturally aspirated engines and already possessing the pneumatically-actuated valve trains and variable-geometry intake systems crucial to performance, teams in the last 10 years have focused primarily on increasing engine power by way of increasing engine speed. Past-formula V10 power plants red-lined at around 18k rpm.

The formula change for 2006 mandated a reduction in engine capacity from 3.0 to 2.4 liters and a change in configuration from a V10 to a V8 (also doing away with variable-length intake trumpets).  Essentially stripped of 20% of their cylinders and displacement, teams under the new formula pushed ahead with the rise in engine operating speeds. V8 engines run in competition during the 2006 season registered over 21k rpm, with higher speeds certainly explored during test sessions.

While engine speeds never reached the 25k rpm level predicted by some commentators before the season, the observed increase represents drastically higher loads on engine components and much higher risk of failure. These increasingly delicate machines are short-lived, lasting only 1400km in normal usage.

These achievements– while significant in terms of performance gains on the track– are almost completely inapplicable to the modern commercial automotive market. Increasing demands for more fuel-efficient cars have risen in tandem with the constant consumer desire for higher performance. F1 engineers provide their teams with horsepower aplenty, but they’ve not been “encouraged” by the sport’s technical regulations to develop their drive trains in ways that satisfy the need for fuel efficiency.

Max Mosley, president of the Fédération Internationale de l'Automobile (FIA), recent comments to the sporting press have finally brought us long-awaited evidence of the “greening” of the sport. Mosley envisions three distinct, overlapping sets of regulations, two of which should emerge by the 2010 season. First, in 2009, they’ll introduce “energy-recovery and re-use from braking.”  Then, in 2010, teams must work on “recovery and re-use of excess heat or waste heat from the engines.” In the longer term, Mosley wants “a completely new F1 engine reflecting the industry tendency which is to have a downsized, turbo-charged engine.”  That’s right; the Turbo’s back. 

Technical details and my enthusiasm for forced-induction aside, F1 must undertake this challenge to remain relevant. Fueled by manufacturer money and beholden to it, teams have recently produced little of value in terms of technology. They have, of course, remained an advertising powerhouse, but their technological contribution has diminished significantly.  The continued good fortunes of the sport depend on its relevance to the products that earn so much for the manufacturers. Each of the sets of regulations above corresponds to road-relevant approaches to vehicle performance and fuel economy and consequently are very attractive to manufacturers. 

The potential for a great leap forward is obvious. F1’s designers and engineers will be given a new, wide-open development path, one with plenty of room for innovation– as it should be. Given the current crudeness of the technologies in question, and assuming that the FIA wields its regulatory power with some skill, the sky’s the limit. No question: Mosley’s on the right track.

By on November 25, 2006
turbo2222.jpgEvery month the pages of car magazines sport autoerotic photographs of the greatest thing to hit the roads since, well, the last time. In their celebration of unbridled speed and handling, reliability simply isn’t a major factor. It should be. A high performance car may be fast, furious and fun, but if bits keep falling off, if it spends more time in dry dock than cruising the highways and byways, it's nothing but a pretentious, expensive fraud. And yet automakers continue to build "supercars" that can't even run hard for an entire day without some kind of extremely expensive tinkering afterward. 

There's a long, sad history of big name cars that show up for a magazine road test, only to go weak in the knees when the stop watches come out. Once at the Transportation Research Center in Ohio I watched a bewinged, bellowing, NACA-ducted Lamborghini Countach fail to crest 140 mph. Then there was a cross-country comparo featuring a Lamborghini Diablo and some Ferrari-of-the-month. The article neglected to elaborate on the fact that a van containing mechanics and assorted parts followed the cars at a discreet distance.

Back in 2002, the redoubtable Brock Yates, late of Car and Driver, challenged Ferrari/Lamborghini (for the purposes of this article they are interchangable) to place in the top three in his annual One Lap Of America. He put five G’s on the barrel to back up his claim that they couldn’t measure up. "All the swooning about Italian iron fades away when the party gets rough,” Brock said. “When it comes to a hard-core street fight, they're as soft as mozzarella in the Tuscan sun." Perhaps that’s also why a Ferrari PR man once admitted that his customers are “an integral part of the development process.”

Nor should we overlook that latest of nonsense cars: the $1.3m rolling sucker bait known as the Bugatti Veyron. Here we have a 1001hp car with a “troubled gestation,” with more cooling than the Sears Tower, that requires a troop of people to acompany it whenever it's tested. Let's overlook the fact that it's as ugly as a mud fence. How do you say garage queen in French? Or is it German? Even the $455k Mercedes-Benz SLR McLaren has been criticized for its snatchy brakes and the persistent smell of unburned fuel in the cabin under hard deceleration.

And then there’s Porsche.

There's an old racing expression: "To finish first, first you must finish." Porsche doesn’t just pay homage to it, they live it. The German company has dominated nearly every race series in which they’ve competed. More to the point, Porsche’s won the grueling 24-hour race at Le Mans sixteen times. That’s more than Ferrari and Ford put together. This phenomenal stamina is now built into every Porsche road car.

A while back, I was invited to speak to a local chapter of Porsche owners. I tried to explain the over-engineering that makes Porsche’s road cars so tough. For example, their engines and transmissions are built absurdly strong for their size. You will find more bearing area, big-ends and mains, for each liter of displacement in a 911 engine than in any other engine in production today. It’s an obscure technical point, but a telling one. You simply cannot buy a more robust high performance automobile. It’s a difference a skilled driver can feel.

There are plenty of surveys that document Porsche's reliability. Porsche’s Finnish subcontractors, Valmet Automotive, recently received the Bronze Plant Quality Award from J.D. Power’s Initial Quality Study 2006. The Cayman S was ranked best overall (together with Toyota Lexus LS 430) for having the fewest quality problems in the entire industry. The Cayman S was best in its category "Compact Premium Sporty Cars,” with the Porsche Boxster ranked third. And Porsche was awarded the highest initial quality of all automobile brands.

OK, it is true that the Carrera GT’s carbon fiber clutch is a disaster that transforms a perfectly serviceable (if low slung) daily driver into a San Francisco supercar owner’s worst nightmare. But it’s the exception that proves the rule. The Porsche Turbo is still the single most effective exemplar of the “everyday” supercar. It’s the only ultra-high performance automobile I’d jump into at a moment’s notice and confidently head for the other end of the country, or take to the supermarket to pickup a weekend’s supplies.

Is reliability the ultimate measure of a high performance car? Of course not. Otherwise, the Porsche Turbo would be in a class of one. In my opinion, in fact, it is. But reliability is an important safety consideration too for anyone who intends on using their exotic as God intended. And it jibes with the age old question: what’s the world’s best car? Simple: The one that lives up to its promises.

[For more of Don Vorderman's work, please visit www.carcritic.com.] 

By on November 24, 2006

jimmy.jpg I first noticed the trend in about eighth grade: Moms trading their lumbering station wagons for one of those newfangled minivans. It was a slight move upwards on the handling and visibility front and a huge step forward in the space-is-the- final-frontier front. Equally important, the minivan maintained the traditional segregation between Mom and Dad-mobiles. But Dad’s world was changing too, and not for the better.

Almost overnight, the car guy thing morphed from muscle car / urban sophisticate to Marlboro man. Broncos and Blazers and big ass Suburbans weren’t a new idea, of course. You could see vehicles sort of like them plying the grasslands of Africa every Sunday on Mutual of Omaha’s Wild Kingdom. But suddenly, every high-school badass in Michigan was giving up his Buick Regal for a GMC Jimmy, exchanging the lure of the open road for the equally fantastic lure of the off-road. 

At the time, I couldn’t fathom it. Looking back some 20-odd years later, I still don’t. Even the modest work-a-day pickup truck became a gotta-have for both blue-collar guys and white-collar weekend wannabes. It was… grotesque. But, hey, I’m all about freedom of choice. If you’re a pretentious poser who wants to clutter your driveway with an oversized 4X4 that’ll never see anything but asphalt, that’s your call. I won’t stand on the sidewalk and cheer as you drive by, but I won’t preach to you about rollover statistics and fuel-efficiency either. At least not much.

Lately, however, I’ve noticed a welcome trend. As little as three years ago, I’d have trouble finding a parking space at work. I simply couldn’t see past the rows of trucks and SUV’s to find an open spot. And when I did find one, the bloated haunches of some Durango or Yukon XL spilled over the lines of adjacent spaces, rendering the spot unusable. Likewise, I had trouble enjoying what little scenery accompanied my daily commute. My view was blocked by the aggressive, trail-rated grocery mules clogging up the traffic lanes and monopolizing my rear-view mirror.

The vehicles they are a changing. As I peer out my office window today, the automotive population below is strikingly different. There are still a couple Trailblazers, a Durango, an F-150 and a Buick Rendezvous. But the majority of spaces are occupied by real cars: coupes and sedans and pony cars. Impalas, 300’s, Passats and Mustangs. Practically overnight, we have gone from a society that ‘needed’ the hulking, overwrought, extra-capacity vehicles that matched our hulking, overwrought, capacity-hogging lifestyles, to a society that seems to get along fine with average-size cars. 

Anyone who looked at the situation objectively could have seen it coming (though they might not have wanted to admit it). I mean, it’s nice to have a big vehicle with the power to pull a boat, the space for a few sheets of ply-wood or a third row for that fourth kid. But I’d been paying attention all those years, and I saw what most of these SUV/truck/van people were hauling each day: nothing. I would walk through parking lots and see endless rows of pick-ups with nothing in the bed but sandbags for added traction in the winter. What a waste.

At some point, thankfully, the 20-year SUV trend literally ran out of gas. Obviously, money had a lot to do with it. The post-Katrina gas price spike impaled itself in the heart of Middle America, causing a vicious vehicular circle of desperation and depreciation. The implicit freedom of owning an SUV quickly became the explicit slavery of not being able to sell it, and the financial tyranny of feeding its tank. No money down doesn’t look as good when you become a de facto mortgagee to Exxon.

I like to think that the SUV’s declining popularity is more than that. I like to think the craze was a temporary aberration, a collective failure of common sense and personal responsibility. In that sense, I also want to believe that Americans saw the war in Iraq and felt the need to make some kind of sacrifice on the home front. But I suspect there are other, less moral forces at play.

Clearly, bling killed the SUV on the cultural level. When playas re-equipped their behemoths for “stunting and flossing,” they revealed the Emperor’s new clothes. What’s a Navigator with 22” wheels and low profile tires have to do with the romantic allure of fording streams and climbing hills? The same thing as a Navigator with 18” wheels and all-season tires. Nothing. Once you see the absurdity, there’s no going back.

Whatever the cause, I’m delighted to see cars replace SUV’s. I like living in a world where I’m not swimming in a sea of wretched excess. From those of us who never got caught up in SUV craze, welcome back.

By on November 22, 2006

2000gt_red_library340w2222.jpg"Arguably in every parameter that you can look at, the Toyota Production System is the finest product system in the world for designing and manufacturing products. They make products that people want and they do it with less resources and less time than anybody in the world. They're a magical machine." Not my words, but those of Alan Mulally, now charged with pulling a carmaker out of the swamp marshes of Fordor. Like Alan, I admire Toyota’s manufacturing processes, quality control and after-sales. But I also know their weakness…

First, to those of you who are tired of hearing what a great company Toyota is, Toyota is the world’s foremost manufacturer. Bar none. Other manufacturers must study, learn, apply and improve. That’s the only way they’ll build the war chest they need to fight back from a position of strength. Until they do, they’ll be playing a hopeless game of catch-up.

Back to Alan for a moment. Every day a 737 pumps out of the hangar at Boeing, and after a 35 minute flight it’s in revenue service. Of course, they told Mulally it couldn’t be done – ”You can’t build planes the same way you build cars!” Yes you can, and doesn’t Airbus wish they were? This was Mulally’s gift to Boeing, and in a strange game of hopscotch it could become Toyota’s gift to Ford channeled through a disciple. Bill Ford only wishes he’d thought of it sooner.

Reaching parity with Toyota– and adding a few bells and whistles of their own– is the best Ford can hope for. It’s a long shot, as ToMoCo isn’t standing still. But Mulally is a self-professed disciple of The Way and if Ford’s resources don’t run out first, he’s the man who can give it the best shot. Who would you rather have making the effort: Wagoner and Lutz in their constant states of denial, or someone who’s actually hit the bullseye already?

Mulally is already applying his knowledge to the task at hand. For example, he knows that Ford must align itself more closely with its suppliers’ best interest. FoMoCo’s suppliers are wobbling with fatigue, having been squeezed dry by their overlords. They’re so fed up they’ve started to squeeze back, exploiting the weakness of the rulers up at the Castle. Hopefully both sides will see the light before they force one another off the field of battle. Ford’s already seeking a more constructive relationship with its key suppliers, so don’t think Mr. Mulally is simply holding Thursday chat sessions.

Mulally’s also begun realigning his forces in the field, making the various divisions understand they’re answerable to High Command and that the brandmash has got to stop. That’s going to be the tough one. There are hundreds of stakeholders who will be resisting any transfer of power back to the corporate mothership. I suspect this is why Mulally insisted on being co-director along with Bill Ford. A fly on the wall would have heard this: ”I’ll do it, but only if you’re willing to rain hell on the holdouts that will be fighting my changes. You and me Bill, we’re in this together.”

Assuming Mulally can get Ford’s ducks in a row, it’s time to reveal Toyota’s weakness: a legacy. They don’t have one.

Where do Toyota owners go to proudly display their classic Toyotas to other owners? Right, nowhere. What comes to mind when you think of Toyota’s history? Nothing. Yes, 25 million Camrys sold is fantastic. But Toyota is not a brand builder. They’re blandbuilders. They’re not building dream machines. Instead, they are experts at playing the law of averages to their consumers’ satisfaction.

Without a legacy you’re not building brands, you’re building cars, you’re providing transportation. Toyota is aware of this. That’s why it’s in F1 and NASCAR. That’s why they’re pushing the envelope on alternative drive-trains, and spending without limit on Lexus. And that’s why they put the brakes on building more Scions – sensing an opportunity to harness brand cachet. They are wising up. Toyota is trying to build a legacy before their opponents notice their weakness. While we wonder whether there’s a future to GM and Ford (a pity given their past achievements), there is no past in Toyota, only a future that’s going to be better than average.

If Ford (or any of the domestics) want to take on Toyota, they’ve got to show what brand spirit is all about. Ford and GM have some choice morsels in their history, ready to be added to the mix. Of course, to do that Ford and its cohorts need to get rid of their spreadsheet ”car makers” and tune their brandlines for an exhilirating roll of the dice. Which is the topic of my next column.

By on November 20, 2006

rick_wagoner__gm__s_230084c.jpgIn Friday’s interview with Automotive News (AN), Rick Wagoner snapped. When confronted with the fact that Toyota is set to overtake GM as the world’s largest automaker, the CEO stopped making sense and started talking to himself. “I can't argue that if you keep drawing the trend lines, your conclusion is correct. Is it inevitable? No. No it's not inevitable. If Toyota passes us, I guess they pass us. Do I like it? No. Am I willing to take us off our plan or to sacrifice our profitability or the implementation of our marketing strategy here? No, I'm not willing to do that. If we're going to stay ahead, we're going to stay ahead doing it the right way and a sustainable way." 

So, here we are at Death Watch 100, and nothing much has changed. The good ship GM is still taking on water and it’s still steady as she goes. Rick’s turnaround plan– cut costs and build stuff people want to buy– remains unaffected. Don’t get me wrong: it’s a great plan, something along the lines of the classic “take in more money than you spend.” Only it’s not working. Quite aside from the fact that GM is still losing money, and has done so with remarkable consistency since we began the series (including a few truly spectacular financial quarters), Rick has failed to address the fundamentals dragging his employer into bankruptcy.

The General still has too many brands, models, dealers, legacy costs and overheads. Its UAW contracts and overcrowded smorgasbord of lackluster vehicles still make it a high cost automotive producer trying to sell heavily discounted products in a highly competitive market. And Rabid Rick is still talking as if simple persistence– rather than radical change– is the key to GM’s survival. Wagoner’s comments to AN about the infamous jobs bank– the ultimate symbol of GM’s management stupidity and union intransigence– tell you everything you need to know about Wagoner’s reformatory zeal.

"We'd like to reduce the cost of the Jobs Bank, yes. There are plenty of ways to do that… A lot of times people want to jump to the sort of extreme answer and that very well might not be acceptable to the UAW. If we've learned anything over the last decade, it's that if we sit down and work over the tough issues, most of the time we can make some progress."

He’d “like” to reduce the jobs bank? “Most” of the time we can make “some” progress?  Methinks Rabid Rick may have learned too MUCH in the last decade; applying the rules of GM’s past labor negotiations (“give ‘em what they want”) to the current crisis. And make no mistake about it: GM is in crisis. The General has sliced production, sold off everything except GMAC, burned through the cash and still isn’t making enough money to stop the rot. 

It can’t be that bad, can it? After all, Automotive News claimed that Wagoner is “unwilling to return to heavy incentives and fleet sales to stimulate sales.” So I guess GM’s just announced, much anticipated (by customers anyway) Toe Tag Sale– offering $5k discounts on selected ’06 vehicles and $3.5k on some ‘07’s– doesn’t count. And the same goes for the large number of generic GM vehicles that still find their way into fleets (roughly 25% of production). The truth is Wagoner has failed to reverse the increasingly accurate impression that GM is the overstock.com of cars. 

For those who’re listening, the klaxons are sounding loud and clear. Check this excerpt from a GM press release regarding an upcoming $1.5b seven year secured loan (tied to machinery and equipment and special tools at US production plants).

"GM's ability under some of its existing bond indentures to pledge U.S. property, plant and equipment is likely to be affected in the future by new rules applicable to pension and OPEB accounting, which could cause GM's shareholders' equity in its year-end 2006 financial statements to be negative.”

In other words, the well has run dry. With 51% of its GMAC finance unit (a.k.a. cash cow) set for sale, GM can no longer borrow from this once dependable internal source. As of next year, GM still won’t be able to take out unsecured loans, while the terms of its bond indentures rule out secured loans. With a negative cash flow from its North American operations and no ability to borrow, with debt payments due AND the need to fund Wagoner’s turnaround plan (new products, severance pay, depreciation, etc.), GM’s cash crunch is going critical. The only money available: $8.5b (plus another $4b over three years) from the GMAC sale.

How long will that last? We’re going to find out. Or not. Rick says he’s “optimistic” that the GMAC sale will go through by year’s end. Should it fail, so will GM. In any case, watch GM’s dividend payments. If and when they’re suspended, that's it: the beginning of the end. Either that or just another stop along the way.

By on November 19, 2006

the-follow-shot22.jpgAs a six-year-old growing up in the rich farmlands of northern Illinois, I spent my days playing in the creeks that meandered along and across Flansberg and Orangeville roads. One day, I was ambling home when a thunderous roar jolted me from my reverie. A black car came out of the curve behind me and sped past. The passenger waved. Convinced that I’d seen not one but two ghosts (restless souls at that), I ran home. 

I told my tale of the phantoms of Flansberg road. My father listened, and then explained my sighting in less paranormal terms. “Some crazy people aren’t happy using an automobile to get them from here to there. They think it needs to look different and move faster. It’s as foolish as standing around with a hot rod in your bare hands. Now eat your dinner and do your chores.” But the image and sound of that car never faded from my mind.

Forty-four years later, Kurt Flannery called to tell me he was building a Ford Speedster. When I said I’d never heard of such a thing, my old friend clued me in. At the beginning of the last century, amateur enthusiasts would buy a Model T or Model A and take it back to their shed or garage. They’d strip the car, soup-up the engine, lower it by a foot or so and retrofit it with aerodynamic bodywork (or leave it bare). These “speedsters” were the world's first hotrods, patterned after Henry Ford’s early efforts (including a 91.37mph land speed record on a cindered frozen lake just outside of Detroit.)

A couple years later, I went to see Kurt’s finished speedster. As the door slowly swung upward, I saw a ghost. It was the exact same car I’d seen along the Flansberg Road. It had the same sleek appearance, the same tall white steel wheels and same long, low, predator posture. And it was beautiful: a boat tailed speedster worthy of a master builder. In the dim light of the garage, Kurt’s creation lay motionless, like a monster not to be awakened. 

My friend handed me a white jacket, chrome goggles, black racing gloves and a soft white helmet. The speedster’s four banger cranked into a low throaty idle. When Kurt cranked the revs, the sound transported me back through time, back a half of a century, to a dusty road just outside of town.

The speedster was fast. I felt like I was riding on the outside of a rocket, sitting beside a steely-eyed missile man in full and unfettered control. We raced past huge trees, casting ever-lengthening shadows in our path. Every bump in the road, every twitch of the ancient chassis had me glancing over at my old friend for reassurance. Each time, he smiled and gave me a thumbs-up. On and on we sped…

I don’t think it even dawned on me when Kurt slowed just enough to straighten out the turn that would put us onto Flansberg road. The sun had just slipped beneath the trees to the left as we sped north. Kurt literally screamed over the exhaust noise that there was a set of curves just up ahead that he enjoyed at speed.

When we emerged from the last bend, there was a young boy walking along side the road with a fishing pole over his shoulder, bathed in the red of a fiery sunset. As he came into our view, he turned sharply to see what was overtaking him. He was startled by our quick arrival, and the specter of two men in strange suits, helmets and goggles. I smiled and waved.  

When we pulled into the drive, it was dark enough for headlights. They died at the same moment as the engine. The monster was once again sleeping. The silence was painful. Gone was the “ten on the Richter scale” noise, the immense vibration, the cool wind in our face and the fleeting intense beauty of the moment itself.

I now find myself seventy-five years of age. Whenever I get back to the Midwest, I make time to stroll in the countryside where I grew up, just for old times' sake. Sometimes I look around and find that, after all these years, it looks the same as it did back then. And when I’m walking out there during sunset, and the wind lulls momentarily, and the rustling leaves settle to a whisper, I swear I can hear the faraway distant thunder of the phantoms of Flansberg road, moving quickly out of earshot. Of course, it’s only my imagination. But then, everything worth doing starts somewhere in the imagination.     

By on November 18, 2006

engine222.jpgThe sex industry has a motto: if you don't get it, it's not for you. Never mind all those activities involving non-reproductive bodily fluids, military fatigues and/or extra-legal restraining orders, I don't get hookers. I'm not saying I don't understand why other people employ prostitutes, and I'm not saying I've never paid for sex (and not in that "one way or another" sense). But if I had done so, I am saying I probably would have found it an incredibly unsatisfying experience. (Can you imagine the tortuous language OJ Simpson must use in his non-confessional confessional?) Same goes for rental cars.

I am fully aware that many pistonheads relish rentals, safe in the knowledge that there won't be any long-term consequences for any motorized misbehavior (provided they tick the right boxes). But I can't stand them (rental cars, not my beloved pistonheads). I suppose I might change my mind if I ever rented a car worth driving– as opposed to the asthmatic pre-beaters the rental companies foist on their suspecting customers. Ford Mustang V6? Chevrolet Impala? Toyota Vanilla? You gotta be kidding. Quite simply, I've never met a rental car I liked.

And while I will never compromise my commitment to calling it like I see it, I have just about enough tact left in me not to want to return someone else's car in pieces. That said, it happens. I've knocked the wing mirror off a Land Rover, watched an electric gate crease the side of a Civic and woken-up to an Infiniti sitting on milk crates (as opposed to tires). And I've seen journos crash press cars. In all cases, the PR flacks involved trotted out the "as long as no one was hurt" shibboleth. Which says a lot about PR flacks– one way or another.

When it comes to lunching a rental car, I reckon the paperwork must make it worth not crashing. Sure, you only pay the deductible, but insurance companies know all too well that traumatizing all parties involved with endless, excessive, obsessive bureaucracy is the best way to prevent future accidents. And, of course, you have to fill out a police report. "I was driving at a safe and reasonable speed when the car's front end suddenly and inexplicably began to understeer. The vehicle plowed nose-first into the curb, at approximately 25 miles per hour." Thankfully, I can only imagine the look the trooper must give drivers of recently creased automobiles when they hand over the rental car agreement. 

In short, I don't like breaking cars. It runs against my nature, imprinted into my subconscious mind during all those times I broke my own car with one stupid ass stunt or another. [Note to self: check road for leaves before testing tire adhesion.] And while I can appreciate the skills involved in driving a really horrible car really fast, I find that the really horrible cars that rental car companies provide are so horrible that driving them fast is, well, horrible. And for me, defying death is not half as satisfying as trying to find my way where I'm going without wandering into the middle of a 3am drag race in the wrong part of Philadelphia (no, really).

Anyway, JD Power reckons the rental car industry is getting better: faster, happier, shinier and more customer friendly. Well, good for them. And good for all the poor sad bastards who must take their laptops to places where people couldn't care less if they died in a horrible car wreck, never mind whether or not they made a compelling PowerPoint presentation. I’ve seen those haunted faces in the rental shuttles. I’ve heard their loud locker room talk with their cohorts, as they prepare their egos to drive a car that grinds them down with the mechanical equivalent of an endless loop of Pink Floyd’s The Wall.

I know there are exotic car rental companies that will loan you a Porsche, Ferrari or Merc. And the mainstream players are beginning to catch on that people are willing to pay extra for a car that doesn’t suck-out their soul. But until and unless Hertz et al rent out an Audi S4 for the price of a V6 Mustang, I’m always going to regard that walk to space H8 as a stroll down death row. They can wash them, clean them and de-cigarette smoke them, but rental cars will always be a kind of automotive purgatory, always endured rather than enjoyed. Which probably accounts for so many enthusiasts’ desire to punish their rentals. And that, my friends, is kinky.

By on November 18, 2006

lotus-49b.jpgColin Chapman and the Lotus team defined F1 in the 1960’s. His mid-engined Lotus 25 and 49 pioneered new ground in the F1 technical world, bringing GP car layout near to its current standard. When Chapman fitted his 49B with bodywork designed to produce aerodynamic downforce, he brought F1 its most fundamental step forward. The idea, however, was not a stroke of genius from a man who had undoubtedly experienced many such epiphanies. It was the culmination of a concept developed over 40 years or more or automotive development in general, and racing in specific.

In 1928, engineers working for Germany’s Opel brand attached inverted aerofoils to combat high-speed lift in a rocket-powered test car (one of the first examples of the breed). The idea, while “in the ether,” never coalesced in the minds of designers. Various vehicles grew and shed aerodynamic attachments, but none ever took the concept to its ultimate level. Robin Herd, chief McLaren designer, briefly tested wings on F1 cars in the early sixties, but ultimately neglected this important avenue of development. 

The 1968 Lotus 49B incorporated a raised, flat tail and small front winglets. When the car was first raced at the 1968 Monaco Grand Prix, Graham Hill waltzed to victory from pole position. But at the next GP, at Spa-Francorchamps, Brabham and Ferrari both showed up with full-size rear wings mounted to the rear of their cars. Chris Amon took pole at Spa by nearly four seconds.

Two races later, Chapman took the concept one step further by mounting the wings directly to the wheel hubs themselves. While this greatly enhanced the efficiency of the devices, the loads they produced were beyond the carrying capacity of the day’s materials. A look at Chapman’s decision clearly illustrates the essential conflict in F1 during the period: the essential tradeoff between safety vs. performance. Chapman consciously accepted the risk this novel setup imposed on both his car and, by extension, the driver.

Chapman’s singular focus forced the hands of his fellow designers, who quickly followed suit. Matra’s system consisted of movable wings electrically actuated by the brake pedal, their angle increasing when pressure was applied. Meanwhile, to take advantage of the less turbulent air higher above the car, the Lotus’s wings grew ever taller. And the stalks to which they were attached grew ever more spindly.

This particular design philosophy came to an abrupt end after the 1969 Spanish GP. Piloting identical be-winged Lotuses, Jochen Rindt and Graham Hill had identical accidents on the Spanish circuit: wing failures while cresting the same ridge. (Both emerged without injury.) Hill crashed first. Even before he could inform his pit of the failure, Rindt followed suit. Wings were banned completely following the copycat failures. They were allowed to return, in a limited form, shortly thereafter. But the technology was drastically restricted; the tall, movable wings favored by the teams were banned outright.

To comply with the ever more restrictive regulations concerning wing height, width, location and so on, Chapman brought F1 the first modern GP car– at least in terms of concept. The Lotus 72 featured a wedge-shaped body, front wings molded into the bodywork and a modern-style rear wing (extending only between the rear wheels and of limited height and depth). The 72 incorporated some of the first F1 thinking about drag, downforce, and the relationship between the two. The 72’s concept is one nearly identical to that embraced by today’s designers.

The arrival of aerodynamic wings on the F1 circuit provided the final point of the so-called performance triangle – power, grip, and downforce. Overnight, downforce became the biggest force in F1 (so to speak) and the obsession of its engineers.

Wings have defined not only the look, but the design of every F1 car designed since the 1969 season. The performance benefits offered by aerodynamic development have easily eclipsed the gains found in any other single advance. Suspension design, powertrain, even layout and construction are all subordinate to the demands of the aerodynamicists. Current F1 teams now employ dozens of these specialists, and provide them with space age facilities in which to practice their dark arts. Simply put, for more than three decades, aerodynamic performance has been the absolute most important factor in GP car performance.

But the starting point of this period, while a glittering example of the sport in its golden age, also exposed the seldom-discussed but deadly compromise being made by F1 designers. Pushed by Colin Chapman, designers pushed their machines ever closer to the breaking point, frequently, if not commonly, overstepping the boundary. This was the fundamental tradeoff in GP car design: safe vs. fast, losing or winning. Though Jackie Stewart’s crusade would soon rid the sport of its “barbaric excesses,” the sport’s first posthumous world champion would be an exemplum for its costs.

By on November 17, 2006

chrysler_pt-cruiser_05_1024x76822.jpg Americans never demanded whale blubber. They simply wanted to light their homes. When a better means to the same end came along– a cheaper, safer and more effective energy delivery system (that didn’t require long, dangerous voyages and a Hellish rendering process)- they said ‘pardon me, be right back,’ and never returned. By the same token, Americans don’t demand imported oil or inefficient cars. They want a certain standard of performance. The two concepts just happened to be joined at the hip– at the moment. But that needn’t be so.

Many critics of America’s vehicular efficiency call for a gas tax to “force” the free market to create more efficient cars and trucks. The truth is a hefty gas tax will never pass. Besides, our federal Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards are a perfectly adequate instrument to stimulate a relatively painless increase in our automotive efficiency. If this system was properly implemented, every car, van and truck in America would get better gas mileage. We know this because we can already see its effects: hybrids, eight speed transmissions, composite materials, Canada goose-like drag coefficients. This process could easily be accelerated simply by raising the CAFE standards. 

Could automotive engineers meet the challenge of more demanding regulations? Consider Formula One. Year after year, the sport’s regulating body attempts to slow things down using restrictive legislation. Year after year, F1 teams create cars that perform at the brink of human endurance. To say ingenuity can’t lead to more fuel-efficient cars, trucks, vans and sports cars is to say science is played out and we know all there is to know. The principle that CAFE necessity is the mother of invention remains fundamentally sound. Ah, but there is a caveat; raising CAFE standards is not enough. The rules are fundamentally flawed. 

First, the legislation should be amended to stop assigning higher fuel economy ratings to flexible-fuel vehicles. For example, CAFE regs rate an E85-compatible 5.3-liter V8 Chevy Tahoe at 33mpg. The vehicle’s “gas only” EPA rating is 15/19mpg. The SUV struggles to achieve 10mpg on E85– which is more or less completely unavailable to 90% of the US population. Oh, and that’s one of the reasons why GM can advertise the fact that so many of their vehicles get “over 30mpg.” The CAFE regulation’s E85 calculations are ridiculous on so many levels it hurts.

Second, the EPA mpg figures should reflect actual real world driving. A Toyota Prius does not get 60mpg in city driving or 51mpg on the highway, and should not receive CAFE credits for doing so in the theoretical realm. While new EPA regulations will supposedly lower mileage estimates on hybrids by roughly 30%, and reduce a lot of other overly-optimistic estimates, it’s been clear for quite some time that the EPA should be using real world data. What’s more, the agency should create one simple statistical average for both city and highway driving.

Third, the loophole whereby passenger vehicles get called trucks or light trucks– removing some of the worst CAFE offenders from manufacturers’ car fleets and subjecting them to lower truck-related mpg standards– must be cinched. Classifying the PT Cruiser as a truck because it has a removable rear seat is just wrong. Classifying a crossover a truck because it has greater cargo-carrying capacity than passenger-carrying volume is also unacceptable. Common sense– rather than weights and measures– should be applied. If we’re really serious about improving overall fuel efficiency, it’s time for pickup trucks to be classified as passenger vehicles, regardless of their weight or commercial use. 

Fourthly, the whole system of CAFE “credits” should be eliminated. Specifically, when a manufacturers’ car or light truck fleet’s average fuel economy exceeds the required standard, they earn credits that can be applied to any three consecutive model years prior to (“carry back”) or subsequent to (“carry forward”) the model year in which the credits are earned. Why do we need to dangle a carrot in front of automobile manufacturers?  On the stick side, the penalties for non-compliance must be raised to the point where companies like BMW can’t simply shrug them off as a cost of doing business.

Lastly, again, CAFE standards should be raised. A manufacturer’s passenger car fleet is currently required to average 27.5mpg; light trucks must average 21.6 (rising to 22.2 mpg for 2007). I suggest a relatively modest increase of 2% a year for the next ten years.

Repealing the laws of supply and demand is challenging.  If cars use less gas, supply rises, prices drop and the airline and trucking industries gobble up what good CAFE achieved. Everyone needs to be in the same boat, because consumption is – forgive me – a whale of a problem.  Transportation is responsible for nearly 70% of the world’s oil use.  The captains of that industry should be charged with changing course.

By on November 16, 2006

roewe22.jpgImagine an alternate reality where General Motors operates state-of-the-art factories with flexible manufacturing systems allowing production of vehicles with different platforms on the same production line. Where they operate with a lean manufacturing philosophy that encompasses purchasing, logistics, manufacturing, sales and quality management. Where they use non-union labor to keep costs down and profits up, avoiding the legacy costs unions bring to the table.  Where sales are up more than thirty percent. Huān yíng guāng lín to China.

In 1997, GM entered a 50-50 joint venture with Shanghai Automotive Industry Corp. (SAIC) to form Shanghai General Motors (SGM) Co. Ltd. At the time, it was the largest single foreign investment in China in decades; many analysts considered it a high-risk undertaking. They’ve since been proven wrong, as the partnership continues to prosper. Currently, SGM produces 29 products under five main brands: Chevrolet, Buick, Cadillac, Saab and Opel. Additionally, they manufacture and sell ACDelco parts and Wuling minivans and pickups. 

SGM also operates China's first automotive engineering and design joint venture: the Pan Asia Technical Automotive Center (PATAC). PATAC handles all the vehicle design, development and testing for SGM and their domestic joint ventures. It has more than 1100 salaried employees, many of whom have masters and/or doctorate degrees. Their emission testing facility is one of 11 certified by the Chinese EPA and can test to European or American standards (including California’s stringent super-low emission standards).

GM has invested billions of dollars in their booming Chinese operation. If anyone has any lingering doubts about GM’s commitment to this market, the American automaker has just announced their plans to mass produce hybrid cars in China by 2008. While they’ve eschewed hybrid cars in the US (focusing instead on pickups and the Saturn Vue), the company’s PR flacks state "the GM Hybrid System is flexible and cost effective and is ideal for high volume global applications, which include its introduction in China in 2008."  So far, The General hasn’t indicated any plans to expand its hybrid market in the US. But few industry observers would be surprised to see hybrid powertrains– or even complete hybrid-powered cars– coming through customs shortly after their Chinese debut.

So what does GM get in return for their investment?  They have access to what is arguably the fastest growing automobile market in the world; sales jumped 36.7% in the first three quarters of this year. GM’s leadership is acutely aware their Shanghai goose is producing dozens of golden eggs, and they’re doing everything they can to keep it healthy. During a visit to Shanghai earlier this month, Rick Wagner stated, "we are willing to invest ahead of demand here because we are very bullish that demand is going to keep growing here."

All is not sunshine and rainbows, though. SAIC is using the expertise and experience gained from their joint ventures to launch their own premium brand, Roewe, at this month’s Beijing Auto Show. Their first offering, the Roewe 750E, is based on the Rover 75 sedan. They will market it as a premium brand in direct competition with Cadillacs, Saabs and top line Buicks.  SAIC plans to launch 30 new models under the Roewe brand between 2006 and 2011, and hopes to produce 120K Roewe cars in 2007. 

Where does this leave GM? It’s too early to tell. Under Chinese law, foreign automakers have to be in a joint venture agreement with a domestic company. That means GM can’t sever their ties with SAIC– unless it hooks-up with another Chinese manufacturer. SAIC says it has gleaned "rich experience and resources in every field" from its work with GM. GM says it “understands" SAIC’s "desire for further growth" and is confident "SAIC recognizes that the success of both companies in the China market is closely linked to the success of our joint ventures." Industry analyst Michael Dunne states, "the Chinese formed joint ventures for one purpose: to learn how to do it themselves one day. That day is here."

In the short term, GM will feel very little impact from SAIC’s decision. Cadillac is one of the top brands in China, on par with (or maybe even more desirable than) Mercedes. Buick has been on the Chinese market for almost 10 years. Both marques have solid reputations as prestige brands, so it may take Roewe a while to catch up.  GM seems to have the inertia they’ll need to survive in the Chinese market.

However they can’t drop their guard. They have to keep up with market trends and keep manufacturing costs in check. And whatever else they do, they must avoid the brand dilution that plagues them in other markets. Hopefully, GM’s China connection will provide the capital it needs for a corporate turnaround.  In fact, the future of GM’s North American operations may depend on it.

By on November 15, 2006

bridgend_engine06722.jpgIf you want to buy a Honda Civic or Fit in the US, you’ll probably go on a list and pay full price. With such success you might be surprised to learn that Honda has decreased its US Fit allocation and reduced Civic production at their East Liberty Ohio plant. Honda’s also changing over one line in its Canada plant to make Civics and moved part of their Pilot production to their minivan plant in Alabama. All this shuffling seems more like three-card-Monte than modern manufacturing. But there are trade-offs. Honda is willing to trade basic efficiency for manufacturing flexibility, which keeps plants running steadily, which ultimately leads to greater efficiency.

It’s a basic fact of life that the automobile industry is always fighting against the corrosive effects of excess production capacity. Auto manufacturing doesn’t reach cost efficiency until you can run at about 80 to 85% of your capacity. Run below that level and you either need to charge premium prices (if you can) or watch underused machinery and workers kill your profit margins. The specter of idle machines and workers is so awful that Chrysler recently decided to re-introduce the reviled “sales bank”: a pool of cars built without dealer orders. (The practice is a bit like buying lottery tickets on a credit card.) One of the main reasons for the The Big Two Point Five’s collective death spiral is their need to keep moving the metal—no matter what.

Flexible manufacturing is the usual antidote for overcapacity. Automakers who can build more than one model on the same production line (preferably using the same machinery and workers) have a much greater ability to respond to variations in market demand for a given model, and keep the factory humming. All automobile manufacturers use flexible manufacturing to some extent; Europe and Asia’s fragmented markets practically require the capability.

While The Big Two Point Five’s flex-ability still lags behind the foreign competitions’, they’ve improved from the nadir of the ‘70’s to early ‘80’s, where one plant could not even build its badge-engineered “cousins.” There are two reasons for the lag: union contracts (and fixed job descriptions therein) and cost. Vehicles that can be built on standardized equipment also cost more to develop. Machinery that can produce many types of vehicles costs more than single-use equipment. The Big Two Point Five has traditionally opted for greater amounts of cheaper production capacity.

While Honda has two large US factories for their mass-market sellers, both also contain “niche” production capacity. Marysville builds most US-spec Accord sedans and all Accord Coupes and Acura TLs.  The company has also converted a plant in Japan to build up to 80k more Accords to satisfy potential demand in the upper end of the home market and “take up the slack” if more TLs are required abroad. Similarly, East Liberty makes Civics, the Element and RDX (with the CRV on the way). This set-up limits the number of the Civics the factory can make. While several of Honda’s Japanese plants can pitch in, that production must “come out” of their Fit/Jazz production.

The short-term solution: shift some Pilot production onto the Odyssey plant to free one line to build Civics. The long-term fix: build another assembly plant in Indiana to increase Civic and Fit production. But that’s a couple years away. (Honda’s bigger problem is they can’t grow their capacity quickly enough to match sales increases; a problem Detroit would dearly love to face.)

All this juggling has three positive results for Honda. First, all their factories are working all the time, even if demand patterns shift. Second, they can keep their mass-market production in tune with demand. Matching supply to demand minimizes the need for margin-killing incentives and “fire sales” that knock down prices and increase depreciation (which further erodes sales and prices). Lastly, niche vehicles can be “soft launched” and take time to find their market share.  It’s much less damaging to have 10k extra Civics or Pilots than 10k too many Ridgelines.

Clearly, The Big Two Point Five need to ramp-up their flexibility even further and— equally important— find a way to get the unions to ease working restrictions. More critically, they need to integrate their flexibility in ways that make market sense, building mass-market and “niche” vehicles in the same plants. Price and sales targets need to be set and stuck to. Development needs to be streamlined so that “niche” vehicles don’t need to punch above their weight.

At the same time, The Big Two Point Five needs to develop a realistic market picture. Traditionally, Detroit swings for the fences, aiming to build hot-selling blockbusters. The problem is that by aiming so high, they ensure that any failure will be self-reinforcing. It’s time to get flexible, and sell one profitable car at a time.

By on November 14, 2006

x07ca_sl001-1222.jpg What do China, Thailand, India, Mexico, Eastern Europe and Venezuela have in common? They’re not America. Or, if you prefer, the United Auto Workers don't work there. Which is why General Motors is planning on producing its new Gamma Gamma Hey small car platform in these low-cost labor countries– and exporting the wee beastie to the US and other "developed" nations. In fact, it’s increasingly clear that GM is trying to outsource/globalize/synergize its way out of trouble. It seems to make sense: building standardized products in non-unionized factories will save the carmakers billions. But are they going about it the right way?

On one hand, GM seems to know what it's doing abroad. In China, GM uses its proven engineering and manufacturing skills to create the bird-eyed Buick GL-8 minivan and the recently announced Cadillac STS variant (the SLS). Both vehicles demonstrate The General’s ability to modify established products to local tastes. And there’s no question that GM’s reaping the rewards: sales of Chinese Buicks, Cadillacs, Chevrolets, Opels, Saabs and Wulings rose 35.2 percent this year, to a grand total of 665,390 units.

On the other hand, there’s the Cadillac BLS, a Swedish-built Euro-spec sedan riding on GM’s Epsilon platform, powered by a FIAT-sourced 1.9-liter diesel, wearing a US luxury car badge. Or how about the most recent Pontiac GTO, a re-badged Australian Holden Monaro built on an enlarged Opel Omega B platform (formerly used for the Cadillac Catera), sold in the Middle East as a Chevrolet Lumina SS? The failure of these cars to find a sustainable international audience illustrates the challenge of leveraging economy of scale into a viable product– when you start with economy of scale rather than a viable product.

Of course, GM (and now Ford) aspires to the Toyota model: sell the same "world" car (built on the same platform) in as many markets as possible. That’s fine if A) you build the right car and B) you've got deep enough pockets and a lean enough organization to recover from a major bomb. Do we really believe that GM can pull off a Corolla? The new Gamma platform small car was designed by Daewoo; if past history is any guide, they ain't no Toyota. By the same token, when the Toyota Echo went nowhere fast (in every sense of the phrase), the Japanese automaker re-engineered it to become the best-selling Yaris and other local variants. Does GM have the resources it would need to snatch victory from a dud Gamma-woo? 

As Toyota has demonstrated countless times in dozens of countries, “world” cars require a coherent and focused sales, marketing and distribution channel. And that's only possible if the car in question is part of a coherent and focused brand. While analysts tend to think of small cars for developing nations as a commodity– if it's cheap enough, it'll sell– branding plays just as crucial a role at the bottom of the market as it does at the top. A Toyota small car is not an Opel, Daewoo or Chevrolet small car. It's a Toyota, and everyone– designers, engineers, auto workers, marketing execs, dealers, salesmen and customers– know what that means. 

What IS GM's world brand these days? Oh right, it has four: Buick, Chevrolet, Cadillac and Saab. Although there are basic distinctions between these brands, things fall apart at the local level. Chevrolets are many brands and a wide variety of models to many people around the world– to the point where GM decided to create a separate "Corvette" brand in Europe. A Cadillac is a luxury car made of unobtanium in some markets, and a garden variety mid-priced mid-sized sedan in others. A Saab is a sophisticated European-style sedan in some markets, and a Chevy Trailblazer with the ignition key between the seats in others. 

When it comes to international automobile production, GM’s biggest problem isn’t its cost structure; it’s brand management. No matter where they do business in the world, no matter what food items are on the menu, McDonald’s and its customers know who it is. The same can not be said for GM, which, lest we forget, doesn't even exist as a brand. The General's cluelessness on the product branding front threatens any potential production-related savings from multinational platform sharing. Not to put too fine a point on it, low unit costs only create profits if you sell what you make.

This brings us back to the primacy of products over process, and the all-conquering power of coherent brands. GM CEO Rabid Rick Wagoner may be looking around the world and lovin' it, but until and unless GM sorts out its branding issues, globalization will hasten its destruction, not its success. 

By on November 13, 2006

oacampodium2222.jpgAs bad as Ford’s third quarter results (version 1.0) were for Dearborn’s darlings, the future doesn’t look much better. Ford’s Chief Financial Officer Don Leclair has publicly admitted that he expects the automaker’s fourth quarter to look like the one that crushed the Arizona Cardinals in week six: a complete and utter disaster. What’s more, Leclair has also acknowledged that Ford’s production cuts crush any hopes of financial rebound for at least the first half of 2008– no matter how their cross-border crossover fares in the marketplace. So, is it time to panic?

Ford PR flack Becky Sanch certainly jangled a few nerves when she agreed with a Detroit Free Press analysis that estimates FoMoCo’s year end losses could snowball to a staggering $12.5b. (For those of you keeping score, that’s another $5.3b in the hole.) Market mavens blame about $1.6b on normal operating losses for the Christmas season. Ford also let slip that somewhere between $1.5b and $2.5b more in “special pretax items” would show up on ‘06’s financial statement. Bruce Clark, a senior VP with Moody’s Investors Service, figures FoMoCo’s cash cushion will lose some significant padding in the coming 12 months. The fact is Ford will continue to lose liquidity even after that. 

Meanwhile, matching production to waning demand is job one. Ford’s across-the-board manufacturing cuts are designed to lead to 100% production efficiency (assuming Ford’s market share stabilizes at 13 to 14%). Short term, the reduced output should place less strain on Ford’s bloated dealer network, which is busy starving to death. Mike Jackson, CEO of AutoNation, points out that Ford's unsold inventory estimates include fleet sales. Jackson reckons Ford dealers are sitting on 105 days worth of unsold units– not the 75 that’s been reported. That’s a Hell of a lot of metal that needs moving. 

While the production cuts will help dealers “catch-up” with falling demand, without a drastic reduction of the 4400 national Ford dealer network, improvements will be… fleeting. Rumor has it that Ford’s looking to fork-out $300k cash incentives to stores willing to cut their losses and die. Even if true, a mass exodus is hardly likely; $300k wouldn’t even cover most Ford dealers' Reynolds and Reynolds software contract. Several dealers indicate privately that it would take about $2m to $4m in further “special pre-tax” cash financing to get them to fold up their Ford tent and go home. 

Analysts estimate that only 600 dealers can be bought out and closed down at the proposed rate. If so, Ford’s “new” market position means that the remaining Ford floggers will only move around 670 units each. That’s not what you’d call good news. To compete effectively with the vastly more efficient foreign-owned competition, to restore some of the lost luster to dealer profits, at least 1400 Ford dealerships need to get the axe. With just three thousand stores, each lot could conceivably push close to 1000 units out the door.

Again, it’s not likely that Ford will surrender the big bucks needed to make such a deep (and long overdue) cut to its dealer network. They may not have to. Given current estimates of about 616 units sold per dealer in ’06– “excess” dealerships may disappear through “natural attrition.” Without sufficient throughput, dealers lack the advertising dollars needed to lure the punters. And with less profit per unit to motivate sales staff, their ability to move the metal erodes. In increasing numbers, dealers are finding their margins bumping up against their overheads, until they take in less money than they spend and there’s no point carrying on.

While the dealer cancer spreads, freshly-minted Ford CEO Alan Mulally told the DTN that his employer needs to cut its costs: "It's all about competitiveness," he said. "You can't compete with a $3,400 disadvantage." Translation: Ford can’t afford its United Auto Workers (UAW) agreements. Mulally optimistically predicted that the UAW would see sense in their ’07 contract talks because A) it’s “Detroit’s defining moment” and B) if they don’t, by golly, he’ll take Ford’s case straight to the workers. Hi, I’m Alan. I made $35m this year and fly around in a Gulfstream. Here’s why you should work for less money, less benefits and a smaller pension.

If that wasn’t enough to rattle the bear cages on Wall Street, Mulally acknowledged that the Ford mothership faces a do-or-die cash crunch. "We have got to turn around North America and be profitable by 2009," Mulally said. "Because if not, you just keep losing cash and pretty soon you run out." Notice the change from “we” to “you.” It’s a classic example of disassociation; Mulally literally can’t face the possibility of a Ford bankruptcy. OK, now you can panic.

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