Category: Editorials

By on April 24, 2006

 Anyone who's shopped for a Toyota Prius knows that the gas – electric sedan comes complete with a 'hybrid premium': a theoretical surcharge included in the manufacturer's suggested retail price. Although there's considerable debate on this point, it is possible for a mileage-conscious Prius driver to save enough money at the pumps to recover the extra cost of purchasing a hybrid– eventually. But no matter how the customer makes out, Toyota still comes out on top. This despite the fact that the cost of developing and manufacturing hybrid technology– batteries, drivetrain, controls, brakes, etc.– means that Toyota makes a loss on every single Prius sold. But by losing the battle, they win the war.

It's no secret that hybrids get a lot more media attention than actual sales. Gas may be cresting $3 a gallon, but Americans still love their big cars, pickup trucks and SUV's. And while manufacturers love the profits on these large vehicles, they've all got to meet federal Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards. Otherwise, the automaker must pay large fines. [Since 1983, the EPA has collected $650,831,288.50 in CAFE fines from BMW, Jaguar, Mercedes, Porsche, VW and others.] The US Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 currently dictates that an automaker's US passenger cars must achieve a combined fuel economy average of 27.5 mpg. The combined average for their 'light trucks' (that's SUV's and pickups) must be 21.6 mpg.

So, Toyota can sell as many gas-guzzling Tacomas, Tundras and Sequoias as they like; they just have to sell enough fuel-sipping vehicles to maintain the required fleet average. In other words, Toyota and its compliancy-seeking competitors aren't trying to make big profits on little cars; they're trying to lose as little money as possible on small cars so they can make as much money as possible on big, profit-rich vehicles. To meet the CAFÉ regs., Toyota prices their smallest models at a loss– and then adds discounts, finance deals and incentives that cost even more. Prior to the Prius, Toyota's pushed the less-than-thrilling Echo with deep discounts and heavy incentives and attractive financing offers.

Seen in this light, the Toyota Prius was a stroke of genius: a vehicle that boosts the company's CAFÉ numbers to SUV-sustaining levels AND generates enormous positive PR for the brand. Somehow, no one other than a few tree-hugging environmentalists and Chevy's PR department seems to notice that Toyota's mileage on their other products lags behind the industry leaders. The social opprobrium attached to selling SUVs that are bigger and thirstier than a Chevy Tahoe (and probably more profitable) slides right off Toyota, because they're the leaders in hybrid technology. In one brilliant marketing move, Toyota has transformed their money-losing small car operation into a priceless marketing campaign.

And yet, as always, physics trumps bullshit– er, marketing savvy. Even with Toyota's hidden subsidy, the Prius is simply too heavy, complicated, expensive and yes inefficient to quickly and easily justify its premium price. Recent media focus on the discrepancy between hybrids' real world mileage and the official EPA numbers only reveals part of the truth. If consumers considered the fact that the Prius uses every non-hybrid trick in the book to raise its fuel efficiency (de-contenting, skinny tires, lightweight materials, etc.), if they compared like-for-like (the Prius vs. a similarly equipped, same-sized gas-powered car with equivalent horsepower), they'd see that the efficiency gap between competing propulsion technologies is narrower still.

The expansion of hybrid technology into large and heavy cars and trucks highlights this conflict between political/moral concerns and plain old physics. For example, EPA numbers suggest that the hybrid-powered Lexus RX400h 2WD SUV gets eight more combined mpg's than the gas-engined RX330 2WD. But if you "downsize" the vehicles' EPA numbers to real world experience– a process which doesn't lower the RX330's fuel economy as dramatically– the difference between the two Lexi is a lot less impressive. The truth is that short of cold fusion, there's no way a heavy hybrid will deliver mileage significantly better than a smaller and/or smaller-engined gas-powered vehicle. Of course it's also true that the new hybrid SUV's are a boon to their manufacturer.

The profits on Toyota's Lexus 400h hybrid-powered SUV takes their hybrid strategy to the next level. In the vehicle's rarified market demographic, the consumer pays the entire cost of the hybrid modifications. When that's the case, there's no way that the average owner will ever recover the extra cost of the hybrid. Given the likely cost of battery replacement and repairs in later life, there's little chance the original owner can recover any of the costs when selling or trading the car. But they can still feel virtuous and politically correct while driving a large luxury SUV. As Toyota's hybrid sales prove, sometimes perception is all.

By on April 23, 2006

 Word up young and financially fortunate pistonheads: don't be dissing minivan man. I know it's easy. It's easy to glance over from your hot hatch, company Bimmer or precious Porsche, see Mr. Mom sitting-up at the wheel of his minivan stuffed with car seats and kids, and snigger. Poor bastard, you think, he doesn't have a clue about cool. I'd rather drive a white Ford Fairline than that bread van. But you're mistaken. A) There's nothing lower than a Ford Fairline, and B) Minivan Man doesn't deserve your cardescension. In fact, there with the grace of God go you.

Morphing from pistonhead into Minivan Man (MVM) is a process, like grieving. At first, when the kids arrive, proto-MVM goes into denial. He hangs-on to his/his partner's two-door, or trades the sports car for a hot two-plus-two. He assures his partner that everything will be OK; the baby will fit in the back, no sweat. (Silently thinking, it's a baby, it'll never remember.) When the new father feels the brunt of his hormone-crazed wife's rage as she tries to maneuver a squealing child into the back, when he sees his precious litte angel in that dark, windowless space; he knows he's been beaten. He gets angry. Then he gets over it.

Bargaining starts. Well, honey, we don't really need something THAT big do we? A large sedan would be just as good, wouldn't it? Maybe something with a sports suspension. You know you like to drive fast too– not that you would with baby on board, but every now and then… Hey, how about a Dodge Magnum SRT8 station wagon? And then, suddenly, he becomes aware of minivans. The ease of those sliding doors. The advantages of all that room: less struggling, less screaming, Mommy can go back there and pick up the damn bottle, infinite cup holders, etc. He gets it.

After depression, acceptance. Then, purchase and pleasure. Today's minivans really are great for kids: safe and comfortable, with lots of room for Happy Meal toys, juice boxes, bikes, groceries, soccer balls, backpacks, PSP's, friends and all that other stuff that makes parenting so expensive. The best ones even have God's gift to hassled adults: rear seat DVD's. The audio for these systems can be faded to the rear of the vehicle, giving MVM the rare chance to have an uninterrupted conversation with his partner. That's no bad thing; unless of course it is. In that case, there's enough room for your beloved to stretch-out in the back and watch Toy Story for the 46th time.

And guess what? Minivans aren't that bad to drive. The Honda Odyssey and Toyota Sienna can both outrun a glacier and handle like big sedans. Besides, anyone can drive a Porsche fast. Minivan Man has to thread his beast through traffic without spilling Sasha's Slurpee or Rachel's blue Gatorade, while telling Lola that if she touches Sarah one more time she's never going to Chuck E. Cheese again as long as she lives. And that's final.

Supposedly, the one thing denied Minivan Man is sex appeal. Most guys think women are attracted to a flash guy in a flash car. And they are. But those sunglass-wearing sports car types are the "bad boys"– the ones who break your heart in your twenties and/or fuck around with your alimony in your thirties and forties (and fifties and sixties). Minivan Man is sexy to the women he actually has a shot at, and tends to see more often than not: Mommies. I'm not suggesting that all housewives are desperate, but the ones that are look for three kinds of guys: someone young (not you), someone divorced and responsible, or someone who has as much to lose from an affair as they do. Minivan Man.

Anyway, there is life after minivan. Eventually, the kids grow up, get their own cars and leave. If Minivan Man has been prudent– and it goes with the territory– there'll be a nice little nest egg Mazda MX5 or 350Z to enjoy in those golden years. Unless your kid is smart enough to go to grad school. Then by the time you can afford a sports car, the grandkids will come along and you're straight back in big car territory. And anyway, a hard suspension and six-speed gradually becomes less desirable than a bit of class, a comfortable ride and… quiet.

So don't diss Minivan Van. The chances are he's just as crazy about cars as you. He might even have something hot and fast stashed in the garage. For the time being, he's just doing what he's got to do: driving the best vehicle for the job at hand. If you think about it, that's the exact same formula sports car drivers use to select their wheels. Now how about that?

By on April 22, 2006

Carroll Shelby [left]. Courtesy spiritlevelfilms.comIn the mid-fifties, Carroll Shelby started tearing-up his local racing circuits. Within a few years, the young driver dominated every major road race in the United States: Sebring, Daytona and more. When Sir David Brown caught wind of Shelby's prowess, he figured that the good-looking Texan's charisma would help sell Brown's hand-made British supercars stateside. Brown whisked Shelby off to Europe to drive for his fledgling Aston Martin racing team. In 1959, Shelby drove a DBR1/300 to victory at Le Mans. More importantly, Aston beat Ferrari and Shelby met Enzo. A rivalry was born.

After his Le Mans win, Shelby revealed that he had a hereditary heart condition and shockingly retired from racing. Back in the States, he tried his hand selling tires and establishing a performance racing school. But in his heart of hearts, Carroll wanted to return to Europe with an American car and beat the Hell out of Enzo Ferrari's mob. He even had a plan: stuff a muscular American V8 into a nimble British roadster. The long tall Texan envisioned a hairy-chested mule clobbering Enzo's prancing thoroughbreds.

The very first Shelby Cobra.  Courtesy shelbyamerican.comLuckily, Ford was getting ass whooped both on the track (and in the showroom) by Chevrolet and the Corvette. The Blue Oval needed a halo vehicle. The company agreed to give the famous race car driver a new, lightweight all-aluminum V8, originally designed to power Canadian pickup trucks. Shelby turned to A.C. Cars in Britain for the frame and chassis. The Cobra was born. Or, more precisely, still-born. The first Cobra wasn't slow, but the mechanicals were garbage; the axle snapped during the car's first race and the engine wasn't nearly powerful enough to take on Maranello.

Enter a bunch of young, square-jawed Santa Monica hot rodders. A complete teardown, redesign and engine implant commenced. The resulting car is generally acknowledged to be the fastest (and coolest) muscle car of all time. The Cobra was so accelerative that Carroll would stick a $100 bill on the dash. If potential customers could grab it before the Cobra hit 100 mph, they could keep it. They couldn't. The 289 Cobra could do 0-100-0 in 15 seconds flat. The 427, in less than 13– which still counts as absurdly, violently fast more than 40 years later.

The Shelby Daytona Coupe. Courtesy rennlist.com That Cobra's extreme performance and relatively nimble handling helped Shelby's team dominate practically every American race during the 1963 season. With high hopes and a quick car, they headed for Europe to do battle in Enzo's backyard– only to be crushed by Ferrari at Le Mans. On the three-mile Mulsanne Straight, the convertible Cobras –- with hard tops bolted on –- topped-out at 150mph. The Ferraris went 180. If Carroll Shelby was going to show Enzo what-for, he needed a proper coupe.

In Spirit Level Films "The Cobra/Ferrari Wars," documentary filmmaker Richard Symons offers a riveting account of the simmering rivalry between the American chicken farmer's motley gang of West Coast thrill-seekers, and Europe's blue-blooded racers. Interlacing vintage racing footage and latter day interviews with most of the key players, the film chronicles a seminal moment in American automotive history: the development of Carroll Shelby's Daytona Coupe. It's a classic story of American blood and guts.

Designer Peter Brock with Shelby Daytona Coupe.  Courtesy datsun.org. Shelby recalls how he tasked a 23-year-old engineer named Pete Brock with designing the Coupe's body. Brock started with the windscreen, holding it in place with duct tape and wood. He then built the car's shell around it and the driver. Everyone agreed that the resulting Coupe was funny-looking– in a not-so-funny-kinda way. Brock assured them it would work. Or rather, fly. Even so, Shelby brought in an aerodynamics specialist who took one look and balked. Faced with a looming deadline and no Plan B, Carroll decided to trust his unknown engineer.

With Bob Bondurant and Dan Gurney behind the wheel, the Shelby Daytona Coupe hit an astonishing 196 mph on the Mulsanne Straight, and earned Shelby's band of brothers a first place finish in the GT class at the 1964 Le Mans. On his own terms, in his own way, the lanky Texan had beaten the imperious Italian. And then he did it again, in '65. And again, helping Hank Ford II's boys build the GT40 to punish Enzo for a last-minute walkout on a Blue Oval buyout. Four straight years of GT40 dominance in LeMans helped seal Carroll's reputation for all time.

Success at LeMans.  Courtesy shelbyamerican.com Shelby's victory is all the more poignant when compared to today's motorsports; complete with computer-aided design, manufacture and telemetry; PR flacks, chefs and personal fitness trainers. Back in Shelby's day, victory was achieved by personal determination, imagination and grit. While these characteristics will always be vital ingredients in motor racing, it's hard to imagine a time when they seemed so pure, so unadulterated by the cold-blooded demands of big business. Symon's film captures the last time a bunch of buddies got together in a small garage to take on the world's best, and won.

[Spirit Level Films provided a DVD of The Cobra Ferrari Wars for review.]

By on April 20, 2006

 The ancient Greeks knew the truth: character is fate. If Oedipus hadn't been such an asshole he wouldn't have killed his father, married his mother and kept psychiatrists busy for centuries. By the same token, if Rick Wagoner wasn't a corporate narcissist, he would've completed the Herculean tasks left by his predecessors. GM's CEO would have cleansed The General's stable of excremental vehicles, severed its eight-headed brand portfolio, subdued the UAW's cretinous bulls and sent Cerberus packing. Instead, we get to watch Rabid Rick's company sink into the mire, bribing a financial journalist and engineering a sports car whose roof flies off at 60mph. To wit:

Robert B. Reich is a journalist and commentator who once worked for President Clinton in the Labor Department. He currently enjoys a regular slot on NPR's nationally-syndicated "Marketplace" program. On Wednesday, Reich announced that he'd been approached by a "public relations firm working for General Motors." Reich said the flack asked him to praise GM's buyback deal for its workers. He then offered to pay Reich "remuneration" for a positive story "out of respect" for his reputation. Reich declined the unspecified offer.

The man attempting to bribe the twenty-second United States Secretary of Labor was Richard Strauss of Strauss Media Associates of Washington, DC. According to the company's website, Strauss Media uses its "integrity, perseverance, and skill" to help clients "realize the power and influence of radio." The PR company's client roster includes Nike, Eastman Kodak, Coca-Cola and General Mills. Although Strauss Media Associates doesn't list GM as a benefactor, a description of recent projects includes work on the Saturn brand's Second Annual National Donor Day.

Marketplace's host Kai Ryssdal confirms the connection. In a phone interview with TTAC, Ryssdal said Richard Strauss personally set-up a recent radio interview with GM CEO Rick Wagoner. When I asked if the show's producers investigated Reich's claim that he'd been bribed, Ryssdal said they had. According to Ryssdal, Strauss backpedaled furiously; calling the offer a "misunderstanding." Ryssdal also said the program had spoken directly to GM's new PR Supremo, Steve Harris. Harris said he never authorized payments to "sympathetic journalists." When Reich's damning piece aired, GM and their Washington PR firm remained silent.

So, The General's own PR firm didn't have enough confidence in the value of GM's employee buy-out plan to let a journalist draw his own conclusions. Clearly, the General's generals feel embattled and desperate. And why wouldn't they? What has their imperious leader said or done that would lead them to believe that GM is a company that deals with its problems head-on?

Meanwhile, on the same day, Sprite2005 posted two pictures of his semi-decapitated C6 on a Corvette forum, with an accompanying explantion. "I still can't believed this happened. Had just shifted out of first @ around 6900-7000k, hit 2nd and hear a loud crack, pull over and my roof is missing…" Sprite2005 is not alone. On the 23rd of February, GM sent out tech bulletin number #05112A, which states the following.

"On certain 2005-2006 Chevrolet Corvette vehicles, the painted roof panel may separate from its frame in some areas if it is exposed to stresses along with high temperature and humidity. The occupants of the vehicle may notice one or more of these symptoms: a snapping noise when driving over bumps, wind noise, poor roof panel fit, roof panel movement/bounce when a door or hatch is closed, or a water leak in the headliner." Dealers should "apply adhesive foam to ensure proper adhesion, or in a small number of vehicles, replace the roof panel."

Although the defect doesn't appear to affect the Corvette's structural integrity, an airborne roof panel raises some pretty major road safety issues. Equally important, the situation does nothing to bolster GM's supposed reputation for improving build quality– or the company's willingness to accept responsibility for customer concerns. Notice that the notice says the roof may become separated 'in some areas,' blames "stress, high temperature and humidity" and recommends replacing the roof panel "in a small number of vehicles." If that attitude isn't familiar to disgruntled GM owners, perhaps this [unedited] response is:

"I can't believe how many of you people are actually defending this and saying its not that big of a problem," writes forum member Sweetvet. "The mans roof flew off his brand new $75K car- thats a pretty big friggin deal to me- I would be livid, and would ensure this car was bought back by GM, and would never buy another GM product again. God, I'll be glad when my corvette is sold so I can get back into something with build quality- something (anything) German"

GM's first quarter losses less than last year? So what? As long as Rabid Rick Wagoner is tempting the fates, GM's is sealed. Ipso facto.

By on April 20, 2006

 If anyone doubts that product is the key to success in the car business, just look at the new Ford Mustang– if you can find one. While The Blue Oval's US dealers watch 500's and Fusions pile up in their lots, the only signs of Mustangs are the smoking rubber streaks in the driveways leading out. And the money's not bad either. While Ford has placed huge incentives on just about every other car, truck, minivan, crossover, hybrid and SUV in their arsenal, Mustang GT's are selling within shouting distance of list price. Insiders are still amazed that a hot car like this could emerge from Ford's normally moribund new car development process. The answer is simple: Ford hired a capable, inspired product planner named Chris Theodore and set him loose.

Ford put Theodore in charge of the Mustang program, and later the GT. When Theodore punched-in, the Mustang program was in the doldrums; no one was willing to buck Ford's long-winded product development process to make a great car, instead of another example of humdrum transportation. Convinced that Ford's designers were devoid of new ideas, Theodore told the studio to make a clay model that represented a brand new interpretation of the old Mustang theme. The result is perhaps the best rendition of 'retro' on the market today. More importantly, Theodore then set to work resolving the problems of actually making the car– problems that have hamstrung Ford's creativity for decades.

 When Theodore assumed control, the Mustang was due to be built upon the Lincoln LS platform. The Mustang's engineers knew it would be impossible to meet their cost and weight targets using the LS' heavy and expensive underpinnings. Theodore took one look at the program and told the engineers to forget about the Lincoln. Ditching the Lincoln's independent rear suspension and its short-long arm front suspension (upper and lower control arms of unequal length) freed-up money for a new 300hp engine. Losing the remote gas cap flap release, automatic temperature control, heated seats, navigation system, parking sensors and a host of other "luxuries" left money for big, better brakes; a suitably stout suspension and superb rack and pinion steering. And then Theodore's and his team headed into deeper, more difficult waters…

FoMoCo has a set of rules and requirements for new product development called, internally, "the cookbook'. Follow all the rules, add the right ingredients, and you move one more notch up the corporate ladder. Of course, that's not supposed to be the goal; it's supposed to lead to attractive, high-quality, cost-effective cars. But the rules certainly make it difficult for managers like Theodore who don't like to play "by the book." More specifically, the cookbook dictated standards for rear seat legroom– measurements that the short wheelbase Mustang simply couldn't meet.

 The Mustang's project managers dithered for six months, trying to devise a way to meet the requirements: sufficient space for the stems of a 6'3" passenger. The seat supplier submitted design after design, but the theoretical passenger's knees still went through the passenger in front. Management seriously considered adding six more inches to the wheelbase. When Theodore got word of the impasse, he resolved the entire crisis by simply reminding the team that they were making a Mustang, not a Town Car. By bucking the system and taking the heat from top brass, Theodore kept the Mustang program on track and on target.

The result is a Mustang with, effectively, no rear seat legroom. Obviously, Mustang owners don't care. If they did, they would have bought a Fusion. In fact, I'm sure there's a ten year old boy somewhere looking at a new Mustang and saying, 'When I grow up, that's the car I want to drive!' Not "Where the Hell am I going to put my 6'3" twins?" Theodore also brought a similar focus to the Ford GT program, helping to create a budget supercar car that brought glory to both Ford and its country of origin.

 So what happened to Theodore? Promoted, given new projects, made a product spokesman like GM's Bob Lutz? Theodore was, as they say, "eased out.' Making great cars, even making great cars that make money, are not qualifications for longevity in Ford's corporate community. Break the rules and you're out the door.

While there's no question that Ford is struggling under the burden of its fixed costs, creating new cars that people can't resist is still the name of the game. The Mustang's success is a reminder that Ford has the ability to do just that– if only they had the will. Put another way, if Ford could encourage and reward talented car guys like Theodore, they wouldn't have to offer customers an average of $3k off a new model. Back of the envelope? Ditch the discounts and instead of last year's two billion dollar loss, Ford could have made a billion bucks. Bottom line? Business isn't risky. People are.

By on April 17, 2006

 The first generation Escalade always conjured up the image of a cubist Joan Crawford with chrome lips. In fact, it was nothing more than a melted-nosed Suburban sprayed black (ditto the Denali). The second generation didn't fare much better, dubiously distinguishing itself as some incongruent amalgam of curvy and chiseled forms, chrome-plated into a creature from Mary Shelley's deepest somnambulatory nightmare. And now, for the sports stars finding themselves bored between criminal investigations, fines and/or sentencing; pop music glitterati caught in the interim between final music-video edits; and the rest (whose leases are up), we present to you the 2007 Cadillac Escalade.

Much has been written about Cadillac adding aesthetic audacity with each successive Escalade. Oddly enough, that statement doesn't apply to the new model's front end. Flying in the face of all things big, brash and American– literally– the 'Sclade's design team have displayed a stupefying level of taste and restraint. The 'stacked' headlamps which work to such truck-like effect on Cadillac's passenger cars seems perfectly suited here on – gasp! – a truck. The Caddy's grille, though marginally larger in size, actually uses less brightwork than the previous model. Yo bro'! Where's the fun in that?

 This time around, the brute looks like most of the other pieces actually fit, not as if they were tortured to fit. Most, but not all. Caddy's blingmeisters attempted to disguise the Escalade's side mirrors Chevy parts-bin origins by chroming their lower portion. It's a clever (if obvious) touch– that still doesn't justify attaching a form as smooth as a river-rock onto a shape possessing not so much as a single curve (excepting the wheels and Cadillac crest). Besides, is this kind of thinly-disguised cost-saving measure really necessary at this price point? There's no good answer to that question…

Nor is there any logical reason for the Escalade's off-road equipment. Any idea that this urban whip's headed for four-wheeling– beyond accidentally jumping a moderately high curb in the snow– is immediately dispelled by the fog lights' placement in the basement. A titular SUV, this. Forgeddaboutit. Recline the Escalade's power seats, open the windows, blast the seismic bass, and get in tune with this truck's singularity of purpose. It's nothing more than lacquered and chromed coquetry on wheels. Ladies take note.

 From the side, Cadillac owes a debt of shame to Land Rover's Range Rover Sport. The superfluous front quarter-panel vents are, at best, homage; at worst, they're intellectual thievery. Meanwhile, if the Escalade's sheer mass doesn't get your immediate attention, then the wheels will– and not in an entirely positive way. In other words, the person who devises a way to make a 13.6' disc brake NOT look like tic-tacs in the mouth of 22' chrome-plated seven-spokers deserves a job over at Caddy– and a prime spot in pimp heaven.

From the 'Sclade's side and the rear, one gets an unflattering view up the big Caddy's skirt, as it begins to betray its lesser genetics. The bone-straight glass area throws the look of the whole some favors, though platform sharing militates compromise. This thing comes at you like a bull and leaves with a meow. Where's the bold design statement from the rear? Did the interns handle that end? Granted, it's a tough line to tow. Let's say the overall image has matured…

 The Escalade finally merits a truly distinct interior. The cabin is a bespoke, well-arranged affair that blends a stout dash design (that Mercedes foolishly abandoned at the end of the last century) with a bit of Lexus' minimalist chic. The fake wood accents are convincingly handsome (Zebrano anyone?). But the design stumbles badly with its razzle-dazzle, flavor-of-the-week electric blue indicator needles. And the chancre of platform sharing rears its puss-filled head in a major gaffe: a manually-tilting, NON-telescoping wheel. Power liftgate and manual-tilt wheel? It's unforgivably antediluvian at the thick end of $60-large.

The 'Sclade's a steal at dollars per inch. So why is such a potentially voluminous interior put to such poor use? Why the intrusive padding, moldings and roof pillars? Noise, vibration and harshness be damned; Caddy buyers rightly expect a cavernous interior. (If it sounds like one, so be it.) Third row legroom is strictly nominal. In fact, Cadillac might want to consider ditching the rear chairs entirely and take the Range Rover high-road (metaphorically, of course): accepting that four people travel in style. Anyone else is just… luggage. If Louis Vuitton ain't stitched across your rear, you DON'T want to be in the rear.

All in all, the new Cadillac Escalade is, without a doubt, the most visually forceful, convincing and desirable product from Cadillac in decades– which either says a great deal about GM's ability to build a good springboard sport/ute platform, or Cadillac's wholehearted abandonment of what made it famous in the first place.

By on April 17, 2006

 I once complained to my accountant about sky-high UK petrol taxes. An oil-producing nation with the highest gas prices in the world? What's that all about? He laughed. "Bitching about the petrol tax is like complaining about a mosquito bite when your carotid artery's been severed." This Sunday, The Detroit News ran a story about GM's $17m Viagra bill. Reporter Brett Clanton justified the titillating take on GM's health care provisions by claiming "company executives" use the factoid to illustrate runaway costs. Be that as it may, Clanton's story is nothing but an inane distraction from GM's death by a thousand cuts, both literal and figurative. Or is it?

The Detroit News seems to have missed the fact that GM workers go to their doctor, get scrips for Viagra, then re-sell the erectile dysfunction medication on the street. Insiders tell us that a large part of GM's $17m Viagra bill ended-up in UAW workers' pockets. In fact, the Viagra story could very well be the tip of a huge drug re-selling scandal (Vicodin, Oxycontin, etc.). And again, that's without considering the REAL story: all the tens of millions of dollars spent on unnecessary tests and procedures– blithely commissioned by doctors and patients who have no incentive to minimize GM's health care bill.

Of course, GM CEO Rabid Rick Wagoner is tackling this whole health care cost situation head-on, right? Back in October, GM and the United Auto Workers (UAW) negotiated a "historic health care giveback." According to the agreement, some 475,000 retired union workers will now make co-pays, capped at $752 per family per year. The health care deal also stipulates that all 118,000 active UAW members must defer 17 cents an hour in cost-of-living increases, and 83 cents an hour in general wage hikes (which were scheduled to take effect next September).

Bottom line? GM could save roughly $360m a year from the co-paying retirees and $245m from the hourly workers (40-hour week = $2,080 per clock-puncher per year). Put the numbers together and GM trims a total of $605m– roughly 11%– off their $5.6b annual health care bill. Unfortunately, in the last three years, US health care costs have risen by around 10% per year. So the GM – UAW health care deal only saves the company 1% of the additional money they WOULD have paid– not the money they're currently paying.

Or does it? The agreement caps the co-pays of individual UAW retirees' (workers without participating families) at $370 a year. And any UAW retiree with a pension of $8000 or less continues to pay nothing. Although the UAW won't break out the number of individual retirees, union officials claim that 74,000 "low income" members qualify for no-cost health insurance under the new plan. If you remove these workers from the above equations, you reduce GM's savings by around $55m, lowering their total reduction to around $550m. That's less than 10% of GM's total tab. So it's a wash, or if you prefer, GM's health care deal with the UAW lets them tread water– until inflation catches up.

Of course, there's more (or less) to this agreement than meets the eye. When the health care deal went down, The General agreed to create a $3b fund ($1b over three years) to cover the co-pays of workers who couldn't afford them. Do the math: GM plunks down $3b to save itself $550m a year. I make that and five-and-a-half year's savings paid in advance. Obviously, there's a whole lot of tax law and actuarial stats in all this, but the fact remains that the UAW's "givebacks" were GM's "pay forward." And though GM's new plan initiates at least some kind of accountability, the UAW's gold-plated health care coverage continues apace.

And while we're at it, who gets the interest on this $3b fund? Five percent interest on $1b is $50m; times three is $150m. Neither GM nor the union will answer this question, but if the cash goes into the UAW's coffers, what effect will that have on the UAW's motivation to play ball with GM come contract negotiation time in '07? Should they get that far. As everyone now knows, a Delphi strike could scupper the mothership. Of course, the union would need a pretty large strike fund to bring Delphi/GM to its knees. Money that GM's health care deal could be putting into union coffers.

Meanwhile and anyway, neither UAW members nor this writer considers Viagra a "lifestyle" drug. Pfizer's erectile dysfunction medication is critical to its users' mental well-being and the cohesion of their family unit. Making Viagra jokes about GM's ED patients (should they exist) is cruel. Besides, if GM's PR department has suddenly decided it's open season on sexual chemistry, what of Rick Wagoner's testosterone levels? Surely Generous Motors should pay for the drugs Wagoner needs to increase his testicular fortitude, and sort out his company.

By on April 14, 2006

 At yesterday's New York International Automobile Show, Bob Lutz provided the hook for GM's PR counterattack. Of course, the Car Czar's rallying cry wasn't planned. As usual, the former Marine aviator simply greeted the press, opened his mouth and OoRah! came out. 'GM has the worst behind it.' Whatever else you can say about Maximum Bob Lutz, the man is an idiot. While GM's first quarter results will be a lot less bad than last year's annus horribilis, Lutz' statement flies in the face of the growing, looming, unresolved, irresolvable conflict over at bankrupt parts supplier Delphi; the fact that GM's gas-guzzling SUV's are heading straight into a $3 a gallon shit storm; and a shoal of dangers so extensive that GM CEO Rick Wagoner has taken to calling it "stuff." But wait; there's more!

"Soon all will be revealed,' Lutz said. 'I can't mention figures, because I'd get in big trouble." So, Mr. 'Don't Tell Mommy' wants the nattering nabobs of negativity vulturing GM to believe that his company's management team (whom MB has just placed in harm's way) has a secret plan to pump-out GM's umpteen flooded compartments and restore the company to preeminence. Well, profit. Never mind that GM watchers have been waiting for an aggressive restructuring plan since 1973, or that every time Rabid Rick Wagoner steps up to the dais these days and says "Ta Da!" he's closing, cutting and/or buying out something or someone. If we're looking for company-saving revelations, what could possibly top the still only potential sale of 51% of GMAC for $14.1b? The mind boggles.

Or maybe I misunderstood. Maybe Maximum Bob's saying that GM's financials are about to get better. That would be odd. In March, GM's market share tumbled from 26.5 to 23.3%. Car and truck sales fell 15%. As for new product, The General has shot its wad, placing its bets on gas-guzzling GMT900's. Although Bob and his Booster Brigade are cheered by the supposed surge in sales of these brand new-ish Tahoes, Yukons, etc., it's best to remember that GM books fleets sale on "allocated preference" (i.e. when they're scheduled for production) and/or as soon as an SUV ships to the dealer. Also, Rabid Rick's publicly admitted stockpiling parts in preparation for a Delphi strike; perhaps Bob's optimism is based on "phantom" figures…

In fact, GM might be teetering on the brink of financial collapse. No one outside the company knows how low GM's US cash hoard has gone between balance sheet dates. And while Maximum Bob was busy entertaining the press corps, GM's purchasing guy publicly stated that The General is stretching its account payables to 55 days, essentially financing itself on the back of its vendors. That's not good. Nor is the recent revelation that the GMAC sale will NOT improve GM's credit rating and WILL slaughter GM's cash cow, starving The General of ANY dividends for five years. As one correspondent put it, "This deal does nothing to facilitate a restructuring of North American operations, but rather lets them keep the lights on until the UAW calls the end game."

I reckon the light at the end of Bob's tunnel is the headlight of an oncoming General Motors FP59 diesel-electric locomotive. But hey, that's just me. And Bob thinks I'm full of shit. 'Most of the analysts living in New York don't even own cars, and have never even visited one of our dealerships,' Maximum Bob proclaimed. 'At some point, I start to question whether they're holding short positions on the stock.' (FYI: This writer owns a car but not GM stock. And thanks to GM blacklisting, I've visited several GM dealerships for test drives.) As Detroit News reporter Brett Clanton pointed out, Lutz' analytical anti-Christs are the same effete intellectual snobs who heard GM predict that the company would be solidly profitable in '05– the year it lost $10.6b.

But Bob's not done playing the dozens with us financial and media mavens, announcing that "The imminent bankruptcy at GM is a myth created by Wall Street and our beloved media." It's nice to be loved, however sarcastically, but this website has been begging to differ on the Chapter 11 front for over a year now. Bob's said nothing to change our perspective and plenty to reinforce it. Sure, Maximum Bob's blend of feistiness and anti-intellectual, anti-media paranoia played well with his dealers and GM's decimated, dispirited troops. Maximum Bob's force of will even gave GM's beleaguered (not-to-say overvalued) stock a temporary boost. Be that as it may, Lutz is, at best, guilty of premature recapitulation. At worst, he's completely divorced from reality. Bob says "the last skeptic in America will [soon] be convinced that we are well on the way to recovery. GM has its best days ahead of it.' We say, well, good luck with that.

By on April 12, 2006

 I'll never forget the billboard looming over London's Hammersmith flyover. At the exact point where drivers suddenly confront the endless congestion ahead, a teleconferencing company asked 'Is this journey really necessary?' I'd like to put the same question to the harried hacks covering The New York International Automobile Show– at the exact moment they hear the stilted cadences of The VP of Marketing for Generic Sedans enter the twenty-third minute of his presentation. And what say you show goers, as those circulation-constricting swag bags help transform your "visit" into a Bataan Death March? Is your Odyssean journey really essential?


Don't get me wrong. Auto shows aren't going to die. As long auto execs need to compare stand sizes with unaffiliated colleagues; they'll be there. As long as cherished dealer principals need to feel proud, special and drunk; they'll be there. As long as pistonheads need a happy place where they're not considered nerds, where they can touch, feel and smell the obscure objects of their desire; they'll be there. Wherever there's a cop beating' up a guy– no seriously, the human desire for real, honest-to-bad-breath social interaction guarantees that the auto show is with us to stay.


But social interaction ain't what it used to be, and neither is The Big Show. The days when they provided a back room bacchanalia for white men in dark suits, or a cherished father son bonding experience, are gone; replaced by political correctness and Gran Turismo 4. The Internet has changed everything. If gaining attention for a new vehicle is the question, cyberspace is the answer. If you're a media maven or rivet counter seeking a new whip fix, the web is to car spotting what a CAT scanner is to a neurologist. Even without considering the cost of an auto show stand or the expense of going to one, the Internet is 175% more efficient than the current bricks and mortar motoring ho'-down.


In ten years' time, defenders of today's auto show format will sound like those nostalgic nutcases who assert that radio drama is an unappreciated art form. Meanwhile, sensible people have to suffer mystical statements about the irreproducible benefits of seeing a new car 'in the flesh'– as opposed to clocking it via crystal clear digital photography or reasonable quality video. We'll also have to endure endless paeans to the value of face time and the 'gathering of the tribes'– as if high school reunions weren't ugly enough. The truth is, putting pistonheads and purveyors together in the same place at the same time for an endless series of new product launches and miles of static displays only makes both groups feel… unappreciated.


Fortunately for those of you reading this rant on your laptop in Jacob Javits' bowels– I mean in the bowels of The Jacob K Javits Convention Center– the modern car show is not an either/or reality/Internet situation. For every live human being sucking-up recirculated air in JKJ's cavernous confines, there are 10,000 surfers harvesting the heavy metal fruit of the auto blogging brigade. If the organizers of The New York auto show could suck a buck from every one of the web heads who check in on their vapid display of automobiles-in-aspic, they'd make enough money to pay for post-traumatic show disorder therapy– for everyone!


You don't have to be a dotrepreneur to realize that people around the globe would pay a reasonable fee to 'attend' an auto show from the comfort of their computer. A monopoly on the event's web rights– live web cam coverage, instant access to new photo galleries, on-road video and specs; forums, chat-rooms, IM interviews, etc.– could be worth a fortune. Hundreds of thousands of E-visitors would pay– either directly or through advertising– for the privilege of not going to the 'actual' show. The inappropriately-named independent media would scream bloody murder, but car manufacturers would conclude, rightly, that the spin starts here, with maximum content control.


At some point, the big e-auto shows will start to resemble professional sports, with only the die-hards bearing the cost and inconvenience of physical attendance. That said, fantasy cars aren't football; whether there'd be enough hard core shmoozers and show goers to justify the mondo auto show's astronomical rents and high-priced tickets is an open question. In fact, dwindling attendance has already liberated the London/Birmingham auto shows from their inner-city amphitheaters, fragmenting the event into smaller eventlettes. With less expensive and more accommodating venues, UK exhibitors are now doing really wild and crazy stuff to entertain the faithful– like demonstrating vehicles in motion.


Thanks to the Internet, it's a brave new world. Well, new. Making the switch from today's big ass car shows– a dead genre expense accounting– to tomorrow's smaller and/or virtual get-togethers will require both vision and courage. Either that or an auto exec who's had one steamed hot dog too many.

[For a look at the mutations to come, visit www.autoshowinmotion.com]

By on April 10, 2006

 I wonder what Billy Durant would have made of Rick Wagoner. GM's founder was a man of great honesty, intelligence and drive. He was also a high school drop out who started the company with a $1000 loan– and ended-up penniless. Twice. Perhaps that's why historians tend to credit General Motors' epic growth to the man appointed president in 1923; about whom an observer wrote, 'The manufacture of correct assessments, not physical products, is what most gratified Alfred Sloan.' Billy was the "car guy." Alfred was the "bean counter." The history of GM is the history of the struggle between these two opposing forces: passion and, um, accounting. Rick Wagoner is, of course, a Harvard MBA.

I suppose Durant would have liked Wagoner well enough, at least at first. Durant's legendary charm was based on a simple but effective strategy: "Assume that the man you are talking to knows more than you. Do not talk too much. Give the customer time to think. In other words, let the customer sell himself." Rabid Rick is pretty good at selling himself these days. With a new PR guy pushing the buttons, Wagoner's making the rounds, defending his chairmanship on CBS' 60 Minutes and Face the Nation, and in the pages of The Wall Street Journal and other carefully-selected publications. So if Rick and Billy were schmoozing about GM, Wagoner would have done the talking.

What would Billy have thought if Rick repeated his recent kvetch to Newsweek? 'It's not so easy to do stuff, particularly if you can't do it yourself, if you've got to do it in cooperation or in conflict with unions, if you do it with Delphi, if you need partners to consider a partial sale of GMAC. What has been done in the last six months borders on unprecedented accomplishments and advances. This stuff didn't happen because somebody decided on Jan. 15, why don't we do stuff? This stuff happens because we're working on it, we're ready to do it, we're talking to people, and then when we have it ready, we announce it.'

Durant would have been alarmed at Wagoner's use of the word "stuff." Billy may have been the yin to Alfred's yang, but he was every inch the detail man. He knew every nut and bolt of every vehicle, every nuance of the production process. Durant would not have been pleased with a GM CEO who spoke with such thinly-veiled buck-passing imprecision. As a risk-taking deal maker extraordinaire, Durant would've also wondered why Wagoner hadn't already united GM's "partners," or taken the bold action necessary to avoid GM's current morass. Equally important, as a man who lost his company to conservative-minded "insiders" (twice), Durant would've also had problems with Wagoner's "company men know best" hubris. To wit:

"These are sophisticated problems with historical tails that run back 80, 90 years. The chance of someone coming in and not understanding our business, making the right calls and doing them in cooperation with key constituencies like dealers and unions, is absolutely microscopic. That would be the biggest risk I've ever heard of." Risk? What does a man who's never worked a day outside Generous Motors (its former CFO no less) know about risk– except how to avoid it at all costs? Even so, Durant would have kept his trap shut. And then, at some point, Billy would want to go for a ride.

Durant believed that great products make great companies, and vice versa. GM began when Durant was so impressed by a horse-drawn buggy's innovative suspension that he bought its manufacturer: the Coldwater Cart Company. One wonders which vehicle Wagoner would choose for Billy's test drive. A Corvette would certainly swell Durant's heart with pride. Anything else and… there would be questions. Why doesn't this Tahoe have a hybrid engine? What makes a Pontiac G6 better than a Toyota Corolla or Honda Civic? Why isn't the Cadillac STS as good as/as expensive as a Mercedes S-Class?

Durant would have listened to Wagoner's responses thoughtfully and concluded that GM's CEO had an answer for every objection, every fault, every danger; and the answer was always the same: we're working on it. Things are getting better. We'll sort out the jobs bank, the quality gap, the Delphi situation, the GMAC finance deal, our car sales, this car, all of it, everything, later, soon, sooner or later. In that sense, Durant might have seen something of himself in Wagoner. Like his father before him, Billy squandered his fortunes on stock market speculation. Gamblers understand denial. They know that some men will always believe– no matter what– that their salvation, their resurrection, is only a deal away.

So, if William C. Durant were Chairman of GM today, would he fire Rick Wagoner? Truth is, Billy never would have appointed Wagoner CEO in the first place.

[For more info., please read 'Billy, Alfred, and General Motors' by William Pelfrey.]

By on April 8, 2006

 Porsche recently unleashed the Cayenne Turbo S, a 521-horse update on their 'regular' Cayenne Turbo. While I haven't had the pleasure of testing Porsche's latest, greatest off-roader, Porsche purists have used the model's debut as an excuse to, once again, make snide remarks about The Sultans of Stuttgart's SUV. Even though the truck has dumped a mountain of money into Porsche's corporate coffers– funding the development of the 911, Boxster, Caymen and forthcoming Panamera– a great many US Porschephiles still think of the Cayenne as Mrs. Porsche Driver's second-rate whip. While the general population of pistonheads won't even notice this ongoing slander campaign, I do and it pisses me off.

Apparently, the Cayenne is a rolling indictment of Stuttgart's brand management, a vehicle that betrays all that's holy in Porsche World. According to this theory's addled adherents, the Cayenne represents a dangerous diversion from Porsche's one true mission: producing 911's and, if it really must, other sports cars. By this strict standard, the faster the Cayenne, the more suitable it is for non-paved surfaces, the more of an abomination it becomes– like some kind of hideous tuner project gone out of control. The fact that the Porsche factory racing team jacked-up a couple 959s and won the Dakar Rally twice doesn't come into it. A Porsche is not a truck, and a truck is not a Porsche.

Of course, even these fussy enthusiasts know that Porsche has deviated from its pure form — P. J. O'Rourke's "ass-engined Nazi slot car"– many times. Surely the brand faithful haven't forgotten the front-engined 928, 924, 944 and 968, or the mid-engined 914? When the superb Boxster appeared, the Carrerisiti also slated it for having a trunk near the exhaust pipes. The purists criticized the last generation 996 for being– ready for it– water cooled! Never mind the fact that the 996 kicked the schnitzel out of the 993 in every meaningful way.

And now, again, the Cayenne SUV gets a kicking. OK, granted, the entry level Cayenne, with its VeeDub-sourced six-cylinder engine, is about as appealing as Subaru's B9 Tribeca — which is to say not at all. And while we're at it, the normally-aspirated 340hp Cayenne S isn't exactly what you'd call exhilarating. (It's Carmella Soprano, not Paulie Walnuts.) But the 450hp Turbo and its brat-out-of-Hell sibling, the 521hp Turbo S, are two of the finest SUVs ever made. For one thing, short of military vehicles like a Hummer H1 or a Unimog, no truck can match the Cayenne Turbo's non-pavement prowess.

I've owned three Jeeps. Working as a team, they couldn't traverse the rough stuff like a Cayenne Turbo. On the most challenging off-road course I've ever encountered, the uber-truck conquered all. It mastered a 60% incline by virtue of a 32 degree approach angle and 11 inches of ground clearance. Sure, Cayenne drivers are "isolated" from rocky terrain, but that is, I believe, part of the point. Fine, the ABS makes some awful sounds as the brake-calipers stop airborne wheels from spinning. The payoff is poise on a precipice. Yes, the computer is doing most of the heavy lifting. So what? The Cayenne will take you to places other SUVs couldn't reach in their muddiest dreams. FAST, too.

While a Land Rover or Land Cruiser may nearly match the Cayenne's slow-speed mountain goat routine, nothing– not even an EVO– will catch a Cayenne Turbo on a long, dusty road. It's the Paris-Dakar rally car writ large, with all the fun that concept implies. On-road, the Cayenne Turbo defies logic. Flogging the beast around an autocross track is revelatory. How on earth can anything this fat (5500 pounds) and ugly (more correctly, "deformed") hustle round the cones not only as quickly as a WRX, but with as much control? Then you remember that the same truck just swam through two-feet of water, bashed its ass on a boulder and drove up a wall. Stunning. More like unbelievable. Bravo Porsche, bra-fucking-vo.

OK, I suppose the brand-protecting purists have something of a point. This monster looks like Bigfoot next to a Boxster on the showroom floor. From a marketing and PR point of view, Porsche would have been better advised to build their truck under an entirely different label. If the anti-Porsche SUV crowd had been given a Volkswagen or Audi Cayenne Turbo, there'd be fewer cries of Judas kiss. Porsche still would have collected the necessary ducats to fund the Cayman and the upcoming Panamera and remained independent enough to buy one fifth of VAG. Still, a rose by any other name would still kick ass both on and off-road, and bring credit to the engineers who tend the garden in which it grows.

By on April 5, 2006

 When things are going well, when the US economy's humming along and the right models await eager buyers on dealer lots, being the world's largest auto maker in the world's largest automobile market is a license to print money. When the stars are aligned, GM's economies of scale, eight brand range and vast dealer network make it an almost obscenely profitable enterprise. Lest we forget, The General earned tens of billions of dollars in the SUV-mad 80's and 90's. If you're wondering why GM's fortunes have reversed so quickly, dramatically and irrevocably, there's your answer: they're victims of their own success.

GM execs have two ways to stand out: make more sales (by striking out in new directions) or make more money (by doing more of the same). Since it's hard for GM NOT to make money in good times, GM managers invariably opt for the safer option. Sure, every now and then, someone sets a lofty new goal: selling Cadillacs in Europe, building fuel cell cars, reinvigorating a struggling brand, etc. And then the next group of suits comes along and ignores them. After all, THEY didn't come up with the idea. And big ideas take time. How could a highly-paid exec use a long-term project to score career-boosting credit? No wonder every new generation of vehicles has a new set of names; no one wants to share credit with an old project.

Bottom line: GM execs know that hitching their star to a long-term project like hybrid engines is a quick ticket to a dark basement. No, it's far better to glom onto less adventurous, less expensive ideas that show immediate profit: a rebadged minivan for Buick, a rebadged roadster for Saturn, employee discounts for everyone, a range of newish SUV's, etc. Even if an exec succeeded on a more audacious venture– should he still be alive when it came to fruition– which looks better on their resume: 10,000 conquest sales or an extra three hundred million dollar profit?

GM's inherent timidity has lead to a slow erosion of the company's presence in the marketplace. Even when profits were flowing, The General's general lethargy and allergy to innovation kept its products at least a full model cycle behind Toyota, Chrysler, Hyundai, etc. GM held up its bottom line, but it lost precious market share. Round after round of downsizing has cost the company dearly, perhaps fatally. For every active employee, The General pays pension benefits and health care for 2.5 retirees. That's a Hell of a lot of deadweight. And it's about to get worse; GM recently announced its intention to buy out tens of thousands of active UAW members.

Besieged union members like to point out that GM made this bed. They're right. Back when GM had a mountain of money, The General's generals traded a significant proportion of their immense wealth for labor peace– and then backed themselves into a corner. The General's switch to just-in-time inventory and production elevated labor peace from reassuring to essential. Slim inventories are a great thing for a cost-conscious company (and a stick that GM's competition used to beat them with), but the process handed enormous power to GM's unions. [Note: before giving your partner a loaded gun, make sure you both mean the same thing by the word "partner.']

And now GM is cash-strapped. Oh wait, it isn't. If the sale of their GMAC finance unit goes through, it'll dump $12b into the corporate coffers. And if history serves, GM will use the cash to pay off the unions, keep making the same short-sighted decisions that brought it to the brink, and hope the market turns in their favor. Using the cash to hive-off two or three companies would be better for both the corporation and its assets. Cadillac is eminently saleable. Chevy is a respectable budget car company with a good truck arm. Someone's bound to buy Hummer. A foreign brand might buy Saturn just for the dealer network. Alternatively, GM could spin off SAAB and Hummer, kill Pontiac and Buick, and grow Chevrolet and Cadillac.

In whatever guise, a smaller GM would be a wiser GM. Constricted resources would increase accountability and force the company to sort itself out for both the short and long term. Once again, the problem is… too much money. For one thing, the $12b from the GMAC sale will make it virtually impossible to wrest concessions from the UAW. For another, the current downturn may shake-up GM's Board of Bystanders, but the stock price is still too high for a hostile takeover. Sooner or later, bankruptcy looms. Can the world's largest automaker survive bankruptcy intact? Will the pieces still be viable after Chapter 11? Watch this space…

By on April 3, 2006

 Chasing Robert Berry's Enzo up Equinox Mountain in a Lamborghini Murcielago, I remember thinking there's no way I'm going to keep up with this guy. As the Ferrari's exhaust note ripped through the Murcie's windscreen like a shotgun blast through fiberboard, I set my priorities: no dying, no crashing, no humiliation. The big bull proved equal to the task. Every time I over-cooked it, the Murcie's front tires juddered and… we're back! Every time Berry slowed for a turn, the V12 supercar closed the gap. The experience gave me a profound respect for Lamborghini. And then I drove a Gallardo.

As reported here, the Gallardo is as cohesive as a first grader's art collage. While the four-wheel drive supercar cuts corners like a bankrupt builder, the Gallardo's over-wrought sheetmetal, humdrum cabin, relatively feeble brakes, lack of low-end grunt, questionable high-speed stability and point and clunk paddle shift gearbox wouldn't pass muster in an entry level Porsche or, for that matter, a garden variety Audi. Well exactly. Audi has owned Lamborghini since 1988. The Gallardo (né '03) should have married German precision and Italian passion. Instead, it joined German flair with Italian fastidiousness.

Given the parade of eccentrics who've owned Lamborghini since the Arab oil embargo first forced the former tractor maker into receivership– Georges-Henri Rossetti and René Leimer (Swiss investors), the Mimran brothers (Senegalese-born French food tycoons), The Chrysler Corporation (recovered US bankrupt), 'Tommy' Suharto (son of the former president of Indonesia, now serving 15 years for murder) — Audi deserves credit for saving Lamborghini from oblivion. But at what cost? Lamborghini's build quality may now, finally, match that of an average Ford, but the company's entry level model fails to embody the marque's well-established brand values. It's a sure sign that the venerable nameplate is, once again, heading for disaster.

Let's be clear about this. Automotive identities are not half as mystical as the fees brand consultants charge to divine them. In fact, if you can't sum-up a car company's core values in four words, the chances are it doesn't have any. By the same token, any marque that sells models that don't embody those values is in deep shit– whether they know it or not. Jaguar: sexy looks, smooth ride. BMW: impeccable ergonomics, superb handling. Toyota: faultless build, cheap price. Cadillac: ummmm. Mercury: errrr. Lamborghini: sexy body, monstrous power. Almost every Lambo ever produced conforms to this recipe (even the mid-engined Miura). The Gallardo does not.

Lamborghini's failure to stick to the knitting highlights an insidious force that destroys valued brands: cash. With a few exceptions (e.g. Saturn), automotive manufacturers start as bootstrap operations. The lack of resources forces them to be focused, creative, dynamic and driven. As venture capitalists and dot bombers have discovered, the more money you plough into a small company, the less efficient it becomes. When Lambo's budgets were tight, managers had to sweat every investment, every sale, everything, all the time. When investors like Audi backed the Brinks truck up to the company gate, suddenly, anything was possible. Paint bubbling? Panel gaps visible from outer space? Sorted. Hey, I know! How about we get a Belgian to design a small Lamborghini and give it a torque-deficient V10 engine? Increasing possibilities increases the possibility of mistakes– and doubles the difficulty of rectification.

Just because you CAN do something doesn't mean you SHOULD. Unless management protects a car company's core values, focus is lost. From there, short term gain's siren song seduces the company into building brand-betraying products. There are plenty of examples: Lincoln Zephyr, Buick Terraza, Saab 9-7x, Jaguar X-Type and more. Cash-rich companies fool themselves into thinking they have to do everything– reliability, safety, performance, style, comfort, packaging, fuel efficiency, etc.– and do everything well. Their survival actually depends on creating cars that do one or (at the most) two things better than anyone else.

It's all part of the automotive equivalent of the Big Bang. In the early 1900's, hundreds of tightly-focused car companies exploded onto the scene. The consolidations that gave birth to GM and the rest of today's limited universe of multi-branded automotive conglomerates continued until the century's close. Now, the entire system is collapsing in on itself, leaving a handful of major players. Eventually it will implode, leading to another explosion of small manufacturers (aided by globalization and new technology).

In that sense, the brand-busting Gallardo is a sign of the times. Whether or not Lamborghini ultimately withstands Audi's stewardship is an open question. But energy is never lost. As long as there are wealthy drivers who crave the howl of a big-bore V12 encased inside an in-yer-face Italianate wrapper, Lamborghini has a future. As for all the other emotive car brands currently sheltering under the wing of a multinational conglomerate, well, the road to Hell really is paved with good intentions.

By on April 1, 2006

 E85 proponents tout "flex fuel" as a Bridge Over Troubled Waters. They believe that vehicles running on E85's mix of ethanol and gasoline will take us to America's "hydrogen future", where zero emission vehicles power up with super cooled fuel supplied by alt-powered micro-refineries. Meanwhile, less utopian thinkers see E85 as a hammer-simple solution to the fuel cell's (and hybrid's) Rube Goldbergian complexities. With a few minor changes to our modern gasoline engines– a corrosion-proof fuel system, new software and rejigged ignition– a nation of bio-powered vehicles could thumb its nose at OPEC crude dealers. If only.

Supporters point to Brazil. In less than two decades, the Brazilians have just about achieved energy independence. Now that they grow millions of acres of sugar cane for fuel production, and have converted the vast majority of their vehicles to ethanol-friendly propulsion, nothing can cut off Brazil's energy supply or screw up their economy– save a strike by the sugar cane farmers. Or a climactic catastrophe. Or a huge rise in labor costs. Or land values. Meanwhile, Brazilian retailers sell E85 for a buck-a-gallon less than gas. America seems ready, willing and able to follow suit: to make the jump from fossil to bio-fossil fuel. So what's the hold-up?

It's not the vehicles. Every day, tens of thousands of E85-compatible car, trucks, SUV's and minivans enter active service, from America's best-seller (Ford F150) to the Chrysler Sebring. Thanks to federal legislation, every Flex Fuel Vehicle (FFV) sold helps bump-up its manufacturer's CAFÉ numbers to SUV-protecting averages. No, the real problem is supply. In rough numbers, only 600 out of 200k US gas stations stock E85. A quick search on http://afdcmap.nrel.gov/locator/LocatePane.asp reveals that there isn't a single E85 pump within 50 miles of my Indiana-based computer. Even our local Farm Co-op– which happily sells bio-diesel– is an ethanol-free zone.

This despite the fact that there's an ethanol plant forty miles away. The plant's proximity is a critical and, alas, limiting factor. Ethanol's corrosive nature and purity requirements preclude it from being pumped through the nation's underground pipelines. Virtually all ethanol must be shipped by barge, train or tanker truck– adding considerable expense to the final price. It would take many years and billions of dollars to build an ethanol-tolerant US pipeline network; regional production is the only way around current distribution issues. Hence the fact that corn-growing Minnesota has the most E85 pumps: around 200. Which is still less than 5% of The Gopher State's gas stations.

Even if they can find a supply of E85, motorists have to think twice about filling-up their FFV with the bio-fuel blend. Although ethanol has higher octane than gasoline (about 105), burns more cleanly and combusts more smoothly (increasing engine life), it contains roughly 25% less energy density. A vehicle that gets 20mpg on gas will only achieve around 15mpg on ethanol. Assuming a twenty gallon tank, an E85 driver will run dry after 300 miles, instead of 400. Americans, who are not keen to sacrifice any aspect of their motoring pleasure for any reason, ever, will not be amused.

It's also important to note that we're dealing with a commodity priced to a TENTH of a cent. The average driver will soon learn to factor in the 25% loss of mileage to the price of a gallon of E85. In other words, economic viability demands that E85 cost at least 25% less than the price of an equivalent gallon of gas. Even with tax subsidies, E85 struggles to compete against the availability, efficiency and price of good old gas.

When it comes to making E85 from corn (America's donor crop of choice), the energy in – energy out equation for grain ethanol keeps the purchase price relatively high. Industry boosters say there is an answer: enzymatic cellulosic fermentation. They claim that applying this process to cornstalks, bean pods, switch grass and wood fiber will dramatically increase ethanol production efficiency. Perhaps. The Canadian company pioneering the new technology still refers to its efforts as "feasibility studies". Iogen's largest pilot plant is processing about 30 tons of biomass per day. The company estimates each plant would require up to 1500 tons of biomass per day to make 45 million gallons of ethanol per year. That's a lot of switch grass, hay, woodchips and old houses. To create enough gas to make a dent in America's foreign policy, the country would have to be riddled with new plants.

I want to drive E85. But America is not Brazil. We don't have the cheap land or labor we need to produce and distribute ethanol on the kind of scale that would significantly curtail our dependence on foreign-born gas. Given current E85 production efficiencies and transportation limitations, there's only way to clear these hurdles and put our "oil addiction" into rehab: technological innovation combined with legislative intervention. To do that, we need the most potent commodity of all: political will.

By on March 31, 2006

 At 9:30am this morning, a group of lawyers representing bankrupt auto parts supplier Delphi will appear in front of Federal Bankruptcy Judge Robert Drain. The lawyers will file legal motions for Sections 1113 and 1114. It's a legal request to void Delphi's current collective bargaining agreements with the United Auto Workers (UAW). The moment the judge says the word "granted," he will terminate the wage structure, post-retirement health care and life insurance plans for the company's 33k US hourly workers. The UAW will respond with a strike against Delphi. Starved of its former subsidiary's parts, GM's assembly lines will fall silent. The General will begin its final slide into Chapter 11.

There will be a gap between Delphi's filing, the judge's final ruling (May 9th) and industrial action. During this highly fraught interregnum, Delphi President Steve 'Quotation Marks' Miller may make a fourth wage and benefits offer to the UAW. The proposal would fall somewhere between the workers' current compensation ($27 per hour) and Miller's last last stand ($16.50 per hour). As we've said before, the UAW will accept nothing less than the status quo, and that's somewhere where Miller won't go– at least not without GM footing the bill. Common sense says if GM CEO Rick Wagoner was going to ride to Delphi's rescue, he would have done so already. Chances are he can't.

Analysts estimate that the General's got about $20b lying around. Take away the $10b GM needs to run its business, add in its line of credit, discount its line of credit (the company just got locked-out of $5.6b worth of previously available funds), add in recent and upcoming sales of overseas assets (including Isuzu), discount the cost of recently announced worker buyouts and plant closures, add back the cost of worker buyouts (it's unlikely that many workers outside the infamous jobs bank will take-up GM's offer), discount ongoing losses from its automotive operations, ponder the possibility of more "accounting adjustments," throw your hands in the air regarding the possibility of GM selling majority interest in its GMAC finance unit (The General's only remaining lifeline), and you'd be forgiven for wanting to check Rabid Rick's wallet.

GM's inability/reluctance to pay off Delphi's UAW work force may be the clearest indication of The General's true financial situation. In fact, despite a stock price still hovering around $20 a share, the world's largest automaker could very well be worthless. I write that with some trepidation. I'm aware that any large institution in extreme financial crisis is susceptible to the fatal effects of negative perception. So much so, it's entirely possible that GM's fate will be sealed somewhere well away from federal bankruptcy court, by someone who simply loses faith in The General's future. For example…

Although The General has pledged to reduce sales to rental car fleets, the automaker still sells as much as 15% of its US production to these volume/discount buyers (roughly 600k vehicles). All of the purchases are financed by large banks, who lend money to the fleets based on the strength of GM's buyback guarantee. All of these banks have industry analysts who now admit (if not actually forecast) the possibility of a GM bankruptcy. Should the banks suddenly decide that GM's buyback guarantees are meaningless, financing for GM products would dry up quicker than the Mojave Desert after a light drizzle. Without rental sales, well, as TTAC's Deep Throat eloquently puts it, GM would soon be Tango Uniform.

Alternatively, GM's suppliers could be its ultimate downfall– a poignant reversal given how harshly The General has treated its parts-providing "partners." While GM's biggest suppliers aren't anywhere near as short-sighted as the UAW (i.e. they know better than to kill the golden goose, no matter how pitted and pathetic it may seem), a smaller, mission critical, non-GM dependent supplier could look at the lay of the land, get up its gumption, and refuse to give GM credit on terms. GM would have to put cash up front for its parts. Once news of the deal got out, all of GM's suppliers would seek similar protection. GM couldn't survive this "run on the bank" scenario.

And so it goes. As anyone who's been following this story knows, we're at the point where if it's not one damn thing, it's another. Critics who call for Wagoner's head are missing the point. GM has expended all its capital: political, creative, financial, moral and, now, psychological. When I started this GM Death Watch, TTAC was one of the few places where the words "GM" and "bankruptcy" appeared in the same sentence. Those days are gone, and it's not our fault. Time and time again, GM had their chance to do the right thing. To stand up, admit their failures and change their business. Now, it's too late.

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