Category: Editorials

By on March 30, 2006

The non-Trail Rated, four-wheel drive Jeep Compass; in repose. Grizzly Pete owned a Jeep. My college roommate's idea of a relaxing weekend: drive into Death Valley with a handgun and a knife and forage for food and water. Pete didn't need GPS; he could navigate via stars reflected off tortoise shells. Heated seats? He'd rub two Gila monsters together until they burst and spread their warm innards on his chair. Parking radar? Pete was the master of the dry lake reverse bootlegger's turn. And if Pete gouged his truck on the razor sharp spines of a Joshua tree, so much the better. A Jeep looked more like Jeep with trail damage. Amen.

Flash forward (mumble) years. I've spent a week putting (15 MPG) and blasting (8 MPG) around Los Angeles in a Jeep Grand Cherokee Limited. Yeah, it's got a HEMI, complete with cylinder deactivation/vasectomy. It was also equipped with a six-disk in-dash changer, Sirius satellite radio, a rear seat DVD player, adjustable pedals, heated leather seats, dual-climate zones, auto brights, a GPS navigation thingy, ParkSense (backup beeping), traction control, a manu-matic gear grabber and blingy chrome rims. I'd no sooner take this luxochariot off-road than I'd take Pete's battered Jeep down Rodeo Drive.

If I paid $43,830 for it, that is. Since I didn't, I drove it off a cliff. Then, with the help of Jeep's astounding Quadra-Drive II 4WD system and bona fide low-gears, I climbed back up. After that, I found a mud bog and did enough donuts to tank Krispy Kreme's stock. Off-road adventure accomplished, I slid the Cherokee into neutral, flipped the switch for the transfer case and calmly drove off to grab a beer. No question: the gussied-up Grand Cherokee is still a real Jeep.

Why wouldn't it be? Like virtually all Jeep products, it wore the coveted 'Trail Rated' badge. To earn this distinction, Jeep vehicles must satisfy the brand's criteria for a 'proper' off-roader. Here's the boilerplate: 'The Jeep Trail Rated® badge certifies that the vehicle has been designed to perform in a variety of challenging off-road conditions identified by five key consumer-oriented performance categories: Traction, Ground Clearance, Maneuverability, Articulation and Water Fording." Grand Cherokee? Yup, yes, absolutely, uh-huh and you betcha. And now… the new Jeep Compass.

Aside from the fact that Jeep's soon-to-be-released trucklette is uglier than a casino lobby at 7am, the Compass will be a terrific Jeep– for antiquing and wine-tasting. That's right; you guessed it: the Compass won't be Trail Rated. It will never cross the Rubicon, no matter how big the tires. Although the Compass isn't the first Jeep bereft of the badge– 2WD versions of the Liberty and Grand Cherokee share that dubious distinction– it will be Jeep's first non-Trail Rated AWD vehicle. And proof positive that the brand is ditching its off-road roots in pursuit of soccer moms and style conscious left brainers.

These are the same oxymorons who calmly insist that a passenger vehicle that can mount a 50 degree incline is as useful as a dyslexic accountant. While it's true that current Jeep buyers don't climb every mountain or see a stream and automatically think there's a ford in their future, they find their Jeep's untapped capability endlessly reassuring and secretly thrilling– like a condom in their wallet or America's nuclear arsenal. The Compass reveals a radical change in Jeep's marketing strategy, an attempt to court "non-traditional buyers." Or, if you prefer, they're chasing people willing to trade the actual, honest-to-God possibility of off-roading for the mere foggy idea of it.

Wrong answer. Does Daimler Chrysler really believe that buyers will stroll into their local Jeep dealer, have a look at the Grand Cherokee and ask if they have anything with a little less machismo? Maybe DCX is hoping potential customers will see the Jeep logo and brand design cues, assume off-roading ability, clock the lower price, sign-up and, please God, avoid the rough stuff. If so, it's a cynical marketing ploy that will bite the brand on its ass. A brand's identity flows from its products, not to them. A Jeep that can't survive Death Valley sells off the backs of the ones that can. And dishonors them all.

The Compass shows that Jeep has lost its bearings. Even if it sells well, it's an SUV that seems specifically designed to alienate the Grizzly Petes of this world, who gave the brand its cachet in the first place. In fact, I doubt the Compass will be a sales success. Aforementioned donuts to dollars, the faux Jeep will mimic the appeal of Land Rover's Freelander: unloved, unwanted and, most importantly, unsellable. But the Compass' effect on the Jeep brand will be incalculable. Like Buick, Lincoln, Mercury, Pontiac, Saturn and Saab, it will condemn the company to becoming yet another American automotive nameplate with no clear mission or purpose, slowly heading off-road for all eternity.

By on March 27, 2006

 German filmmaking giant Werner Herzog speaks often about our culture suffering from a 'lack of adequate imagery.' This means that you walk into the dentist's office and there's that same damn picture of the Grand Canyon or a Moulin Rouge poster. Since Herzog now lives where I do, I'll take his theory a step further and proclaim that we are really suffering from a lack of adequate sound imagery. If I ever hear the Beatles again, I'll slit my throat. Gwen Stefani? Your throat. Thankfully, Steve Jobs solved this problem by developing the iPod.

Mind you, I can't stand Apple. Their computers are too expensive, nothing runs on them and it took the company twenty-five years to figure out what a right-click button is. However, the iPod is the greatest invention of the last decade. Sure, there are other MP3 players out there (quick, name two) but there is also Betamax, Laserdisc and for Americans, Diesel. Plus, all my friends have iPods so not only can we swap music, but at the weekly poker game we can fight over what gets played in the iBoom-box. Mine holds 60 gigabytes of music (which I think is 92 trillion songs) so now I have an entire lifetime's worth of music that I enjoy in my pocket. Stuck in line at the post office? Great. Even long plane trips are ten times more enjoyable than they once were. And seeing as how the average American spends five years of their life cocooned inside an automobile, all the better.

Except that carmakers are stupid. Apple's iPod has been around for five-years. I own a brand new car and I can't plug my iPod into it. Stupid. And not just my car, but nearly all cars lack the ability to let me listen to what I want to listen to. Big stupid. Especially when you consider that big Autobahn-stormers and wanna-be Autobahn-stormers routinely offer $5,000 stereo options. Some might argue that these cars have multi-disc in-dash changers. So? I don't want 1/10th of one percent of my music collection; this isn't 1995. And I especially don't want to change CDs while going 80 mph around a bend. But satellite radio offers dozens of commercial free music stations to keep your ears happy. Hogwash. You know the cliché about 500 channels of cable yet there isn't ever a damn thing on TV? Ditto. Worse. Besides, everything I could ever possibly want to hear is in my pocket, you bastards!

This means that I have to spend an additional $90 on a radio transmitter for my iPod. On paper it makes sense. Plug the thingy into the cigarette lighter, tune to a predefined station and voila, your music is served. But not so fast. It sounds shitty, as you are still listening to FM radio and not digital music. More infuriating is when you are listening to that really sublime part of your favorite song and you happen to pass under power lines. If you are lucky you get static; if you are me you get dreaded Mexican polka. Moreover, even if you are out in the desert where there are no power lines or errant stations to gunk up your transmitter, you still have a three-foot cable hanging out of your dash, usually resting right where you row the gears. And it still sounds lousy.

There are a few cars out there, namely those aimed at the XBOX generation, that have input jacks and AUX buttons for your iPod. But would you be caught dead in a Scion Xb? Didn't think so. A few cars adults might enjoy driving have iPod inputs, but like Saab's 9-3 that has the jack inside the center armrest, clearly they are afterthoughts. And as the Xb's website states, 'You must use your MP3 player's interface to navigate and play your collection.' Which, in the age of Bluetooth and voice recognition is not only stupid, it's dangerous. Moreover, with 92 trillion songs at the ready, in shuffle mode I am constantly curious as to what I'm listening to.

There is a solution. Remember 8-Tracks? You know: the big boxy tapes that you stuffed into a hole in the dash. The original plug'n play. Carmakers — do that with iPods! Let me insert my iPod into a dedicated slot. Then, let me use your controls to pick what I want to hear and let me see which song is playing. When I exit the vehicle, I'll yank it out and go. VW recently demontrated a similar system– with software that talks to your chest freezer. It will will either never see the light of day or arrive on dealer lots five minutes before the next killer app renders the iPod obsolete. Music lovers need a simple and reliable iPod interface. And we need it now.

By on March 16, 2006

 As predicted, the American Family Association (AFA) has renewed its boycott of the Ford Motor Company. The move comes after The Blue Oval reneged on a private pledge to the AFA to stop advertising in gay and lesbian media, and end direct financial support to gay and lesbian events and organizations. When the story broke back in December, Ford denied the AFA deal. They claimed the decision to pull Jag and Land Rover ads from gay-oriented publications was "strictly business." When that didn't fly with the gay, bisexual, lesbian and transgender (GBLT) community, Ford reversed itself and kept the cash flowing. Thus the AFA's retaliation for their alleged betrayal. Now what?

This time 'round, Ford has taken a sensible line on the AFA's boycott: ignore it and hope it goes away. Yesterday, Blue Oval Spinmeister Kathleen Vokes issued a written statement more generic than store brand soap. 'Ford is proud of its tradition of treating all with respect, and we remain focused on what we do best — building and selling the most innovative cars and trucks.' Ignoring Henry Ford's vicious anti-Semitism and the brand's spurious claim to technological supremacy, the official pronouncement left little doubt about Ford's current perspective on the AFA's goals. Not to put too fine a point on it, Vokes' words were multi-national corporate PR speak for "fuck off and die."

That's not likely. Like many such crusades, the AFA's Ford boycott is largely the result of one man's zeal. In this case, it's Donald E. Wildmon, a United Methodist minister operating out of Tupelo, Mississippi. In 1977, Wildmon formed the AFA's predecessor, the National Federation for Decency. His subsequent boycott and protest march against Sears Roebuck and Co. convinced the doomed retailer to pull its ads from 'Three's Company' and 'Charlie's Angels.' The action might seem quaint by today's moral standards, but Ford underestimates Wildmon's resolve at their peril. Wildmon is a veteran campaigner whose scored many high profile victories in the last twenty-nine years– including Procter & Gamble's decision to remove its sponsorship from 50 TV shows in 1981 and chain stores' banishment of Playboy and Penthouse magazines in 1986.

Again, Wildmon is something of a one man army; it's highly unlikely that the AFA has anywhere near the 2.2 million supporters it claims. But the main point remains: the Mississippi minister is a tough, shrewd, organized and persistent opponent– who knows the fine art of media spin. While the GBLT community likes to present the AFA as a group of right wing fundamentalist extremists who revile and reject alternative lifestyles, Wildmon and his followers are not so easily cornered. According to the AFA's official statement, "Ford could have easily avoided this boycott had they desired to do so by simply remaining neutral in the cultural battles."

Wildmon has a point. While the AFA is rightly reviled for demanding an end to Ford's advertising in homosexual-oriented publications, FoMoCo's financial aid to GBLT pressure groups plants the corporate flag on one side of a highly contentious issue. Ford has made large cash contributions to the Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation, the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force and the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Campaign. More specifically, the Ford Motor Company Fund donated $250k to the Affirmations Lesbian and Gay Community Center in Ferndale, Michigan. More explosively, Ford sponsors a great many GBLT events (e.g. the London Pride parade) that generate images bound to offend mainstream sensibilities.

Does the average American Ford buyer care that his or her car payments support these GBLT organizations? I have a sneaking suspicion we're going to find out. Wildmon is an Internet savvy activist with a strong core constituency. He's ready, willing and able to spread his message of protest to the general public. In stark contrast, the GBLT community cut Ford a great deal of slack when it was revealed that the Blue Oval Boys had been playing footsie with the AFA. They pointed to the company's policies towards their GBLT workforce, took a meeting with Bill and let the incident slide. If it comes down to it, I reckon the AFA's steadfast determination will surprise its opponents and hurt Ford's reputation, but good.

It promises to be a nasty scrap, but that doesn't alter the fact that this is a debate worth having. While all fair-minded people support the GBLT community's right to fair treatment under the law and Ford's right to advertise its products where it pleases, the AFA raise a pertinent question: why is Ford donating money to gay and lesbian activist groups? Surely the company should take a politically neutral line in ALL its charitable contributions, restricting their largesse to apolitical organizations like children's hospitals. Either Ford has a deep moral committment to homosexual rights, or, more cynically, they thought that spreading corporate cash throughout the GBLT activist community made good business sense. If that's the case, Wildmon may be about to prove them wrong.

By on March 15, 2006

 I've been formally instructed never to put numbers into a lead paragraph. So let's just say I've been lucky enough to own roughly as many cars as there are basic cable channels. While I've enjoyed every single one of my motors for at least a month, I can state without a moment's hesitation that I didn't enjoy buying any of them. I find the car buying process only slightly more enjoyable than colonoscopy, yet remarkably similar. (No anesthetic, though.) In fact, I'm hoping this car reviewing thing will wean me off my ownership addiction. 'Cause if you haven't figured it out by now, let me tell it to you straight: buying cars is a beeyatch. And I swear it's getting worse.

For starters, there's been a wholesale change in the decision timeline. What once was a late summer/early fall dramatic new-model reveal has become one dazzling, continuous roll-out of new steel. Los Angeles, Detroit, Chicago, Frankfurt, Geneva, New York, Tokyo… it's one damn car show after another, all instantly available on-line. Once upon a time, Harley Earl fans had nearly a year to settle in with their purchase decision. Nowadays enthusiasts experience buyer's remorse before they buy. You just know that whatever you settle on today will be superseded by something better within days. And if you actually buy a car it's gonna be… If only I'd waited just a little longer… I wonder what it would cost to trade…

Remember when "Sneak Previews" were held a month or two before new models came out? Now we're treated to manufacturers' photos of highly desirable new product two or more YEARS from production. The PR pimps describe these dramatic new cars as "in near production-ready form"; dangling scorching hot metal in front of us like a cocaine dealer at a supermodel retreat. Of course, the car mags and websites are all too happy to collude in this eternal foreplay, splashing spy shots and photo-shopped images on their pages without the slightest concern for their readers' mental or financial health.

And when we turn to these selfsame media teases to help us decide which beckoning siren of desire deserves our patronage, the mainstream auto press' loyalties force them to hide their criticisms between the lines. Magazines like Car and Driver and Road and Track used to tell it like it is. Now, teasing out the "real" value of a Cadillac STS-V or an Audi S8 from a buff book car review makes phrenology seem like a scientific pursuit. And then they go and change their minds. The same whip that got great reviews, the machine hailed as "The Best Car of Its Type Ever Made by Hand of Man", gets smoked six month's later in a shootout by some supposed also-ran. Paranoia creeps into the madness.

While all of this [mis]information clamors for proper processing, the car ads add to the emotional turmoil. These days, it's the art of the deal that sells the wheels. Wow! Look at that leasing rate! Hey Honey, we spend more on Chardonnay. We can swing this. Let's go have a look. Hang on, what's that asterisk? There's *rate available only for select customers, **not vehicle shown, which includes extra cost items and ***capitalization cost reduction contribution required (i.e. several grand down stroke). I always get a bit annoyed when the advertised lease payment inflates by double digit percentages at transaction time (in the same sense that Geronimo was irritated by the US Army). Needless to say, the best brands are the worst offenders, attempting to make their product seem more affordable than a mass-market beater.

And then there's political correctness. Years ago, you bought the best car you could afford and waited to see if your neighbor turned green. Now the bastard IS green, and eyes your eight mpg Ford GT or gas-sucking SUV like it's got baby's blood dripping from the front grill. Add safety concerns, insurance costs, resale value, reliability and dealer satisfaction, and your brain feels like it's doing major laps on the torture circuit of a desert proving grounds. But being enthusiasts, we can't just idle. It'a time for a new ride.

To cope with the stress, I've developed a new way to shop for a car. Set a price limit and find photographs of all the cars you like in that range. Cut and paste them on a Styrofoam board. Step off twenty paces, turn, close your eyes and let fly with three darts. Collect the photos pierced by each dart, shuffle them behind your back and visit each dealership in order. (Medicate as needed.) If the first dealer tries anything unseemly, bolt. On to dealer number two. Then three. The cleanest, game-free deal wins. Until next time…

By on March 11, 2006

 Ward's Automotive recently profiled Pete Gerosa, GM's former Vice President for Field Sales, Service and Parts. Although Gerosa's heading for retirement, he's still on the road, selling the company line to GM's dealer network. Reporter Steve Finlay painted the 42-year industry veteran as a living link between GM's past and professed future: selling the vehicle, not the deal. While Finlay pressed Gerosa on GM's so-called value pricing, the scribe failed to confront the exec about GM's recent sales incentives or The General's March Madness campaign. In any case, Finlay's feature contained a telling tale.

At a dealer conference, David Latshaw, finance director at Shaver Pontiac in Thousand Oaks, CA, asked Gerosa why GM can't build enough Solstii to meet demand. "Our dealership had 600 initial orders and only got thirteen cars,' Latshaw said. "What is the right number?' Gerosa answered. 'Too many, and you discount. Too few, and there are waits. But thirteen is too low." Ya think? Latshaw: 'We put a sold Solstice in the showroom just to display it, and people were saying, 'I want to buy that car!' They got mad when we told them they couldn't. They were freaking out. We had to hide the car in back." Before we file that one under defeat, from the jaws of victory snatched, note Gerosa's inability to accept responsibility for the company's screw-up or promise any kind of resolution to an ongoing problem.

Mr. Gerosa may be a tenacious and dedicated foot soldier. His efforts may have earned The General tens of millions of dollars. But his career arc and atttitude reflect and reveal a company without the slightest hint of personal accountability. Where middle management fails upwards or, at worst, sideways. Where assembly workers' jobs are secure whether or not there's a market for the products they produce. Where a CEO and his team can oversee the inexorable dimunition of their company's market share, losing $8b in a single financial year, and continue to get paid millions of dollars to hold the tiller. Where GM's Vice President of Global Product Development can threaten American jobs without repercussions.

Check it: At the Geneva Auto Show, Maximum Bob Lutz addressed the pressing issue of US labor costs and dropped this pearl upon the press: 'Hourly workers in the U.S. no longer are faced with a choice between high-paying jobs and low-paying jobs. They must choose between jobs or no jobs at all… In a few years time, it's clear that the Chinese automobile industry will be capable of exporting products. There's no doubt that someday we will be (using) GM China as a source of products. I'm very optimistic." Even if it's true, it's not exactly what you'd call helpful– given GM's do-or-die labor negotiations at bankrupt parts supplier Delphi.

But who's going to stop the septuagenarian Car Czar from shooting his mouth off? Rick Wagoner? Like Gerosa, GM's CEO is a lifer. Rabid Rick's learned that there's no comment or action or inaction that doesn't disappear off the face of the earth if you just give it enough time. Drop $4b on FIAT? Pontiac G6 a sales dud? Hybrids and muscle cars ten years too late? GMAC sale a bit… delayed? SEC probe unearthing some nasty accounting problems? Forgeddaboutit. Literally. It's a logical corollary of unaccountability: all failure is temporary, survivable and, ultimately, irrelevant.

GM watchers who are shocked by the lack of urgency over at RenCen don't understand that GM's corporate culture is the ultimate defense against reality. Nothing can go that wrong because even if it does, well, life goes on. Rabid Rick cashes in GM's chips at Suzuki, uses the money to pay off Delphi's workers and everyone goes back to business (or lack thereof). That fire burning-up GM's cash reserves? Oh, we'll put it out eventually. It's the same mentality that the UAW displays in its negotiations: tough it out, give them nothing and everything will be OK. That's the way we've always done things around here, bankruptcy or no bankruptcy. Even if the union leadership knows better, they know their members don't.

It's Pan Am redux. The international airline once enjoyed a clear playing field: no significant competition and enough money to give the unions whatever they wanted. When deregulation arrived, the company considered itself too big to die– even as it lost market share, sold off assets, wiped billions off shareholder equity, suffered union strife and floundered in an endless sea of red ink. An article by Jon Marcus and Gretchen Voss quotes a financial advisor to the company: 'Half of Pan Am's problems were caused by circumstances. The other half was caused by the culture, which seemed to make perfectly rational men think they were invulnerable once they walked through Pan Am's doors.' Nuff said?

By on March 10, 2006

 Harley-Davidson has been making obsolete, inefficient and technologically deficient motorcycles since the 60's. Despite an unrelenting onslaught of technically superior Japanese product, the Harley-Davidson brand has stayed true to its roots (however inadvertently). They've never stopped building bikes that maintain the charm and character of old-fashioned American motorcycling. Or, put another way, Harley makes its living convincing otherwise responsible adults to pay premium prices for old technology. This transition– from cutting edge to outdated to nostalgic to a way of life– is a perfect model for the American automobile industry.

It's already happening. Consider America's love of big dumb SUV's, or, better yet, its best-selling vehicle, the F-150. Ford's perennial sales leader is a tried-and-true workhorse built around fundamentally simple (if highly evolved) technology. As personal transportation it's incredibly inefficient. Compared to a Japanese or Korean car, it's laughably basic. And yet the F-150– and American pick-up trucks in general– are thriving. They're style icons that remind drivers of a time when American culture was dominant and cast iron V8's ruled the roads. The modern F-150 is as "authentically American" as any '50's hot rod or '60's muscle car.

 American automobiles started going wrong in the '80s and '90s, when Japanese imports changed the rules of the game. Yes, there were still cars wearing the Camaro, Firebird and Mustang nameplates, but even these Stone Age carry-overs were loaded-up with "sophisticated" technology. As for the rest… Modern braking and steering systems, turbocharged engines, front-wheel-drive, aerodynamic design, adaptive suspensions– there's a long list of technology that gradually turned proud American iron into something, well, pathetic. These "improvements" robbed American cars of their character without adding anything to their intrinsic appeal.

The Japanese are very good at building Japanese cars (which are enhanced clones of European sedans). American automakers should stop trying to compete. In fact, they can't compete. While the Big Three have engineering and design talent to spare, their sky-high labor costs and stifling bureaucracy make it virtually impossible to build a passenger car with anything like the quality and technology of their rivals'– never mind the price. As FedEx proved, the key to success isn't doing something a little better than the other guy; the trick is to do something DIFFERENT. Like building American cars.

 Building big dumb American cars offers US automobile manufacturers a huge economic advantage. American-style muscle cars can be sold for higher margins than price-sensitive mainstream vanilla sedans (whose manufacturers are engaged in a never-ending battle for value-driven customers). The possibilities are endless. GM, Ford and Chrysler could market an entire range of garish, low-tech, high-profit American nostalgiamobiles. No need for state-of-the-art braking systems, no need for fuel-efficiency (captive imports can be used to keep the CAFE under control), no need to keep up with Toyota or Honda or Nissan or Hyundai. Just build something with all-American allure, satisfy NHTSA safety regs and call it good. No, call it great.

This strategy would be in perfect synch with the heartbeat of America: NASCAR. The quintessentially American race series is a showcase for '60's tech. (Yes the race teams are high-tech, but how many modern cars are equipped with carbureted V8's?) In fact, "NASCAR Nation" is nothing more than a public manifestation of American car culture– which never died nor wavered from its belief that there's no replacement for displacement. Before the Daytona 500, Speed Channel interviewed several NASCAR drivers. To a man they said that their first, favorite and current vehicles were pickup trucks. Just like the majority of Americans.

 Building and selling charismatic American vehicles with V8 engines and solid rear axles could result in a rebirth of the "win on Sunday, sell on Monday" philosophy. Cruise nights at local drive-ins would no longer be dominated by cars built during the Johnson and Nixon administrations. In fact, you'd see a new flowering of American car culture. And since the automakers wouldn't be spending money on developing, refining and implementing the latest vehicle technology, they could focus their R&D dollars on accessories. As Harley Davidson will tell you, non-mechanical parts are a licence to print money.

Of course it'll never happen. Detroit still thinks this is 1966, not 2006. Too many people in top management believe their automotive divisions will never become Harley-like 'niche players'– even though it's already happening. They think they're only a spiffy new high-tech car (or fifty) from market dominance and massive profitability. They think they can somehow compete against the new guys' non-unionized labor and technological ingenuity– even if they have to build their cars in China and Korea to do it. We can only hope that the Big Three's bankruptcy and resulting reorganization happen as quickly and painlessly as possible. That way, America's automakers can retrench, regroup and start building genuine American cars again. Cars with style, power and profit.

By on March 9, 2006

 Picture the scene. We're sitting at the kitchen table in the PAG household (that's Ford's Premier Auto Group). Disgruntled father Ford, stressed with bill payments, pounds the table with clenched fist, stares young, seditious daughter Jaguar square in the face and demands, "Why can't you be more like your sisters?" He points to her snide, adopted siblings; vixen Aston Martin, rugged Land Rover, and pudgy little sister Volvo, who with a mouthful of meatballs chimes in, "Ja, vhy kan't you? Dumhuvud."

No wonder Jaguar CEO Joe Greenwell is feeling unloved: Volvo and Land Rover are both doing solid business. There's a December waiting list for Aston's V8 Vantage. To avoid articles like this one, Ford doesn't break out profits according to individual brands. But according to British regulatory filings, Jaguar lost $1.1b in '03. The British marque's losses for '04 and '05 easily match– if not exceed– that figure, capping a sixteen-year flow of red ink. Jaguar's highly-touted plans to sell 200k cars a year? Gone. Last year, Jaguar built 120k cars. US dealers were flooded with 21k off-lease cars; these three-year-old Jags retained just 40% of their value.

 It's not all bad news. J.D. Power & Associates recently rated Jaguar number one for customer satisfaction for the second year running. But those poor residuals, along with expensive sales incentives and shameful parts 'n trim cost-cutting (not seen since the 1970s), threaten Jaguar's viability in the US market. What's worse, Jag's entire lineup lacks sparkle. The flagship XJ sedan is a hollow cast of its aristocratic predecessor. The X-Type is an exercise in badge engineering that fooled few and backwarded many. The S-Type only briefly caught the public's imagination. And while the XK aged gracefully, its replacement is long, long overdue.

Last December, Ford took action: the Blue Oval wrote a $2.1b check to Jaguar for "restructuring." Ford executives claim the recapitalization proves the parent company's commitment to Jaguar. Given Ford's woes, the money is probably an ultimatum: perform or else. In 2004, when Jaguar Racing failed to bring home any F1 trophies for the fourth year in a row, Ford sold the franchise to déclassé energy drink maker Red Bull for $110m. Ford's willingness to cut losses shows that if bad came to worse, selling Jaguar to eager Renault is a practicable option.

 To stave off that ignominious eventuality, Jaguar is sending the revamped S-Type down the pike, putting the X-Type out to pasture and leaving the XJ to soldier on. Jaguar's management pins their immediate hopes on sales of the forthcoming all-aluminum XK. Unfortunately, the "new" Cat lacks the very characteristic that Jaguar is selling these days: sex appeal. Sure, it's good-looking– but it's not the kind of drop-dead gorgeous that makes a Porsche 911 or Mercedes SL owner sideways aspirational. Parked next to the Aston Martin V8 Vantage (the car that shares the XK's platform) the Jaguar looks like Cinderella's ugly step-sister.

This does not bode well for a company built on "pace and grace." Mercedes AMG, Audi's S-Line and BMW's M products have obliterated any chance of Ford's Jaguar out-pacing the competition. Sexy is all the Cat's got left. While Jaguar's "Prefer Gorgeous" campaign demonstrates that company management understands Jag's unique position, the most sensual advertising in the world isn't going to help the marque if the products on the showroom floor are, well, blah. As it stands, that's how it stands.

 Jaguar desperately needs a car like the original XK120 or E-Type: a machine that redefines automotive desirability for generations to come. The retro-styled F-Type concept car– strangled at birth to fund European diesels– could have been such a car. With so many superb platforms in the Ford empire, and nothing much to lose, what's stopping Jaguar from unleashing a show stopper?

The door is still open. Mercedes-Benz's "passionate" four door CLS500 coupe shows that sexy can't be reverse engineered. Acura, Infiniti and Lexus are stuck selling one aesthetic flavor: vanilla. Only Maserati can legitimately claim to sell genuinely sexy machines, yet like Aston Martin, Quattroportes are built on a bespoke basis. So it's not too late for Jaguar to design, build and sell the kind of visual aphrodisiac that will return the British marque to both glory and profitability.

At least Ford executives seem to understand that image is Jaguar's main asset, and the key to its future success. Hopefully, Jaguar has enough time and money to build products faithful to the brand's core values. In the meantime, the Jaguar brand is an old E-Type sitting in Ford's garage. Bill kicks the tires, caresses the lines and spends his fortune on the blessed car because, at the end of the day, owning it makes him look good. Now, if only the damn thing would start…

[Gunnar Heinrich publishes www.automobilesdeluxe.blogspot.com]

By on March 7, 2006

 As GM fast approaches the day when it surrenders its world's largest automaker title to Toyota, it's important to remember that we're still talking about a corporate colossus. If you include fleet sales, The General makes one in every four vehicles sold in the United States. Obviously, GM's problem isn't volume. It's profitability. GM's US operations are still designed to cater to a third of the US car market. That's Hell of a lot of fat to trim– especially with a union that hears "efficiency" and thinks "downsizing". Meanwhile, The General has an even bigger problem: it doesn't have a heart.

An automotive brand's "heart" is the car that the average customer associates with a given brand. It's the vehicle whose character most clearly personifies the brand's values. Toyota has the Camry. Honda has Accord. Nissan has the Altima. Ford had the Taurus (and demolished it to push the Explorer). GM has nothing. More importantly, Chevy has nothing. Remember "the heartbeat of America"? It's on the crash-cart, waiting for a transplant.

 Ironically, Chevrolet sells The General's halo car: the Corvette. The 'Vette is a world-class sports car whose style, power and handling has met with universal approval. It's a sexy, well-engineered vehicle that should instill pride into the heart of every American enthusiast. And yet the 'Vette is not Chevrolet's heart. How could it be? At $50k plus, it's far too expensive for the average car buyer's pocketbook. Even if were affordable, a two-seater does not speak to the average car buyer's real world aspirations. If it does, the Corvette says one thing: toy. Just like the Pontiac Solstice, the 'Vette is little more than showroom eye candy.

Meanwhile, at the other end of the financial spectrum, the $10k Aveo is an equally unlikely candidate for becoming Chevy's "people's champion." Even without considering its flaws, the Korean car's point of origin rules it out. The new Impala is a sensible, well-built car, but it's the automotive equivalent of a straight-to-video movie: a rental car wannabe from the word go. The Malibu is decently equipped, reasonably frisky, sensibly priced and no rental slut (unlike its predecessor). But it's another slab-sided scoop of low-calorie vanilla with a Motel Six interior: one of the few cars that can make an Accord or Camry look sexy. As for Chevy's trucks, that ship has sailed.

 Chevrolet seems to think that selling something that doesn't suck is enough to fill this gap. It's not. Chevy needs one bullet-proof, brand-defining car. The company needs to build one superb machine that buyers can examine inside and out and instantly "get it". An inherently desirable car that tells the world what it means to be a Chevy. The heart car should have a modern engine (a baby Northstar), the best possible cabin materials, plenty of standard equipment (in recognizable trim levels), superb build quality and just enough style that you know who built it.

Profit margins have nothing to do with it. The only way Chevrolet can claw their way back to credibility is to take the financial hit and build something so outstanding in both form and function that it redefines GM's home brand for years to come. Profit can come later– and it will. Good niche vehicles grow off of good roots. (Weak trunks grow into Azteks.) While the heart car's volume grows, it will provide a decent base for more profitable spin-offs. A good heart car could spawn a sport coupe, and some of those vaunted "crossovers", including the original crossover, the minivan.

 In fact, Chevy's flagship model could be a minivan. There are over a million of these family haulers sold in the US every year. (Chrysler, Honda and Toyoda own 75% of the market, with the Japanese skimming the cream, and Chrysler doing the volume.) GM's current minivans are warmed-over nose-jobs grafted onto overly-narrow European platforms– more proof that GM doesn't have a clue. A feelgood proletarian minivan with genuine American style and plenty of class could be a profitable volume seller, and an appropriate model to show the world what a "real" Chevy is all about– well, these days.

Why go on the attack now? Because the best defense is a good offense. When GM abandons a market, the competition consolidates and goes for it. Backing only the profitable lines built GM's bottom line– barely– but it kills brands. Even now, Toyota and Nissan are taking aim at the full-size pickup truck market. They've been at this for years; they haven't got it all together yet. But they're going to keep whacking the door with an axe until it opens. (We've seen this movie before.) In both pickups and mass market motors, GM hasn't pushed back. It can't. Not because it lacks guts or talent or money. It simply doesn't have the heart.

By on March 6, 2006

 Mercedes-Benz makes a lot of cars for customers with serious aspirations. Just out of college, looking for bit of respect? C-Class. Mid-level manager aspiring to the next rung on the corporate ladder? Take an E. Mr. Got it All looking for a set of wheels for the woman who isn't his wife? CLK cabriolet. And a car for the woman who is? The SL. The clear link in all this is badge snobbery. In fact, if class consciousness has a symbol, it's a three-pointed star. So what's one of the brand's current campaigns for their $96k CL500? "Mercedes-Benz: For Everyone." Right.

Post-modern irony aside, it's true. Mercedes-Benz wants to sell a car in every automotive niche. (Not to mention the ones they invent.) Mercedes can get away with it too. If Mercedes produced the equivalent of Europe's proletarian Ford Ka and slapped a MB badge on it, the automotive press would slam it and tens of thousands star struck buyers would go straight out and buy one. Oh wait, they did. Mercifully, US buyers were spared the rolling atrocity known as the A-Class. That said, it may be only a matter of time before the entirely inappropriate B-Class finds its way into trendy loft livers' assigned parking spaces. Badge snobbery über alles.

 Consider the Gelaendewagen, or, since Mercedes-Benz of North America started importing them directly, the G500 and G55 AMG. The G-Wagen has been guzzling its way over the world's peaks and valleys since the 1970s. The $81,000 truck– and it is a truck in spite of the price– has passed the previous record holder to become the longest running Mercedes-Benz chassis. The G-Wagen beat-out the iconic R107 body SL convertible. Could you imagine Mercedes-Benz peddling the R129 SL of the 90's today? I can. The company only retired the convertible a little over three years ago.

Back track for a moment. Mercedes-Benz is a fantastically successful car company. Like Porsche, they've consistently beaten their previous year's U.S. sales records for more than a decade. On the face of it, attributing Mercedes-Benz's profits to a simple combination of name and emblem is disingenuous. There's a great deal of substance behind the company's name and its star.

 Mercedes-Benz rose from the ashes of WWII to build the best cars in the world, for more than five decades. They weren't always pretty– the 1970s were a particularly troubled time in their design department-– but the company achieved a quality standard that no other manufacturer could touch. Cars like the stalwart 300SD stand the test of time. Literally. Today, that bullet-proof German quality is little more than vehicular folklore. Engineered like no other car in the world? That's fine by Lexus, as Toyota's luxury brand builds far better cars than DaimlerChrysler's Benz. MB vs. BMW or Audi? No contest.

It is difficult to identify the exact moment when Mercedes craftsmanship went south. Then again, you could say the moment arrived in 1993, when Daimler-Benz built a plant in Alabama to manufacture the M-Class SUV. Soccer moms took a second mortgage on the house just to roll-up at practice in a new ML320. When the corporate volk back in Stuttgart realized that US buyers were snapping-up the new M-Class despite failed transmissions and electrical problems, the pressure was off. Why use high-cost components or materials that car buyers can't see and don't care about? Brand extension and "de-contenting" kept MB's hugely profitable juggernaut moving forward.

 A decade on and the German marque ranks lowest among the luxury brands in reliability. The latest issue of Consumer Reports highlights this fact. Reliability is listed as "below average," "poor," and "below par," for the C, E, and S-Class, respectively. "Poor reliability" and "Mercedes-Benz" in the same sentence? Where is "vault-like" and "dependable"? It's been more than a decade since any of the automotive press used those terms to describe a Benz and I'm hard pressed to see their return anytime in the near future. The chintzy E350, vault-like? I don't think so. The all new ML500 dependable? I'll believe when I see it. There is nothing about the current Mercedes-Benz lineup – save the SL – that warrants that kind of praise from the media.

Like the rest of western society, Mercedes-Benz is living on credit. It's been paying nothing towards the debt to its own name. There comes a point when the line expires and the loan is called. When that happens, the customers walk away and into the ready arms of the competition that has been making reliable, sound, solid automobiles all the while. It is not just General Motors and Ford that the Japanese are keen on passing. If Mercedes-Benz wants to continue its run, it must stop making cars "for everyone" and manufacture only the best. That is, after all, what everyone wants.

[Gunnar Heinrich runs www.automobilesdeluxe.blogspot.com]

By on March 4, 2006

 I get kinda touchy when people start kicking the boots into Saab, especially when they're basing their opinion on mistaken information. As Saab is a GM brand, and Mr. Farago is the author of an ongoing series called "GM Death Watch", it's understandable that the author was black about the brand's future.  But the "seasoning" enhancing his main points is pure theatre and his conclusions overly pessimistic. Let's examine his argument point by point:

'Saab's Aero-X, a Corvette-based concept car…'

Reports prior to Geneva indicated that the Aero X concept is based on a completely independent platform that won't see production.  But hitching it to another GM car suits Farago's unquenchable thirst for GM badge-engineering stories.

'…a brand that's lost GM several billion dollars over 17 years.'

GM has never put a number to Saab's losses. Objective reports quote a figure of about, or a bit over, $1b.

'…Lutz' alternative to York's Saabicide is badge engineering. Or, more specifically, MORE badge engineering… turning German Opels into Swedish Saabs.'

Saab doesn't live in an ideal world where funds are free-flowing and accountability is non-existent.  (Saab lived in this world for a while, right before Investor AB sold it to GM.)  The "badge-engineering" following GM's takeover was nothing more than a cost-effective business decision.  Whilst it hasn't always been done as well as it could have been (think 9-2x), the business case is clear.  It's a matter of head vs. heart.  As Jimmy Johnson said in The Cinderella Man: 'My heart is for my family.  My brains and my balls are for business, and this is business.' 

Saab is now working on a new entry-level car– from the ground up.  They're also working on at least one new SUV– from the ground up.  Yes, they'll share underpinnings with other vehicles, but that's 'business'.  The market will judge whether they're Saab enough, and if they aren't, they won't sell.

'Saab's ignition key slot will remain in between the front seats, but the decisions about its major components will now be taken somewhere a long way away from Sweden.'

What's he referring to here?  Powertrain?  Is the award-winning, Swedish-specced, Mexican-cast, Australian-assembled twin-scroll turbo 2.8l V6 engine not a decent powerplant?  It certainly was when I drove it last month and it had the key hallmark of a Saab powerplant: huge torque over a wide band. It's also notable that there's still an engineering staff in Sweden numbering almost 1,700.

'Anyway, as the Saab faithful will tell you, it's too late to worry about the brand's identity.'

A little presumptuous, I think. If General Motors doesn't remain faithful to the Saab brand's identity, the market will tell them. Slow sales of the Subaru-based Saab 9-2x show GM where they got it wrong.  The success of the 9-3 SportCombi and the 9-5 Biopower [in Sweden] illustrates the brand's continuing popularity amongst "the faithful," and its potential future.

'…the Opel Vectra-based Saabs drive remarkably like… Opel Vectras.'

This statement is based on a popular misconception. The Epsilon platform underpinning both cars was first used by Saab in the '03 Saab 9-3. Because the platform was used in concurrence with the '03 Vectra, ill-informed enthusiasts conclude that the Saab was built on an Opel platform. 

Not so. Saab uses a modified "Epsilon" rather than "Opel" platform. In fact, Saab modified the Epsilon platform so heavily that the 9-3 can't be built anywhere else. This is one of the main reasons GM stepped-in to take budgetary control of the company.  As for the driving comparison, other than the fact that both cars can get you from A to B, the driving experience is fundamentally different. The 9-3 is a faster and safer car than the Vectra. Subjectively, it's also more comfortable and fun to drive.

Farago seems to enjoy tap dancing on Saab's perceived grave because it suits his anti-GM agenda.  At the same time, he hints at a twinge of sadness about the loss of a previously independent-thinking automaker. Saab certainly isn't as independent and innovative as it once was.  At this point, it can't be.  Is that because of GM's corporate ownership stifling the creativity of the Saab engineers etc?  Only partly.

The main reason Saab can't be the Saab its supporters desire is simple: they gotta pay their bills.  The type of R&D Saab needed for true distinctiveness is only possible with either bottomless pockets or decent profits. GM can't provide Saab the former without the latter. Meanwhile, I don't subscribe to the belief that GM's ownership of Saab has been the death of the company.  Nor do I believe that GM's platform-sharing program will rob Saab of its unique character. Saying so is both unrealistic and irresponsible.

[Steven Wade is a finance professional who runs www.trollhattansaab.net]

By on March 3, 2006

 It's official: bankruptcy is good for GM. In their recent ass-covering exercise for the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), The Ford Motor Company listed 'adverse effects from the bankruptcy or insolvency of a major competitor' as a significant risk to its financial future. Translation: if GM goes bankrupt, The General will slough off its excessive labor costs and become… wait for it… competitive. So competitive, in fact, that Ford reckons GM's products would gain an important price advantage. Well how about that?

Obviously, there's more to it than that. Ford's SEC filing also alerts investors that GM's Chapter 11 could destroy The Blue Oval's supply chain. Both automakers share a large number of mission critical parts suppliers; if GM's submersion sucks vital parts makers into bankruptcy– which it most assuredly would– Ford will lose access to the bits and pieces it needs to build Fords. In fact, it's hard to see how Ford could survive a GM bankruptcy. Or why it would want to. The automotive community is slowly (and quietly) beginning to conclude that bankruptcy is both the only thing and the BEST thing that can happen to GM, and, by extension, Ford.

To review: GM can't build competitive vehicles at a profit. It's got too many models, brands and dealers. Too much bureaucracy, waste and inefficiency. Its labor costs are too high, its capital investment is too low and its supply chain is about to snap. And GM can't change a thing. The United Auto Workers' contract prevents any wage or benefits cuts, and precludes any alteration to their Byzantine working practices. Legal obligations also stop GM from trimming its distended dealer network or euthanizing fatally wounded brands. To survive, GM needs to lower its costs and revamp its business. And it can't do that without Chapter 11.

Oh, OK, it could, if everyone pulled together: investors, management, unions, dealers, suppliers and customers. But they won't. It's not in their nature. And even if it was, GM CEO Rabid Rick Wagoner is singularly incapable of tackling this monumental leadership challenge. And even if Rabid Rick could unify all the negatively charged particles in the GM universe, it's too late. The General doesn't have enough cash to weather the turbulence between business-as-usual and the end result of a difficult and dangerous overhaul. Nobody's going to give them the extra money– at least until The General declares bankruptcy. As Ford publicly acknowledged, only bankruptcy can give GM the wiggle room it needs to implement necessary changes to the way it goes about its business.

So be it. As I said at the beginning of this odious odyssey, GM will emerge from this multi-decade debacle a smaller, leaner and better automaker or, preferably, automakers. And that's why Ford's worried. Of course, they're not the only ones. The prospect of revolutionary change is making everyone involved a little, well, crazy. We're already seeing some strange behavior emerge from GM World: a public pledge to end national incentives followed by the announcement of a "March madness" sale, exciting new cars playing one-two-three green light, red light, green light; a Board Member and Car Czar squabbling over a moribund Swedish car brand, etc. It's the End of Days, Detroit style.

As GM's fate reaches its terrifying conclusion, workers will get all the attention. The moment the axe falls, whether by a slow strike or a lightning default, the spotlight will shift to "the little guy." Needless to say, the media will depict them as victims. They'll highlight the most desperate cases and blame their fate on management incompetence, outsourcing, the Japanese, the Chinese, foreign trade policy, currency manipulation, oil prices, George W. Bush, the anti-GM press, anyone and anything other than the workers themselves. Never mind that a huge number of these workers performed two hours work for eight hours pay. Never mind that thousands were willing to receive full pay and benefits for doing nothing whatsoever. It will always be someone else's fault.

Understand this: GM's workers are no better or worse than any of the other players in this sad saga. All of them work for a company where personal responsibility doesn't exist. Where everyone thinks they deserve to be well-paid, no matter what they or the company does, or doesn't do. Yes, there are plenty of good people within GM. And here's the kicker: most of them can't wait for the company to file. They want to see an end to the waste, laziness, greed, corruption, inequality and stupidity they see around them. When GM becomes the world's largest bankrupt, these good men and women will be satisfied, knowing that there is justice in the world. And they'll be hopeful; that something good will replace something bad.

By on March 2, 2006

 Automotive pundits in these parts have lauded the new Audi DSG (Direct Shift Gearbox) as if it was the Second Coming of Dr. Ferry Porsche himself. In reality, the "dual clutch" design has long been discredited amongst most modern automobile engineers. Don't get me wrong. BorgWarner and The Volkswagen Group have created a truly impressive version of a 50-year-old concept. But the dual clutch transmission is still nothing more than a wonderful toy, a mechanically elaborate dead end.

Like many other European carmakers, VW is still trying to make a manual transmission shift for itself. Their method: use two clutches, allow the unused gear to overrun (or freewheel), then switch between the two clutches to engage the various gears. It's certainly clever, and modern electronic controls should make it both reliable and user-friendly. But what's the point? The whole concept of a changing gears– whether by hand, solenoid, piston or rubber band– is a concept that should have died with the carburetor.

Paddle shifters– and all the other excuses for avoiding a true automatic transmission– remain a simple matter of stirring gears around in a box, like cars did nearly a century ago. The only difference between DSG and ye olde stick shift is how the gears are stirred. Hudson, Cord, Reo and others tried to make a manual gearbox shift by itself. None of these ideas were successful because the basic gearbox just didn't lend itself to the task. In fact, Audi's DSG traces its roots to the 60-year-old Chrysler transmission: the M-6. Chrysler developed the concept of overrunning gears, and almost made it work.

The Chrysler M-6 was essentially a four-speed manual box with some of the gears mounted on overrunning clutches, so that they were free to rotate on their shafts in one direction. The M-6 allowed a second gear to be engaged without disengaging the previous gear. Chrysler used a combination of electrical solenoids to move the gears, controlled by a simple hydraulic system. Linkages to the carburetor told the transmission how hard the engine was working, so that the transmission could time its shifts accordingly. But without electronic controls, the M-6's gear changes were usually accompanied by a resounding 'clunk.' It didn't help that Chrysler used an odd gear selection schedule inside the transmission, with low gear seldom used.

The moment the super-smooth Hydra-matic transmission debuted, the M-6 was dead in the water. By 1954, Chrysler came out with their own version of a modern automatic transmission, using a torque converter and a set of planetary gears. Shortly afterward, Chrysler used the overrunning gear principle in their legendary Torqueflite transmission, which engaged second gear without releasing first. Engagement could be precisely timed and calibrated. Drag racers loved it; with a little tinkering, Chryslers would chirp their rear tires on the 1-2 shift. In 1964, the Turbo Hydra-matic 400 used the overrunning gear principle on all three gears. Freed of the problems of timing multiple gear change operations, the transmission was calibrated to the engine, car and driver rather than its own internal needs.

Again, it's this 50-year-old overrunning gear principle that allows the Audi transmission to work as well as it does. Given the level of engineering ability at The Volkswagen Group, why didn't they apply it to the development of a truly modern automatic transmission? Ideally, an improved automatic transmission would keep the engine close to an ideal rpm range for the speed, load and performance of the car. It would accomplish this task with as little lost power as possible and not interfere with the driver's ability to drive. At the risk of reigniting the flame campaign against automatics, the world's best paddle shift system is still a distraction, asking drivers to worry about gear selection when monitoring direction, traffic, available grip and speed should be their paramount priority.

There are still many ways transmission design could be improved. Modern engineering tools allow better analysis of geartrains than ever before, and offer the opportunity to reduce friction and noise, as well as hydraulic pumping losses inside the gearbox. Electronic operating controls could be more adaptive; making the transmission fit the driver rather than the other way 'round. The possibility of using more than one stator in the torque converter could tailor the converter's torque multiplication more closely to the vehicle characteristics. And, now that every maker has their own transmission fluid, perhaps VW/Audi could develop an innovative new compound that would reduce hydraulic losses inside a torque converter.

Any of the above would impress me more than a perfect paddle shift, and change the lives of millions of 'average' motorists. Hashing over an outdated and discredited concept just to avoid a true automatic transmission is still, when the day is over, a waste of time.

By on February 28, 2006

 Yesterday, The Detroit News caught-up with Maximum Bob Lutz at the Geneva Auto Show. GM's Car Czar was busy unveiling Saab's Aero-X, a Corvette-based concept car from a brand that's lost GM several billion dollars over 17 years. It probably seemed as good a time as any to ask Maxi Bob about GM Board of Directors' member Jerry York's call to axe the Swedish brand. 'I've spoken at length with Jerry York,' Lutz said. 'And he's off this get-rid-of-Saab thing.' Thing? Calling the Turnaround King's strategic recommendation a "thing" is so condescending it qualifies Lutz for a British knighthood. More importantly, Maximum Bob's summary dismissal tells you all you need to know about Saab's future, and it ain't good.

Lutz' alternative to York's Saabicide is badge engineering. Or, more specifically, MORE badge engineering. Yes, now that The General has sold off its share in Subaru, the plan to transform Japanese Scoobies into Swedish Saabs has been ditched in favor of turning German Opels into Swedish Saabs (with an Ohio SUV thrown in for good measure). In other words, GM is fully committed to integrating the Saab brand into the bureaucratic clusterfuck known as GM's "global vehicle development system." Saab's ignition key slot will remain in between the front seats, but the decisions about its major components will now be taken somewhere a long way away from Sweden. And the choices will be made by a series of committees with far greater responsibilities than "just" Saab.

Never mind that GM Marketing Maven Mark LeNeve recently swore on a stack of Solstii that GM would no longer slap a badge on a standardized GM product and call it a Pontiac Torrent (oops). Don't confuse Maximum Bob with the company line; the man's talking about returning Saab to profitability by lowering the division's cost per unit. 'Soon.' Anyway, as the Saab faithful will tell you, it's too late to worry about the brand's identity; the Opel Vectra-based Saabs drive remarkably like… Opel Vectras. If you still cling to the belief that this platform sharing arrangement serves the greater glory of Saab, or, alternatively, justifies its destruction, Maximum Bob's happy to dispel either proposition. 'Saab is no longer an independent company that you could sell off as a unit.'

Now there's a bit of auto industry theater for you: Bob Lutz proudly admitting that GM has killed its Swedish goose before it could lay a single golden egg. Yes, proudly. As far as Maximum Bob is concerned, the de-Saabing of Saab is not only desirable, it's overdue. 'We left it independent way too long. Three years ago, Saab had its own capital budget. They ran the business as if it didn't belong to General Motors. Now, it's totally blended into the worldwide architecture plan.' Saab has its own budget? Who the Hell do these Swedish guys think they are, a car company? We've got a business to run here, Sven.

If you want to know why GM makes such a broad range of substandard products, why they can't or won't build a truly magnificent Saab, there's your answer: centralized power and control. The ends of the The General's vast Empire constantly fight against the center– and lose. Can you imagine the difficulty Saab has– I mean would have had– sourcing a seat bracket? Can you imagine the difficulties they would face if they tried to make a NEW seat bracket? Theoretically, the GM corporate mothership helps each brand achieve its goals. In practice, The General's overarching bureaucracy sucks the life force out of everything it touches, until all its vehicles are as bland and lifeless as a Pontiac G6.

The opposite of corporate synergy is… GM. The "global architecture" that makes Lutz' heart beat that little bit faster was designed by the company, for the company. Putting as many models as possible on the same platform using the same bits will reduce each brand's unit costs, but it won't enhance each brand's character or the consumer's pleasure. In fact, Saab never stood a chance against the legions of GM pencil pushers, bean counters and union reps: people who couldn't care less if a Saab looks, feels and drives like an Opel as long as its sales, marketing and production don't violate GM's corporate practices.

All of which makes the Aero-X concept a fitting memorial for Saab: a striking vehicle whose beauty and imagination will never see the light of day. Oh sure, Lutz dutifully mouthed the usual crap about incorporating the X' "design cues" into Saab's lineup, but it's hard (not to say nauseating) to imagine GM adding the X' aeronautic themes to Saab's rebadged Trailblazer. The Aero X is physical proof that "crisis what crisis?" GM is happy to celebrate its corporate diversity– even as it grinds its divisions, and itself, into the dust.

[UPDATE: After receiving an email from Jerry York, Maximum Bob Lutz has publicly retracted his contention that the GM Board member favors the continuation of the Saab brand.]

By on February 26, 2006

 If you were going to invent a way to control an automobile, you wouldn't ask the average driver to develop the skill and coordination of a church organist. Note I said "average." As far as hardcore automotive enthusiasts and skilled pipe organ players are concerned, there's nothing more natural or satisfying than making beautiful music with a sublime dance of hands and feet. Yes, well, the average person would rather drive an automatic and download an iTune. Pistonheads and pipe worshippers may sneer, but if the majority of humans didn't take the path of least resistance our species would still be stuck in the trees. Meanwhile, just as digital sound has invaded God's house and rocked the organist's world, Audi's DSG transmission is here and tripedalists are toast.

The day F1 racing cars switched to paddle shift control, the clutch pedal was doomed. Only the paddle system's violence kept the left pedal from a date with old Sparky. Ferrari's ground-breaking attempts at a passenger paddler were representative rubbish; the clunky F1 system transformed the sublime F355 into a herky-jerky one-track pony. Other early systems were equally obtrusive, equally foul. At the same time, style conscious high-end manufacturers added wheel-mounted button shifts and gate activated "tip shifts." Although the technology simply handed customers slushbox control, computers eventually transformed the systems into a reasonably convincing halfway house between mindless ease and endless excitement.

 Aston's Vanquish got closer to the real deal. If drivers tapped its over-sized plus paddle at the exact right rpm, the V12 GT rewarded them with a perfectly timed gear change. If not, not. Other systems followed: Ferrari, Maserati, BMW, Lamborghini, Aston Martin, even Toyota (MR2 Spyder). All of these paddle shifters downshift magnificently– even blipping the throttle on your behalf– but they either slur their upchanges like a drunk handing you a cigarette or smack you in the back of the head like a sadistic schoolteacher. And that's without considering the challenges of around town ambling or, God forbid, reverse (a non-issue for F1, obviously).

And then BorgWarner and Volkswagen AG developed DSG. The direct shift gearbox (DSG) features two wet plate clutches: one engages the odd-numbered gears, the second the even-numbered gears. When the first clutch is putting down the power, a computer readies the second clutch to engage the next gear (pre-selected according to engine revs and speed). When the driver bangs the paddle for another gear or the automatic calls for another cog, the first clutch is released and the second engages. Gear shifts are fast, smooth and accurate; both up and down the ratios. The DSG's computer– complete with 12 sensors– stands guard against "inappropriate" gear selection; an over-twitchy paddle shifter can't stall or blow up the engine.

 OK rivet counters: Volksie didn't invent the double clutch. Citroen offered something similar over 70 years ago, and Porsche's formidable 962 racer also gave it a go. But VW and BorgWarner have just about perfected the DSG. (The only drawbacks are a certain sluggishness when gently tipping-in and a slight hesitation when lifting off and paddling down more than one gear, as the DSG shuffles through the intervening ratios.) Even with its quirks, the DSG rules– to the point where the clutch pedal and traditional manual gearbox is a mechanical redundancy, a dead device shifting. In fact, any car manufacturer who doesn't have a DSG or something similar installed in their performance-oriented products will soon be at a tremendous disadvantage.

And here's where the culture wars begin. Two years ago, Bob Elton's editorial "Death to the Stick Shift" suggested that cars equipped with an automatic gearbox were safer, more reliable and more pleasurable than their manual equivalents. Enthusiasts considered the proposition a personal affront. Two years of flame mail leads me to conclude that stickshifters– a self-selecting community of motorists who cherish the skill and pleasure that only a manual transmission can provide– consider autoboxers less competent, safe and passionate. Many of these tripedalists will not take kindly to the DSG; it's a bridge from the know-nothing rabble to the self-proclaimed automotive elite. The barbarians are at the shift gate; The Volkswagen Group has unlocked the door.

 It will be some time before this issue plays out, but the stickshifters will lose. Once they get behind the wheel of a DSG-equipped machine like the new Audi A3 or the VW R32, even the hardiest of these manual transmission diehards will understand the system's clear superiority; in terms of speed, safety and, most importantly of all, enjoyment. Eventually, the tide will turn. Automakers will be forced to buy 'dual clutch transmission' technology from BorgWarner or their partner Getrag, or develop something at least as good. Of course, there will still be enthusiasts who stick with the stick, for personal pride and sensual satisfaction. In the meantime, a quick message from Paddle Shifters Anonymous to open-minded automotive enthusiasts: get ready for some serious fun.

By on February 23, 2006

 A couple of days ago, I was talking to an auto industry analyst about the world's largest automaker. We were discussing the cracks in GM's hull, trying to figure out which of The General's compartments were already breached, which are filling with water and which remain viable. A wistful tone in the analyst's voice indicated head-shaking dismay. "I'm no longer hearing anything positive about GM," he revealed. "The conversations range from how bad it is, to how bad it's going to get." I didn't want to sound like a paranoid fantasist to a new source, so I tried not to out-pessimist the doomsayers. But it wasn't easy.

GM's supply situation is dangerously dire. If former subsidiary and mission critical parts supplier Delphi doesn't reach an agreement with its unionized workers by March 30th — the third and "final" deadline — a judge will void the company's labor contracts. Pundits poo-poo the possibility; they reckon the UAW will make concessions and GM will fork over the necessary union blood money to keep Delphi chugging along. But… over at Tower Automotive, the smaller but equally bankrupt GM supplier tried to cut $1.50 to $3 from their union members' $13 to $15 hourly wages. The United Auto Workers (UAW), United Steel Workers and International Union of Electrical Workers (IUEW) said no. On Monday, a judge will void Tower's union contracts. The inevitable strike will deprive GM's Hail Mary GMT900 SUV's of vital suspension components (amongst other things).

This ominous development reflects the indisputable fact that the UAW and its brother unions are not prepared to surrender a single dime in their salaries, pensions or health care benefits. Not one. Not ever. (I doubt UAW Boss Big Ron Gettelfinger has ever said the word 'concession' in public.) What's more, the unions are literally spoiling for a fight. To wit: members of IUEW will vote today to authorize its leaders to strike Delphi as and when. That's 33,000 Delphi workers ready, willing and able to walk at a moment's notice. It's not posturing; it's preparation.

The unions own GM. If organized labor strikes even one key supplier, they'll be giving The General a 90-day death sentence. While some analysts believe that's no bad thing– the situation forces the unions to accept responsibility for the fate of the company paying its wages, leading them to take the hit needed to keep those wages coming– nothing could be further from the truth. The UAW and its fellow unions are like a cancer: they will feast on their host until it dies. End of story. Why would they walk out on Delphi and send GM into Chapter 11? Because they can. Look at the Rust Belt. How avoidable was that? By the same token, General Motors gives in to union demands when it can't afford to because that's what they do.

GM didn't rush in, bail out Tower and protect its new SUV's because the supplier is only the tip of an iceberg that's gouging a hole in the General's hull. GM's constant efforts to low-ball its suppliers, its poor credit (downgraded by Moody's on Tuesday to B1, five rungs below investment grade) and the looming prospect of bankruptcy are all inflicting fatal wounds to its supply chain. Suppliers are caught in the squeeze between rising commodity costs, declining production (due to lost market share) and contracts that reduce pricing over time. TTAC's Deep Throat reports that an inferior part for the GMT-900 recently forced GM to return to a "quality supplier." The supplier refused to invest its own money to create the part and demanded a contract stipulating that the automaker would pay a true market rate for the finished component.

This is not an isolated case. GM used to provide suppliers an advanced payment program arranged by GE Credit. Late last year, GE bailed on the entire business, in favor of GMAC (yes, the same GM-owned finance company currently on the block). If that wasn't a bad sign of GM's financial situation in and of itself, GMAC then tightened the restrictions. The payment program is no longer available to the broad spectrum of GM suppliers. Bottom line: GM's current procurement process fails to assure parts manufacturers adequate financial compensation, doesn't provide protection against program termination due to budgetary constraints or model "realignment", and can't possibly guarantee payment if GM files for Chapter 11.

It's not too much of a stretch to imagine that at some point, one way or another, GM's entire supply chain will collapse. How's that for dark? You want light? How about this: I've received dozens of emails from frustrated workers, designers and administrators inside GM. No question: there's an enormous amount of creativity and passion locked-up inside General Motors. Once The General shakes off its union, deep-sixes its insufferable bureaucracy, dumps unnecessary brands and gets down to the business of building a limited number of great cars, it will build a limited number of great cars. When it comes to GM, the parts are greater than the whole.

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