Category: Editorials

By on February 18, 2006

 With so many superb high-end sedans for sale, I'd be hard-pressed to name the automaker building the world's best luxury car. But I'll tell you which one makes the best chocolate cake: Volkswagen. At VW's 'Glass Factory" in Germany, a PR flackling served-up a Schwarzwaelder Kirschtorte whose cherry-flavored choctasticness established an insurmountable standard for the field. The same could not be said for the car being built below. The Phaeton was doomed from day one, minus the number of days between the moment of conception and the first commercial example. And yet, despite its inevitable withdrawal, the Phaeton may prove to be one of the most important cars of its time.

When the ghetto fabulous Bentley Continental GT made its debut, VW's boutique brand took great pains to distance their erstwhile British sedan from its German roots. But there was no getting around the fact that the Conti's rap sheet included some hard time on the Phaeton's platform. The baby Bentley's mighty mill was a twin-turbo version of the W12 engine powering the big Vee Dub. Should [all] US Phaeton owners pile into a modern Bentley, they'd immediately recognize the swankmobile's climate control and air suspension systems. By the same token, the current Audi A8 owes much of its character to its humble (though pricey) predecessor.

It's also worth noting that the Phaeton marked a return to form for German engineering. The luxobarge's windshield wiper blades rest on alternate sides to create even wear. The sunroof's lip spoiler adjusts at speed to prevent drafts and harmonic distortion. The climate control system opens vents for rapid cooling, then closes them when the desired temperature arrives (switching to indirect air flow). At a time when even Mercedes had lost the plot, the Phaeton's build and materials quality were beyond approach. I mean, reproach. For those of us who wondered if the Germans had lost their manufacturing mojo, the Phaeton kept the faith alive.

Of course, none of that makes the Phaeton particularly important. You might even call the ridiculously-badged, absurdly-priced Phaeton automotive cocaine: a sign from God that VW was making too much money. The model's real contribution to the future of the automotive industry lies elsewhere, well away from the greasy bits. It was the Phaeton's sales and marketing that separated the machine from the dozens of Dodos (Chevrolet SSR anyone?) launched by overly-adventurous automakers.

German Phaeton buyers were invited to the imperious Glass Factory to spec-up their car. In VW's Customer Experience Center, perched high above the former Allied bombsite known as Dresden, café and kuchened customers stroked sumptuous leathers and glassine veneers. They twiddled a digitized table to select an ideal blend of exterior and interior colors and the appropriate rear accommodations (dual thrones or bench). After their chariot was built, these automotive patrons returned to… an empty room. At the push of a button, accompanied by symphonic swelling, their custom built Volkswagen Phaeton rose from under the floor. A specialist guided the appropriately awed owner through the Phaeton's various functions. Then the outside wall rolled back and the customer drove their car into the parking lot and onto the street.

Although VW's Phaetonology shared some of its key characteristics with Japanese dealer techniques (which are driven by a lack of urban real estate), the Germans elevated customer contact to Wagnerian levels, and blazed a trail for US sales. It was, in a word, genius.

First, there were no cars. Why anyone selling an expensive product would want potential customers to contemplate a large number of them is beyond me; "pile 'em high and sell 'em cheap" is programmed into us on the genetic level. Second, Phaeton customers were isolated, indoctrinated and, most importantly of all, relaxed. The average car dealer's showroom is more uncomfortably exposed than a public urinal and less relaxing than a dentist's chair. Third, customers customized their car. Their detailed selections bonded Phaeton owners to both their vehicle and the company providing it. And fourth, the handover process– THE critical moment in the entire sales process– was appropriately dramatic, bonding Phaeton owners to both their vehicle and the company providing it.

The retail end of the American automotive business hasn't changed since the turn of the century– two centuries ago. Clothes, hardware, music, food– there isn't any other retail sector that hasn't been revamped and revolutionized in that time. The Phaeton gave VW a better way to sell cars. MINI has moved in that direction. And now Audi has a chance to make it happen. Audi of America's Executive Vice President Johan de Nysschen recently announced that his company will create regional distribution hubs to store, maintain and distribute cars 'within 48 hours.' Why not keep all but single examples at the hub, change the dealerships to [smaller] 'Experience Centers,' customize customers' cars at the hub, send 'em to the dealer and sex-up the handover procedure? I reckon it'd be a piece of cake.

By on February 16, 2006

 This is a tale of two Tahoes. The first is a wildly successful SUV that's flying off the lots at full price: a Hail Mary pass that will put General Motors back in the end zone, saving them from the unthinkable humiliation of bankruptcy, with only moments to spare. The second is a gas-guzzling truck that's being swept out to sea by the vast receding tide of SUV buyers: a four-wheeled indictment of GM's inability to build what America wants to drive at a price that makes the company enough money to stay in business. For the time being, which vehicle you see depends entirely on which one you want to see.

Over at The Detroit News, Brett Clanton paints a portrait of the new Tahoe as the corporate lifesaver The General needs it to be. His article on the Tahoe's initial fortunes is sprinkled with the kind of upbeat non-contextual factoids that German newspapers relied on at the end of WWII: "Tahoe sales were up more than 50 percent in January. The 2007 model is fetching a higher average selling price than its predecessor… Only on sale since Jan. 10, GM has booked just more than 4,000 sales and is still in the process of shipping Tahoes to dealers." To be fair, Clanton mentions Wall Street's unenthusiastic response and sensibly states that "a true verdict on the vehicle is probably still months away." But the article's overall tenor is reflected by the headline "Hot Tahoe fuels GM Optimism."

If Tahoes are 'hot,' Antarctica is 'tropical.' Four thousand Tahoes per month equals 48k per year– as compared to the 152k examples Chevy sold in '05. Meanwhile, down on the showroom floor, I was offered a $2k discount on a brand new LT without asking for it. No wonder: in his February 6th newsletter, automotive journalist Ed Wallace reports that GM is offering a $1750 fleet rebate on new Tahoes and Yukons. (So much for GM's "Value Pricing Program": the highly-touted plan to keep vehicle sticker prices– and incentives– low.) What's more, GM isn't putting an actual number to '07 Tahoe sales or breaking out sales by model year. In other words, that "50% increase" represents sales of both the new and the old Tahoe. Add in the fact that dealers are selling the '05 Tahoe with an $8k rebate, while the '06 models are leaving dealer lots with $5k off sticker, and the rosy picture takes on a more deathly pallor.

In fact, Wallace's assault on GM optimists extends well beyond carefully shrouded Tahoe sales. The talk radio host points out that The General's dealers sold slightly fewer than 300k vehicles (discounting fleet sales) in January. Yet the company currently plans to build 1.26 million vehicles this quarter. That's 25% more vehicles than it will sell at the current pace. You don't have to be an economist to know that there's only one way prices can go when supply exceeds demand. Talk about duality: GM can't afford to discount its products; it can't afford not to discount its products. Unless sales pick-up quickly and dramatically, GM CEO Rabid Rick Wagoner's recent production cuts won't be enough. The General's death spiral will continue.

Depending on what happens tomorrow, we might be spared the agony of watching GM lingering on life support. We'll know whether or not Delphi has hammered out a deal with the United Auto Workers (UAW) that allows the parts maker to continue making parts for the Tahoe, Yukon and the rest of The General's lineup. The smart money says the UAW will accept some cuts to their members' compensation, while GM foots the multi-billion dollar bill for a continuation of the status quo. The smarter money says the UAW will agree to nothing more than window dressing, while GM foots the multi-billion dollar bill for a continuation of the status quo. If not, the UAW will strike and no one will have to worry about Tahoe sales for quite some time, if ever.

If you hear "deadline extension", think strike. Anyway, either way, this is a fight GM can't win. In fact, we're back to twins, and they're BOTH evil. The world's largest automaker can't survive a strike (UBS analyst Rob Hinchcliffe reckons a moribund GM would burn through its $19 billion cash hoard in about 10 weeks) and it can't afford to subsidize Delphi's UAW workforce (GM is ALREADY on the hook to Delphi workers for $12b). All of which means the new Tahoe's sales are… unimportant. Even if the Tahoe and its platform siblings fly off the forecourt at full retail for months– reversing a deeply entrenched industry trend– it couldn't keep GM's sinking ship above water. So the General's pride and joy, its last, best hope for financial salvation, is destined to become what anti-SUV campaigners saw all along: an irresponsible irrelevance.

By on February 14, 2006

 Over at Edmunds.com, automotive journalist Alistair Weaver reckons Dubai's Jebel Hafeet Mountain Road is "The World's Greatest Driving Road." Judging from Marty Padgett's rhapsodic description of Maui's Heavenly Hana Highway, The Car Connection scribe may beg to differ. It's a dual-branded debate. BMW paid for Weaver's wanderings; Volvo footed the bill for Padgett's peregrinations. I'm not saying these corporate subsidies rendered these writers less qualified to choose the world's best tarmac, but neither journalist could make that call without car company cash. In other words, once again, money talks, bullshit walks.

Both Edmunds and The Car Connection neglected to tell their audience that their travelogues were made possible by a grant from a company whose cars were described glowingly therein. I have no qualms with Weaver's assertion that the MINI's "success is a testament to the brilliance of its design." Nor do I quibble with Padgett's assessment that Hawaiian C70 drivers should "bring great music for the C70's top-notch 910-watt audio system." But these stories wouldn't exist without the manufacturers' undeclared interest. Withholding that information from site visitors is unethical.

Fair disclosure: I don't know for sure that BMW or Ford paid for these trips. I've yet to receive an email on the matter, or a statement from either site about their junketeering policy in general. So I'm assuming. This is the same defense I've heard from publications who happily sell junket fruit (i.e. NOT Business Week, Conde Nast Traveler, The Wall Street Journal, Boston Globe and the LA and New York Times). One gatekeeper told me straight out that he simply assumes that his readers will make the connection between pay and play, and so be it. Which is a bit like a counterfeiter saying that a store clerk should be able to tell a bogus bill from a real one when they see one.

I've also heard the excuse "we don't have a choice." Which is more or less true. New car launch junketeering is so pervasive that unless a car publication/journalist accepts an all-expenses-paid first-class trip to Spain, South Africa, Arizona, Hawaii or wherever, they won't get Stage One access to the latest whip. (Post-junket, manufacturers cars take about two months to filter down to the local writers.) Buff books and car manufacturers are locked into a symbiotic relationship whose corruption is smothered by the quality of the free surrounds, food and, lest we forget, alcohol.

I find the extension of this jet-set corruption club to web-based media distressing, but not surprising. As eyeballs defect to the net, carmaker cash was bound to follow. Why wouldn't the Mayja Playas work the same scam on web-based automotive journalists that they've employed so successfully on their print-based colleagues? Why shouldn't websites stick their poorly-paid snouts into the same velvet-lined trough? Who really cares if there's an unspoken agreement: you be generally positive and respectful of our products and we'll keep you in the style (and access) to which you've become accustomed?

Word up: the web ain't like that. While carmakers and info corps are busy working the same old, same old, surfers are looking for the real deal. At the risk of repeating myself, buying a car is a big deal. Consumers want the straight shit. And they aren't stupid. They know what that big old Chevy logo blinking at them from the corner of Edmunds.com means. They know what's what when an article waxes lyrically about Hawaii, and then ends with a plug for a Volvo C70. Websites that think they can get away with unacknowledged junketeering will learn that it ain't necessarily so. And by the time they do, it'll be too late.

Meanwhile, I realize that the majority of my colleagues are a lost cause. I don't expect them to buck the system or take the high moral ground or even engage in fair disclosure. So I call on the automotive manufacturers to end this gold-plated junketeering once and for all. Listen up guys: TTAC, Jalopnik and Autoblog's Google rankings, and the increasing relevance of brand-based forums, proves that the rules have changed. Car buyers will find independent information about your products. You can't stop it. You can't co-opt it. So why not go with the flow? Less philosophically, ending the junketeering practice will give you far more bang-for-the-buck.

Ditch the Dubai and Hawaiian feeding frenzies. Release new cars to the regional press fleets. The buff books will find a way to keep their customers. You'll save a huge amount of money AND get blanket coverage. And here's another idea: lend your cars to web-active automotive alphas. If your products are good enough, you'll get the kind of groundswell of honest, untainted opinion that sells cars in this, the new millennia.

By on February 13, 2006

 Last Thursday, GM's Vice President of Global Communications sat with the suits and outlined his plan to rescue The General's image from public crucifixion. The man in charge, Steve "Twisted Sister" Harris, had been lured out of semi-retirement from a PR firm specializing in "reputation challenging situations." Ironically, The McGinn Group's website lists GMAC and The US Department of Justice as customers (although the federal seal is too blurry to be sure exactly which federal agency spent our tax dollars burnishing its image). More to the point, the opening animation silently intones "Experience. Accountability. Judgement". Talk about foreshadowing…

Yup, GM's Judgement Day is on its way. Meanwhile, Twisted Sister wants American consumers to know what a great job General Motors has done, is doing and will do, bet your bottom dollar, tomorrow. We're talking high mileage vehicles, clean-running ethanol engines, JD empowerment, we-must-be-doing-something-right sales figures, that kind of thing. Like most people paid to spin straw into gold, Sister doesn't trust the media with this message. He prefers working with cappucino-fuelled creatives to fashion fabulously expensive TV, print, radio, direct mail and web-based campaigns– rather than sitting down with cynical journalists prone to going "off message" and arguing about silly things like facts.

Although GM recently trimmed $200m from its '06 ad budget, it will still spend $1.2b flogging its products. There's bound to be enough loose change down the back of the corporate sofa to subsidize Operation Love Me Tender. Besides, with all this press about plant closures, layoffs, billion dollar losses, a Presidential f-off and the "b-word", Sister's sledgehammer PR campaign seem a reasonable idea. Unless something's done to alter GM's tragic trajectory, consumers are heading straight for the 'you can't touch this' tipping point, where buying any GM product will seem like throwing money into a black hole. Why not sell potential customers a little automotive anti-gravity?

Simply put, the harder GM pushes the fact that they're doing well – or will do well, you know, eventually – the more people will believe they're headed for oblivion. GM's spinmeisters fail to understand the depth of consumer ill-will towards The General. For decades, millions of people spent their hard-earned cash on poorly made, unreliable and (come trade in) expensive GM vehicles. Their complaints were met with arrogance, deceit and indifference. These disgruntled customers told their friends, neighbors and co-workers about their misery and vowed "never again." In fact, the GM resentment bank is so full that any claim that "we're different; we've changed" will sound like a junkie's pleas for his twelfth chance.

Twisted Sister beware: it's American car buyers who are cynical about GM, not journalists. (As far as I can tell, the automotive press is desperate to see a GM turnaround.) So how do you convince deeply skeptical consumers that the new, new GM is worthy of their patronage? You sure as Hell don't launch a glossy ad campaign exhorting them to share your pride in a reborn American institution, to buy into GM's new spirit of honesty, resilience and determination. No, you start somewhere else: the only place where you have the slightest hope in Hell of changing public perceptions about General Motors. You start with the product.

The best promotional device in the world was, is and always will be a great product. Any PR or ad campaign touting GM's imminent recovery that isn't specifically and credibly tied to product excellence is doomed to failure. That's because the average customer doesn't care about the company that makes their car, any more than they care about the company that makes the electricity powering their home. They care about their car. If The General's products fail to live up to the automaker's promises of reliability, quality or style; if there's the tiniest gap between expectation and reality, all the money spent "selling" that promise will be wasted. And that's provided you can devise a way to get customers to drop their barge poles.

Sure, GM makes some great vehicles: the current Chevrolet Corvette, Cadillac CTS-V and um, whatever. But the vast majority of The General's vast product range simply isn't good enough to give Sister's band of brothers the rustoleum they need to save GM's tarnished image from corroding into dust. (You try and build a "This ain't the same old GM" around a Pontiac G6 or Saab 9-7X.) Of course, even if GM made Carreras, Camry's and F150's, it still wouldn't stop the company's slide into bankruptcy. Until The General sorts out its sky-high labor costs, trims its dealer network and ditches its moribund brands, they're a dead automaker spinning. On the other hand, if The General DID make great products– and ONLY great products– at least they'd have something to talk about in the meantime.

By on February 9, 2006

 As our GM Death Watch series gains traction, I've taken to scanning the skies for black helicopters, stashing Glocks around the house and avoiding the fine city of Detroit. But I would have loved to been at RenCen to see the look on Bob Lutz' face when his boss sliced the Car Czar's salary by 30%. If you recall, Turnaround Tycoon Jerry York originally suggested executive pay cuts as a way to send a clear message to workers throughout the world's largest automaker: WE'RE IN DEEP SHIT. At the time, Maximum Bob responded to the suggestion with characteristic bravado: "I gave at the office." I guess he's learned that bankruptcy is the gift that keeps on giving.

To be fair, Mr. Lutz had something of a point. Although his employment contract isn't a matter of public record, much of Bob's compensation package is tied to the company's performance, both directly (through incentives) and intimately (through stock options). As GM bleeds out, shedding value like a dot com bomb, Bob's lost theoretical millions. OK, it's more than partially his fault. But as an employee stockholder, Lutz has GOT to be worried. Yesterday, Deutsche Bank took a hard look at the state of GM's finances and issued a Lutzian pronouncement: "sell."

The recommendation came despite the fact that a newly independent Jerome P. York finally joined GM's Board of Bystanders. (An SEC 13D/A filing for Tracinda Corp states that Jerry won't share confidential info with his capo, GM stockholder Kirk Kerkorian. Yeah right.) What's more, The Bored of Defectives ordered GM CEO Rabid Rick Wagoner to bring Mr. York the head of Alfredo Garcia. And so he did, making across-the-board cuts in accordance with York's rescue plan: trimming white collar pay, pensions and health care; reducing GM's annual dividend by 50% and, get this, signing-off on a significant reduction in The Board of Bystanders $200k annual "retainer." Message received?

Not where it counts. Let's be clear about this: the cuts will not stanch GM's massive wounds. The General lost over eight billion dollars last year. The largest measure in this package– the dividend reduction– will save GM $566m. Add up all the rest of the bits and pieces, double it and it still doesn't cover GM's losses. Or its recent "charges against earnings." Or the cost of keeping idled GM workers in the "money for nothing and your checks for free" Jobs Bank. And then remember that GM is about to fork over multiple billions in blood money to keep bankrupt parts supplier Delphi's unionized workers working.

Again, Wall Street was suitably unimpressed with GM's black February. More importantly, so was United Auto Workers (UAW) President Big Ron Gettelfinger. Lest we forget, convincing the UAW to take one for the team was the whole point of the exercise, as Rabid Rick quickly pointed out: 'I think it's clear, now more than ever, that we very much have a shared fate." Indeed they do. Unless GM can lower its union labor costs, alter union practices and sell some product by, say, last May, it's all over bar the filing. And… According to the Detroit Free Press, "The union chief dismissed any suggestion that [the cuts] set the stage for GM to push the UAW for more concessions." So, that's that then.

Reporter Daniel Howes over at The Detroit News says Big Ron's stonewalling is nothing more than a bit of pre-election, pre-negotiation posturing. In yesterday's editorial, Mr. Howes said the union boss called for "shared sacrifice" and claimed that "Union folks are smart enough to know that tough times demand tough calls, including concessions they never expected to give." I guess Mr. Howes would also see UAW Vice President Richard Shoemaker's same day statement that Delphi's insistence on pay concessions "will surely lead to a long strike, and that is true whether it involves other corporations or does not involve other corporations" as more posturing.

If Rick Wagoner is a religious man, I bet he's praying that Daniel Howes is right: the union will see sense and do what needs to be done to save the corporate host upon which they feast. Judging from his bankruptcy-proof pension, Rabid Rick's not a betting man. Which is just as well, because unions don't posture. They threaten. If you don't capitulate to their demands, they make good on their threats, come what may. GM has paid billions to the unions. There's no way the union officials that would lead the rank and file into a strike are going to miss a meal because of an anti-Delphi or anti-GM union action, short or long term. They have nothing to lose. As far as they're concerned, you can pay us now, or you can pay us later. Only thing is, white collar cuts or no, GM can't afford either option.

By on February 8, 2006

 If there's one group of people within the GM universe who elicits less sympathy than the current management team, it's the legions of loud-talking, loudly-dressed GM dealers. Despite the media's fixation on the corporate mothership, the survival of the world's largest automaker depends just as much on its dealer network's success as any new initiative coming from GM's RenCen HQ. All the flailing and failing in Detroit shows you that all is not well on the sharp end. In fact, GM's dealer network mirrors the automaker's ancient, costly production process: a fundamentally flawed institution in need of radical restructuring. Ah, but who will bell the cat?

Actually, euthanasia would be a better option. It's a little known fact The General's dealer network is roughly the same size as it was forty years ago. Back in the day – when GM owned the US car market lock, stock and double-barreled carbs – The General's network provided a significant advantage to both franchisees and the corporation. (Potential customers were never more than a twenty-minute ride away from their local GM dealer.) Now that GM buyers are increasingly thin on the ground, dealers must squander precious resources warding off "poaching". (Disgruntled customers are never more than a twenty minute ride away from a rival GM dealer.) Internecine warfare for conquest sales is even more damaging, forcing each store to engage in cut-throat pricing and blanket advertising. And that's without considering competition from rival brands, some of which may be closer than they appear…

GM single-line dealers have traditionally relied on solid sales within the lower end of the luxury market. Sales at this price point tend to flow outwards, towards other models sharing the same badge. (Dad buys a nice big sedan; Mom gets an SUV, Junior settles into something a bit smaller and sportier.) As competition has grown fiercer and niches multiplied, GM has launched a wide variety of rebadgineered vehicles to help dealers keep customers within a given brand's fold. The 'everything for everyone' strategy has unintended consequences. It's all well and good for The General if a customer buys a Chevrolet Equinox instead of a Buick Rendezvous, but it's a catastrophe for a Buick-only dealer. At the same time, GM's epic multi-branded line extensions have made the automaker slow, lazy and inefficient. Instead of hitting target markets dead-on with killer products, it's strictly spray and pray.

In short, the size of its dealer network forces GM to make too many (crap) products, which leads to (crap products and) too many incentives. There's only one way to untie this Gordian knot: cut it into pieces and throw away the excess bits. In other words, hundreds of GM dealerships must bite the dust. Terminating a third to a half of GM's existing single-line dealers would be a win-win situation for GM and any dealers that remain. There'd be less internal competition, less feeble product, less confusion in the marketplace, less incentives and less bureaucracy. Oh, and more profit.

Eliminating whole product lines would be the best way to make the necessary change. Of course, killing brands is hardly an "easy" option. Contract law– originally written to stop GM from pushing dealers out of profitable territories– guarantees that the cost of the cuts would be stupendously expensive. Killing more than two thousand Olds dealers cost GM billions. Axing Buick would be at least as expensive; Pontiac even more so. And if both of those brands are killed, GMC may as well go as well. Unfortunately, now that the situation calls for desperate measures, GM probably doesn't have the cash to make it happen.

If and when The General files for bankruptcy, dealercide would be relatively easy. Federal bankruptcy court would offer The General the legal protection it needs to do the deed. Unfortunately, surveys have shown that Americans aren't all that excited about the idea of buying a car built by a bankrupt automaker; a nation of boarded-up GM dealers could make the perception problem insurmountable. No, the only way to trim the dealer fat is to do it now, take the hit and move on. And why– aside from cash considerations– not?

The dealers. No GM dealer wants to be the first store eliminated, or, if GM starts throwing around real money, the last. Give these battle-hardened entrepreneurs credit: they know a thing or two about business. If GM does [somehow] make a comeback, the value of their dealerships will be a significantly greater than the sell-out price. They're hardly likely to "take one for the team". Remember: self-interest built this powerful dealer network. Only self-interest can dismantle it. But time is running out. Unless GM can "bell" this cat before it devours the remaining mice, both the manufacturer and its dealer network face imminent extinction.

By on February 6, 2006

 It's no surprise that the Ford GT garnered a huge amount of publicity for its parent company. It was fast, sexy and charismatic. It showed the world that Ford can build a world-class car at a budget price. It pioneered new building techniques. It refocused attention on Ford's racing heritage. It drew crowds at autoshows. It made dealers feel like serious playas. It sold out. It earned a buyer's premium. It will be worth serious money at auction some day. But Ford was right to kill it.

Like the Bugatti Veyron, the GT was never going to be a mainstay of its parent company's lineup. For one thing, the GT was simply too expensive; the "budget supercar" cost almost five times as much as the starting price of the company's next-most expensive vehicle, the Excursion. For another, Ford's current model range is about as sporty as a pair of woolen socks. Sticking a Lamborghini Gallardo next to a Golf GTI in a VW showroom would be far less incongruous than positioning the GT next to just about anything wearing the Blue Oval badge. Since Ford dropped the Focus SVT, it has only one sports car affordable by mere mortals: the ubiquitous Mustang. Placing a Ford GT next to a Mustang simply makes the Mustang look bad.

As a "halo car," the GT was equally ill-conceived. How does an automobile aimed straight at the idle rich bring glory to a company that sells mass market motors? The original GT40 was a proper race car whose victories ennobled the entire brand. Ford's "homage" is nothing more than a fantastic toy, a collector's piece that will no doubt spend most of its life sheltering in the climate-controlled garages of its well-heeled benefactors. It's a supercar, but an unlikely candidate as the "ultimate Ford."

If there are any cars we should be worried about Ford failing to produce, it's the production versions of the company's most recent concept cars. The Iosis concept from the Frankfurt Auto Show was supposed to signal Ford's new 'kinetic' design language, proving that the company could make even a four-door sedan look dynamic and exciting. The Reflex concept at the Detroit show (and, thankfully, on stage at the Way Forward plan's announcement) was designed to show us that 'fast' and 'green' were not mutually exclusive terms. These are the kinds of cars Ford should build: cars that do one thing better than anyone else. Not different-for-their-own-sake models or remade classics that will lose their luster over time (just ask VW about its New Beetle sales).

Again, the Reflex is the right kind of "gotta have" product. While the concept contained a lot of flights of fancy that would never make production, the idea of a diesel-electric hybrid coupe is both feasible and desirable. Although only relatively fast, the sports car's claimed 65 MPG fuel economy would blow away the competitors (even the Lotus Elise only manages about 40 MPG). The Reflex might even be the hammer blow to the sports car market that the expensive, fuel-guzzling GT could never be. You could drive a Reflex every day without feeling guilty for consuming non-renewable energy or contributing to global warming. Forget touting the Escape Hybrid as Ford's environmental friendly poster child. Show motorists the Reflex and they'll know that even cool cars can be green.

By the same token, the Iosis would be a deeply desirable car. Even if it loses a bit of its appeal in the translation from concept to production, it will still be a mid-size sedan that doesn't look like it was designed by a committee, with all the dulled performance and inoffensiveness that comes with the territory. The Five Hundred, Focus and Fusion aren't cars enthusiasts aspire to own; we begrudgingly rent them at the airport when we're on vacation, or sign them on to corporate fleets. With proper work under the hood, a production Iosis would give Ford a car that at least "feels" like performer to the aspiring enthusiast with 2.2 children. At the moment, Ford dealers can only point to the Mazda dealership down the street.

Face it: average consumers don't need to see a Ford GT in their local Ford showroom. It distracts them from the practical, sensibly-priced cars they've [hopefully] come to buy. Ford needs cars which satisfy the 'gimme' urge in a more direct, brand-faithful way. Cars like the Mustang GT, Reflex and Iosis will ratchet-up the excitement on the Ford forecourt, while remaining true to the company's blue-collar roots. They offer the prospect of everyday, affordable excitement, along with traditional Ford values of value and (dare I say it) reliability. The Ford GT was a bit of fun that was great while it lasted. Now it's time for Ford to put away the toys and get back to business.

By on February 5, 2006

 I'll never forget driving a red-with-white-striped Ford GT to a photo shoot one misty Manchester morning. By then, I knew car and road well enough to use the former to annihilate the latter. The GT hurtled through the woods like an Imperial speeder, its supercharged V8 sounding like God scrubbing the world clean with a wire brush. The 550-horse GT also did an excellent imitation of pre-Army Elvis: thrusting obscenely in time with the changes, moving in perfect synch with the mechanical melody. After that run, I wanted a Ford GT more than a Porsche Carrera GT, Ferrari Enzo, Pagani Zonda or Lamborghini Murcielago. The GT is that charismatic, that much fun to drive.

On Friday, Ford announced it's idling its Wixom assembly plant in the second quarter of next year. As a result, production of the Ford GT will end this September. Speaking to the Detroit News, Ford spinmeister Jim Cain handed the mid-engined supercar its gold watch with only a slight hint of sentimentality: 'It was our plan all along to wind up production on the 40th anniversary of the 1-2-3 victory at Le Mans… It's not being canceled. It's just run its race.' Yes, well, checkered flag or no, FoMoCo's 'dismissal' of the GT is the automotive equivalent of Buddy Holly's plane crash: a sad day for a special car.

It's unlikely that Ford made a dime on its $151,245 range topper. The Ford GT relied on new construction techniques and materials. And as with many "all-new" cars, the Ford GT program faced substantial production problems and experienced long delays. Even after the GT finally hit the forecourts in late 2004, a defective suspension part (made using a new technique) grounded the entire fleet of 100 sold cars, and halted production for a few months. Even more surprising, Ford dealers have only sold 1603 of the 2603 GT's produced to date. Although many dealers say they plan to keep their GTs indefinitely for promotional purposes or personal use, there's clearly no shortage of Ford GT's sitting in dealer showrooms, waiting for a home.

A great deal of the blame for this sad state of affairs lies with Ford's dealer network. The GT was first released in a very limited supply. "Early adopters" were willing to fork out a large premium above the manufacturer's suggested retail price (MSRP) to buy their own personal piece of automotive heaven. But now that the supply has increased and those few "gotta have it now" buyers have their GT's, the days of the $100k premium are long gone. Even so, dealer greed has kept MANY GT's bolted to the showroom floor. That will change; as the 2006 model year Ford GT has arrived on the scene, reports are filtering through of '05 Ford GT's selling for sticker or, gulp, below. With 1400 more cars to go before production ceases, it's only a matter of time before prices soften further, perhaps dramatically.

Clearly, Ford screwed-up the sales side of their supercar project. They should have produced fewer, better GT's, or more cheaper ones. But that doesn't mean they should kill it. The money spent on the Ford GT bought them a small but wealthy population of Ford GT owners. Surely it makes sense to keep these buyers within the Ford family with new and faster GT's, just as the Viper has a dedicated coterie of owners. If Ford eased-up on the GT supply (without ending it), demand would eventually catch-up and profits would be restored. After all, this is a car whose intrinsic appeal is not likely to diminish over time. Nor has the GT's promotional value run its course.

Time. Ford just doesn't get the whole long-term thing, do they? Their minivan tanks and they cut bait and run. The Lincoln LS looks a bit old in the tooth and they kill it stone dead in an endless pursuit of The Next Big Thing. The Ford GT wins the hearts and minds of millions of enthusiasts but the company's attention span for it is only two years long. In fact, I'm so disappointed about the GT's short run I'm contemplating a Ford Death Watch. So far, I've resisted the urge because I didn't think The Blue Oval Boys were headed for the buffers. Now, I'm not so sure. By failing to capitalize on the long-term benefits available from making a car like the GT, Ford has revealed itself as short-sighted, timid and clueless. If left unchecked, these traits will prove fatal to a company that once aimed for the pinnacle, and, despite the odds, got there in style.

By on January 31, 2006

 Porsche is my favorite automotive brand for one reason: they make my favorite sports car. They do not, however, make my favorite SUV. Infiniti's FX45 is more fun to drive, Land Rover's LR3 is more capable, their Range Rover is more luxurious and when it comes to carrying a crew, Lincoln's Blingigator is the bomb. Sure, the Cayenne Turbo is the world's fastest SUV. And? Aside from dubious relevance, I reckon the debut of the glacial V6 Cayenne cancels-out the accomplishment. But the worst thing about the Cayenne is that it's subsidized Porsche's plan to take over the Volkswagen Group.

This morning, Porsche AG announced it will raise its stake in the Volkswagen Group from five to 20 percent. So much for the Sultans of Stuttgart's claim that they were buying VW stock to ensure access to parts and platforms for future Porsche models. The real motivation behind Porsche's land grab is the same as it ever was: power. More specifically, Porsche's Machiavellian machinations are a real world version of one of those Jeffery Archer-style family sagas, involving genetics, greed and history. Just for fun, here's the plot line:

Ferdinand Porsche made his bones building the "people's car" for Adolph Hitler. As co-general manager of Volkswagen's Wolfsburg factory (along with a Nazi administrator), the Austrian engineer used his considerable design and manufacturing skills to build jeeps, tanks and other weaponry for the German war effort. After the war, the Allies stripped Herr Porsche of his power within Volkswagen (it might have had something to do with Ferdy's willingness to use slave labor). Aided by his son Ferry, financed by a royalty on the Beetle, Ferdinand founded the sports car company that bears his name. Fast forward fifty years…

Following a few decades of Porsche ups and downs and some maneuverings over at Vee Dub, Ferry Porsche's nephew Ferdinand Piech ascended to the Chairmanship of the Volkswagen Group's Board of Directors. And there he stayed, inflicting his autocratic style on the mammoth conglomerate, gathering car brands like a 5th Avenue matron collects Manolo Blahniks, watching VW's US market share swirl 'round the toilet. Two weeks ago, after 13 years on the Group's board (most of it as CEO), Piech finally agreed to step down. Not so coincidentally, his decision cleared the way for today's news: Porsche to assume two seats on the Volkswagen Group's board.

The effect of all this Dallas-style plotting on the Volkswagen Group is not my main concern. Piech's plans for world dominance– such as matching Mercedes model for model– hasn't exactly turned out as planned. (Phaeton anyone?) Now that slave labor isn't the done thing, I'm happy letting the free market determine the wisdom of a Porsche-controlled Volkswagen Group. But I am worried about the fate of the Porsche brand. What will happen to my preferred sports car provider as it becomes more and more deeply enmeshed in Volkswagen Group politics?

In fact, Porsche has already sacrificed its soul to its corporate ambitions. Lest we forget, the Cayenne was originally "sold" to skeptical Porsche-philes as a way for the company to fund development of future sports cars– a story which now has a very different ending. Indeed, if the Porsche family's hunger to reclaim Ferdy's legacy wasn't so strong, would the Cayenne have even been built? Given that Porsche's SUV was developed in close cooperation with Volkswagen, given that the same will apply to the forthcoming Panamera, it's clear that this Porsche – Volkswagen nexus is already heavily influencing the type and character of Porsche's products. Where will it stop?

Bentley, Lamborghini and Bugatti brands were once independent, high-end automakers. Setting aside questions about significant product overlap (an issue which has not troubled the Volkswagen Group since it began its buying binge), why wouldn't a Porsche-controlled Volkswagen simply add Porsche to their corporate portfolio? Members of the Porsche clan who own shares in the family firm would become wealthy beyond their wildest dreams– unless, of course, this has been their dream all along.

If Porsche loses its independence, the sports car lover's best interests would not be well served (a sentiment Porsche has been expressing for as long as I can remember). As part of the Volkswagen Group, any decision regarding Porsche's product development would have to be made in relation to the rest of the group's needs, within the context of the existing bureaucracy. In other words, Porsche's design, engineering and marketing choices would be controlled by, gulp, committees. What's worse, Porsche's current path away from highly-focused manufacturer of sports cars, towards performance-oriented multi-genre automaker, would surely accelerate.

I firmly believe that Porsche should make the world's best sports cars, and that's it. I find it incredibly sad that one of the few automakers that never lost its focus, has. As far as the enthusiast community is concerned, Porsche's incestuous relationship with the Volkswagen Group makes the Cayenne look even more like the beginning of the end. Again, still, I hope I'm wrong.

By on January 26, 2006

 I once showed-up for a job interview in the adult film industry. (It was an honest mistake.) Before I bailed, I complimented Mr. Triple X on the spectacular view over the Hudson River. He closed the blinds. "I'm agoraphobic.' When I asked the pornographer why someone afraid of open spaces would chose an office overlooking a large part New Jersey, he said "It's not enough to have a million dollars. People have to KNOW you have a million dollars." The obverse is also true. Losing $8.6b is bad, but it's worse if people KNOW you lost $8.6b. Just ask GM.

While GM's prospects have been on the wrong side of dire for the last three financial quarters, both analysts and the general public generally believed The General would limp back to port to make the necessary repairs. After yesterday's announcement, nobody's kicking ice around the deck anymore, waiting for the engines to restart. GM's financial report evoked the unmistakable sound of exploding boilers. Everyone on board now knows that the world's largest automaker is destined for a watery grave. GM CEO Rabid Rick Wagoner's pathetic bleatings about an [eventual] $6b reduction in GM's materials and labor costs sound about as convincing as "this ship is unsinkable."

Truth be told, GM's financials are far worse than yesterday's official report revealed. For example, GM took $3.6b in charges against earnings to cover Delphi's pension liabilities. Yes, well, GM currently reckons the final tab for the parts workers' pensions will be somewhere between the stated $3.6b and… $12b. GM also took a $2b charge against earnings for its much-publicized production cutbacks. Although most of this figure is earmarked for employee costs, those costs continue: the idled workers go straight into the UAW "jobs bank' (where they're paid full whack not to build cars). By the same token, the charge doesn't include the cost of buying-out a large percentage of these idled UAW workers' contracts. Plant write-down accounts for the remaining charge, but the amount stated won't cover the cost of writing down ALL the plants GM intends to close– or will be forced to close.

And none of this includes the damage from Rabid Rick's forthcoming billion dollar (plus) payoff to the UAW to maintain Delphi's union peace. Remember: the cash outflow from these events is out there… waiting. If GM had to pay these charges today, the company's bank account would be perilously close to its minimum operating cash level ($10b). In short, Rabid Rick's erstwhile turnaround strategy relies heavily on underwater bilge pumps. If GM continues to lose market share, if it doesn't create some financial buoyancy, Rabid Rick's crew will have bought no more than a six month reprieve before GM begins its descent into Davey Jones' locker.

File all of the preceding information under "Iceberg, Tip Of." Meanwhile, Wagoner's music-facing ceremony also failed to include any mention of the lifeboat: GMAC. Due to the looming prospect of bankruptcy, only magic bean salesmen appear to be interested in GM's loan arranging cash cow. (If GM goes belly-up, creditors would pig pile on GMAC.) And Rabid Rick didn't make any mention of GM's dividend payments, which show a bizarre, Rasputin-like ability to avoid necessary execution. Oh, and what of the ongoing SEC probe into GM's accounting practices? You can bet there are a lot of crossed fingers on THAT score…

As bad as GM's financial situation is, as bad as it's going to get, the bottom line is more about psychology than numbers. The entire world now knows The General is in deep shit. (When the President of the United States says he ain't gonna bail GM's ass out, a lot more consumers suddenly know GM's ass needs bailing.) An ever-increasing number of current and potential GM buyers are suddenly realizing that they could be left with worthless trade-ins, questionable warranty protection, limited parts availability and problematic service. At some tipping point, they'll simply stop buying GM products. The General's hull will fracture, and the ship will slip between the waves in triple-quick time. Ironically enough, fleet sales will be the first to go…

There's only one thing that could bridge the death accelerating perception gap between GM's potential/inevitable slide into bankruptcy and the [slim] chance that everything will [someday] be all right: GM CEO Rabid Rick Wagoner. THIS is the time for Rabid Rick to publicly announce a bold, clear, inclusive and unequivocal course to a financial safe haven. But no. Rabid Rick's refusal to say (guess? predict? estimate?) when GM will be profitable again is a PR obscenity. Hey Rick; news flash. If you say you don't know when, you're also saying you don't know how, and if you're saying you don't know how, it's time to jump in your golden lifeboat and go. It's not good enough to BE the captain; you have to ACT like one.

By on January 24, 2006

 In 1817, Marie-Henri Beyle toured the Uffizi museum. Lost in a maze of galleries, the French novelist was paralyzed by indecision. His heart raced. His breathing was shallow and labored. His mind was completely disoriented. He couldn't move. Beyle eventually wrote about his experience under his pen name, Stendahl. In 1979, Italian psychiatrist Graziella Megherini coined the phrase 'Stendahl Syndrome' for people paralyzed by excessive choice. It's a concept bedeviling supermarkets, web pages and… carmakers.

For example, BMW's M5 is considered the ultimate sports sedan. And yet the uber-5er faces a bewildering range of operational decisions: three suspension, shifting and e-traction levels; two horsepower options and eleven gearbox modes. While a hard-core cadre of enthusiasts embrace the Bimmer's programmability, most newbies sit in the M5's driver's seat and… freeze. After overcoming their initial shock, they rely on one or two factory settings– or walk away thanking Gott in Himmel they own something a lot less complicated.

The M5's complexity reflects automakers' overly literal interpretation of America's favorite shibboleth: freedom of choice. Carmakers clearly believe that the more their products cater to each owner's personal preferences, the better. You only have to count the number of motors underneath a S-Class' seat– or tally-up the number of ways it can massage, heat or cool its occupant's hindquarters– to see the philosophy in action. And it's not just the luxury playas kissing ass. Even a humble Hyundai Elantra offers eight-way adjustable seats. This sort of multi-variable "feature creep" is spreading through the automotive landscape like electronic kudzu.

The personalization craze is based on a couple of false assumptions. For one thing, it assumes that people are different. As much as purple dinosaurs would have us believe otherwise, most humans share the same likes and dislikes. Put an Audi MMI interface in front of a wealthy, middle-aged man, and he'll use it (or not) the same way as any other wealthy, middle-aged man: completely ignoring 80% of its functions. If middle-aged men are your core clientele, confronting them with options they don't want or (worse) understand is an indisputably boneheaded idea.

The "options uber alles" movement also assumes that people enjoy experimentation. How do you decide when your M5's chair bolsters should deploy? Which suspension setting is best for the family on a road trip? Technophiles are comfortable "playing" with BMW's buttons until they achieve a suitable result. Regular Joes prefer to leave things as they are (rather than get lost inside an iDrive sub-menu). In both cases, psychological comfort depends on a precise balance between the amount of available choice and a person's ability to understand and evaluate the options. Today's luxury car salesmen spend twice as much time on customer deliveries– explaining functionality– than they did ten years ago. That's a sign of trouble, not progress.

Automotive Stendahl Syndrome isn't restricted to the human – vehicle interface. The industry itself is triggering buyers' instinctual freeze response. Customers must select from literally hundreds of models. Let's say a potential buyer restricts themselves to Ford products. They must then choose from one of eight brands: Ford, Lincoln, Mercury, Mazda, Volvo, Jaguar, Land Rover or Aston Martin. If they take a fancy to Volvo, they must then select a vehicle from eight models: S40, S60, S80, V50, V70, XC70, XC90 or C70. If they opt for an XC90, they then must decide on one of two engine configurations. And then there's the options list… Is it any wonder so many people buy a newer version of their existing whip, rather than face the prospect of Stendahl Syndrome?

Automakers looking to increase customer satisfaction and build their brands should buck the trend and implement a radical, counterintuitive strategy: less choice. First, they must only offer the options and features their core clients really need/want (erring on the side of minimalism). Second, they must make all in-car functions completely intuitive. Third, they must realize that customers are most comfortable choosing between two– count 'em two– options (e.g. heated seat: on or off). Fourth, they should never offer a customer more than three choices for adjusting an in-car device (e.g. driving character: comfort, sport or extreme).

Here's the really tough part: carmakers should only sell three models per brand. I know it sounds crazy, but the average luxury buyer has a better chance of naming the staff at their local Starbuck's than listing Cadillac's entire lineup. By the same token, back in the days when a VW was a Beetle and a bus, the automaker's image was far stronger than it is today. By simplifying their products and scything their range, carmakers would eliminate Stendahl Syndrome, making it easier for customers to choose and enjoy their car. Any way you look at it, that's got to be a good thing.

By on January 19, 2006

 If I hear that "you can't cut your way to prosperity" line one more time, I swear I'm going to post a forty-eight page article about surgical cancer treatment. Listen up. General Motors sells a vast range of crap automobiles for less than they cost to make. The General has only one hope for survival: cut itself into pieces, jettison ALL the cancerous bits (products, brands, management, committees, supervisors, labor contracts, buildings, factories, suppliers, dealers, Gulfstream jets, the lot) and get on with the business of making the world's best vehicles at… wait for it… a profit.

It's increasingly obvious that this necessary (not to say inevitable) "restructuring" will have to wait until GM goes under. The General's generals made that clear when they reacted to Turnaround King Jerry York's suggestion that GM should deep-six or sell their Saab and Hummer brands. GM execs dismissed the idea with the PR equivalent of a derisive snort. Marketing Maven Monster Mark LaNeve, a man whose comments about GM's pricing strategy sound a lot like a snake-handler speaking in tongues, assured the press that "all GM's brands will eventually be profitable." Bet your bottom dollar? Done. GM has mortgaged its future on baseless brand optimism.

You wouldn't expect anything less from Rabid Rick Wagoner's "Iceberg? What iceberg? Oh THAT iceberg" administration. But what's up with ascot-clad industry doyen Jerry Flint? Forbes magazine's Main Man reacted to York's call for brand assassination with thinly-veiled scorn and happy-clappy cheerleading. In an anti-cull diatribe published by The Car Connection, Flint was contemptuous of Wall Street analysts in general and Kirk Kerkorian's proxy in particular. He excoriated them all with characteristic bluntality: "Well, they are just wrong."

Flint says GM will save Saab by federalizing German Opels, slapping on a Saab sticker and sending them stateside. He predicts that THIS plan will deliver the goods (as opposed to the previous brainstorm involving rebadged Subarus and touched-up Trailblazers). Yes, well, as the writer himself pointed-out back in '93, "For $1.5 billion, GM got a money-losing operation that needs a 30 percent sales increase to break even and maybe a 50 percent increase to be seriously profitable. For that money, it could have built a new line for Cadillac to make it a global contender in the luxury field. Instead, it has Saab." Which still hasn't made a dime for GM; ending '05 down $300m on increased sales.

Flint also sneers at York's proposed Hummericide. He lauds the new H3's sales and trumpets the fact that it's built on the Chevy Colorado platform, sharing its asthmatic five-cylinder engine. Why kill a brand that's on its uppers– you know, other than the fact that it's not profitable? On one hand, you gotta love a GM brand– ANY GM brand– with such a tightly-focused product portfolio. On the other hand, even casual observers might suggest that the whole Hummer shtick is a great landing in the wrong decade. Cliff diving sales figures for Hummer's ludicrous H1 and laughable H2 are only one indication that the brand may not have the brightest of futures. Gas prices are the other.

Flint's Hummeraphilia reflects his faith in GM's overarching strategy of platform sharing (a.k.a. badge engineering). The rest of his article defends Buick, Pontiac and Chevrolet against the executioner's blade on the basis that they sell a Hell of a lot of stuff, and that much of that stuff comes from the same assembly line. "If you eliminated the Pontiac Torrent, for example, there would be less volume for the factory that makes the Equinox and the Torrent. Kill Buick and you starve the factory making the Cadillac DTS and the Lucerne. The trick is to make distinctive models off the same platforms."

For a lesson on how it should be done, Flint points to the factory cranking-out the [sisters under the skin] Chrysler 300, Dodge Charger and Dodge Magnum. On the face of it, DCX' cost savings reaffirm Flint's case for cranking-out as much shit as humanly possible. But the strategy holds a hidden danger: homogeneity. The Dodge Charger may be relatively cheap to build, but the NASCAR Dad's sedan is hardly a "distinctive" departure from the Chrysler 300– or, for that matter, a solid sales success. Lincoln Mercury's disastrous dependence on tarted-up Fords is teaching The Blue Oval Boys that platform sharing and genre-killing brand-specific products are mutually exclusive.

Corner-cutting kills cars. And brands. And companies. Longtime pundits like Flint, who look at the ever-changing roster of products slated for GM's various divisions and conclude "The way up is to grow, not to kill", are just wrong. GM is clinically obese and chronically slow. Platform sharing just makes The General fatter and lazier. Yes, killing brands– and models– would be enormously expensive. But General Motors is diseased. One way or another, sooner or later, the surgeon's knife will swing down and do what must be done.

By on January 17, 2006

 'We didn't plan it this way. But Delphi has become a metaphor for nearly every economic and social issue gripping America.' Jesus, I hope not. Before I explain my concerns, let's review. The speaker is Robert "Call Me Steve" Miller, president of bankrupt auto parts supplier Delphi. Miller made his remarks to a bunch of industry wonks at Automotive News' grandiosely-named World Congress. Now, strip out the hyperbole (Delphi's plight isn't a metaphor for the impact of rap music on African Americans) and Miller's saying 'as goeth Delphi, so goeth American manufacturing.' Like I said, scary stuff.

Back in the fall of '05 (no pun intended), Miller was the tough-talking turnaround expert who'd taken the reins at GM's former subsidiary. Miller was all about cutting the United Auto Workers (UAW) down to size: wages, pension, health care, vacations, job classifications, the lot. Words were not minced. If the UAW didn't agree to a 60% cut to its hourly workers' wages, Miller vowed to have their Delphi contract thrown out by a federal bankruptcy judge. Analysts hailed Miller's "we can't afford this shit anymore" stance as the automobile industry's long-awaited, much-needed wakeup call. Supposedly, Miller's realism was both a preview and template for GM's survival.

It's hard to believe that the man who dared take the UAW to task for unionizing his company's lawn care would cave so quickly and completely to organized labor. But then, the stakes couldn't have been any higher. If Miller made good on his threat to deep-six Delphi's UAW contract– an accord that the parts maker's bankruptcy had conclusively revealed as untenable– the UAW would have nuked Delphi's production lines. Starved of parts, General Motors would have rolled over and died. In fact, the entire US auto industry would have been thrown into chaos, as edge-living subcontractors followed the mother ship straight into the impact crater.

How the UAW turned "Call Me Steve" Miller into The Joker is anybody's guess, but you don't have to 'fall' into a vat of toxic waste to know that a trillion dollar status quo does not go quietly into that long good night. Ultimately, The Joker's mission to deflate Delphi's union's bloated costs was waylaid by GM CEO Rick Wagoner, a man whose UAW dealings are distinctly cephalopodan. Faced with Delphi's doomsday scenario, unwilling to use a UAW strike at Delphi to put his house in order, Rabid Rick bellied-up to the bar. The ensuing multi-billion dollar damage to GM's tab will be both epic and ongoing– but nobody does epic and ongoing like GM.

GM's forthcoming bailout will defuse the possibility of a UAW confrontation at Delphi. No surprise, then, that man once considered the Dr. Death of old school American unionism is now talking about "soft landings." In other words, Delphi's GM-funded UAW agreement will maintain its union members in the style to which they've become accustomed while pledging/pretending to make future "adjustments" to the company's labor costs… Eventually. In other other words, once again, US automakers are putting off until tomorrow what can't be put off forever: a fundamental restructuring of administration, production and sales.

Thankfully, Delphi's plight is NOT symbolic of American industry's ability to compete with foreign rivals. For one thing, you'd be hard-pressed to find another multi-national conglomerate that can simply transfer its profit-killing labor costs to its largest customer (the word "blackmail" should probably be in there somewhere). For another, most US manufacturers have already solved the problem of sky-high labor costs and restrictive union practices. They've gone bust, forced their unions to face reality or transferred manufacturing operations to non-union locations (either here or abroad). What, exactly, is Delphi and GM waiting for?

The Joker, of all people, should know the drill; this is the man who personally dragged Bethlehem Steel and United Airlines kicking and screaming into the 21st century. Delphi's situation is simply more of the same: a huge, outdated company displaying a pathological inability to change. Detroit laughed at small Japanese cars in the 60's, sniggered at German luxury cars in the 70's, ridiculed hybrids in the 90's, and so on. By the time they "got it", they'd lost it. What's different about GM and Delphi's approach to their manufacturing costs, now that Delphi is an "independent" company? Nothing.

Readers of this series will not be surprised by Rabid Rick's readiness to pay the UAW the blood money needed to keep The General on life support. But few insiders had figured The Joker for a fool. Obviously, personally, he isn't. Come what may, Robert S. Miller will emerge from this slow motion debacle with considerable wealth. The same cannot be said of Delphi or GM.

By on January 11, 2006

 On Tuesday, the elephant in GM's boardroom removed its cloaking device. In the heart of GM's corporate HQ, in the middle of the Detroit auto show, Jerome P. York told GM's management to fall on their swords. More specifically, the man behind The Man Who Would Be King told The General's generals to prune their salaries, big style. Sure, Kirk Kerkorian's proxy also recommended killing brands, halving dividends, eliminating production capacity and a bunch of other turnaround type stuff. But his call for deep cuts in executive compensation was the exec's most chilling suggestion– at least to the people pulling the strings at the world's largest automaker. RenCen shuddered in horror.

Characteristically, the West Point grad was happy to put some hard numbers to his personal attack. According to York, GM's Board of Bystanders should work for "significantly less" than $200k per year. The company's top five officers should take a "significant" hit to their $7m per year salary. Management further down the "pyramid" should suck up double digit reductions, until "you got to the lowest levels in the plants and offices, where the percentage would hopefully be only a single digit number." In short, Mr. York seems Hell bent on turning on the lights and sending GM's lifelong party-goers home to their parents.

And why not? Obviously, Kirk "Mr. Las Vegas" Kerkorian doesn't have the juice to whack GM CEO Rabid Rick Wagoner and his Board of Bystanders and replace them with made men like York. Captain Kirk knows if he leaves it too long, it'll be too late: they'll be nothing left to plunder. So Kirk decided to kick 'em where it hurts. You know, wake 'em up a little. And just in case GM's fat cats were too stupid to feel the pain, York pointed to the time bomb ticking in the corner: "…the current cash burn rate of $24m per day would keep GM going for another thousand days or… roughly three years." Whew! "But of course that's if conditions remain the same as they were in the first nine months of 2005." Stop it Jer; you're killing me!

York's speech gave three reasons why GM's thousand day march to bankruptcy might take a bit longer (The General's new SUV's, the Chevy Malibu "renewal" and the Saturn Aura), and a more complete and plausible list of reasons why the gig could be up by next Friday (a weakening US economy, the cost of Delphi's union peace and downsizing production, the loss of GMAC income and market share). As far as veiled threats go, this one arrived buck naked on a white charger, and I don't mean the sexy new Dodge. In fact, it was so compelling it probably scared GM's top dogs for a full ten minutes.

Despite York's ability to spell-out GM's clear and present danger, his speech lacked sufficient animus to light a sustained fire under GM's corporate butt. It was couched as "tough love", suffused with compliments and reassurances. "We're not waiting to feast on GM's dismembered body," York as-good-as declared. "We're here because we want to see GM restored to its former glory– well, OK, profitability." Call it the Home Depot approach: You can do it. We can help. To which GM's Car Czar Maximum Bob Lutz immediately and publicly replied: I can do it and you can piss off. And leave your hands off my salary, Bub.

If only York hadn't pulled his punches. As TTAC's Deep Throat points out, York's estimation of GM's cash stockpile included money that isn't there: gains from the sale of GMAC, Saab, Hummer and anything else that isn't nailed down. Also, GM would be forced to declare bankruptcy well before it runs out of cash. Analysts say The General needs at least $10b on hand just to run the business (York uses $5b as an acceptable minimum). My Go-To Guy says GM currently can get its mitts on about $5b (above the $10b bankruptcy threshold), plus an equal amount from its VEBA fund (Volunteer Employees' Benefits Association, whose use is restricted). So, at $24m a day, GM's nest egg will be gone in 400 days.

That's IF things stay on an even course. York's doomsday scenario was bleak, but it didn't include the fact that a new pension funding rule could wipe out GM's entire hoard. Or the cataclysmic effect of recent price cuts and incentive reductions on GM loyalists, who are already so far backwards on their loans they can't afford a new car. Or what happens if fleet buyers– 25% of GM's business– smell bankruptcy. Or what's going on with the SEC probe. Or, let's face it, any number of nasty things currently hidden and vaguely hinted at in York's "aside" calling for greater transparency. When you think about it, York's audience may not know the half of it– literally. Clearly, they should.

By on January 10, 2006

 If you're visiting the Detroit auto show, do me a favor. Go to the GM stand, find the new Chevrolet Tahoe Dual-Mode Hybrid SUV and ask the moto-bouncer to pop the hood. See if the thing's got a hybrid engine. (Ignore the engine cover; a few months ago, GM put a fake plastic cover over a pushrod powereplant to convince AutoWeek they were driving a hybrid prototype.) If The Man refuses to accommodate your request, try to decide if he's hiding something. Either way, let me know. 'Cause I'm beginning to think that Buickman is on to something…

If you don't know Buickman (a.k.a. Jim Dollinger), it's not for lack of trying. Since '94, the Michigan car salesman has dedicated his life to promoting his "Return to Greatness" recovery plan. He's brought his campaign to salesmen, customers, stockholders, board members, union members, dealers, the press, the web (www.generalwatch.com); anyone and everyone who'll give him the time of day. Now that GM faces the final curtain, Buickman has pretty much given-up on his quixotic quest and transformed himself into a whistle blower, or, if you prefer, a professional thorn in the side of GM's masters. Less charitably, Buickman is now a full-blown GM conspiracy theorist.

Buickman believes a cabal of international financiers is driving GM into bankruptcy so they can buy it up for "cents on the dollar". If I tell you that Buickman identifies the main culprits as the Rothschilds, a favorite villain for folks suspecting the secret implementation of a non-democratic "New World Order", your mind may turn away from the details of his allegations. As would mine– if it weren't for that damn engine cover. Even though I don't buy into that whole "World Bank as KAOS" shtick, I keep wondering what kind of company would create a hybrid head fake. Whose idea was it? Who knew about it? More to the point, if GM's willing to lie about the availability of hybrid engines, what else are they up to?

On the face of it, Buickman's allegation of corporate suicide don't square with counterfeit hybridism; if Rabid Rick Wagoner wants to jam GM's yoke forwards, why pretend The General's got the magic engine elixir? Of course, whenever you enter Conspiracy World, every objection has an equal and opposite explanation. In this case, Buickman maintains that Wagoner wants the world to think he's trying to save GM, even though he isn't. Plausible deniability. And then Buickman brain dumps a mountain of innuendo, from Wagoner's bankruptcy-proof pension to the company's $4b FIATsco.

And that's where it starts to get weird, because Buickman ain't just whistling Dixie. Why would GM's Board of Bystanders let Wagoner create a bankruptcy-proof pension if, as he claims, "we don't have a plan for bankruptcy"? Why did Merrill Lynch immediately buy GM's abandoned FIAT stock, given that Merrill's CEO also serves on GM's Board? Furtive Jewish bargain hunting bankers or no, Buickman's right: there are a lot of dubious goings-on over at RenCen involving the disposal of GM's assets.

And then there's the union health care 'giveback.' When we first heard of the deal, we were surprised to learn it established a $3b health care fund for the United Auto Workers (UAW). Aside from the obvious duplicity involved (when is a giveback not a giveback?) and the devious timing (Wagoner made the announcement on the day GM revealed its third quarter losses), why did GM fork over a lump sum to the UAW? Why not just pay out for increased health care coverage from The General's corporate coffers? Buickman points out that the UAW receives a 20% "administration fee". If true (neither GM nor the UAW will confirm the report), that's a $600m 'tip'. That's… scary.

And then Buickman says that the UAW and GM have agreed to stage a union strike later this year to destroy the company, so that the nefarious forces responsible can live happily ever after. As Buickman can't provide any evidence for his GM-killing, nest-feathering conspiracies, sorting fact from fantasy is nearasdammit impossible. Applying Occam's razor (the simplest explanation is most likely to be correct) doesn't help when you're forced to explain GM's endless F-ups by choosing between gross incompetence and Enron-style shenanigans.

The best I can do is reference Martha Mitchell. Mrs. Mitchell's husband John was the US Attorney General under Richard Nixon. Mrs. M would call Washington reporters in the middle of the night with bizarre tales of illegal activities: a secret enemies list, South American assassinations, break-ins, wiretaps, the FBI Director wearing a dress and more. By the time these reporters realized Mitchell wasn't a crazy drunk, her husband was in jail for conspiracy, obstruction of justice and perjury. In other words, while it's easy to dismiss Buickman's rants as the sour fruit of a man scorned by GM's Boy's Club, being bitter doesn't make a man a fool. Or, come to think of it, wrong.

UPDATE: The Chevy Tahoe hybrid has been removed from the floor of the Detroit Auto Show for 60 Minutes spinnery. We await confirmation of its powerplant…

Recent Comments

  • Lou_BC: @Carlson Fan – My ’68 has 2.75:1 rear end. It buries the speedo needle. It came stock with the...
  • theflyersfan: Inside the Chicago Loop and up Lakeshore Drive rivals any great city in the world. The beauty of the...
  • A Scientist: When I was a teenager in the mid 90’s you could have one of these rolling s-boxes for a case of...
  • Mike Beranek: You should expand your knowledge base, clearly it’s insufficient. The race isn’t in...
  • Mike Beranek: ^^THIS^^ Chicago is FOX’s whipping boy because it makes Illinois a progressive bastion in the...

New Car Research

Get a Free Dealer Quote

Who We Are

  • Adam Tonge
  • Bozi Tatarevic
  • Corey Lewis
  • Jo Borras
  • Mark Baruth
  • Ronnie Schreiber