Category: Editorials

By on January 9, 2006

 I don't want to be the one to throw cold water on Detroit's billion dollar beauty pageant, but someone's got to do it. The workers' demonstration outside Cobo Center turned out to be a damp squib (probably because the workers in question enjoy a union contract that guarantees them job security, a comfortable salary and comprehensive health care). The mainstream automotive press isn't about to bite the hand that RSS feeds. So I'll step into the breach with a simple statement: the last thing Detroit needs right now is a bunch of new cars.

Once upon a time, the Detroit auto show was The Detroit Auto Show, not some gussied-up international flying circus. Carmakers showed off wild, inherently stupid concept cars that would never, EVER be built and the latest update to their showroom models. And then everyone headed off to open bars and hooker-laden hospitality suites to do what comes natural to middle-aged white men. Now the suits are serious and the web is alive with the sound of clickery, as even industry addicts struggle to keep up with dozens of new models headed for the showrooms. While it's easy to get caught up in the buzz, I'm here to say that all this product overkill will, as the Brits say, end in tears.

Of course, niche marketing mania already has a lot of shareholders crying– should anyone be bothered to notice. GM and Ford have wiped off tens of billions from shareholder value in the last year alone, and yet everyone is happy to believe that spending hundreds of millions of dollars building and showing off a fantastic over-abundance of new products is a sign of corporate health and hope. Even Daimler-Chrysler-Mercedes-Dodge-not-so-SMART, a company that missed a date with the executioner by the skin of the [Hail Mary] 300C, is happy to move with the gluttony-as-God groove. Detroit's submersion under a red ink tsunami ought to tell folks in no uncertain terms that this "car of the minute" shotgun approach is an abject failure, even if Detroit's titanic deck party says otherwise.

While GM unveils the latest Buick van (a vehicle that should have been called "Last Days in the Bunker" instead of "Enclave") and declares a corner turned for a dead brand waiting, Toyota reveals a refreshed sixth gen Camry with a hybrid engine option, and keeps grinding the competition into the dust. The makers of America's best-selling sedan (for the last four year's running) "get it": you sweat blood and spend billions to get customers into a new vehicle, and then you sweat blood and spend billions to bloody well keep them there. Lexus' updated eight-speed LS technobarge will keep their customers away from Mercedes dealers. Infiniti's non-radical G35 concept car and tweaked FX and M models will do the same.

The Big Three are neglecting their core models in favor of entirely new models that look like nothing else in their portfolio (e.g. the Lincoln MKX). While the Japanese are not adverse to growing and selling a bit of strange fruit from time to time, they refine and refine and refine their existing best-sellers, minting money and growing market share. Screw GM's new crossovers, how's the new Impala and big Caddy? Forget about the Ford Edge, how's the new Lincoln LS– I'm sorry, Five Hundred? Crap, really. Nothing but a big soft target for rival automakers coveting their audience. The fact that Ford and GM's "new" SUV's won't offer a world-class hybrid powerplant for another year is nothing less than a disgrace.

A while back, the "ten day car" was the talk of Cobo Township. The idea: build a customized version of a mainstream model and deliver it to the buyer in ten days. At an auto show conference, consultant Michael Robinet declared the concept dead. At the same time, The Vice President of CSM Worldwide acknowledged that dealer profits are increasingly dependent on aftermarket conversions. Hel-lo? As the increasing number and sophistication of Camry options indicates, the ten day car concept is far from dead. And money, like energy, is never lost; it just changes form. The dealer profits are a clear indication that mass customization IS the future– not the explosion of new models. In fact, its realization could help save Detroit's automakers from oblivion, maintaining what little customer loyalty remains.

Think about it. Check the history of the sales charts, where the same models appear again and again. That's because the vast majority customers don't want a NEW car. They want a BETTER car. As you can plainly see at The North American International Clusteryouknowwhat, Detroit seems resolutely determined not to give it to them. So party on guys. A reckoning is on its way.

By on January 6, 2006

 Regrets? GM's Vice President of North American Vehicle Sales has had a few. Then again, too few to mention. When quizzed about the wisdom of last summer's Fire Sale for Everyone, Monster Mark LaNeve said "Hindsight being 20/20, I probably wouldn't have done it." Probably? The campaign annihilated The General's fall and winter business and sealed GM's rep as America's largest discount car company. Which LaNeve now vows to fix by ignoring the connection between guilt and change and reanimating the company's short-lived "Total Value Promise" program.

Which is what, exactly? Although LaNeve's past rhetoric qualifies him for a job as the fifth Wiggle, and the specifics of the latest version of the Total Value Promise (TVP) await a Detroit unveiling, Monster Mark's been dropping hints. At the LA car confab, the slightly confessional marketing maven revealed the basics: lower sticker prices and a clear focus on comparative excellence. "We'll say, 'Best product, here's why," LaNeve said. "'Best price on an MSRP basis.'" What's more, "With every new product we bring to market, we'd like to price it very aggressively."

Not to coin a phrase, but the spin-out starts here. First of all, GM doesn't make the best products. While The General's camp followers will cry foul and cite various measurements placing GM vehicles head and fenders above the competition, the Chevrolet Corvette is the company's only undisputed class leader– and the $65k sports car division isn't exactly what you'd call crowded. Sure, GM's refreshed SUV's may turn out to be the business, but the majority of GM's products are also-rans. After all, if GM vehicles WERE the best of the best, the world's largest automaker wouldn't have to discount the damn things.

As for GM's plan to reduce advertised prices, well, we've been here before. In the brief period between Fire and Toe Tag sales, GM launched (pre-launched?) the TVP. Then as now, Monster Mark declared that GM's window stickers would be "closer" to the actual bottom line. The fact that this less-than-iron-clad "promise" was quickly and completely deep-sixed for yet another nationwide incentive campaign removed any chance consumers would believe GM's latest pledge. And why should they? You don't have to be a Keynesian economist to know that The General's inability to limit its supply guarantees a glut, which assures an eventual price cut. Lesson learned? Wait and prices will fall.

In fact, the whole concept of MSRP (Manufacturer's Suggested Retail Price) has been thoroughly discredited. Thanks to a seemingly endless succession of nationally-advertised discount campaigns, consumers now operate on the basis that a vehicle's MSRP is only an inflated starting point, or, if you prefer, meaningless. No one pays sticker. No one. How do consumers compare vehicle prices when they're subject to an ever-changing farrago of incentives and finance offers? The savvy ones go to independent websites like www.kbb.com, press a few buttons and sort it out. Given the confusion, volatility and newfound transparency of car prices, GM might as well lose the sticker and simply direct consumers to an appropriate website.

Obviously, legally, they can't do that. Equally obvious, strict TVP adherence is highly unlikely, veering towards impossible. Think of it this way: if one of GM's competitors reduces their prices with an incentive campaign, a TVP-faithful GM could only respond by lowering their advertised sticker price. That's not a strategy bound to please recent owners or dealers, whose livelihood depends on trying to maintain as much of the inflated MSRP as possible. It also flies in the face of common sense: what's built must be sold. If discounts are what American consumers need to get the iron off the lot, discounts is what they're gonna get.

The biggest problem with TVP is that GM is, as always, hedging its bets. Note LaNeve's use of MSRP as a measure of relative price; GM is not promising to have the best price relative to the competition in absolute terms. By the same token, LaNeve said he would "like" to price new vehicles aggressively, not that he 'will.' In truth, there's only one alternative to the current rebate-driven set-up: the no-dicker sticker. If GM really wants to eliminate incentives, they have to say 'this is the price for this vehicle.' Period.

You could certainly posit that much of the Fire Sale for Everyone's success was due to the [perceived] lack of price negotiation. You could also credibly maintain that non-negotiable prices assured the Saturn brand's initial survival. But you'd have a hard time arguing that GM's management has the stones to weather the inevitable fall-out from a no-haggle pricing policy, as dealers scream bloody murder and duff vehicles pile-up in their thousands. Bottom line: expect GM's TVP to fade into obscurity for the second time, replaced by yet another round of rebates. And once again, Monster Mark LaNeve will be left without regrets.

By on January 5, 2006

Fields1.jpgOn Wednesday, Ford Motor Company’s freshly-minted Executive Vice President and President of the Americas took center stage at the Greater Los Angeles Auto Show and declared that the customer is king. And there you have it: Ford’s Way Forward. To his credit, Mark Fields admitted (in just about every way imaginable) that Ford has lost its way with American car buyers (in just about every way imaginable). Those of us hoping to hear the wunderkind’s secret recipe for reclaiming faded Glory, for better serving Ford’s collective majesties, were still left wondering if there’s a Ford in our future…

At least Fields’ speech centered on cars. Although Ford continues to enjoy a lengthy and profitable love affair with its truck buyers– the F-series sold more than 901,000 units this year and remains the top selling private vehicle in the U.S.– The House of Henry doesn’t share GM’s desperate faith in a resurgent light truck market. Ford recognizes that its financial salvation depends on reinvigorating its car business. And to get THAT side of the operation back in the black, Fields announced his intention to launch new products with bold, distinctly American designs and a large dose of “innovation”– the salve for all that ails a struggling manufacturer.

Fields asked his attentive audience to compare Ford’s current doldrums with Apple and Motorola’s recent past. According to Ford’s new kid on the [chopping] block, both once-proud American consumer corporations were recently on the skids, heading towards acquisition, dismemberment and/or death. But lo and behold, they shine today! Why? They figured out what their customers wanted and made it for them. And they were bold. And they were innovative. And profits rose. And yea, they made their employees, dealers, distributors, stockholders and yes, presidents, wealthy and prosperous!

While few would dispute the broad outline of Fields’ inspiring tale of corporate comeback, it’s important to note that both Apple and Motorola have a long history of bold marketing and innovative products. Both of these firms have made some huge missteps, but they pale in comparison with the gigantic mistakes made by Ford’s plodding, doddering bureaucracy, especially during Detroit’s Dark Ages (e.g. buying Jaguar, neglecting the Taurus, stonewalling the Explorer roll-over, etc.) In any event, you could hardly say that Ford’s inexorable move away from cars and towards ladder frame trucks was either bold or innovative.

Like a long-term alcoholic, Fields now promises that this time things will be different. From now on, Ford will listen and respond to its customers’ needs quickly and efficiently, with true capitalistic creativity. There’s even an internal rallying cry for Ford’s New Think: Red, White and Bold. With this patriotic, take-no-prisoners mantra in place, Fields promised that Ford will succeed in the good old-fashioned American way, as opposed to “trying to out-Korean the Koreans” (whatever that means).

More specifically, Fields believes his customers are bullish on crossovers, midsized sedans and small cars. Fields talked-up the forthcoming “Edge” crossover as a representation of Ford’s newfound ability to build the cars America wants. The Fusion (a.k.a. the Mazda 6) remains Ford’s answer to the question “Why not an Accord?” while Fields told his none-too-stunned audience that small cars are increasingly popular with young people. “Small cars are ripe for bold design and innovation,” Fields said, adding that “no American manufacturer is putting a stamp on small cars.”

As he headed for his conclusion, and his next gig at The Mother of All Auto Shows, Fields indulged in a final fillip of flag-waving. “Many brands want to be American,” Fields asserted. “However, there is no uniquely and consistently American brand in the auto industry.”

Obviously, Ford’s Boy King wants to leave us believing that his employer will fill this neglected role. Yes but… Fields had nothing substantive to say about the exact nature of “an American brand”. Surely the days when bold design and technological innovation set American cars apart from their foreign competitors are long gone. Of course, focusing on these issues has the benefit of drawing attention away from more politically-explosive questions: how much of any “American” Ford will be designed and built using American parts and workers? How is Ford an “American brand” when five of the eight brands in its corporate stable are foreign?

Anyone seeking clarification on these issues is bound to be disappointed. And even if you’re feeling Fields’ love (of customer-centered hi-tech), it may be a long time before the result appears in a showroom near you. Fields’ pronouncement that all the past corporate entanglements would be vanquished by Red, White and Bold sounds all well and good. But, as an independent marketing executive told me afterwards, auto show speeches are a lot like concept cars. They’re all very sexy on the display stand, but once the design heads for the factory floor, things never quite turn out as planned.

By on January 5, 2006

 On Wednesday, Ford Motor Company's freshly-minted Executive Vice President and President of the Americas took center stage at the Greater Los Angeles Auto Show and declared that the customer is king. And there you have it: Ford's Way Forward. To his credit, Mark Fields admitted (in just about every way imaginable) that Ford has lost its way with American car buyers (in just about every way imaginable). Those of us hoping to hear the wunderkind's secret recipe for reclaiming faded Glory, for better serving Ford's collective majesties, were still left wondering if there's a Ford in our future…

At least Fields' speech centered on cars. Although Ford continues to enjoy a lengthy and profitable love affair with its truck buyers– the F-series sold more than 901,000 units this year and remains the top selling private vehicle in the U.S.– The House of Henry doesn't share GM's desperate faith in a resurgent light truck market. Ford recognizes that its financial salvation depends on reinvigorating its car business. And to get THAT side of the operation back in the black, Fields announced his intention to launch new products with bold, distinctly American designs and a large dose of "innovation"– the salve for all that ails a struggling manufacturer.

Fields asked his attentive audience to compare Ford's current doldrums with Apple and Motorola's recent past. According to Ford's new kid on the [chopping] block, both once-proud American consumer corporations were recently on the skids, heading towards acquisition, dismemberment and/or death. But lo and behold, they shine today! Why? They figured out what their customers wanted and made it for them. And they were bold. And they were innovative. And profits rose. And yea, they made their employees, dealers, distributors, stockholders and yes, presidents, wealthy and prosperous!

While few would dispute the broad outline of Fields' inspiring tale of corporate comeback, it's important to note that both Apple and Motorola have a long history of bold marketing and innovative products. Both of these firms have made some huge missteps, but they pale in comparison with the gigantic mistakes made by Ford's plodding, doddering bureaucracy, especially during Detroit's Dark Ages (e.g. buying Jaguar, neglecting the Taurus, stonewalling the Explorer roll-over, etc.) In any event, you could hardly say that Ford's inexorable move away from cars and towards ladder frame trucks was either bold or innovative.

Like a long-term alcoholic, Fields now promises that this time things will be different. From now on, Ford will listen and respond to its customers' needs quickly and efficiently, with true capitalistic creativity. There's even an internal rallying cry for Ford's New Think: Red, White and Bold. With this patriotic, take-no-prisoners mantra in place, Fields promised that Ford will succeed in the good old-fashioned American way, as opposed to "trying to out-Korean the Koreans" (whatever that means).

More specifically, Fields believes his customers are bullish on crossovers, midsized sedans and small cars. Fields talked-up the forthcoming "Edge" crossover as a representation of Ford's newfound ability to build the cars America wants. The Fusion (a.k.a. the Mazda 6) remains Ford's answer to the question "Why not an Accord?" while Fields told his none-too-stunned audience that small cars are increasingly popular with young people. "Small cars are ripe for bold design and innovation," Fields said, adding that "no American manufacturer is putting a stamp on small cars."

As he headed for his conclusion, and his next gig at The Mother of All Auto Shows, Fields indulged in a final fillip of flag-waving. "Many brands want to be American," Fields asserted. "However, there is no uniquely and consistently American brand in the auto industry."

Obviously, Ford's Boy King wants to leave us believing that his employer will fill this neglected role. Yes but… Fields had nothing substantive to say about the exact nature of "an American brand". Surely the days when bold design and technological innovation set American cars apart from their foreign competitors are long gone. Of course, focusing on these issues has the benefit of drawing attention away from more politically-explosive questions: how much of any "American" Ford will be designed and built using American parts and workers? How is Ford an "American brand" when five of the eight brands in its corporate stable are foreign?

Anyone seeking clarification on these issues is bound to be disappointed. And even if you're feeling Fields' love (of customer-centered hi-tech), it may be a long time before the result appears in a showroom near you. Fields' pronouncement that all the past corporate entanglements would be vanquished by Red, White and Bold sounds all well and good. But, as an independent marketing executive told me afterwards, auto show speeches are a lot like concept cars. They're all very sexy on the display stand, but once the design heads for the factory floor, things never quite turn out as planned.

By on January 1, 2006

 Thanks in part to Charles Darwin's theory of evolution, mankind believes everything's gradually getting better. It's a pretty strange kind of optimism, what with killer uptopians like Adolph Hitler and Joseph Stalin hanging-out in our collective past. But this faith in the eternal sunshine of the spotless future fits in nicely with the whole New Year's thing. As does The Detroit News (DTN) January 1 feature "The Road Ahead." Given the black cloud of bankruptcy hanging over Detroit, writer Bill Vlassic's desire to spread a little holiday cheer with a bit of automotive boosterism is entirely understandable. But there's a big difference between lightening-up and enlightenment.


Vlassic begins by revealing that some 40 new cars will debut in Detroit. It's a perfect illustration of the current industry belief that the more models, the merrier. Not so. The explosion of new product actually betrays monumental desperation and a terrific lack of focus. From Porsche's expanding portfolio of unsports cars to Pontiac's odd collection of rebadged vehicles, the abundance of new and often unrelated products represents an unnecessary and self-defeating dissolution of a marque's core strengths. Is General Motors any better off because its Detroit auto show display will feature 10 more products than last year (128 vs. 118)? I don't think so.


Vlassic cites the launch of the Toyota Camry hybrid as a corner turned in a "relentlessly competitive industry" (as opposed to what, real estate?). Yes, 'whether it's hybrid power, computerized safety devices or satellite radio, the average American car is tacking on new technologies and features at dizzying speed" (as opposed to what, personal computers?). We're told that the 'headlong race to satisfy ever-more diverse and sophisticated customers will determine the winners and losers in the auto industry in the coming years." Aside from the nouns involved, this love letter to the joys of automotive progress could've been written in the Eisenhower era.


Back in the day, the American automobilist was equally enthralled by the thrill of the new– only gizmology wasn't their first priority. It was more about style, power and, well, snobbery. But that's not the kind of message today's PC automakers want to send to potential customers. They want consumers to see their feature-laden chariots as miracles of modern science teetering on the brink of perfection. The idea that technological progress is fiendishly difficult, infinitely desirable and strategically paramount provides manufacturers with a convenient excuse for lackluster sales AND endless hope that they can reclaim their share of a brighter tomorrow.


In reality, carmakers are not "perfecting the vehicle." For one thing, perfection is impossible. For another, legislation is now the driving force behind automotive design and engineering. As you'd expect from this odd intersection of fiat and free market, the car industry is being pulled in all directions. It's forced to reconcile mileage with safety, cost with complexity, innovation with liability. While technology plays a crucial role in meeting these conflicting goals, Vlassic's "headlong race" towards more technically sophisticated products isn't the be-all and end-all the writer would have us believe.


More specifically, the hybrid Camry may mark a tipping point for wider acceptance of gas – electric powerplants, but it's only a small indication of how far domestic carmakers have fallen behind their competition; the Japanese lead in smooth and reliable gas engines is far more commercially significant. Growing consumer discomfort with mouse-driven controllers and kludgy electronics indicates that many manufacturers are boldly going where consumers wish they didn't. The US car market is not as highly fragmented as Sciontologists suggest; the American sales chart is still plenty top-heavy. And the only real indication of the average consumer's "increasing sophistication" is their newfound ability to establish dealer invoice.


Those of you who follow such things will realize that Vlassic's logic is Ford friendly. Considering The Blue Oval's recent 'Innovation' rebranding, the DTN feature reads like a transcript from a Ford-sponsored press lunch. No surprise, then, that Vlassic takes us for a PR spin 'round Ford's Innovation Acceleration Center. Vlassic describes it as the Motown equivalent of a Silicon Valley software developers' lair, complete with Lego, a video wall and flop couches. The writer lauds Ford's two-year-old blue sky department with predictable, wide-eyed enthusiasm– even though the fruits of their labors are vaguely described as "many advances in Ford's hybrid engine technology" and "new vehicle incentive programs and marketing strategies."


Like Vlassic's article, Ford's innovatorium appears to suffer from an overdose of self-importance and a hobbling of misdirected focus. Obviously, automakers must develop products that incorporate new technology. But in car making as in nature, 'true' innovation almost always spawns mutant babies. Survival depends on a constant stream of incremental improvements to a proven product. Any automaker who bets the company on a constantly changing menu of technologically advanced vehicles faces corporate extinction, as we shall soon see…

By on December 29, 2005

1959 Cadillac Coupe de VilleLess than a half century ago, every carmaker offered at least one two-door automobile. Entry level coupes were often a young married couple's first car. Sportier coupes were a suburban staple. Coupes like the Ford Galaxy and Chrysler New Yorker offered ordinary Joes a chance to own a car with an extra touch of class and panache. And no luxury marque could thrive without a fabulous Coupe de Ville, or equivalent thereof. The coupe's lack of rear seat room, window leaks, and interior noise were considered a small price to pay for high style. Then things got serious…

The convertible was the first to go. Perhaps the move away from ragtops reflected the uneasy tenor of the times: inflationary belt-tightening, divisive foreign policy, Cold War jitters, the Arab Oil embargo, presidential scandal. Maybe Ralph Nader's seminal work "Unsafe at Any Speed" and blood and guts high school Driver's Ed programs got US car buyers thinking about decapitation. In any case, the topless car was suddenly seen as a needless, dangerous extravagance, rather than a bold and fun statement of personal prosperity. From Corvairs to Cadillacs, convertibles disappeared from American highways. Coupes followed thereafter.

1957 Chevrolet Bel AirMarketeers explain the four-door's ongoing supremacy by pointing their fingers at baby boomers. Supposedly, the industry's driving force needs four-door sedans to help feather their full nest: teenage/young adult children and aging parents. But most such families have at least two cars, and not all baby boomers face these transportation responsibilities. Besides, studies show that "practicality" plays little or no role in a car purchase. The real reason for the moribund coupe market lies within shifting consumer perceptions of quality, desirability and mission-appropriate genre.

For years, European automobiles sold in the US have been universally (if not entirely accurately) recognized as the epitome of engineering excellence. BMW, Mercedes, Audi and others initially entered the US market with well-engineered, fun-to-drive sedans, in part to differentiate them from the "typical" American two-door hardtop. Since most of these foreign importers didn't offer coupes to US buyers, the public began to associate upmarket motor cars with four-door sedans. When Toyota and Honda entered the luxury car market, their Lexus and Acura brands reflected and capitalized on this assumption with a lineup of four-door sedans. Lexus' success further cemented the commonly held image of a quality car as a four-door sedan.

1953 oldsmobile 88 Holiday CoupeBut what of today? Even with 911 and Iraq, we live in breezier times. Stability control, pop-up roll bars, crumple zones and a plethora of electronic and structural measures have eliminated much of the convertible and coupe's inherent safety risk. The coupe market has expanded– somewhat. Upmarket brands now offer a range of two-door models. Entry level couple like the Cobalt, Civic and Focus appeal to The Fast and Furious crowd. But grown-up, low to middle income car buyers who want to ditch the back doors are sniffing with the hounds.

GM offers the G6 and Monte Carlo. Ford weighs in with the Mustang and Focus. Dodge has the Stratus, while Chrysler flogs its Crossfire and Sebring. Toyota sells the Yaris, Scion the two-door tC. Honda has the Civic and Accord. BMW brings the MINI and the 3-Series. VW builds a two-door Golf and the Beetle. In today's niche-driven marketplace, that's not a particularly impressive selection of reasonably-priced, reasonably commodious coupes. Ah, but there's a twist in the tale. The great American coupe hasn't disappeared from the US automotive scene; it just morphed into a pickup truck.

1955 Mercury Montclair ConvertibleThe Ford F150 is America's best selling two-door. Chevrolet, Dodge and GMC two-door pickups aren't far behind. If a newlywed couple wants a cheap pickup, there are plenty of affordable choices. Suburbia is lousy with bling and bad-ass pickups. Luxury "car buyers" can opt for the Ford F150 Lariat, or upmarket Dodges, Chevy's or GMC's. They all offer the same leather-lined, power-everything wretched excess that US consumers snapped up in 70s coupes.

The current movement away from light trucks, back to cars, will eventually stimulate the rebirth of the coupe genre, and the return of the great American [auto-based] coupe. The luxury marques are leading the way towards this renaissance. They're in full coupe mode– from the new BMW 6-Series to the Bentley GT. The success of upmarket hardtop drop-tops will also help the movement, tendering the tempting prospect of lower-priced versions. With designers like Ralph Gilles (300C) looking for ways to inject excitement into what's become a standardized product, it's only a matter of time before the coupe once again becomes an automotive mainstay. The Detroit debut of the new Camaro and Dodge Charger coupes will signal the coming coupe d'etat. As for the kids and the old folks, they'll have to squeeze in the back, drive their own damn car or… buy a coupe.

By on December 26, 2005

 When historians analyze GM's collapse, searching for the precise moment when The General jumped the shark, it will be like trying to pinpoint the onset of Alzheimer's. The world's largest automaker has been screwing things up so spectacularly for so long that even a $2b payoff to FIAT for signing the wrong bit of paper seems like a bump on the road to oblivion. What's more, GM's management is still busy making monumental mistakes. The Board of Bystanders' decision not to admit Kirk Kirkorian's proxy into their midst is only the latest and greatest example.

Unfortunately, I don't have any inside info on the failed negotiations between GM's largest private investor and The Powers That Be. I only know that last Tuesday, after GM's Board rebuffed Captain Kirk's nominee Jerry York, the billionaire investor sold 12m GM shares. The move cut his stake from to 9.9 to 7.8 percent and sent GM's stock into freefall (down to an 18-year low). Some financial experts see it a tax dodge. Others look at Kirk's on-again, off-again romance with MGM and predict his return. TTAC's Deep Throat figures this is it: Kirk's outta here. In any event, Kirk has sent both GM's board and the markets a clear message about GM's future, or lack thereof…

When Kirkorian began his buying binge, GM Car Czar Maximum Bob Lutz displayed his usual penchant for mindless optimism: "He smells a turnaround." Meanwhile, the octogenarian investor was, sensibly enough, plotting to wrest control from Lutz and the other corporate officers who'd mishandled GM's mighty engines, limiting the ship's maneuverability, condemning it to a Toyota encounter of the iceberg kind. Equally obvious, a seat on the Board was the only way Captain Kirk could oust Rabid Rick Wagoner from the bridge, and maybe, just maybe, save the ship from a watery grave. (For those of you keeping metaphorical score, the Titanic had an antiquated rudder.)

And why not? You don't have watch all 357 Dallas episodes to know that a company's future depends on the character of the people running it– or that some people will do anything to maintain control. Wagoner's "I'm going to bring Bobby down if I have to destroy Ewing oil to do it" response to Kirkorian's play was predictable enough, but the Board of Bystander's negative reaction was surprisingly [Cliff] Barnesian. Clearly, they excluded Mr. York to protect Wagoner's mob– which is a bit like backing a flyweight boxer and his fawning entourage over a highly decorated lieutenant commanding a heavily armed, battle-scarred SWAT team.

Now how did THAT happen? You'd be forgiven for thinking that the simple fact that GM's stock price has dropped $20 (and counting) since last January would have motivated The General's Board of Bystanders to activate Rabid Rick's bankruptcy-proof retirement package, STAT. Again, we may never get a clear picture of Rabid Rick's anti-York maneuvering (never mind view the incriminating negatives). But at least we can get a little insight into the Board's myopia, thanks to Slate's Daniel Gross.

Gross recently reported that GM's Board has two gold-standard retired CEO's: Sara Lee's John Bryan and Northrop Grumman's Kent Kresa. And then… Philip Laskawy ran scandal-plagued accountants Ernst & Young. George M.C. Fisher, former chairman and CEO of Eastman Kodak, failed to reverse his company's declining market share. Former Compaq CEO Eckhard Pfeiffer did so well during his tenure that company founder Ben Rosen bought a full-page New York Times ad to diss him. And former ABB head Percy Barnevik was recently forced to return 60% of his $88m pension.

GM's board also includes five active execs: Armando Codina (Republican fixer, Board of Directors-aholic, Florida real-estate maven), Erskine Bowles (ex-Clinton Chief of Staff, twice failed senatorial candidate, President of the University of North Carolina), Ellen Kullman (safety minded DuPont Veep), Karen Katen (Pfizer Drug Lord) and Stan O'Neal (Merrill Lynch's cost-cutting 'Mr. Ruthless'). Other than Rabid Rick Wagoner, Stan the Man is the only CEO in the bunch who's run a publicly held company. He's also the only GM Board member to have revived a publicly held company. And, one surmises, he's the only board member with an ounce of common sense.

After all, this is the motley crew who believe it's a good idea to keep Rabid Rick Wagoner in the Gulfstream G5 style to which he's become accustomed. More to the point, these are the same group of misadventuring misfits who can't recognize a good man when they see one. Well, OK, maybe York's not a "good man" in a Grosse Point golf club kinda way. But he's a devastatingly effective corporate leader: a West Point grad that kicked IBM and Chrysler's ass into shape by paring waste, reorganizing resources and asking questions no one else dared ask. Turning down York's guidance to thwart Kirkorian's ambitions and protect Wagoner's ass was a– if not "the"– seminal moment in GM's long, sad saga. One the company will not live to regret.

By on December 21, 2005

 For those of you who've just joined us from Wall Street, welcome. We've been waiting for you for a while– long enough to wonder if GM's stock price got lost in hyperspace. I guess you guys needed some kind of sign to find your bearings. Something like Toyota's announcement that they're gonna Avis The General in '06, ending GM's 70-year run as the world's largest automaker. Or Rabid Rick Wagoner's post horse departure barn door closing homily: "I'm not conceding anything to anybody." No matter. Now that you're here, let me tell you a story…

I was scanning Wardsauto.com the other day when I came across a "good news" piece: "Crucial GM Fullsize Truck Program Launches Early". Well, OK, it MIGHT be a good news piece, you know, if The General's SUV cavalry racks-up the sales GM needs to die another day. Obviously, it's a bit of a long shot, what with SUV's being a dead genre guzzling. But hey; it is what it was. Anyway, mid-way through Ms. Priddle's puff piece, a thought occurred to me: is it really a good idea to rush the GMT900 vehicles (Tahoe, Yukon, Escalade, Suburban, Silverado, Sierra, etc.) to market? What if they're not ready?

It's not inconceivable. The Pontiac Solstice was due to hit the forecourts in June, promised for November, still isn't widely available and already appears on bulletin boards with a laundry list of complaints. Let's face it: GM has a bit of a history manufacturing, dare I say it, crap. Oh wait; Ward's says the "new" trucks will use 60% of the old trucks' components. And according to Gary White, GM's Fullsize Truck Vehicle Line Executive, the GMT900's are "entering the world with higher quality than the ones they replace." Now THERE'S a reassuring thought.

But let's get to the point. Check the article's last paragraph: "'No one's going to ride a 1-trick pony today,' White says, noting GM could have spent an extra $2 billion for marginal additional improvement to the GMT900 lineup, but recognized the money is better spent elsewhere for a balanced product portfolio." Now ask yourself a question: what the Hell does THAT mean?

The first part of White's quote seems straightforward enough. White's saying his handiwork's got to be safe, reliable, comfortable, attractive and frugalesque. (By implication, yesterday's 'one-trick' SUV's were, um, affordable.) But what's that second bit about the extra $2b GM DIDN'T spend on "marginal additional improvement"? Is White seriously suggesting that a couple of bil only buys you a bit of soft touch plastic here, a nicer steering wheel there? I'm no bean counter, but I would have thought that 2000 million dollars can do a great deal to improve a vehicle.

I emailed Ms. Priddle to see if White had specified these missing marginalities. (GM stopped returning my calls sometime back in April.) No joy there. It then occurred to me that no matter what White's mob left out of the GMT900's, his remarks typify GM's product mentality. The company's lineup is stuffed with ¾ vehicles: cars, trucks, SUV's and minivans that are just about as good as the competition, but not quite. For example, the Pontiac G6 seems a suitable alternative to a Nissan Altima. But if you look closely (as customers do), the G6 isn't up to snuff on almost every level: interior quality, engine refinement, reliability, etc. Even the class-killing Chevrolet Corvette features some of the nastiest plastic known to mankind. In general, The General signs-off its vehicles when they're still a few furlongs from the finish line.

An Audi engineer once told me that the final millimeter of a materials gap eats up a third of the item's production budget. Even though an Audi buyer might not see or feel the resulting precision, the automaker makes the effort and pays the freight. That's just the way they do things. It's already clear from the GMT900's 60% parts carry-over (much of which is due to the SOS timetable) and pre-production shots of the vehicles themselves that White's got it exactly backwards. The huge amount of money GM spent on these vehicles delivered nothing BUT marginal improvements.

White's comments highlighted the trade-off that created the $2b compromise: "marginal improvement" vs. "a balanced product portfolio". In other words, rather than get one vehicle– I mean, a host of similar vehicles– absolutely perfect, GM prefers to build [yet] another product. It's a shotgun approach in a rifle shot world. By manufacturing a complete range of not quite products across eight brands, GM condemns itself to perpetual mediocrity, and guarantees its also-ran status relative to the tightly focused folks at Toyota. The General's generals fail to realize that people don't buy GM's balanced product portfolio. They buy a single GM product. Or, increasingly, not.

By on December 17, 2005

Spring is in the air.In Ford's latest ads, Mr. Bill touts The Blue Oval as a tireless automotive innovator. In reality, Ford has seldom, if ever, taken the technological lead. The Model T's accomplishments owe more to its production process than any mechanical advance. Later successes– like the original Mustang and the first Explorers– broke new ground in marketing and style, not engineering. And lest we forget, Ford still relies on relatively unsophisticated engines to propel its products, ceding both fuel efficiency and powertrain refinement to their competitors. Fortunately for Ford's new focus, the company is a real leader in at least one key engineering discipline…

Ask an old-timer about air suspension and they'll regale you with tales of the ill-fated air springs that bedeviled GM, Ford and American Motors cars in the late 50s; springs that left many a model listing like a 17th century sailing ship in a howling gale. But there was a good reason automakers pursued the technology: it held forth the promise of a constant ride height and frequency. In other words, a properly air-suspended vehicle's ride doesn't degrade with a full load of passengers and luggage; the tail won't drag and the headlights won't point at the sky. Air springs can also be precisely tuned, giving chassis designers a greater opportunity to balance ride and handling.

Of the mass manufacturers, Ford alone stepped up, again, later, still, to the challenge. In '84, Ford finally felt confident enough in their technological prowess to [re]introduce a car that glided on air: the Lincoln Mark VII. Ford's luxury division's new model featured air springs at all four corners, a sophisticated electric air pump and dryer system, leak-proof hose connections, and electronic controls to monitor the system and maintain vehicle height. Although the Mark VII was a clear sales winner, its remarkable air suspension was hardly ever mentioned in its advertising, or any other Ford promotion.

In '88, Ford added elements of the Mark VII system to the Continental's underpinnings. The redesigned Lincoln Continental had a full air system, like the Mark, with electronically controlled variable damping and steering effort to boot. In '93, the Mark VIII's air spring system lowered the car's ride height at speed. While a few clever TV ads showed off the benefits for ride comfort and car control, the air suspension technology that made it possible was never mentioned. Ford eventually spread the technology to more mundane cars like the Lincoln Town Car and Mercury Grand Marquis. Every day, thousands of criminals ride to the slammer atop a pair of air springs in a Crown Vic.

Ford's air spring technology also made its way into the company's vast array of SUVs, where it has greater theoretical advantages. These vehicles, designed to carry large loads and tow heavy objects, need the advantages of constant height and ride frequency even more than a luxury coupe. The Lincoln Navigator, for example, can tow up to 8600 lbs. without the slightest degradation of ride height or ride comfort– AND it kneels for easier entry. Other Ford SUVs now have partial air spring systems, from the Expedition to the new Ford Explorer. All benefit from greatly from this advanced technology.

If Ford's looking for a quick and relatively inexpensive way to enhance its reputation for technological proficiency, The Blue Oval could extend their air suspension systems to their light trucks. Although a light truck's rear leaf suspension gives it tremendous load-bearing capabilities, the genre typically rides and handles extremely poorly when empty. Since that's the way most F150s are used most of the time, their drivers end-up constantly shaken and stirred by road irregularities. Air springs, especially at the rear, would allow Ford trucks to maintain a comfortable ride and a level stance, whether fully loaded or completely empty.

Maybe Ford's afraid that pickup drivers enjoying a smooth ride won't think that their truck is 'Ford Tough'. But heavy truck manufacturers rely on air suspension extensively; those 18-wheelers you see cruising the interstate have been riding on air for almost half a century. (In fact, it's rare to find a heavy truck without air springs.) Ford's advertising and marketing departments could capitalize on the heavy-duty and long distance trucker's reliance on air suspension to infuse their air-sprung pickups' image with appropriate machismo.

Perhaps the best proof of Ford's leadership in air suspension is the fact that many of Europe's finest now deploy their own versions of Ford's ground-breaking technology. Jaguar and Land Rover ride on air for the home team, while Mercedes' S-Class has [finally] returned to the air-suspended glory of their '68 300 SEL 6.3. The Volkswagen Audi Group touts the value of their adaptive air suspension for the A8, Bentley GT and Bentley Flying Spur. It's not often that Ford can honestly claim to be at the forefront of an important automotive technology used by the prestige players. It's about time they did.

By on December 14, 2005

 According to Rabid Rick Wagoner, terminating his employment would only slow down GM's recovery: 'When you bring in a lot of new people, you bring in a lot of change and people just sort of sit there and try to figure out what to do.' As opposed to what? Keeping the same old people and making no changes so that people can sort of sit there and watch the world's largest automaker go bankrupt? Rick's comment appeared in AutoWeek immediately after Standard & Poor's rating service downgraded GM's credit rating to "B", some five steps below investment grade, with a negative outlook. Clearly, Wagoner is to leadership what penguins are to civil engineering.

Like any clueless corporate alpha, Rabid Rick wants us to believe that everything's under control. Indeed, he's instructed PR flack Gina Proia to tell the world that GM has "an aggressive and well thought-out strategy to turn around our North American business." Apparently, this comprehensive plan comes complete with quantifiable goals, implementation dates and, well, everything Rick's mob needs to save GM from a Valentine's Day Massacre. Only AutoWeek reports that Rabid Rick "prefers to keep it private." In fact, GM's would-be savior "declined to predict whether GM's North American automotive operations could break even next year." [NB: "could" not "would."]

"Other people may or may not have time frames, but it's not what I'm worried about,' Wagoner told AutoWeek. 'I'm focused on the fact that we need to fix the business, and that's really what is driving me.' Why do I keep seeing images of Rabid Rick in a pinafore, wandering through a vast wonderland of unsold GM product? In what alternative universe is it OK for the head of the world's largest automaker to stare financial oblivion in the face and say "trust me, don't rush me"? Lewis Carroll himself would be proud of Wagoner's strange rhetoric, which blithely suggests that timetables are antithetical to corporate repair.

Anyway, it's not as if GM's rivals are about to steal Rabid Rick's master plan, so that they can counter The General's new product launches and/or drive their company into the ground. UNLESS… Rabid Rick's briefcase actually contains the codes for the nuclear option. Sure! Rick's mob have a secret plan to leave Delphi twisting in the wind and let the United Auto Workers (UAW) strike. GM would then fall into bankruptcy accidentally on purpose, so it could jettison its UAW contract, close factories, cut brand deadwood, realign the product portfolio and…

Yeah right. Back here in the real world, Rabid Rick is fighting for his company's survival by strolling down the path of least resistance. Rather than make a stand against the UAW, Rabid Rick's ready to pay the blood money needed to forestall a Delphi strike– even though "we certainly didn't budget for stuff like that." Rather than kill-off Buick, Saab and Saturn, Rick's content to let their salesmen hit the forecourt like members of Robert Scott's ill-fated Antarctica expedition (i.e. "I may be some time".) Rather than slash GM's model range across the board and concentrate on building the world's best cars, Rick's happy to manufacture dozens of mediocre examples of the sorts of vehicles people may want to buy by the time GM finally gets around to building them.

Rabid Rick's timidity makes me wonder if he's even trying. When asked about the SUV slump in Automotive News, Wagoner claimed the company was powerless to respond. 'We just couldn't react,' he admitted. 'It really highlighted that the underpinnings of our business are too fragile… if we lose mix or volume, we cannot get costs down as fast as (sales) volume comes down.' Does Rabid Rick really think that GM's ability to turn tail and run is the key to its success? Wouldn't building hybrid SUV's, killer crossovers or awesome sedans have been the better option?

As the Italians say, the fish stinks from the head down. If GM couldn't detect and react to a change in market conditions quickly enough to avoid losing its proverbial shirt, that's because its CEO couldn't perform with sufficient insight, speed or decisiveness. If the UAW is tying Wagoner's hands, preventing him from doing what needs to be done, it's his job to sever those bonds, once and for all. It's one thing to admit you made a mistake, it's another to have the courage and wisdom to make sure it never happens again. Isn't that why Wagoner gets paid so much money?

News reports recently revealed that The General's CEO has negotiated a deal with GM's Board of Bystanders that makes his multi-million dollar pension fund bankruptcy-proof. Not only is that a boneheaded move relative to GM's negotiations with the UAW (which include pension liabilities and contributions), but it betrays Rabid Rick's stunning lack of confidence in his own talents. It's an opinion that's increasingly easy to share.

By on December 13, 2005

 The battle is joined; the safety nannies have scaled the walls of common sense to patrol the courtyard outside the castle keep. How else can you explain Euro-NCAP's (European New Car Assessment Program) pedestrian safety standards for automobiles? Apparently, it isn't enough that modern cars must coddle their occupants in hyperbaric cocoons, girded by all manner of airbags, crumple zones, seatbelt pretensioners and Silicon Valley chipset wizardry. By the look of things, it's now necessary to legislate OUTSIDE the box, to protect hapless bystanders from Death Race destruction.

Europe's new NCAP testing regime rates a car's ability to protect a pedestrian's body upon contact with the front bumper and hood. Eventually, cars that fail the test will not be allowed for sale within the Euro-Zone. It's yet more proof (if proof were needed) that Brussel's non-elected bureaucrats would have their sponsoring nations consider automobiles a curse that must be controlled, a lethal weapon ready to savage any luckless pedestrian who dares place a stray toe beyond the curb.

Back when NCAP first floated the new standards, carmakers were politely apoplectic. They denounced the new criteria as expensive, impractical and expensive, and, despite their nature as chronic heel draggers when it comes to matters legislative, they had a point. How do you create a car that can lose such a one-sided battle of mass, inertia, momentum and blunt force? Of course, government-mandated necessity being one bad mo fo, automakers playing their wares in the Euro-Zone feverishly concocted various mechanical systems to meet the new NCAP standards– but not without a frightening bill in terms of cost and complexity. A tab passed directly along to… wait for it… the consumer.

French automaker Citroen became the first to answer the dubious ring of NCAP's bell, with the organization declaring the marque's new C6 executive saloon the Jaywalker's Best Friend. In order to secure NCAP's first-ever four-star rating, Citroen fitted their range topper with a prodigious muzzle (clock that front overhang) and a labyrinth of sensors tied to under-hood pyrotechnics. When a lunkheaded pedestrian stumbles out into the roadway and the speeding C6 clips his/her maladroit legs, a network of impact and pressure sensors activate, triggering explosive charges that push the hood upwards, creating an impact buffer zone between the car's hard points and the unfortunate's soft points.

As one might imagine, this is a single-use, blow-it-and-throw-it proposition. Once detonated, one doesn't simply tamp down the hood, thumb a reset switch and get on with it. In addition to whatever cosmetic, structural and driveline damage have been wrought, there will henceforth be new sensors to source, incendiary charges to be refurbish, etc. It all adds up, especially because many of these devices are given to activating during normal front-end collisions, regardless of whether the automobile is impaling itself on another car, a centennial elm, or Angelina Jolie's inestimable stems.

Other solutions being efforted include external airbags, larger front ends with heightened space between engine and sheet metal, thinner body panels with improved give (but inferior dent resistance), and any combination thereof. For cars with abbreviated-by-design front ends (roadsters, minivans, full-size vans, etc.), it is proving particularly troublesome (if not impossible) to meet these standards without an active mechanism component. To crib a Diddyism, 'Mo' money, mo' problems.'

Why should this matter to us Yanks? Both Japan and Australia are about to establish their own pedestrian friendly safety legislation. The automakers mucking about in America's sandbox are busy craning their necks to see how this mess pans out. If the 'soft landing for peds' regs hold abroad, it won't be long before they creep Stateside. Perhaps industry lobbyists will be able to stave off federal implementation for a while, but a cabal of personal injury lawyers– the unscrupulous sort who sue municipalities for millions over potholes when their alcohol-soaked clients stagger from bars into darkened streets with their laces tied together– will eventually make it so.

It's instructive to note that, on average, U.S. footsloggers are far less likely to be smacked (never mind killed) by passing motorists than their worldwide counterparts. For example, the annual number of British pedestrian fatalities is fully seventy-five percent of America's totals, despite the fact that Blighty boasts just one-fifth of our population. Perhaps it's because limeys drive like madmen, or maybe it's attributable to differences in roadway and infrastructure design. More than likely, it's because Americans would just assume drive to their refrigerators than walk, if only their cars could apex the breakfast table.

Regardless, if the U.S. adopts criteria similar to that of the Euro-NCAP, the cost/value relationship between adopting such standards will prove to be even less compelling here than it is abroad, and another battle for personal accountability will be lost.

By on December 12, 2005

 I'm a bit of a fix-it freak. Don't get me wrong: I'm no great fan of home improvement. I just love tools. I can quite happily while away an hour or so down at the Depot, cruising the aisles, checking out the hammers, screwdrivers, drills, planes, work benches, etc. Needless to say, I can spot a perfect implement at twenty paces. The second it falls to hand, I'm suffused with delight. A well-designed tool's intrinsic excellence rescues me from the foul compromises of daily strife. It soothes and thrills me with its minimalist mix of precision and possibility. It fills me with admiration for the craftsman who made it. It's the same feeling I get from the new Porsche Boxster S.

I freely admit that the new Boxster S doesn't look particularly special. Although Porsche's open-top roadster shares no major sheetmetal with its immediate predecessor, it continues to forfeit sexy to its continental and Japanese competitors. Truth be told, the Boxster has yet to recover from its divergence from the sublime, Speedster-inspired prototype. The latest iteration pins its hopes for aesthetic redemption on newly pumped haunches and a slightly more aggressive stance. It's better, certainly, but the Boxster's overall form continues to reside in push-me/pull-you no-man's land. It still looks like a hairdresser's car.

In the same sense that a hammer's true beauty is its use, the Boxster S saves its siren song for its driver. The seduction begins when the door slots back into the bodywork like a rifle bolt sliding home. The allure intensifies when your fingers curl around the perfectly-sized, blissfully button-free steering wheel. And then the 3.2-liter flat-six spins into life. The mechanical melody filling the cabin combines the steadfast solidity of an office building's cooling tower fan with a rasp that sounds like a sharpened blade scything a slab of meat. Blip the Boxster S' throttle, sense the immediate response, and the amorphous exterior fades from mental view.

Engage the Boxster S' engine to its wheels and that's it: you're hooked. Don't be misled by all those car hacks who've described the new Boxster S' driving experience with clinical admiration, who would have you believe that yes, it's a great steer, but nothing to go into debt about. I can't explain their blasé commentary any more than I can tell you why someone would build a piece of furniture out of pine. These writers somehow missed the Boxster S' ability to engender overwhelming joy. THIS is the machine that reconnects you with all the pleasures you experienced when you mastered your first bike: confidence, power, freedom, exhilaration.

I remember careening down a long off-ramp in third gear, amping-up the Boxster S' engine under the highway I'd just abandoned. Two possible exits lay at the end of this left-hand sweeper. To go left, I had to tighten my line. As I was already traveling at the outer edges of available grip, I considered taking the easier option. Then I tugged gently on the wheel and felt the Boxster S' back end drift. Without any undue drama, the rear rubber eventually dug in and got 'er done. Respect!

It's all about balance; sheltering in the security of the Boxster S' prodigious grip and progressive understeer or pushing its chassis beyond its limits– just because you can. Well, that and silky smooth shove; mucking about with the go pedal in Variocamland or mercilessly thrashing the sweet-spinning six from basement to penthouse– just because you can. OK, and brakes; relying on the Boxster S' awesome anchors to indulge in a bit of entirely unnecessary exuberance or leaning on them to haul your ass out of impending disaster– just because you have to. Put it together and what have you got? Bippity-boppity-ZOOM!

There are, of course, more accelerative machines. But few of these alternative weapons surrender their thrills at reasonable speeds. Cashing-in their kicks requires real skill, constant concentration and no small amount of courage. The Boxster S' true genius lies in its ability to reward drivers of all talents and abilities, at all speeds. Sure, driving a Boxster S at nine or ten tenths is not a challenge to be taken lightly. But the car is never anything less than fun, and just about as safe as such things get. In fact, the Boxster S' flawless dynamics provide a learning curve that pistonheads can ascend at their own pace, in their own style.

Is the more powerful and rigid Cayman S a better sports car than the new Boxster S? I certainly hope so. But I haven't driven the Cayman S, and the whole point of this exercise is to choose the best car I had the pleasure of driving in '05. That car was the Porsche Boxster S.

By on December 8, 2005

 Forget GM's Toe Tag sale, which failed to extinguish the automaker's low sales idiot light and sealed their reputation as the K Mart of cars. Ignore GM's eternal promise of new and better products. Disregard Rabid Rick's pathetic bleating to the Wall Street Journal that lawsuits, fate and the federal government are responsible for GM's $4.8b black hole. The General's immediate future depends entirely on whether or not the United Auto Workers' (UAW) calls a strike against bankrupt GM parts supplier Delphi.

This January, the UAW's leadership may tell Delphi Prez CallMeSteve Miller to shred his salary and benefit-reducing proposal and flush it down the toilet of his Gulfstream Challenger. Miller will then ask a federal bankruptcy judge to terminate the UAW's contract. The UAW will retaliate with a strike that will starve GM of parts. GM's assembly lines will close. Should the UAW strike last more than a couple of months, The General will burn through its multi-billion dollar cash reserves. The world's largest automaker will be forced to file the world's largest Chapter 11.

Conventional wisdom says it ain't gonna happen. Most GM watchers think the UAW will do whatever it takes to keep Delphi/GM afloat. Supporters of this "acting in their own best interest" theory posit that UAW President Big Ron Gettelfinger is smart enough to understand that the nuclear option would terminate his employer's future, and thus, the union's. Yaysayers dismiss yesterday's comment by UAW Veep Richard Shoemaker that a strike appears "more likely than not" as posturing. Why would the UAW initiate a chain of events that would lead to its destruction?

Simple: they don't see it that way. The UAW knows that the fallout from a Delphi disruption would increase arithmetically; with each passing day, it gets harder and harder (and more and more expensive) for GM to restart its assembly lines. In that sense, the prospect of The General lurching towards strike-related bankruptcy is a good thing; GM's glimpse into the abyss ensures that The General, and thus Delphi, surrender to the union's demands. In other words, the union works on the principle that they can pay us now (GM subsidizes Delphi's UAW contract), or they can pay us later (GM subsidizes Delphi's UAW contract), but either way, they're gonna pay.

In fact, the UAW is spoiling for a fight. Big Ron's stated goal in all this is to forestall the 'dismantling of America's middle class". But his real agenda is, and always will be, the preservation of union power. A successful strike would reassert the UAW's hold over its membership, Delphi, GM and any other automaker or supplier stupid enough to ask UAW workers to surrender one dollar of their salary or a single solitary benefit. While Rabid Rick has proven himself pathologically incapable of drawing a line in the sand (on any issue, ever), Big Ron and his boys are in the sand scribbling business. Anyone who thinks that the union's going to let their adversaries step over the line without retribution faces a rude awakening.

In any case, the UAW doesn't really care what anyone thinks about the virtue of their arguments. They believe (with no small amount of justification) that epic mismanagement caused Delphi and GM's perilous finances. Union members consider the idea that they should take a major hit to compensate for these blunders, helping corporate fat cats and their shareholding paymasters to prosper from their mistakes, beyond preposterous. It's insulting, veering towards evil. The UAW rank and file can just about imagine participating in a plan that would spread the pain equally– trimming corporate salaries, eliminating bonuses, cutting dividends, etc.– but not quite. Just fork over the dough you overpaid bastards, and let's get on with it.

What UAW members CAN conceive, and the analysts can't, is a scenario in which Delphi and GM disappear. The threat of losing everything– salary, benefits, pension, the works– is not the foolproof anti-strike palliative that white collar pundits believe it to be. In fact, the possibility of a cataclysmic GM failure holds a certain Alamo-esque romantic allure– especially for people who see themselves as working class heroes. Or, as one autoworker told the Detroit news: "If we're going down, we're all going down together."

Think it can't happen? Then you don't live in Worcester, Pittsburgh, Fall River or a dozen other rust belt cities and towns where unions drove up the cost and complexity of doing business, and watched it leave. Obviously, it's not unionism per se that caused these economic catastrophes. It was a combination of management arrogance, greed and stupidity; and union arrogance, greed and stupidity. There's only one way to untie this Gordian knot: the UAW must assume greater responsibility for Delphi– and GM's– destiny. They should have a seat on their boards and a large slice of equity. Profit sharing didn't save American Motors, but it just might save GM. Anyway, it's worth a shot.

By on December 6, 2005

 Last Thursday, the American Family Association (AFA) reached an agreement with The Ford Motor Company ending their boycott of the automaker's products. The faith-based organization launched their action last May to stop FoMoCo from supporting gay and lesbian groups. Specifically, the AFA demanded that Ford stop all contributions to homosexual social events (e.g. gay pride parades), end all donations to homosexual organizations and cease advertising in all gay-oriented media. Yesterday, Ford confirmed that Jaguar and Land Rover will pull their advertising from gay publications, but refused to discuss any other details of the AFA agreement. One thing is for sure: The Blue Oval caved, Big Style.

Ford's acquiescence to the AFA's religious agenda is a huge mistake. It's lit a fire under the large, wealthy and equally well-organized gay community. Gays and lesbians around the country are sure to respond to Ford's AFA accord with a boycott of their own. If Ford backs down from THAT pressure, the AFA will relaunch their boycott. By choosing a side in the contentious "homosexual lifestyle" issue, Ford is now smack dab in the middle of a Hatfield – McCoy-style conflict that it can't win, on any level, ever.

But the company's silence is its biggest blunder. It's one thing to cave to a pressure group; it's another to be seen to be doing so; and it's a third to do so without explanation. Remaining shtum on the AFA agreement violates one of the inviolable rules of corporate PR, and its corollary: if you can't defend it, don't do it; if you do it anyway, defend it anyway. When GM responded to reviewer Dan Neil's criticism by pulling its entire advertising budget from the LA Times– without public comment– the move made them appear arrogant, sinister, petty and vindictive. By refusing to discuss the AFA agreement, Ford has made itself appear cowardly, deceitful, insensitive and unresponsive.

While it's hard to imagine an acceptable justification for Ford's capitulation to the AFA's demands, it's not impossible. A weasel like "After consultation with a broad array of public groups, Ford has decided to realign its marketing efforts to appeal to a more mainstream customer base" might have dampened the outrage against FoMoCo's 'accomodation.' In any case, maintaining radio silence in these cybernetic times is a virtual impossibility. Hence Ford spokesman Mike Moran's eventual assertion (to the gay website Advocate.com) that the Blue Oval's withdrawl of financial support from the gay media was "strictly business."

Moran's statement violates the second inviolable rule of corporate PR: never appear greedy. Obviously, Ford is in business to make money. And that's a good thing. The pursuit of filthy lucre is one of humanity's greatest levelers, binding people of all races, religions, nationalities and "lifestyles" in the glorious sanctity of a commercial transaction. Moran's "strictly business" comment sucks the virtue right out of the process, implying that equality to all has nothing to do with Ford's commercial activities. With founder Henry Ford's vicious anti-Semitism in its past, and not a lot happening on the forecourt, Ford can ill-afford the perception that it puts money before morals.

Even staring down the barrel of a nationwide boycott– ESPECIALLY staring down the barrel of a nationwide boycott– Ford should have simply stated that it markets its products without fear or favor. As governments around the world have learned, it never pays to negotiate with terrorists. Ford's AFA appeasement shows pressure groups that the company is receptive to blackmail. At the very least, they will view the automaker as a soft target for free publicity. And we're not just talking about religious groups. What's to stop the National Rifle Association from boycotting Ford if the company advertises in newspapers that oppose their legislative stance?

Nothing. Just as Ford is free to spend its marketing dollars where it pleases, pressure groups are free to respond to those decisions as they see fit (as long as their protests are legal). Clearly the only way to avoid these skirmishes is to remain deaf to ALL extortionists. Ford should defend against attacks against its business practices by appealing to the consumers' belief in tolerance and fair play; realizing that bullies lose their power over the masses the moment they're seen as petty and vindictive. In other words, they should take the high road, outlast the bastards and work behind the scenes to cut them off at the knees. Instead, Ford is taking the low road, waving the white flag mid-battle and kissing ass behind closed doors.

Ford has screwed itself on this one, but good. It's completely blown the "golden 24" hours of damage limitation. Anything it says or does now will only add fuel to the PR pyre. Even so, Bill Ford should immediately reverse the company's pro-AFA stance. He should tell the world that Ford builds, markets and sells cars to anyone who can afford to buy them. If AFA members don't want to buy a Ford, so be it.

By on December 3, 2005

 If a rose by any other name would still smell so sweet, would a Ford Fusion by any other name still be a front-wheel-drive economy car? Lincoln certainly hopes not. It wants its upscale customers to view the new Zephyr as a discrete model, rather than a gussied-up Ford Fusion. Mercury harbors similar hopes/delusions for its Fusion-with-frills, the Milan. Come to think of it, the Fusion is based on the [Ford-owned] Mazda 6, whose price overlaps both the Fusion and the Milan. I suppose the answer to the conundrum posed by the incredible sameness of automotive being depends entirely on the customer's ability to smell a rat.

Fifty or sixty years ago, car buyers were easily fooled by re-badged vehicles. And even if they weren't, it didn't matter. The Big Three bestrode the US car market like a colossus. Even casual pistonheads could name every single car for sale. Auto brands were stronger than superglue. Driving a Ford, Lincoln or Mercury meant something; your car's sheet metal and badge reflected and projected your personal status. Customers who knew that their fancy new Lincoln was actually a Ford in a zoot suit didn't really care– as long as they got a good car that earned appropriate props. Brand loyalty was king.

Today, over forty major car brands produce a range of models whose aggregate is well into triple digits. Brand-related social demarcations still exist, but the lines are blurrier than a college student's Sunday morning memory. Mercedes sells low-end product, while Hyundai make an entirely convincing upmarket homonym. What's more, new models debut and disappear in a matter of months, while longer running favorites undergo dramatic restyles with increasing frequency. "Niche marketing"– creating a genre-killing product for a limited audience– is king.

Ford, GM and DCX act as if 'niche' means 'superficial.' They believe that adspin and blingery obviate the obvious long-term advantages of selling clearly delineated products with focus and depth. A Lincoln dealer recently confided to the Detroit News that he "wished the company wasn't so forthcoming about platform sharing.' Sorry; in these days of Edmunds.com and kbb.com, customers' noses are highly attuned to the slightest whiff of duplicate duplicity. Trying to palm off a Ford as a 'proper' Lincoln simply by adding some bits and pieces– a new grill and rear bumper, extra sound deadening, a softer suspension, wood, new gauges, fancy ICE and silver-effect switchgear– isn't just cynical, it's stupid. Badge engineering is fooling fewer and fewer people more and more of the time.

While the cost-savings offered by the kind of five-minute makeover described above cannot be underestimated, the damage to the car brand perpetuating the platform perfidy cannot be overestimated. If a car brand becomes known for mixing its genes with lesser machines and flogging the result at a premium (i.e. inflated) price, the road to rep recovery is both long and uncertain. Just ask Cadillac– if and when they complete their thirty year wander through the wilderness. As Caddy's ongoing recovery illustrates, even after you throw the badge engineering monkey off your back, you may still have to wait until your old customer base dies off.

Lincoln should know better. It was once one of the world's most exclusive brands. Ironically enough, the company was started by Cadillac's co-founder, Henry M. Leland. Ironically squared, Lincoln's tumble from the top began with… the Lincoln Zephyr. While the 1936 Zephyr helped the brand climb out of the depression, Lincoln's success came at the expense of the brand's premier positioning. No surprise, then, that the Zephyr was eventually canned in 1942 in favor of the similarly-priced, new-to-the-market Mercury, which was derived from a Ford chassis. Rather than carefully cultivating the loyalty of a critical cadre of brand faithful, Ford sold out Lincoln's image to cash in on badge engineering's 'easy money.'

In fact, if you're looking for the hidden force pulling GM and Ford into their respective black holes, badge engineering is it. Well, that and brand bingeing. (DCX' relative restraint in both areas accounts for its relative health.) The two forces have combined to suck the life blood out of the companies' products, until all their brands and all their cars are all pretty much of a muchness. When in-house brands are homogenous, shopping elsewhere becomes just as easy as (and more interesting than) trying to share the salesman's enthusiasm for an invidious distinction.

There's only one solution to this mess: lop off the unsustainable overlaps (Mercury, Buick, Jaguar, etc.), and then build brand-specific vehicles that share platforms and nothing else. Screw economy of scale. Customers want products with genuine individuality and integrity in every aspect, from body style to the interior to engineering. In fact, that's all they've ever wanted, no matter what you call it.

Recent Comments

  • Lou_BC: @Carlson Fan – My ’68 has 2.75:1 rear end. It buries the speedo needle. It came stock with the...
  • theflyersfan: Inside the Chicago Loop and up Lakeshore Drive rivals any great city in the world. The beauty of the...
  • A Scientist: When I was a teenager in the mid 90’s you could have one of these rolling s-boxes for a case of...
  • Mike Beranek: You should expand your knowledge base, clearly it’s insufficient. The race isn’t in...
  • Mike Beranek: ^^THIS^^ Chicago is FOX’s whipping boy because it makes Illinois a progressive bastion in the...

New Car Research

Get a Free Dealer Quote

Who We Are

  • Adam Tonge
  • Bozi Tatarevic
  • Corey Lewis
  • Jo Borras
  • Mark Baruth
  • Ronnie Schreiber