Category: Editorials

By on November 29, 2005

 Yesterday, GM announced it will release former subsidiary Delphi from an agreement trimming big bucks from The General's parts bill. This despite the fact that GM CEO Rabid Rick Wagoner has consistently used the discount to casually suggest that Delphi's bankruptcy was good for General Motors. Never mind. Delphi responded to GM's generosity by extending its contract deadline with the United Auto Workers (UAW) to January 20th. The quid pro quo means GM avoids a cataclysmic loss of parts– until that date. It's all part of Rabid Rick's masterplan for dodging Delphi's strike-related bankruptcy bullet…

Rabid Rick's tendered the 'get out of free competition free' card to provide Delphi with the funds it needs to subsidize the unthinkable: the difference between what Delphi wants to pay its UAW workers ($10 an hour) and what they currently earn ($27 an hour). What's more, TTAC's Deep Throat reckons GM will also reach into its back pocket to mop-up other UAW claims against Delphi's cash. The General will pay Delphi's superfluous union workers not to work, underwrite the union's benefit guarantees and assume Delphi's $10.8b pension liability. In short, Rabid Rick's recently stated desire for all sides to figure out "what we really need to do here" actually means delivering huge sacks of GM blood money to the UAW.

Should this scenario play out, Wagoner will claim victory for avoiding a company-killing strike, Delphi President Miller will claim victory for delivering Delphi from bankruptcy (at GM's expense) and union boss Big Ron Gettelfinger will claim victory for maintaining his members' compensation. Meanwhile, Wagoner's craven capitulation will cost The General a mountain of money. Back of the envelope estimates place the figure at around a half billion dollars per quarter, all in. That would put the price tag for Delphi's union peace at $2b, PLUS the lost discount (which could be worth up to a billion dollars), PLUS the $10.8b pension top-up, PLUS whatever other clever little caveats the union demands and receives.

Excuse me for saying so, but this is turning-out to be a Hell of a year for the UAW. The "historic health care giveback" that saved Rabid Rick's butt in the fall (and made the union look magnanimous in the process) will dump an extra $2b into their bank account and leave health care benefits intact. The plant closures that painted union workers as blameless victims of management incompetence will not injure a single union member financially (thanks to retirement buyouts and the infamous jobs bank). And now Delphi's "Last Stand" promises to make the union bosses look like heroes, as The Man behind the Man caves like a professional spelunker.

Rabid Rick's timidity on the union front is stunning. While it's often said GM can't blame the UAW for its troubles– GM agreed to the union demands that helped create those troubles– the argument avoids the real issue: drawing a line in the sand. No matter what GM granted the union in the past, consenting to it in the present sacrifices the company's future. While you can (and should) blame Rabid Rick's mob for its bone-headed product/brand/discount/investment binges, GM's cost structure remains unsustainable. And though nothing much has been said about the union's inflexibility on the factory floor, that cancer also remains unchecked. Rabid Rick has not even paid lip service to solving these issues.

CallmeSteve Miller is no better. The tough-talking Delphi Prez said right from the start that GM should bail his company's ass out of bankruptcy. In other words, he's happy to sacrifice his anti-union rhetoric on the point of Rabid Rick's check-writing pen. In fact, there's only one resolute player in this entire epic: Big Ron Gettelfinger. The union boss has maintained his hold on both his members and GM's coffers, while winning the PR war without uttering more than a word or two at the appropriate moment. And that's why this thing is bound to blow-up.

While Wagoner and Miller play footsie, Big Ron knows it's Last Man Standing. He doesn't need an expensive independent audit to realize that GM is doomed. Nor does he particularly care. Big Ron's job, the UAW's job, is to extract as much milk as possible from the GM tit for as long as possible. When GM collapses, even if it's his union's intransigence that precipitates the event, even if it means the complete dissolution of the UAW's contract with GM, Gettelfinger will look back with satisfaction and say "I always did my best for my members".

How do you negotiate labor/legacy reductions with a man with that mentality? You don't. You can't. The truth is, GM doesn't really want to. Rabid Rick is willing to pay-off Delphi's UAW now to buy enough time to sell enough SUV's, crossovers, something, anything that will revive the company's fortunes and allow it to once again avoid a UAW confrontation. Yeah right. If Rabid Rick manages to forestall a Delphi strike, GM only lives to die another day. History will describe Wagoner's escapology as a Pyrrhic victory; one that protected his own future at the expense of his employer's.

By on November 22, 2005

courtesy triorb.comI used to think that spin meant arranging facts to conceal their meaning. After watching Rabid Rick Wagoner's responses to the pre-shocks signaling GM's impending implosion, I now see spin as the art of distraction combined with the sin of omission. Back in October, on the day Rabid Rick revealed a $1.6b quarterly shortfall, Wagoner also announced a $1b health care "giveback" by his unionized employees. Only later did we learn that GM is paying the union $2b to cushion the impact. Yesterday, Wagoner announced he was slicing 30k jobs and closing nine production plants by '08. So Rick, how much will THAT cost GM?

Wagoner publicly conceded that The General will take a "sizable charge against earnings" to cover the plant closures– and then point blank refused to provide any details. It's entirely unlikely that Wagoner made the downsizing decision without knowing its exact impact on GM's bottom line. His reluctance can only mean one thing: red ink, and lots of it. Merrill Lynch analyst John Casesa estimates that shuttering the nine plants will cost The General between $1b and $2b. Mr. Casesa was unavailable for comment; it's not exactly clear what expenses his figures encompass. Of this we can be certain: the closures will cost a bundle and do sweet FA to relieve GM's sky-high labor costs, either now or in the future.

As we mentioned the last time Wagoner proclaimed job cuts, The General is hoping that the majority of the unneeded workers will either retire or be coerced into retirement (i.e. be paid off or be paid off). The rest will collect unemployment benefits at the taxpayer's expense. That said, GM is contractually obliged to make up the difference between the "idled" workers' government checks and 90% of their GM base pay AND continue to pay their health care benefits. When their jobless benefits expire, GM will place the workers into its infamous "Jobs Bank". They will then receive a full paycheck for doing nothing, until they retire to collect their pensions and use their GM-financed health care benefits.

With that kind of downside, it's no wonder GM has continued to build cars and sell them at a loss rather than the bite the [exploding] bullet. It's also clear to anyone who even glances at the details of Rabid Rick's mini-restructuring plan that the plant closures are too little, too late. Unlike the health care give-back scam, industry analysts and the mainstream automotive media are all over this one. The Detroit News, Free Press, San Francisco Chronicle, JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch, Sanford & Bernstein, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs– it's pig pile on Ricky. And rightly so. The closures are a tacit admission of GM's failures both in the domestic marketplace and on the factory floor. They do nothing to rectify the fundamental problems bedeviling The General's potential profitability.

Wagoner's spin on this development is the old "tough medicine" routine. In case you missed the implied corollary– I'm the Doc courageous enough to administer the diabolical dose– Rabid Rick dismissed those who would dismiss him: "I wasn't brought up to run and hide when things get tough." Yes, well, the ramifications of his retreat from the field of battle are many– and none holds forth the prospect of a corporate turnaround. As the offical UAW response to the closures pointed out, GM under Wagoner has proven itself incapable of designing cars, trucks and SUV's people want to buy. Predictably enough, Wagoner says the killer products– once new SUV's, now crossovers– are just around the corner. Again. Still.

In any case, when all is said and done, a great deal will have been said about The General's plant closures and job cuts, and nothing will be done to steer GM away from the troubles ahead. With a Delphi-shaped iceberg about to strike GM's hull, you could even argue that GM's production plants should be cranking up to provide inventory, not winding down to bolster Wagoner's flagging rep on Wall Street. Meanwhile, GM's Board of Bystanders– I mean Directors– should be publicly flogged for allowing Wagoner to dance with wolves when he should be busy re-creating GM as a leaner, meaner and more creative organization; making fewer models for fewer brands at a greater profit. It is hard to understand what Board members do to deserve their paychecks, or how they can possibly justify paying dividends at this time of crisis.

Rest assured, there will be a moral to this story: you can spin anything, but lies and half-truths only provide a brief respite from reality. The only way Rick Wagoner can help GM is to be the instrument of its destruction. Whether he knows it or not, the rough beast that will replace the world's largest automaker is already on its way.

By on November 18, 2005

 'I'd just like to set the record straight here and now,' Rabid Rick Wagoner wrote in an email circulated yesterday on GM's intranet. 'There is absolutely no plan, strategy or intention for GM to file for bankruptcy." Obviously, the growing suspicion that GM is heading for a cataclysmic financial failure prompted Wagoner tell the world that The Man in Charge isn't playing kissy-kissy with a bankruptcy judge behind the bike shed. At the precise moment when Wagoner should have been rallying his troops with a bold survival strategy, he chose to declare the fact that he's not [currently] negotiating surrender. Wrong answer.

If you still believe that Rabid Rick and his cronies can save GM, I suggest you surrender that opinion now and join the industry analysts wise to Wagoner's wicked ways. Every time there's trouble at the mill– an occurrence whose increasing frequency is only matched by its escalating intensity– Rick announces Something Is Being Done. The scandalous manipulation surrounding last quarter's financial statement, when Rick revealed the bogus United Auto Workers (UAW) health care "giveback" on the same day GM lost $1.6b, is a perfect example of Wagoner's MO. It's got the point where any executive assertion of corrective action signals yet another financial disaster.

So when The Detroit News (DTN) duly reports that "Ailing GM speeds up fix-it plan", it's a sure sign that The General is closer than ever to flat lining. As part of this nominal plan, whose bullet-pointed description is only marginally better than "lower costs, increase sales", Wagoner vows to cut 25k hourly employees by '08. Only GM's contract with the UAW prohibits plant closures until September 2007. And that means Wagoner actually intends to "idle" the excess workers, or try to lure them into early retirement. Either way, the employees will be almost as big a drain on GM's resources as if they were building cars no one wants.

Meanwhile, back in Wagoner's email, The General's general went to great pains to show he understands the gravity of the situation he's put the company in, and the need to sort it all out, you know, soon. Rabid Rick acknowledged that GM's North American meltdown created losses which are "unsustainable, for sure, and require a comprehensive strategy… that must be implemented promptly and effectively.' In case you haven't guessed it by now, Rabid Rick is saving this meta plan for next quarter's financial statement, when the latest red ink report reveals the full extent of GM's arterial spray.

Hey, if Rabid Rick Wagoner's got a cure-all to keep GM from the corporate crash cart, how come the North America's Vice President of Vehicle Sales, Service and Marketing doesn't know about it? DTN reporter Brett Clanton recently got some face time with Monster Mark LaNeve, and asked LaNeve to outline Wagoner's plan to revitalize GM's sales and marketing. Here's what he got:

"What he means by that is doing a much better job of delivering eight distinct brands to the marketplace that all have unique target customer groups. He's talking about focusing the brands. He's talking about my plan, which is to go to market with value orientation rather than incentive orientation. Do better in the key markets such as the coasts where we've lost a lot of ground in recent years. And then, have a world-class dealer base."

While we're glad to see LaNeve wrest ownership for GM's recently abandoned "Total Value Promise" from his boss, Monster Mark's remarks indicate that Wagoner has yet to hit refresh on his turnaround browser. Even if you accept LaNeve's spinvaguery, there's no evidence whatsoever that Wagoner's crew are doing anything to conquer the coasts or implement brand differentiation. In fact, the recent revelation that GM is preparing 14 crossover vehicles for its eight brands indicates the exact opposite. And if GM's front end is in such disarray, what hope is there for sorting things out in the back?

None. All GM's management maneuvering brings to mind the connection between an ancient Roman conflagration and Emperor Nero's musical abilities. Big Ron Gettelfinger's belligerent remarks regarding the UAW's negotiations with parts maker Delphi reaffirms our contention that Delphi will be crippled by a strike in December, which will cripple GM roughly five minutes after that. Did I say cripple? Perhaps I should have used the word "kill".

Buried inside the DTN story on Wagoner's bankruptcy denial is a startling revelation; a factoid that obviates any move GM's brass could make to save the company's ass. "A Delphi-related shutdown at GM would force the automaker to tap into the $19 billion in cash it has on hand. The investment firm UBS Securities estimates that GM would run through its cash hoard in 10 weeks." In other words, our GM Death Watch is heading for its inevitable conclusion. For sure.

By on November 14, 2005

 Automatic speed cameras have dotted European highways for well over a decade– despite the fact that there's no conclusive proof that they improve safety. In fact, an official British government report recently stated 'No significant difference was observed in the personal injury accident rate for sites with and without speed cameras.' And yet the bane of European roadways is coming to a freeway near you. By the time spring arrives, at least two US states will install photo radar cameras on their highways, issuing millions of dollars worth of fines to hapless motorists.

In October, the Scottsdale, Arizona City Council approved a plan to place photo radar cameras on Loop 101, a freeway that encompasses the Phoenix metropolitan area. It's a no-brainer for Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano; under the plan, the state takes a 46 percent cut of the estimated $22 million annual haul while Scottsdale bears all the political risk. Unsurprisingly, Napolitano views Scottsdale's scheme as a pilot program. Even before its implementation, the governor has publicly expressed her desire to expand the photo radar program throughout the state.

Meanwhile, Illinois is planning to install speed cameras on its interstates. Government officials are busy haggling over how to split the loot with the private company running the program. The state shouldn't be too bothered about the exact arrangement. Once the cameras are erected, Illinois' revenue collection effort will quickly dwarf their Arizona colleagues' relatively limited and leisurely program. No wonder: a single high-speed round-trip on an Illinois freeway could cost a motorist $1375.

The Illinois legislature authorized the ticket cameras to 'protect vulnerable highway laborers'. To that end, Illinois' unmanned speed cameras will snap all motorists who fail to observe the reduced speed limit in designated work zones, and automatically send them a $375 ticket. A second offense costs $1000. Officials admit they may place two cameras a mile or so away from each other. Those so trapped will lose their license for 90 days, receive points on their license, and pay higher insurance premiums.

Of course, the "saving workers" argument is entirely suspect. According to a study prepared by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, automobiles caused just twelve percent of highway worker deaths nationwide. Lawmakers behind the Illinois program cooked the books by including fatalities caused by construction vehicles– such as highway workers hit by their own dump trucks. Be that as it may, Illinois and Arizona are about to experience what happens when history is ignored…

In 1986, two Texas towns, La Marque and Friendswood, began the first US implementations of photo radar. The programs didn't even last the year. 'You could say there was a good bit of unhappiness,' La Marque's former mayor Jack Nash told the Los Angeles Times. Friendswood fared no better. 'I'm certain it's a good system if you want to make money, but you're going to find that the community is going to lose its reputation very quickly,' said Galveston County Constable Paul Bess. 'It won't come back to my area.'

Every time photo radar is put to a direct popular vote, it loses. Big time. Peoria, Arizona voters ran photo radar out of town by a 2-1 margin in 1991, AND sent the police chief packing. The following year, two-thirds of eligible voters in Batavia, Illinois turned out for a referendum on speed cameras. They rejected the devices and booted the main camera proponent from the city council. Anchorage, Alaska completed the anti-camera trifecta in 1997. The state legislature canceled the photo radar program just four days before voters enacted a referendum banning cameras. Months later, Alaska's Court of Appeals found the photo radar program 'unreliable'.

Some long-term speed camera programs have been incredibly successful– in raising revenue from out-of-towners. The District of Columbia complains of 'taxation without representation' on its license plates but practices it on the residents of Virginia and Maryland. Official documents reveal that 'outsiders' received well over 75% of the $155m photo tickets issued by the federal city since 1999. Likewise, commuters traveling between Scottsdale and Phoenix receive 98% of Paradise Valley, Arizona's automated speeding tickets.

The lesson is clear: speed cameras that target local residents are the first to go. The forthcoming Arizona and Illinois programs– and their political backers– aren't likely to last long. [A Scottsdale resident has already launched a last-minute effort to put freeway cameras to a vote.] When given the opportunity, US voters consistently reject automated speed traps as both invasive and ineffective. It's a tribute to the American system of government that our representatives' not-so-hidden addiction to speed camera revenue is– and will continue to be– stymied by a combination of common sense and political will.

By on November 12, 2005

 If it wasn't so funny, it would be sad. GM loses billions in ill-advised overseas 'investments', produces an over-abundance of vehicles that are two model cycles behind the competition, can't build a single hybrid, completely cocks-up production of its Solsticial one hit wonder, cedes US market dominance to Toyota, plays "Let's Pretend to Make a Deal" with its union, announces its intention to sell-off majority interest in the only profitable part of the company, refuses to outline its turnaround plan, and the stock market yawns. The federal Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) discovers GM's accountants have lost four hundred million dollars behind the couch and the stock tanks. What's that all about?

Before the SEC probe, like many other industry watchers, I was laboring under the impression that GM's stunning incompetence and epic lethargy reflected management myopia. In other words, The General's G5 corporate culture had insulated Rabid Rick Wagoner and his well-paid minions from what you and I would call reality. They honestly believe their own hype. Now, I'm not to sure. Although the $400m was "misreported" rather than "lost", there are ominous rumblings that GM's mea culpa is the tip of the proverbial iceberg. Lest we forget, the SEC's main focus was/is GM's multi-billion dollar pension and benefit schemes (vis-a-vis bankrupt auto parts supplier Delphi). Yesterday, the federal Pension Guaranty Corporation reported that Delphi's pensions are underfunded by $10.8b.

If GM's been cooking the books, people will soon wonder if Rabid Rick's secretly hired Dorian Grey's portrait painter. After all, GM maintains an entire ledger of accountants to ensure that The General's financial statements are on the up-and-up. The audit committee in charge of these pusillanimous pencil pushers reports directly to Rabid Rick. So, if the SEC finds that GM's increasingly obvious use of "aggressive accounting" tipped into pension and benefit-related GBH, the chances that the shell game was a devious plot concocted by a rogue element with The General's ranks are minimal. The discovery will reflect Rabid Rick's willingness to encourage– or at the very least tolerate– corporate duplicity.

This would put us back in charted waters: in Enron territory, watching arrogant execs manipulating the public trust for personal greed and glory. And that sucks. Because it would mean that GM is deeply, fundamentally corrupt. That all the garbage we've been interpreting as corporate "spin"– our cars are terrific, our new SUV's are high mileage heroes, we're sorting the brands, badge engineering is dead, discounts are dead, crossovers are coming, hybrids are coming, fuel cells are coming, etc.– is actually a deliberate cover-up of executive malfeasance. It's a slippery slope from PR to lies to cutting corners to criminal conduct. The SEC probe could reveal that Rick's riding a Flexible Flyer.

Sadly, it makes perfect sense. Perhaps Rabid Rick can't turn GM around because he's lost in Nixonian paranoia, struggling to maintain his administration's hold on executive privilege at all costs. Wagoner is, after all, a straight-from-biz-school boffin without any work experience outside of GM. Rabid Rick's moral and ethical compass was handed to him by GM's heavy hitters. His managerial mindset was forged by the plots and plans of The General's inept dictators. Personal power could well be his primary goal– rather than the greater good of the company, its customers, employees, suppliers and stockholders. If you want evidence of this perspective, drive a GM product and ask yourself a simple question: why isn't it better?

I know: it's a deeply cynical portrait. But GM is a deeply cynical company. After launching and vigorously defending its post-fire sale "value pricing" strategy, after going to all the trouble to retrain its front line salesman to switch from deal-making to product pushing (at a cost of millions), The General has just announced a year-end "Red Tag" sale to once-again clear its bloated inventories. At the same time, they're taking credit for building-up their inventories [supposedly] in preparation for the inevitable Delphi strike and resulting production shutdown. Is this first-class crisis management, gross incompetence or a reflection of something darker, something rotten in the heart of RenCen? I'm beginning to lean towards the third option, and so is Wall Street.

Financial analysts like Banc of America's Ron Tadross haven't suddenly "woken-up" to The General's fundamental flaws and looming troubles. They've simply begun to see that The General's generals don't have a viable plan for winning the battles– never mind the war. And like Kirk Kerkorian, they can smell imminent exsanguinations from a mile away. Each day, the likelihood grows that Captain Kirk or another similarly voracious corporate raider will swoop down and buy Rabid Rick's alma mater, sell off the entire GMAC finance unit, pocket the profits and flog the unprofitable automaking side of the business for chicken feed. Either that or just close the factory gates and walk away.

By on November 7, 2005

 For over 30 years, Maryann Keller's kept tabs on The General. The auto industry analyst has watched GM lose billions in overseas investments, surrender great chunks of market share to its rivals and sacrifice shareholder value in an endless pursuit of The Next Big Thing. According to Keller, GM's inability to face-up to its structural weaknesses is nothing new. Nor are the excuses coming from RenCen. "It's one big idea after another," Keller said. "This time it's crossovers. Well, they've used that 'there's a new product in the pipeline' routine for years. GM's problems are NOT temporary." OK, but are they terminal?

Like most observers, Keller's brain balks at bankruptcy. For one thing, The General is sitting on an estimated $30b cash pile– which will grow by another $12b or so when GM jettisons controlling interest in its GMAC mortgage and financing business. For another, Keller says bankruptcy would have a cataclysmic effect on GM's business. "Customers would disappear," Keller says. "They'd think, who's going to pay for my warranty claims? What will my car be worth? And what bank would write a loan for a car sold by a bankrupt company? Would fleet customers do business with them? I don't think so. The long-term damage to GM would be incalculable."

That said, there's no doubt in Keller's mind that GM's current situation is extremely bad, and getting worse. "In October, GM pulled down a 22% market share. If you remove fleet sales from those numbers, they actually had a 13 to 14% share. That's less than Toyota. November and December aren't going to do anything for them, and if Delphi goes out on strike, there's no telling how long current inventories will last. Even as it stands now– 14% of the market, eight brands, 70 plus models– it's simply not sustainable."

Keller is convinced that this doomsday scenario's increasing likelihood will motivate GM's management to address the company's flawed fundamentals. Call it the cornered car company concept. Keller points to Nissan and Chrysler's comebacks as examples of automakers brought back from the brink because… they didn't have a choice. Keller predicts– and clearly longs for– a signal from inside GM that reality bites. She hungers for a bold and comprehensive recovery plan that acknowledges the full extent of GM's problems and pledges the company's full resources to solve them. She calls it the "moon shot solution":

"What I'm hearing is platitudes. What I'd like to hear is a plan. A plan that says we're going to the moon. We're going to spend as much money as it takes to rebuild the brands– even if we don't make a profit on a single car for ten years. We're going to use that money to build substantially better cars than the competition, and significantly under price them… This is not rocket science. GM needs to give customers more than they expect at a price they can't ignore."

Keller doesn't see the unionized elephant in the room as an insurmountable obstacle to this as yet unexpressed turnaround plan. In fact, Keller says GM's recovery is doomed without "shared sacrifice" from management, the United Auto Workers (UAW), suppliers, bankers and dealers. In that sense, Keller feels the UAW is getting a raw deal in the court of public opinion. "It's currently in vogue to blame GM's ills on runaway health care costs, but if things are that bad, why is GM 'giving away' money in the form of stockholder dividends… The only way GM's going to solve its union problems is if they solve all the other problems at the same time. There's no way out of this mess except for GM to fix it."

While I agree with Keller's analysis, I don't share her optimism in the power of self-preservation. Keller says "People buy one car at a time." By the same token, people contemplate their employer's future one person at a time. Nothing I've read, heard or seen convinces me that any of the participants pulling the levers of power in this twisted saga have enough at stake to make them, as Keller puts it, "do things that are not in their character". Even on the fateful day they clamber aboard their golden lifeboat and watch the mother ship sink beneath the waves, they will insist that they did the right thing. To paraphrase Richard Nixon, they will accept none of the responsibility, and none of the blame.

Capitalist enterprises have a way of bouncing back from adversity. Even so, it takes more than a comprehensive plan. It takes leadership. Until and unless GM dumps Wagoner, Lutz, et al. from their lineup, and finds a team with genuine backbone, the company will not have the will nor the skill to sidestep the looming disaster. As Keller says, "Despite its success, Toyota operates with a sense of urgency. I still don't see that from GM. I wonder if I ever will."

By on November 2, 2005

 So, Ford has a new guck. I only caught a few seconds of the ad touting The Blue Oval's "Grand Unifying Concept", but I'm reasonably sure Mr. Bill promised that, from now on, all Ford motor products will be known for… innovation. Should reality somehow mirror hype, Ford's eight brands will heretofore produce cutting edge vehicles that do way cool stuff that will make both consumers and the competition sit up and say "Whoa, Dude!" Maybe, but I reckon innovation is as likely to save FoMoCo as a GM buyout.

For one thing, most people view innovation (a.k.a. change) as only slightly more desirable than hepatocellular carcinoma. Automobilists don't want to drive the radical new machine bristling with innovative technology and design. They want the same car as the one they're driving, only a bit newer. How else could you explain the fact that GM continues to sell cars that are two product cycles behind the competition– to the same people who bought one before? Sure, automakers put a lot of gee-whizzery in mass market motors, but there are still a large number of motorists who'd rather celebrate their birthday at the Registry of Motor Vehicles than program a sat nav system.

You don't need to own a Brush Motor Company friction drive car to know that automotive history is littered with manufacturers who went out on a technological limb that snapped beneath them. Even successful carmakers regularly fall prey to feature sleep. When BMW's 7-Series introduced its pioneering iDrive [you nuts] mouse controller, the system flummoxed the faithful and alienated aspirants. When GM created an SUV with a power roof section above the cargo bay, the advance was met with spectacular apathy (save waterproof grandfather clock collectors). Bill Gates may be sniffing around the auto world, but he does so at his peril.

In fact, the more innovative the automobile, the less saleable it is. For every pistonhead who feels enriched by the latest engineering brainwave, for every Ferrari owner beta testing kludgy software and clever-but-dainty mechanicals, there are a million consumers who understand that the last thing you want in a 4000lbs. piece of metal hurling itself through a world of solid objects is unreliable– I mean "innovative" technology. Besides, you'd think that Ford has suffered enough product recalls without reinventing the wheel, and everything attached.

And then there's the cost. If Ford is serious in their newfound determination to boldly go where CAD-CAM computers make treads, they're going to have to plow a lot more of Mr. Bill's inheritance into research and development. To stay ahead of the technological curve in every automotive technology– from fuel cells to LED lighting– Ford would have to spend Portugal's gross national product on Xtreme engineering. Per year. Technologists will argue about the difference between in-yer-face innovation and behind-the-scenes boffinology, but splitting hairs isn't going to save anyone any money. No matter how you program it into you spreadsheet, high tech costs big bucks.

Innovation asunder, you've can't blame Mr. Bill for wanting to tell consumers why they should buy from the family firm. The 80's motto "Quality is Job One" certainly helped pull Ford back from the brink the last time 'round. Unfortunately, Lexus now owns that piece of real estate. More worryingly, Toyota's snagged reliability (with Hyundai in hot pursuit) AND innovation (by Prius engagement). Honda has bagged the quality engineering gig, GM lives (and dies) on the cheap, DCX does bling, Porsche is performance, Audi loves luxury, BMW is bitchin' and Mercedes still snobs-out. Ford is left wandering in brand image wasteland.

As someone who's good with the guck, I offer the following suggestion: safety. While performance and style grab the headlines and make marketeers feel macho as Hell, the average motorist is motivated by more prosaic concerns: their social, physical and financial security. Any car that protects their personal status quo is in with a chance. Under that remit, the term 'safety' encompasses design, handling, braking, traction control, ergonomics, repairs, finance, etc. So yes, an Aston could be a 'safe supercar'. Lincolns and Jaguars could feature all that expensive hi-tech safety stuff, like heads-up displays and cruise control radar. Mazda could embody nimble safety. Land Rover would be the off-roader that gets you there… and back. (Volvo's a done deal and Mercury can go fish.) Whether you're blasting in an Aston or fooling around in a Ford, the Blue Oval's got your back.

Sound familiar? GM flirted with a company-wide safety campaign earlier this year. Of course, The General's ADD reasserted itself and the safety guck disappeared. So the way is clear for Ford to refine and sell its entire product range under the overarching brand umbrella of safety– from the cars themselves through to the ownership experience. Mr. Bill could even make it hip. Safe! OK, it may not be the sexiest answer to Ford's imagectomy, but it is the safest.

By on October 31, 2005

 While GM models continue to debut and disappear like Manolo Blahniks, the Chevrolet Corvette stays the course, slowly evolving towards excellence. To mark the retirement of Chief Engineer Dave Hill, Car Czar Bob Lutz posted a short honorific on GM's fastlane blog: "Dave was often disruptive, stubborn, unwilling to take direction, unwilling to take advice, unwilling to accept constraints or limits — in other words, the perfect man for the job." In other other words, Hill was a successful guardian of the Corvette flame DESPITE GM, not because of it.

Lutz' unintentional condemnation of his employer's corporate culture won't surprise anyone who's had dealings with The General. I've received dozens of emails from GM workers and suppliers. They describe an organization so complex it makes the legal system in Kafka's The Trial seem like basic addition. One story convinced me that the phrase "institutional paralysis" was coined by a seat bracket designer. Another persuaded me that "matrix management" and "total chaos" are synonymous. And another reminded me of A Confederacy of Dunces, and left me wondering why more GM managers haven't followed author John Kennedy Toole's example.

In all the discussion about GM's perilous financials, it's often forgotten that the company itself is a disaster. Think of it this way: no one at GM wakes up in the morning and says, right, let's go make some vehicles that are two product cycles behind the competition at a price that will bankrupt The General within the next year. [Mr. Hill would have probably sacrificed his left testicle to equip the 'Vette with Audi-esque soft touch plastics.] But something happens between morning muesli and Miller time that kills GM workers' creativity and stifles the company's competitiveness. That something is bureaucracy.

It's not about size. It's about focus. Toyota is living, breathing, money-making proof that a multinational automaker can produce millions of vehicles without tripping all over itself. To do so, to create an organizational structure lean enough to consistently produce genre-dominating cars, a carmaker must maintain laser-like focus. It must first decide EXACTLY what it wants to do, and then it must do it better than anyone else. As a corollary, the manufacturer must accept that it can't– shouldn't– do everything. It's about choosing your battles wisely, fighting them tenaciously and then protecting your territory with steadfast ferocity.

Domestically, GM has eight brands: Hummer, Buick, Pontiac, Cadillac, Saturn, Chevrolet, Saab and GMC. Which one of them has focus? Which one of them sells a coherent lineup, where every single model does [the same] one thing better than anyone else? Are all Chevy's economy cars? Do all Buicks lead their competition in interior quietness? Are all Pontiacs sexy? What do all Saabs, Saturns or GMC trucks do that no other vehicle in their class can match? Sure, all of GM's domestic brands sell cars that don't fall apart, get reasonable mileage, are reasonably comfortable and don't cost a fortune compared to the competition. But what's their unique selling point? Why bother buying one?

It's General Motors by name, general motors by nature. Once you go down that road, it's no wonder that the Chinese walls separating the brands disappear, and dozens of models across the eight brands emerge on their respective forecourts courtesy of the bloodless process known as badge engineering. Since all the cars within each of GM's eight brands must do everything pretty well, but none are asked to excel in any one area (save Hummer, but give it time), it makes perfect sense to save money by sharing management, designers, workers, models, parts, marketing, etc. Is it any wonder that GM's company culture rewards measured uniformity rather than breakthrough creativity?

Of course, inside any large organization, there will always be employees striving to realize their personal vision of product excellence– despite the internal forces ranging against them. Dave Hill was one of GM's "mavericks'; I'm sure he could tell plenty of stories of missed opportunities, needless compromise and administrative lethargy. In any case, Hill's success is an anomoly: the exception that proves the rule. Just think of all the nameless managers who were prevented from creating something great because they had to satisfy GM's overarching desire to do something good…

We've said it before. We'll say it again: GM must die. You can't fix this company. Even if GM's unions agreed to join their Chinese colleagues and work for $1.50 per hour, even if several of GM's 14 (count 'em 14) crossovers are a runaway success, the company is deeply, fundamentally, culturally flawed. Shuttering Buick, Saturn and Saab would help, but nothing can save a car company that's a jack of all trades and master of none.

By on October 24, 2005

Lincoln Mark LT dashIf The Big Three are really serious about paring their production costs to the bone, it's time for them to take a good hard look at the basics. Some of the "standard" features on today's automobiles are either unnecessary or antiquated. While removing or re-engineering these items may sound like a trivial pursuit, American automakers simply can't to afford to ignore the potential savings. They should be ready, willing and able to click, drag, highlight and delete.

Very few motorists regularly check their engine oil. Even fewer monitor their oil pressure gauge, or have the slightest idea what it indicates (much less whether or not the needle is pointing to a safe or a dangerous position). Even if a driver happened to be staring at the oil gauge when a catastrophic loss of pressure occurred, the engine would probably be trashed before the needle sank to the bottom of the red zone.

The same principle holds true for the voltmeter. How many motorists know their car's proper voltage, or what to do if it's not where it should be? A simple warning light would suffice. In fact, every car that has an oil pressure gauge and/or voltmeter also has lamps to monitor low oil pressure and alternator output. The lamps respond a lot faster than gauges, and drivers respond a lot faster to lights than needles. Many new cars dispense with these gauges (e.g. Pontiac Solstice), but many don't (e.g. Chevrolet Tahoe). It's time for them to disappear.

Spare tires have also outworn their welcome. Thanks to superior rubber technology, better roadway surfaces and improved maintenance, flat tires are now almost as rare as cell phones are common. Company car administrators have already moved to eliminate spare tires from their fleets, saving their employers fuel as well as money. Lose the spare tire and you can deep-six the jack, lug wrench, tire hold downs and jacking instructions (and associated legal costs). Most motorists are incapable of using the jack and the lug wrench, so why burden the car with the additional weight and complexity? Extra-cautious (and/or rural) drivers could opt for run-flat tires or a more extensive tire repair kit.

The accelerator cable should also go. Replacing a mechanical cable linkage with an electric motor and a rheostat may not sound like the best way to generate cost savings, but losing the archaic mechanical technology would decrease the cost of other, related systems. For example, an electronically controlled throttle eliminates the need for an idle air control mechanism. A drive-by-wire also makes cruise control less complex; electronically matching engine speed to vehicle speed removes the need for additional cables and mechanisms.

A drive-by-wire throttle also simplifies traction control and stability systems. A computerized system has the ability to change throttle openings independent of driver input, instantly and precisely altering throttle position to limit wheel spin. In some cases, the entire brake-application part of the traction control system can be eliminated. Many high-end cars have switched from a mechanical throttle cable to drive-by-wire throttle control. All of GM's diesel trucks have used this type of system for years. It's time for the rest of cardom to follow suit.

These deletions may sound inconsequential– especially to a multinational automaker locked in a death spiral of rising costs and shrinking profits. But consider the numbers. At a rough estimate, the changes outlined above could save GM some $150 per car. This year GM will make/hopes to make about four million cars and trucks. The total savings would be about a billion dollars– the precise amount GM says it wrested from the UAW to reduce it health care tab.

The Blue Oval Boys have a unique opportunity to make even greater savings. Ford– and only Ford– equips every Ford, Lincoln and Mercury car and truck with an operator-controlled fuel system reset button. If a Ford driver is unlucky enough to crash over the wrong sort of pothole or experience a slow-speed shunt, the fuel system may automatically shut off. Unless the driver is mechanically aware (or has read this editorial), he or she must read the owner's manual, get out of the car, open the trunk, locate the button and press it. It's a dangerous and unncessary procedure.

Ford's electronic engine control systems have all the sensors they need to incorporate an automatic reset system, just like everyone else. If Ford can't figure out how to engineer an automatic reset into their current cars, perhaps their engineers could disassemble a Volvo for inspiration. Lose the $25 fuel reset button, and Ford could save $50 million next year, and increase customer satisfaction to boot.

Fifty million dollars isn't exactly chump change. Nor is it a great deal of money in the Ford scheme of things. Still, 50 million here, a billion there, and soon you're talking about real money.

By on October 24, 2005

 Details of The General's highly-touted secret accord with the United Auto Workers (UAW) have finally filtered out. Even a cursory glance at the fine print– which promises to get finer in the days to come– reveals that the "landmark" deal is not the company-saving "historic giveback" the mainstream media, UAW and company officials would have us believe. In truth, it's not even too little too late. It's nothing at all.

The UAW's new agreement with GM stipulates that 118k active union members forgo a $1 per hour pay increase scheduled for '06. That works out to about $2000 per worker, per year. So, by not paying its workers an extra buck an hour, GM saves $236m. Only "saves" isn't the right word. It's more like "redirects". The $236m that won't appear on GM workers' payslips will now go straight to… healthcare. In other words, GM "saves" the money by spending it on healthcare rather than wages, and its workers go right on enjoying the free and full benefits they've enjoyed since tires were ply.

Even if we operate on the assumption that this money counts as an economy because The General won't have to dig into its pockets for ANOTHER $236m, it's still not the stuff of which corporate turnarounds are made. The amount represents just over 4% of The General's current annual health care bill. As costs in the health care sector are rising by well over 4% per year, it's actually a loss. Anyway, where's the rest of that supposed billion dollar UAW give back?

GM has 500,000 retired employees receiving free health care for both themselves and, where applicable, their family. The new GM – UAW agreement asks them to start carrying some of the financial burden through increased co-pays, slightly larger deductibles and exclusions for "lifestyle drugs" like Viagra (I kid you not). This extra expense works out to be roughly $370 per year for an individual retiree, to $752 for a family. (Workers who receive less than $8k per year from their GM pension still get a free ride.) And there's your remaining $750m in health care savings. Or not.

If you were laboring under the impression that the UAW would give up benefits for the good of General Motors– in the sense that even a blood-sucking parasite knows to drop off the host before it dies– think again. As part of this arrangement, GM will create a special fund for retirees to help them pay for their additional health care costs. The amount going in is… wait for it… a billion dollars. And that's just the first year. In the second year of this scheme, GM will pay in… another billion dollars. And guess who gets the interest on the $2b?

Add it all up and GM saves nothing on healthcare for the next two years. Nada. If you consider the fact that GM also agreed to assume $12b worth of pension liabilities tied to UAW workers left high and dry by Delphi's bankruptcy– PLUS a $1b sweetener– they've actually lost money on the deal. Or, if you prefer, GM and the UAW have successfully negotiated an increase in The General's labor costs.

Not to put too fine a point on it, who cares? Whenever GM's critics lambaste the company for its gi-normous "legacy costs", management always points their finger at health care; that's what's weighing us down! Well, it ain't necessarily so. Just ask CallmeSteve Miller. Delphi's President is asking his UAW members to take a 70% pay cut. That's not what I'd call pissing around. Pissing around is arguing for months about 1/6th of your health care bill, and then paying it anyway. GM and the UAW have done nothing more than paper over the tectonic cracks that threaten to swallow both of them, whole.

Meanwhile, the family silver sale continues. Majority interest in The General's GMAC Golden Goose is still on the block, with both corporate raiders KKR and uber-shark Kirk Kerkorian browsing the catalogue. Hot on the heels of the Fuji Heavy Industries sell-off, GM has announced that they're selling a majority interest in their Australian truck business to Isuzu. South Africa is next. Perhaps GM is building a war chest for the upcoming UAW strike of parts maker Delphi, which will shut down GM's production lines. In any case, Rabid Rick Wagoner recently went on record to say bankruptcy isn't an option. He's right: it's a certainty. Now's the time to short GM stock.

By on October 18, 2005

 To paraphrase Bullwinkle J Moose: "Hey Rocky, watch Ricky pull a rabbit out of his hat!" On the very day when Rabid Rick Wagoner revealed that GM had lost $1.6b during the third financial quarter, The General's CEO announced that he'd cut a deal with the United Auto Workers (UAW). The long-awaited, deeply-desired agreement allegedly reduces the automaker's health care costs. Its announcement had an invigorating effect on the press ("Can UAW deal spur turnaround?") and GM's stock price (up $2.11). What's more, it's quelled the chorus of anti-Rick rumblings. How he gets away with this shit is beyond me.

First of all, the accord's exact details are secret. As of this writing, no one outside of the GM – UAW executive loop knows how this "historic agreement" will lop a claimed $3 billion a year from the automaker's health care costs. The most likely instrument is an increase to UAW member's health care co-pays, premiums and deductibles. Which is why Rabid Rick and union boss Big Ron Gettelfinger are keeping shtum; the UAW rank and file must OK the cuts. Say what you will about Big Ron's leadership, but there's a good chance his membership will tell him to take his increased health care costs and put them where the sun doesn't shine.

So what we have here is a tentative deal; as in a long way from done and dusted. Oh, did I mention that the $3b in savings are before-tax dollars? Give Uncle Sam his due and GM's economy shrinks to $1 billion per year. Hmmm. Let's put that in perspective. This year, GM shelled out $5.6b for its workers health care. So the theoretical savings represent, at best, a 25% reduction. With inflation in the sector running at 15%, you're actually looking at a savings of… 10%. Wow. No wonder GM camp followers believe salvation is at hand.

While we're at it, keep in mind that the General lost $1.6b this quarter after increasing sales by five per cent. (Yes, increasing.) That brings GM's total annual losses in the North American market, so far, to about $4.1b, with current sales dead in the water. If we're conservative and deduct another couple of billion from GM's cash reserves for a piss-poor fourth quarter, we're looking at a $6.1b loss for the year. So, if the UAW deal had been in place this year, GM would have lost "just" $5b. Oh, that's alright then.

Also, lest we forget, GM has this annoying habit of losing a billion here, ten billion there. Forbes writer Jerry Flint reckons GM has already pissed away some $21b on its foreign "alliances"– without figuring the cost of what else GM might have done with the cash. Shuttering Saturn, Saab or Buick (an idea whose time came five years ago) would cost GM billions more. Who knows what other billion dollar bombshells lurk in GM's future? While I don't make enough money to call a billion dollars chump change, forgive me for not considering a billion bucks the difference between life and death for The General.

But wait: it gets worse. Much worse. As you'd expect, the UAW's tentative deal was not a one-sided affair. Again, GM's concessions are shrouded in secrecy, but ye olde sources close to The General report that Rabid Rick agreed to assume Delphi workers' pension costs. Previously, GM had claimed that their liabilities to its former workers might be… nothing. Apparently, Rabid Rick will now ADD money to their pension fund, from the previously estimated high ball figure of $9b to a staggering $12b. What will THAT cost The General on an annual basis?

Alarmist? I don't think so. Anyone who didn't hear that Rabid Rick also announced plans to sell off a "majority interest" in GMAC is deaf. GM's finance arm is it: the cash cow. Sure, the estimated $10b in cash from the sale would see GM through the tough times ahead– right until it doesn't. Think of it this way: if GM is losing $1b plus per quarter NOW, with its factories churning-out HHR's and the like, how much will they hemorrhage during the inevitable Delphi strike, when those factories fall silent?

One person who won't remain silent for long is Mr. Las Vegas, Mr. 10%, GM investor Kirk Kerkorian. You may have noticed that we haven't heard a peep out Mr. Kerkorian's Tracinda Corporation since The Rick and Ron Show pulled the wool over the industry's eyes. Anyone who thinks that's because Rabid Rick's last minute UAW deal– sorry, tentative deal– has rescued his reputation underestimates both Mr. Kerkorian's business chops and the true extent of GM's union-related woes. It's only a matter of time before Rick's forced to say "Maybe I should get another hat."

By on October 16, 2005

GM CEO Rick Wagoner, pasted behind the ill-fated Chevrolet SSRGod knows where Rabid Rick Wagoner got his reputation for being clever. Obviously, you don't get to be the CEO of the world's largest automaker by being stupid. The GM Empire is so vast that simply remembering who does what would vex Jeopardy maven Ken Jennings. But smart is not the same as clever; clever men make the right decisions at the right time. By that standard, Wagoner can't cut the mental mustard. He's consistently failed to grasp the proverbial nettle– from slicing UAW benefits and pensions (come what may) to axing the forest of deadwood cluttering GM's product portfolio. He's long on assurances, short on results and devoid of courage. And as of Monday, he's toast.

When GM's third quarter financial numbers are released, when stockholders learn that GM has failed to staunch the billion dollar arterial spray, that the Employee Discount For Everyone program was a textbook case of robbing Peter to pay Paul, that sales have declined more than 50%, that there is [still] no substantive deal with the UAW over health care costs or pensions, Wagoner will admit only that times are tough. Aside from some mention of gas prices, Rabid Rick's piercing glimpse into the obvious will not be accompanied by excuses. Instead, he will rely on his usual stock in trade: promises.

We're streamlining engineering and production, saving the company some $1b per year! We're importing cheap cars from foreign lands, without paying UAW labor costs! We're importing cheap parts from communist countries, without paying UAW labor costs! The UAW is playing ball! Hybrids are coming! Crossovers are coming! Once again, Rabid Rick will be singing The Chairman of the Board's classic hit 'Give Me Just a Little More Time' when he SHOULD be quoting Simon and Garfunkel's summation of Benjamin Braddock's tryst with Mrs. Robinson: any way you look at this you lose…

Rabid Rick's Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Executive speech wasn't true when he took control of GM, and it's not true now. But it was effective. Rabid Rick understood that GM's stockholders viewed the auto industry as show business. Supposedly, The Big Three carmakers are never more than a 300C away from salvation. With a seemingly inexhaustible supply of 'new' cars just around the bend, Rabid Rick has repeatedly sold the Powers That Be the old 'light at the end of the tunnel' bill of goods. Even as GM's health care costs top $5.6b a year, you can STILL hear the mantra coming from RenCen: product, product, product. Combine the hype with the average investor's five-minute attention span– G6! Solstice! New Tahoe! Saab crossover!– and you can understand how Rabid Rick's public pledges have allowed him to maintain power despite his monumental timidity against the enemies within.

Thanks to a combination of Delphi's bankruptcy, the UAW's foot dragging and the cataclysmic loss of sales, market share and cash; Rabid Rick's promises will now, finally, ring false. Even the most dim-witted investor will understand that GM's business is deeply, fundamentally flawed. Union contracts and bureaucratic bungling render them incapable of building the vehicles that consumers want, in quantities that reflect demand, at a price that guarantees an adequate profit. Anything Rick says about rescuing GM that doesn't include unilateral cuts to the UAW's compensation, a dramatic downsizing of GM's production capacity and the immediate termination of lackluster brands will be [rightly] perceived as too little too late.

Of course, nothing Rabid Rick could say would soothe the savage beast known as Kirk Kerkorian; an investor who's as determined to reap profit from the break-up of GM as Rabid Rick is to maintain the automaker's integrity. There's no doubt whatsoever that Kirk and his pals rely on an ancient Italian principle when analyzing the reasons for a company's financial failures: the fish stinks from the head down. It's an especially apt principle in this instance; assuming as it does that the fish is dead. And just in case you think our reports of GM's demise have been greatly exaggerated, there is a growing school of thought which says that GM should declare bankruptcy NOW, before the UAW's inevitable strike drains The General of its remaining resources.

Imagine if Rabid Rick Wagoner made THAT move on Monday. Declaring bankruptcy would be a preemptive strike against the UAW that would give GM time to re-imagine itself. To create an entirely new business model of ad hoc suppliers, manufacturers, marketers and service technicians that can respond to market trends with confidence, clarity, flexibility and speed. That sort of company would be more like a series of interlocking partnerships than a vast fiefdom run a benevolent dictator. Which is, ultimately, what not-so-clever Mr. Wagoner is fighting so hard to protect. Which is, ultimately, why he can no more win this battle than he can save his career.

By on October 13, 2005

gas.jpgFellow enthusiasts and SUV salesmen fear not: gasoline will be cheap again within a year or two. The price will return to the $1.00 – $1.50 range, just like it was back in December of ‘02. How could this be? Start with this: if high gas prices were solely and inexorably linked to the price of oil, why are there still enough cheap plastic toys to keep your local Dollar Store in business? Why have disposable diapers, polyester pillows, Tupperware, hula hoops, toy dump trucks and other petroleum-based products not jumped to three times the price, too? Because they’re not subject to the same political and economic pressures affecting gasoline.

When voters elect the latest gladhander to their municipal and state governments, the chemical makeup of the gas down at their local pump is not usually high on their list of priorities. BUT if you’re an agricultural activist who wants to sell corn to the government to produce Ethanol, or an environmentalist who believes you possess the magic formula for reducing baby-killing smog in western cities, well, that’s a different story. These groups are extremely effective at lobbying government at the state and local level to create a "boutique" gasoline formula to further their cause. As a result, Missouri gas isn’t good enough to burn in California, whose gas cannot legally be sold in New York City or parts of Arizona.

According to Michael Ports of the Society of Independent Gasoline Marketers of Americas, "Twenty years ago, there were two blends of gasoline offered in three octane levels, and essentially one blend of diesel fuel. Today, there are more than 18 unique blends of gasoline mandated across the nation — again offered in three octane grades — and at least three different blends of diesel fuel." Okay, let’s do the math. I make it… 59 different blends of gasoline spread out over 50 states. Just to make things that much more complicated, no one refinery produces all 59 blends of gas; nor is any refinery typically dedicated to any one grade.

OK, let's say a particular blend of gas for the Atlanta area is made in, oh, Louisiana and Mississippi. And let’s further imagine that a Category 4ish storm named something like Katrina pounds through the area, heavily damaging the refineries, destroying their ability to blend Atlantagas. So, all Atlanta has to do is call up Florida and ask for some Orlandogas, right? Well, no. Turns out the closest supplier of that particular formula of gas might be somewhere like… Europe. Until some big boats brimming with Atlanta-friendly gas cross the pond, load up a few thousand tank trucks and deliver the requisite blend, the local population is forced by legislative fiat to ponder pump prices hovering around $5.57 a gallon.

What’s more, all three octane levels of Atlantagas are all likely to have unique chemical constituents that the other 56 official blends do not. Those ingredients must be transported to the refinery. Some of them, such as Ethanol, may have special production and handling requirements, which adds time, effort and, of course, money to the equation. By the time a new refinery is ready to make Atlantagas somewhere else in the country, the original refineries may start trickling back on-line. The producer must weigh the simple advantages of riding out the storm. If they’re really unlucky, another storm (call it Rita) could be heading towards the new refining location.

Speculation is another factor adding to the recent gas price fluctuations. Back when gas was $2.00 a gallon, industry experts speculated that speculation was adding five to seven cents to a gallon of gas. In the wake of hurricanes, the “investor effect” has been both more volatile and more pronounced. Basically, some heavily moneyed folks are betting against The Truth About Oil; they’re making a short-term gamble that the price of oil will keep going up. Because this strategy has been successful in recent years, more commodities investors are doing it, which inflates the demand (and price) of oil (and gas).

These factors blend together (so to speak) to create a sub-economy so complex it takes a Congressional inquiry or four to prove that "big oil" is not guilty of price gouging. Although scoring political points seems to be our elected officials’ official business, Congress would be better advised to simplify the regulatory chaos surrounding US gas production and distribution. I'm all for clean air, but there is no way that 59 different formulas of gas are necessary to accomplish this laudable goal. Picking a winning formula, even if it is more expensive to begin with, would help prevent supply and distribution problems. During times of crisis, the ability to borrow a cup of premium unleaded from your neighbor would be a strong force against severe price fluctuations, speculation and gouging.

By on October 13, 2005

 Fellow enthusiasts and SUV salesmen fear not: gasoline will be cheap again within a year or two. The price will return to the $1.00 – $1.50 range, just like it was back in December of '02. How could this be? Start with this: if high gas prices were solely and inexorably linked to the price of oil, why are there still enough cheap plastic toys to keep your local Dollar Store in business? Why have disposable diapers, polyester pillows, Tupperware, hula hoops, toy dump trucks and other petroleum-based products not jumped to three times the price, too? Because they're not subject to the same political and economic pressures affecting gasoline.

When voters elect the latest gladhander to their municipal and state governments, the chemical makeup of the gas down at their local pump is not usually high on their list of priorities. BUT if you're an agricultural activist who wants to sell corn to the government to produce Ethanol, or an environmentalist who believes you possess the magic formula for reducing baby-killing smog in western cities, well, that's a different story. These groups are extremely effective at lobbying government at the state and local level to create a 'boutique' gasoline formula to further their cause. As a result, Missouri gas isn't good enough to burn in California, whose gas cannot legally be sold in New York City or parts of Arizona.

According to Michael Ports of the Society of Independent Gasoline Marketers of Americas, 'Twenty years ago, there were two blends of gasoline offered in three octane levels, and essentially one blend of diesel fuel. Today, there are more than 18 unique blends of gasoline mandated across the nation — again offered in three octane grades — and at least three different blends of diesel fuel.' Okay, let's do the math. I make it… 59 different blends of gasoline spread out over 50 states. Just to make things that much more complicated, no one refinery produces all 59 blends of gas; nor is any refinery typically dedicated to any one grade.

OK, let's say a particular blend of gas for the Atlanta area is made in, oh, Louisiana and Mississippi. And let's further imagine that a Category 4ish storm named something like Katrina pounds through the area, heavily damaging the refineries, destroying their ability to blend Atlantagas. So, all Atlanta has to do is call up Florida and ask for some Orlandogas, right? Well, no. Turns out the closest supplier of that particular formula of gas might be somewhere like… Europe. Until some big boats brimming with Atlanta-friendly gas cross the pond, load up a few thousand tank trucks and deliver the requisite blend, the local population is forced by legislative fiat to ponder pump prices hovering around $5.57 a gallon.

What's more, all three octane levels of Atlantagas are all likely to have unique chemical constituents that the other 56 official blends do not. Those ingredients must be transported to the refinery. Some of them, such as Ethanol, may have special production and handling requirements, which adds time, effort and, of course, money to the equation. By the time a new refinery is ready to make Atlantagas somewhere else in the country, the original refineries may start trickling back on-line. The producer must weigh the simple advantages of riding out the storm. If they're really unlucky, another storm (call it Rita) could be heading towards the new refining location.

Speculation is another factor adding to the recent gas price fluctuations. Back when gas was $2.00 a gallon, industry experts speculated that speculation was adding five to seven cents to a gallon of gas. In the wake of hurricanes, the "investor effect" has been both more volatile and more pronounced. Basically, some heavily moneyed folks are betting against The Truth About Oil; they're making a short-term gamble that the price of oil will keep going up. Because this strategy has been successful in recent years, more commodities investors are doing it, which inflates the demand (and price) of oil (and gas).

These factors blend together (so to speak) to create a sub-economy so complex it takes a Congressional inquiry or four to prove that 'big oil' is not guilty of price gouging. Although scoring political points seems to be our elected officials' official business, Congress would be better advised to simplify the regulatory chaos surrounding US gas production and distribution. I'm all for clean air, but there is no way that 59 different formulas of gas are necessary to accomplish this laudable goal. Picking a winning formula, even if it is more expensive to begin with, would help prevent supply and distribution problems. During times of crisis, the ability to borrow a cup of premium unleaded from your neighbor would be a strong force against severe price fluctuations, speculation and gouging.

By on October 10, 2005

 So Delphi is bankrupt. The automotive parts manufacturer will now use the courts to reduce their labor costs, so they can make a profit and stay in business. We're talking about trimming workers' wages from $60 per hour to $10, eliminating $400m dollars in annual payments to idled employees, slicing pensions, closing a couple of dozen factories, that sort of thing. Considering the union's complete intransigence on these issues, Delphi's move into Chapter 11 is entirely sensible. From GM's point of view, Delphi has let slip the dogs of war; dogs that will rip The General to pieces.

Yesterday, we learned the true cost of GM's Delphi-related pension obligations: eleven billion dollars. The figure makes The General's $2b FIAT payoff seem like a tip. It makes the $2.4b GM has burned through this year seem like an ink stain on the corporate ledger. It makes the $800m pissed away in the Fuji deal seem like change lost down the back of the sofa. Of course, pensions are paid out over time, and The General's lawyers are busy preparing to argue that GM doesn't owe Delphi a dime. But they do, and the hit will hurt.

Never mind. When push comes to shove, GM has enough family silver to cover its Delphi-related pension problems. Insiders estimate that the General has about $40b in cash and $50b in credit left. No, the real problem with Delphi's deconstruction is this: the parts maker's bankruptcy will eventually force GM to shut down its assembly lines.

In mid-December, after two months of fruitless negotiation, a federal judge will terminate the UAW's contract with Delphi. The union will strike. They have to. They cannot allow a judge to eviscerate every wage increase, working condition and benefit they fought for since 1935. For one thing, the rank and file won't tolerate anything but a symbolic roll-back in their standard of living. For another, any cut inflicted upon Delphi's 25,000 union members would form the basis of the UAW's new contracts with GM, Ford, Chrysler, etc. That's… inconceivable.

Bottom line: unions are in the business of protecting and enlarging workers' rights, not overseeing their elimination. The UAW's continued existence demands that they draw a line in the sand– which Delphi's management has already crossed, and will cross again, as and when. Although Delphi lost the opening round of the predictable (and pointless) post-Chapter 11 blame game by giving its top brass a pay raise moments before the company filed, there's no escaping the fact that you can't structure an auto parts business in today's highly competitive market using the UAW's current level of compensation.

The inevitable UAW strike will starve GM of parts and force them to shutter US factories. Lest we forget, Delphi WAS GM until '99. Every single vehicle The General makes still needs every single part Delphi makes for it. There is no way GM can build its products without all of its Delphi-produced components. The UAW knows this, and they've got nothing to lose. What's more, they believe a strike will force Delphi, GM and all the rest to get in line, or, as Ron Gettelfinger recently remarked, "we all go down together".

For its part, GM is engaged in some major league damage limitation/distancing/ denial. The General's official response to Delphi's Chapter 11 points out that they've been paying a $2b annual "premium" for Delphi parts. Their supplier's bankruptcy will save them money! Never mind that the savings are entirely theoretical; YOU try and plug a new supplier into GM's Byzantine production matrix. And anyway, a part's price is secondary to its existence: if you can't get one, it's literally priceless.

The UAW's Delphi strike will costs GM billions. Per month. By now, there's nothing GM can do to forestall this eventuality. Rabid Rick Wagoner was right not to pay Delphi blood money to keep the [union] peace. It would have shown weakness to GM's mortal enemy, drained yet more billions from the company's coffers and postponed the inevitable. In fact, all GM can do now is prepare for the coming disruption, and devise a strategy that would allow it to "pull a Delphi" and walk away from its union contracts. Something like… bankruptcy.

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