Category: Editorials

By on October 6, 2005

 Every time there is an oil crisis, four things happen. First, citizens are criticized for their wasteful ways. Second, they are exhorted to conserve our precious, finite resources. Third, alternative fuels take center stage and receive a major cash injection. And fourth, the oil industry finds new ways to find, pump, and refine the liquid gold. Crisis over, everyone goes back to business. Makes sense to me.

It never ceases to amaze me how little Americans learn from history–- or hysteria. History lessons do not draw an audience, though. No media outlet is going to predict life returning to normal when they can release The Day After Tomorrow. By the time the oil crisis is over, some new apocalypse will be taking shape; most people will not even recognize that they were duped into thinking the world is running out of oil.

According to Daniel Yergin, author of "The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power", society consistently underestimates the impact of technology during times of shortage: 'This is not the first time that the world has 'run out of oil.' It's more like the fifth.' When we started pumping oil out of pockets in the ground, we were only able to get a small percentage of what was there. Today, we recover about a third of the oil in any given find, which still leaves two-thirds in the ground.

At $66 per barrel, it makes a lot more sense to develop and deploy the technology needed to get oil from those hard to reach places. Yergin predicts a massive surge in the ability to produce oil between now and 2010: 'Many of the projects that embody this new capacity were approved in the 2001-03 period.'

History backs him up; over the last 100 years, after a period of oil shortage, market forces converge to create the exact opposite: a market awash in oil. If necessity is the mother of invention, the desire to cash in on $66 per barrel oil is a beloved aunt. New oil acquisition methods, like horizontal drilling and steam injection wells, will result in more oil produced from the same places.

According MIT's Morris Adelman, 'the amount of oil available to the market over the next 25 to 50 years is for all intents and purposes infinite.' Adelman agrees that spiking oil prices stimulate new ways to extract the black stuff. We haven't even begun to exhaust these alternative possibilities. The truth is we still may not do so, for quite some time. Why? Higher prices draw out additional supplies of 'easy oil'. Eventually, supply exceeds the demand, the price goes back down, and alternative extraction technologies cease to be ecomically viable. The fortunes of the shale oil industry illustrate this point perfectly.

A barrel of shale oil costs roughly $40 per barrel to produce. With oil trading at $66 a barrel, the trillion barrels of shale oil in Colorado have, again, become economically attractive. This was also true in the 80's– and then the price of oil from relatively simple well heads sank below the cost of squeezing oil out of rocks. The shale business crashed. This time, hopes run high that new technology will reduce shale oil's production costs. If those costs fall below $30 a barrel, Colorado shale could be a sustainable source of oil for generations.

Okay, the tree-huggers are not completely wrong. Conservation also has advantages. For one thing, it keeps money away from people who do not genuinely care about us (Hugo Chavez, Russia, Wahhabists). Unfortunately, today's eco-friendly cars are hardly worth the effort. Using easy math, at $5.00 a gallon, you have to drive 120,000 miles to make up the difference between the Ford Escape ($20,000, 20mpg) and the Ford Escape Hybrid ($30,000, 30mpg). Today's fad of vegetable-oil engines is likely to go the way of the '80's notions of solar powered cars and parachute pants, but the simple fact that you can buy a mass-produced, environmentally friendlier car at all shows how much progress we have made in the last few decades.

According to Adel al-Jubeir, a Saudi foreign policy advisor, "The world is more likely to run out of uses for oil than Saudi Arabia is going to run out of oil.' I believe him. Of course, a world market brimming with fresh oil may be the Earth Liberation Front's worst nightmare, but it certainly keeps the engine of progress turning. With China and India waking up to the economic possibilities that oil creates, there will be even more incentive to get black stuff into a pipeline than there has been since the Underground Railroad. Where there's a will, there's a well.

By on October 5, 2005

 In a news article entitled "UAW, GM near deal on Health", Detroit News reporter Daniel Howes claims that the United Auto Workers and General Motors are about to sign agreement that will trim $1b off The General's health care payments. The doyen of Detroit sums-up the current state of play in his usual comprehensive and no-nonsense style, but a thorough read of his report reveals that his premise is based entirely on rumor. And the rumor is based on hope. And the hope is false.

It's easy to understand why even seasoned journalists would give voice to such illogical optimism. While we've been charting and predicting GM's demise for some time, the actual implications of that cataclysm are so enormous they defy rational exposition. When a GM lawyer enters federal court holding the General's bankruptcy petition, the entire US automotive industry will change forever. Initially, everyone will suffer. It's no surprise that industry insiders hope against hope that the main players will see sense soon enough to dodge the bullet that will kill the status quo.

What observers fail to understand is that GM and the UAW signed a suicide pact a long time ago. Back in the day, when GM's profit-gorged, short-sighted management traded job security for freedom from strikes, they backed the union into a corner. That's right: the union. Once union members were made fire proof, the union could never, ever agree to their dismissal. Pay raises, working conditions, pension contributions, even health care– they're all negotiable. But any UAW boss that says to one of his members "The company doesn't need you anymore. That's it, you're done; you're outta here" wouldn't last five minutes.

Make no mistake: guaranteed employment is killing GM. While everyone is talking about health care payments, the key fact is this: a large percentage of The General's workforce is completely unnecessary. And yet GM is forced by its UAW contract to keep paying these workers, either by continuing to spew out cars no one wants or by putting them in a "job bank" where they receive full salary and benefits for doing nothing whatsoever. While most people understand the insanity of the job bank, few realize that one of the reasons GM makes far too many products is that the union deal means it would cost them almost as much NOT to make them.

All the UAW can say is, well, it's your fault for not designing, marketing and selling vehicles that people want to buy, which would create enough demand to keep our people employed and help you make enough money to pay our salaries. It's not a bad argument, really, but it was formulated at a time when GM owned the US auto market lock, stock and barrel. And even if it's true, it's not important. The chances of GM's design team pulling a dozen or so rabbits out of its hat are now smaller than a Chevrolet Aveo.

Despite all the media hype and hope, the current situation is a Gordian knot. GM can't live with their UAW contract, they can't get out of it without a strike, and they can no longer afford a strike. Meanwhile, the General is bleeding out. Their market share has evaporated, their new products aren't cutting it, Delphi is about to saddle the company with a $7.5b pension bill (and a catastrophic interruption in the flow of parts), their credit rating will soon be sub-junk (nuclear waste?), their losses are completely unsustainable, and so on. Today's fire sale of their stake in Fuji Industries to arch enemy Toyota is just more proof that their time is up.

In fact, GM is already dead. They're already locked in the corporate version of John Kennedy's plane crash: a death spiral headed straight to a violent, inescapable conclusion. Accepting this premise, we can understand GM's recent behavior in terms of Dr. Elisabeth Kubler-Ross' Five Stages of Grief. We've heard the denial (our products are great!); we've felt the anger (the media hates us!) and now… bargaining. As you read this, GM and UAW reps are at the bargaining table, trying to find a way to deal with their mutual loss. They may establish what Ross called a "temporary truce", but they will eventually have to move on.

When Delphi goes belly-up, I reckon the whole lot of them will make the transition to the final stage: depression. When GM itself follows suit, the depression will become chronic. The media will bemoan the loss of American pride and jobs, the UAW will get all sullen and melancholy, and GM's current management will sulk off into the distance, riding their golden parachutes without comment. All that will be left will be acceptance. Kirk Kerkorian and his pals will take charge of this final stage of the healing process, telling the world that it's over. Deal with it. And after that? Who knows? Hope springs eternal.

By on September 30, 2005

The 1953 AC Ace.  Anyone remember the AC Ace? It was a nicely balanced British sports car with a space-frame chassis, four-wheel independent suspension, aluminum body panels, a high-revving straight six powerplant and perfect weight distribution. Car magazines of the day raved about the machine's ideal blend of performance and handling. And yet the delightful little Ace has disappeared into that special memory space reserved for die-hard Anglophile automobilists. Blame the snake.

When GM started cleaning Ford's clock in the early '60's, a Blue Oval man named Carroll Shelby went and stuffed a big old V8 under the hood of the AC Ace and re-badged it a Cobra. The resulting sports car brought fame and fortune to both man and machine, on track and off. Forty-years later, Shelby is still trading on the reputation generated by his modified two-seater. Forty years later, companies are still fabricating Cobra replicas in their thousands. Forty years later, the Cobra is still burnishing Ford's image. Needless to say, nobody worships the well-balanced little sports car that gave birth to a legend.

The Pontiac Solstice Fast forward some 40 years and check out the new Pontiac Solstice roadster. Like the original Ace, or the current Mazda MX5 (nee Miata), the Solstice is a small, attractive, well-balanced sports car. The consensus among the buff books is that the four-cylinder Solstice can compete on most levels with the equally-cylindered MX5– which is quite an achievement for a box-fresh challenger. But it's not good enough. The Solstice needs a V8.

Peppy as it is, the Pontiac Solstice can still be shut down by an old guy in a Lincoln. And the old guy won't even have to know how to shift gears. While some enthusiasts will undoubtedly guard and revere the Solstice as a perfectly-balanced purists' pleasure, when it comes to weekend automobiles, the majority of the great American motoring community prefers muscle. Always has. Always will.

GM's LS4 5.3-liter V8 A Solstice V8 is perfectly doable. GM produces the world's best, most powerful and compact range of V8 engines. Their pushrod design ensures that the powerplant would fit into the Solstice's petite nose. Equally important, in aluminum-block form, GM's small-block V8 weighs less than a hundred pounds more than the Solstice's four. Because of the smoother power delivery from the V8, very little extra stress would be placed on the Solstice's driveline. If any components couldn't handle the extra power, GM could source the appropriate parts from a Corvette, light truck or SUV.

With a simple engine transplant, the Solstice would be transformed from a capable plaything to a legendary road rocket. Instead of a 2860lbs. roadster with 177hp, the Solstice V8 would be a 3000lbs. roadster with 400hp. That's enough horsepower per pound to place the Solstice smack dab in the middle of supercar territory. Leave off the AC (so to speak) and power windows, and the power-to-weight ratio would be even more stunning. As a 'club sport' model, the Solstice could go head to head with Porsche in SCCA racing. Has anyone imagined a Pontiac that could compete with a Porsche? Ever?

 The media buzz generated by a V8 Solstice would be tremendous. The buff books would go crazy. The comparison tests would write themselves. If the exterior changes were kept to a minimum, the sales of the four-cylinder Solstices would be benefit. A V8 Solstice would also provide a proper halo for GM in general, at a fraction of the Ford GT's cost. And that old geezer in the Lincoln could no longer be certain he could out-drag the Solstice next to him at the light.

It's worth noting that Ford, inheritor of the Cobra mystique, almost made the Miata into a latter day Shelby Cobra several times. In the mid to late '90s, several product developers were inspired by the Miata's aftermarket installations to investigate the possibities of shoe-horning a V8 into the Japanese roadster. There are credible rumors of a secret prototype. But Ford management discontinued the 5.0-liter V8 in favor of the underperforming, overweight 4.6-liter V8, and demoted some of the managers who persisted in pursuing the project.

Ford missed their chance to make a modern Cobra. Will GM seize their chance? Not according to GM's car czar, Bob Lutz: "No question, somebody, somewhere will fit a small-block V-8 in here, but we won't be doing it. This car was designed to have a four-cylinder engine.' Our spies report that a turbo-charged Solstice GXP is on its way, which will certainly be significantly hotter than the feeble EcoTec 4 version, but… The GXP won't even be in the same league as the charismatic Ford Cobra. Anyone who's heard the burble, snarl and pop of a V8 Cobra, watched it roar into the distance, and smelled the burned rubber will tell you: there ain't nothing like the real thing.

By on September 29, 2005

Buzz Hargrove, President of the CAW and master of Pyrrhic victoryToday's 11th hour deal between GM and the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW) is yet another example of The General's singular inability to take the bold action needed to avoid bankruptcy. Instead of reasserting its ancient right to fire workers it doesn't need, GM once again agreed to subsidize idled employees. The General will point to the 1000 jobs sliced from its Canadian operations, but the cuts will be achieved through attrition. CAW President Buzz Hargrove knows what's what, and he isn't afraid to spell it out: 'People will either have work or wages."

The idea that an auto worker deserves full salary for not working is insane. But it's not half as crazy as subsidizing the concept with shareholders' money. In case you thought, well, at least GM exchanged impregnable job security for some benefit reductions, forgeddaboutit. The General's 16,400 Canadian blue collar workers also received a 3.5% pay increase over the life of their contract AND increased pension contributions. Industry experts estimate that the pension top-up will cost GM an EXTRA $179m during the three-year period.

As a warm-up for the '07 negotiations with the United Auto Workers (UAW), GM's Canadian caving expedition is roughly equivalent to a prize fighter preparing for a title bout by working on his tan. The General's crack negotiators couldn't even get CAW assembly line workers to reduce their break time by two minutes. Of course, GM's abject failure to stem the spurting artery of red ink known as "legacy costs" is neither new nor surprising. Rabid Rick Wagoner and his minions have continually staked their fortunes on changing the bandages covering the company's wounds, rather than radical surgery. And by surgery, I mean a strike.

There's no question that a tough stance by GM against its Canadian workers would have triggered a walkout. It's equally true that a strike would have severely dented GM's US operations. In 2004, The General's Canadian factories built 824,619 transmissions, 682,000 engines, 603,660 cars, 320,055 trucks, 24.6 million parts and shipped 117,022 tons of steel. Even if the UAW didn't walk out in sympathy with their neighbors to the north, the disruption to GM's food chain– and its effect on beleaguered suppliers like teetering Delphi– would have been catastrophic.

But survivable. GM's Gulfstream-friendly execs wimped-out because A) they're chicken and B) they don't think they need to draw a line in the sand, ever. Simple logic will convince the UAW to surrender members' entitlements. Shrewdly enough, the UAW has catered to this delusion by commissioning an "outside review" of GM's financial health. GM's leaders believe the UAW will read the report, see the writing on the wall and take one for the team. The General's generals figured a Canadian showdown would have put the UAW in the wrong mood for the conciliations to come.

Hello? Am I the only one actually listening to Big Ron Gettelfinger? When asked about the possibility of surrendering union benefits to ensure GM's continued existence, the UAW Prez said: "There comes a point in time where you think, 'We either move forward or we all go down together…' You can't just take, take, take, take, take and that's the mood that's out there right now.' I'm no labor relations expert, but Big Ron doesn't sound like the kind of guy who will extend the hand of friendship across a bargaining table in the name of mutual self-interest. I mean, if Big Ron thinks he's being abused NOW, what hope is there in '07?

None. GM should have forced the CAW to strike. Considering the inescapable fact that GM will eventually face a UAW strike (and/or Chapter 11), it would've been better for The General to have its labor showdown start in Canada. From a PR point-of-view, Americans would be a lot less likely to support a strike on behalf of Canadian workers than one mounted on behalf of UAW employees. This is also a time when GM's inventories are low, and the company's prospects dim. Better to have it out now, heading for the winter doldrums, than later, when sales will be there for Toyota's taking.

A crippling strike would've also offered GM an excellent opportunity to kill half its brands– and blame someone else. But hey, who am I kidding? You only have to look at the timing of the Solstice, HHR or any one of the company's "new" gas-guzzling SUV's to know that the word "proactive" simply isn't in The General's vocabulary. They're used to playing defense. That's what they'll do until the opposition rips off their head and uses it for a football.

By on September 24, 2005

The L39 burns 130 gallons of aviation fuel per hour.In his first podcast, Maximum Bob Lutz insists that the full-size SUV market will survive the changing economic climate, albeit in a diminished form. What, no Cat 5 devastation? Nope. GM's Car Czar reckons around 750k Americans "genuinely need" a jumbo SUV (down from last year's estimate of over a million). Yes, well, a man who flies an L39 fighter jet for fun may not be the best judge of how gas prices affect the average SUV buyer. In fact, I reckon MB's market estimate is too optimistic by half.

Lutz' cigar-scarred voice claims that the full-sized SUV's core clientele need their gargantuan gas-guzzler because they 'tow a boat' and 'carry lots of kids". Where's the data for that assertion? In truth, it's highly unlikely that even 50% of full-size SUV drivers ever tow a boat. What's more, there are plenty of capable sprog carriers out there– most now available in four-wheel-drive– that don't suck gas with the jumbo SUV's unrelenting extravagance. So unless these owners of full-sized SUV's tote more than three kids AND a boat, they're free to downsize.

Or not. Now that buyers of large SUV's are almost as rare as Oprah magazine cover girls, now that all the low-fertility, non-boating SUV owners who can afford to jettison their land yachts have done so (or will do so at trade-in time), the value of pre-owned XXXL SUV's has collapsed. A large percentage of full-size SUV owners owe significantly more money on their behemoth than it's market value, leaving them unable to escape their loan/vehicle. That's bad news for GM's new Tahoe, Escalade, Yukon, Yukon Denali and the eight (yes eight) other GMT900's headed for dealers' parking lots in '06.

Even those who can afford to pay the freight for these sleeker, more cosseting SUV's won't. The General's previous party line– that people who can buy a $40k to $70k SUV aren't overly concerned about $3-a-gallon gas– is moot. Despite Lutz' belief in his customers' maritime/progeny-based buying motivations, the popular movement into large SUV's was fashion-led. The popular movement OUT of them will be equally stylish– with one important distinction. The current fug of anti-SUV negativity is so poisonous it will only take a few months to destroy an automotive trend that was decades in the making.

For GM stockholders, employees and suppliers, it's a tragedy of the worst kind: preventable. While you can't blame The General for making full-sized hay while the sun shined, the automaker should have seen this coming. Unless you believe that GM's market analysts were paid to play Tetris, unless it's OK to enrich a CEO by $7m+ a year when he can't tell which way the wind's blowing in a howling gale, GM had time to get it right. GM could have– should have– dedicated every resource in their Empire to designing, manufacturing and selling the world's most fuel efficient SUV's. A 20 – 30% improvement in fuel economy would have forestalled much of today's "truck flight".

Of course, arrogance is the engine of tragedy. When Rabid Rick Wagoner met with Toyota Chairman Fujio Cho in May, he should have bowed with appropriate reverence (to put it politely), bought the Japanese automaker's hybrid technology and ordered it installed in all GM SUV's– even if it meant a two-year production delay. Instead, Wagoner-san flew back to Detroit, pulled the trigger on GM's great SUV giveaway and ordered production of GM's "refreshed" SUV's brought forward. Vehicles that get one mpg more than the old ones.

Wagoner's hubris stems from his profound faith in the power of perseverance. (It was the key to his rise within GM.) Rabid Rick clearly believes GM will answer the clarion call for improved mileage with new, world-beating technology… eventually. As in too late. Lutz, on the other hand, is a Marine. His hubris comes from his conviction that a warrior's heart conquers all. Listen to his podcast. Check out Maximum Bob's strange combination of bravado, bluster and battle fatigue. We HAVE what it takes. We CAN bunker down and hold out until the hybrid cavalry arrives. We WILL be OK. Except when Bob says "we" he means "I". [Business Law Number Seven from Maxi Bob's book on Chrysler: 'Teamwork isn't always right.]

I digress. Bottom-line: I'd be surprised to see large SUV sales top 400k a year. And yet Lutz' podcast tells us GM's winning: their new-shape SUV's will maintain a 60% share of the disappearing market. Meanwhile, over at the other tables, the croupier is busy shoveling The General's chips in Japan's direction. If it wasn't so funny, it would be sad. Actually, it is sad. Once upon a time, America's largest companies were known for their ability to bring technologically advanced products to market quickly, cheaply and efficiently. If the world's largest automaker can't re-engineer its vehicles fast enough to avoid a completely predictable market meltdown, then maybe it shouldn't BE the world's largest automaker. Ipso facto.

http://fastlane.gmblogs.com/archives/2005/09/first_podcast_w_2.html

By on September 21, 2005

 Imagine Maximum Bob Lutz and Marketing Mark LeNeve heading for the unveiling of GM's new 'full-size' SUV's. At the precise moment when another hurricane is eyeing-up Gulf oil refineries, the dynamic duo is charged with selling the idea that The General's latest fuel-sucking land yachts will stop the automaker's financial fibrillation. Never mind all the other diseases eating away at GM: viral benefit payments, broken brands, model metastasis, bubonic incentive programs, hybrid anemia, etc. This SUV thing is where GM gets its first glimpse of the corporate crash cart. So, how did the boys take it?

Denial is a useful psychological condition. It allows humans to maintain hope in the face of ridiculous odds. By that token, Lutz and LaNeve's inability to confront the full horror of GM's situation is both understandable and indefensible. After all, they're the guys behind the wheel of a multi-billion dollar company launching a fleet of the wrong vehicles at the wrong time. And yet they're pathologically incapable of accepting this fact or, more importantly, its implications. I'm serious. This is not the usual corporate spin. These guys are delusional.

As TTAC's invitation to the SUV launch was lost in the mail, we make our diagnosis based on past history and reports in the automotive press– whose own inability to grasp the nettle is equally worrying (The Detroit News headline "Can new lineup of big SUV's revive GM?" should have preceded the world's shortest article.) According to AutoWeek, Mr. Lutz admitted that "It is realistic to assume that this segment won't grow". How about roll over and die? Not in Bob's world. "I think we may maintain our volume at other people's expense, even if the segment shrinks a little bit.'

May? If? A bit? These are not exactly bold words for a guy who flies military jets for fun. As we learned in a Fortune magazine profile of Rabid Rick Wagoner, Maximum Bob's optimistic sales predictions are the source of a great deal of humor within the GM Empire. When Maxi Bob is downbeat, it's time for the cemetery workers to get out the shovels. More to the point, Bob's use of the word "realistic" and "to assume" in the same sentence reveals that he's seen the enemy, recognized his own face and retreated to the executive washroom for a little pep talk with the mirror.

You'd think that Marketing Mark LeNeve would have a firmer grasp of reality, and you'd be right– in a roundabout sort of way. The Detroit News has LaNeve looking at GM's new full-size SUV's and conceding "This launch is critical to us." Note: LeNeve is not known for his arched eyebrow. Anyway, to quote the Sinatras, then he goes and blows it all by saying that I love you. After conceding that the jumbo-sized SUV market "may" contract, LeNeve asserts "This is a very large, very important and very profitable market.' If only he'd used the word "was"…

It gets worse. When confronted with their new SUV's gas-hoggedness, the GM poo-bahs pointed to their invisible friends: crossovers and alternative fuels. The Detroit News said Lutz was quick to point out that yesterday's big-SUV roll-out was only part of GM's "full-frontal product assault on the marketplace". The Car Czar revealed that GM will unleash eight new crossovers in the next four years. (Eight? How about one good one?) For his part, LeNeve reminded journos that GM's 5.3-liter V8 can run on ethanol, and announced plans to promote ethanol use in those states "with a lot of ethanol fueling stations". Both of them.

OK, look; I'm not a big fan of shooting fish in a barrel. But again, the automotive press just isn't holding GM's feet to the fire re: their monumentally stupid decision to spend billions rushing their '07 SUV's to market. To their credit, the Detroit News has sprinkled their stories with pithy quotes from industry Naysayers (Burnham Securities' analyst David Healy: 'To me, GM is kind of whistling past the graveyard.') But the press seems generally comfortable repeating the same old GM BS we've been hearing for decades: success is just a new model (or thirty) away.

Well it isn't. Everyone involved– executives, union members, shareholders, journalists and consumers– should admit and acknowledge that big ass SUV's are a dead genre guzzling. Unless GM can come up with a credible plan B in a hurry, they are completely screwed. Meanwhile, I'd like to know why we're only seeing pictures and descriptions of the new Tahoe. The preview included the new GMC Yukon, GMC Yukon Denali and Cadillac Escalade. I find it astounding that the automotive press would acquiesce to yet another product-related embargo at this critical moment of corporate crisis. It's a totally unacceptable abrogation of their editorial responsibility.

And where was Rick Wagoner?

By on September 20, 2005

Magna Steyr's Mila CNG ConceptIn the last century, US car buyers have watched some three thousand automobile companies come and go. Today, Ford, GM and Daimler Chrysler represent the remaining fortunes of the US auto industry. But The Big Three needn't be The Only Three. With modern manufacturing and management tools, another US company could enter the fray. A partnership involving original equipment suppliers and an existing dealer network could be just the ticket to change the rules of a game that Detroit seems determined to lose. The prospective players…

Magna International Inc. supplies automakers with a wide range of OEM (Original Equipment Manufacture) parts. Founded by Frank Stronach, the worldwide conglomerate consists of seven groups: Cosma (chassis), Decoma (plastic body panels, exterior trim and fascias), Intior Automotive (cockpit modules, seats, doors, panels, locks and window systems), Magna Donnelly (mirrors, windows, door handles, automotive electronics), Magna Drivetrain, Magna Steyr (powertrains and general engineering) and Tesma (engines, transmissions and fuel components). Magna has considerable experience co-coordinating complete automobile production, from initial design to final assembly.

Delphi manufactures brakes, engine electronics, body hardware, safety devices (side airbags), audio systems and interior components (steering wheels, HVAC systems, instrument panels, etc.). The company is an industry leader in vehicle stability systems and anti-lock brakes, with superb facilities for testing and validation. Although Delphi's onerous UAW contracts and misplaced faith in birth parent GM have sent the company spiraling towards bankruptcy, there's no question that they have a tremendous reservoir of talented engineers and production workers.

AutoNation is America's largest retailer of new and used cars, with 278 dealerships. Their network may not rival that of The Big Three, but it's roughly the same size as Saturn's original dealer group. AutoNation is known as a risk taker that's not afraid to take the tough decisions it needs to compete.

Why would these three companies want to join forces? Magna and Delphi are fighting an uphill battle in an increasingly cutthroat business. The Big Three have forced them into endless rounds of vicious cost-cutting. The bloodletting continues, even as the suppliers struggle to compete against Asian companies paying their workers less per day than Magna and Delphi pay theirs for an hour's labor. Clearly, the business of being a Tier 1 Supplier no longer generates significant profits for either organization.

For its part, AutoNation earns its crust selling cars whose margins have been pared to the bone. As the middleman, they're at the mercy of the rising and falling fortunes of indifferent and bureaucratic automobile manufacturers– despite being closerthanthis to their customers.

Working in concert, Magna, Delphi and AutoNation have the motive, means and opportunity to create an entirely new automobile from the ground up. This new car– this new brand– could begin life free from the dead hand of the past. The group could launch a fresh product with bold marketing and a highly-motivated sales force (thanks to higher margins). They could boldly go where The Big Three can only limp along.

Of course, there are plenty of missing pieces to the puzzle, including the new car's engine. The powerplant could be sourced from… competitors. Many automakers sell engines to their rivals; Honda continues to provide complete engines to GM. What's more, Delphi's expertise in engine controls means they'd only require a basic engine. All the other necessary components– transmissions, tires, glass and paint– could be easily purchased from US suppliers.

As for the production facility for the new vehicle, the decline in automobile manufacturing around Detroit offers plenty of opportunities. Ford's soon-to-be-abandoned Wixom plant is just one potential solution. Ironically, Michigan is spending millions upgrading the roads and bridges around the plant for better access. There's every reason to believe the state would add tax incentives and abatements to help secure new jobs and a new future for the area.

Imagine building a new small car with the quirkiness of the MINI, the practicality of a Scion and the usefulness of a PT Cruiser. Install a class-leading engine for performance and handling, price the product correctly, market it cleverly and support it with first-class sales and service. As long as the Delphi/Magna/AutoNation group maintained a single-minded focus on producing a high-quality model, the new car could signal the dawn of a new era of American ingenuity and innovation.

By on September 15, 2005

Al Ries The GM Death Watch series has repeatedly asserted that The General has too many brands selling too many models, with insufficient focus on any level, with excessive overlap on every level. The very first DW entry, "GM Must Die", recommended that the world's largest automaker should be broken-up; its constituent parts deep-sixed and/or spun off into independent corporate entities. I figured the stance placed me well to the right of my fellow GM-bashers. And then I read Al Ries' Ad Age column, "The Sad and Unnecessary Decline of Saturn" and instantly realized I wasn't being radical enough.

Ries wrote that there are only two ways for a company to increase sales: expand the brand (with new products) or expand market share (capture more of the existing market with the existing product). The Atlanta-based marketing consultant asserts that market share is best. Once a brand captures more than 50% of its market, it's virtually unassailable. Ries cites McDonald's, Heinz ketchup, Microsoft, Tabasco, Rolex, Kleenex, Starbucks, WD-40 and Jello as examples of consumer brands whose market sector dominance insulates them from competitive pressure and obviates the need for brand expansion. [NB: variations within a brand's remit, such as Kleenex with Aloe, are not considered brand extensions.]

Ries' premise flies in the face of the commonly-held theory that an automaker's survival in today's "niche-driven marketplace" depends on a constant and steady stream of new models and variants. If true, Ries' argument makes a complete mockery of this week's auto show hysteria in Frankfurt. Indeed, all those struggling manufacturers promising a raft of new models to rescue their sinking fortunes (Mitsubishi, VW, GM etc.) are actually announcing their intention to drill new holes in their hull. As proof of his postulation, Ries takes a spin 'round Saturn.

At its peak in 1994, GM's "People First" division sold 286,003 vehicles. The figure represented the industry's best vehicle-per-dealer average: 960 cars. That year, Saturn S-series' sales accounted for 16% of the small compact category, second only to the Ford Escort. And then GM took its eye off the ball. Not only did they fail to update the Saturn S-Series– while the Honda Civic went through three evolutions– they also introduced an entirely new replacement, and then an SUV. The upshot? In '04, Saturn's three models totted-up 212,017 sales. That's 26% less volume than a decade previous, with sales per dealer down over 50% (483 units).

As Ries points out, conventional wisdom runs 180 degree counter to his analysis. The industry believes Saturn's troubles stem from a lack of a broad product range, not because of it. Ries cites the long list of insiders who sounded the clarion call to create a larger Saturn portfolio: Automotive News Editor Charles Child, Saturn boss Cynthia Trudell, her replacement Annette Clayton, and, of course, GM Car Czar Maximum Bob Lutz. All of them believed Saturn was languishing because it didn't have enough vehicles to capitalize on the brand's original success.

And now Saturn is finally getting the expanded model range it wants; including a sexy little roadster called the Saturn Sky. Which is basically the same car as the Pontiac Solstice. Which dilutes the strength of BOTH brands. In fact, the more you think about it, the easier it is to see the merit in Ries' supposition. We've always said it makes no sense for GM brands to compete with each other (ipso facto); re-badging the same vehicle for different marques is the worst kind of marketing insanity. But it also makes no sense for a brand to compete with itself.

An automotive brand selling a sedan, SUV and sports car asks consumers to connect widely disparate dots. The best ad campaign in the world must overcome the fundamental "Jack of all trades, master of none" inertia. And even if an automaker somehow fashions an over-arching message (e.g. The Ultimate Driving Machine), multi-branded companies are still stuck in the marketing mire. After all, if Saturn, Chevrolet, Cadillac and Buick all offer a similar range of vehicle types, the consumer will think– quite rightly– that the brands are more similar than they are different. Why bother with any of them?

Assuming Ries' has got it right, how far should carmakers take his idea that expanding market share is better than widening the brand's product line? If you apply the basic principle without fear or favor, Porsche should only be building sports cars (the Panamera sedan probably qualifies, but the Cayenne SUV certainly doesn't). Saturn should only be selling economy cars– if not just one car– and… that's it.

In a recent email, Ries said that he'd heard that there were only eight types of vehicles: pickup, SUV, sedan, sports car, etc. He suggested that GM's eight brands should all make one type of vehicle apiece. Now THAT'S what I call radical.

http://www.adage.com/news.cms?newsId=46020

By on September 12, 2005

 Last June, Rabid Rick Wagoner unveiled his five-point plan to rescue The General. He promised to downsize GM's production capacity– then let normal attrition take its course. He promised thrilling new products– then accelerated production of gas-guzzling SUV's. He promised he'd cut union benefits– then didn't. He promised to end incentives– then launched the Employee Discount for All program. And lastly, Rabid Rick promised to build cars using cheaper parts made in China. This he's doing. Unfortunately, it's the one promise he shouldn't have made.

A quick reminder: China is a dictatorship. There is no freedom of speech, movement or association. There is no independent judiciary. "Workers' rights" exist entirely at the ruling party's pleasure. It is, in truth, a police state. On the positive side (at least from GM's point-of-view), the country has a large supply of men, women and children who are willing to toil on an assembly line for $1.50 an hour without legal protections, health care or a pension.

Let's put aside the moral issue of investing in a communist country– something consumers, the mainstream media and GM's stockholders seem happy to do. On the face of it, Rabid Rick's decision to improve the company's bottom line with low-cost Chinese labor is a no-brainer. If Chinese parts are up-to-snuff, who cares where they're made? Given a bit of time, GM could replace entire UAW-made vehicles with Chinese-made vehicles and poof! The US health care and pension crisis is gone. As long as American consumers don't kick up a fuss, as long as GM doesn't have to hit-up the US government (triggering embarrassing questions from union-supported politicians), they're golden.

Perhaps. Perhaps not. Imagine that President Hu Jintao and his mates suddenly decide that all China-based automakers should be owned and operated by The People's Republic, to create vehicles exclusively for the domestic market. Who's going to stop them? I'm sure GM's high-priced international analysts have officially discounted the possibility, but I wonder if they could name one communist/socialist country that HASN'T nationalized a key industry– including England (British Leyland) and France (Renault). In countries where the armed forces have a say in, um, everything, business conditions can change very, very quickly.

And what of supply lines? The challenges involved with producing key parts for the US automotive industry in an agrarian society that's 6637 miles and 12 times zones away from Detroit seems fairly major to me. Wayward ships, miscommunication, disease, political unrest, general disorganization– I reckon there's plenty of scope for a complete break in the supply chain. Did I mention military action or natural disaster? If the Taiwan situation heats-up, if the region suffers a killer tsunami or typhoon, I don't think Chinese cars or car parts will get first priority.

There are also daunting cultural issues. The world's best manufacturing facilities depend on feedback from the factory floor to eliminate waste, improve quality and create innovation. What are the chances that a class-bound, politically-repressed Chinese worker is going to be a "team player", as explained to him by a Western plant manager? The Chinese automotive worker's pay may be microscopic in comparison to a UAW member, but it's a fortune by local standards. Surely this imbalance places an enormous pressure on Chinese workers to keep their mouths shut in all situations.

Basically, GM is investing billions of dollars in an amoral, unstable, creatively infertile economic environment. What's more, they want their suppliers to do the same. On September 20th, GM purchasing poo-bah Bo Andersson will meet with the company's 250 top suppliers and "recommend" that they cut costs by opening more factories in low-wage countries– especially The People's Republic of China. Bo's suggestion will be backed by an 'aggressive restructuring" of GM's supply base. In other words, get on with it or goodbye.

Sometime before October 17th, parts supplier Delphi will file for Chapter 11, saddling The General with approximately $9b in legacy costs, and proving that managerial incompetence, union intransigence and corporate insolvency are a logical progression. But the correct response to this conundrum is NOT outsourcing to China. Non-UAW American companies have the technology, expertise, flexibility and will to produce parts right here in the USA that can meet or beat the price set by foreign-based operations– without a language barrier or the risks of dealing with a fantastically long supply chain and a totalitarian regime. And that's without any kind of discussion of quality, creativity. national self-interest or, God forbid, morality.

GM's desperation is leading it to reckless adventurism far from home. One way or another, the automaker will pay the price. As an ancient Chinese proverb says, distant water won't help to put out a fire close at hand. Or, more appropriately, once you climb on a tiger's back, it's hard to get off.

By on September 9, 2005

 Peter DeLorenzo latest rant tore US automakers a new orifice. The Autoextremist accused US manufacturers of putting all their eggs in an SUV shaped basket– despite clear warnings that rising gas prices and political correctness would eventually destroy the genre's over-arching popularity. Although Mr. DeLorenzo's essay is a cogent and scathing indictment of the automakers' short-term thinking, he's sure to face some stiff rhetorical competition from the environmental groups who've been railing against SUV's since the first Suburban burbled its way into the American housewife's heart. Guess what? I'm not joining the chorus.

While I'm happy to condemn GM et al for responding to US market trends with all the alacrity of a three-toed sloth, I reject Mr. DeLorenzo's argument that Detroit artificially induced America's "need" for lumbering leviathans. Did Colgate create the "need" for whitening toothpaste? No; they identified a desire, created a product to satisfy it and marketed the Hell out of it. As a capitalistic enterprise, automakers are obligated to follow the same process. Taking automakers to task for making XXXX SUV's handle like cars– instead of simply abandoning the entire genre as "woefully inappropriate"– makes Mr. DeLorenzo more of an Autoelitist than a player of extreme games.

The truth is that no one forced Americans to buy SUV's. By the same token, no one can force US consumers to abandon their "wasteful mastodons" (providing we accept the idea that gas hikes are the result of limited supply rather than conspiratorial collusion). Of course, the combination of high running costs and political incorrectness HAS created an SUV exodus of appropriately epic proportions. But the fact that the Big Three made hay while the sun shined, and used their influence to promote an SUV-friendly legislative environment, is nothing more than good business.

If the party's over, it's over. There's no use blaming Detroit for providing the revelers with jumbo-sized kegs. Everyone involved was, after all, an adult. You can, however, wonder why the Hell GM killed a rear-wheel-drive car platform in order to freshen-up its SUV's at the exact moment when the genre was, no-doubt-about-it, headed for the dumpster. Or what Ford was thinking when it deep-sixed its entire minivan business. Or when DCX will get around to producing a hybrid anything. According to DeLorenzo, these failures are a result of Detroit's lack of "vision, creativity and conviction". In other words, whilst gorging on truck-based profits, the automakers forgot to plan for the inevitable SUV sales crash.

Again, I'm not buying it. Yes, the knuckleheads at GM were dramatically trumped by Toyota in their car-based R&D investments, but you can hardly accuse of them being asleep at the wheel. They've unleashed plenty of new cars over the last five years, and there are more to come. Ford proclaimed last year "The Year of the Car". Their Focus, Fusion and Mustang are an admirable attempt to live up to their own admonition. DCX has also kicked some major car-based butt, what with the 300 and the Town and Country taking their segments by storm. Clearly, the Big Three do have a Plan B. It's just that they also have a Plan C, D, E, F, G and H.

The problem with Detroit is not that they made too many gas-guzzling SUV's; it's that they make too much everything. I've already ranted at length about the patent idiocy of GM running an eight-brand US portfolio, complete with multi-brand product overlap and blatant re-badging. Lest we forget, Ford also sells eight marques stateside, and many of their products compete with each other for the same customer. Is it any wonder that tri-branded DCX is doing better than its domestic brethren? I think not. They have to do more with less.

All three automakers have products appropriate to a marketplace geared towards mileage rather than, um, machismo. It's just that they're not good enough. And that's because no company can do everything well– especially if they're trying to do it eight different ways. If GM, Ford or DCX wants to knock the Accord or Camry from their perches, they should create a single competitive product and keep hammering away until they succeed. Meanwhile, until and unless The Big Three downsize their entire organizations–product, administration and production– they will win some battles, but lose the war.

The Big Three's success in the jumbo-sized SUV market should be a source of inspiration, rather than vilification. After all, the secret to their domination of the genre was their limited portfolios and single-minded product development. In fact, if Detroit uses the death of the large SUV as a cue to pare itself down and concentrate its resources, the gas-pumped shaped comet that's wiping out the large SUV market could be a blessing in disguise.

http://www.autoextremist.com/page2.shtml#Rant

By on September 3, 2005

 You get a terrific view from the top of a roller coaster– but there's only one way to go. GM execs would have known the feeling at the beginning of August– if they were paying attention. They weren't. Despite all the experts' warnings, The General's top brass were too busy high-fiving each other over the 'success' of their Employee Discount for Everyone (EDFE) program, talking-up their plans to gently wean customers from discounts and incentives. Well hands in the air boys, the August sales figures are in…

Ward's AutoInfoBank reports that GM's sales are down 16.5%. [All figures cited are in comparison to August '04] Lest you think the results were a simple case of a sinking tide stranding all boats, Autodata reveals that the US automotive market as a whole rose 3.8%. While Daimler Chrysler and Ford eked-out small gains (1.2 and 1.4%), check out their Japanese competition: Toyota (+9.5%), Nissan (+10.6%) and Honda (+18.6%).

What happened? Truck and full-size SUV sales tanked. Although the media has been busy upbraiding consumers for daring to buy the General's discounted gas-hogs (ignoring their eco-moral responsibilities), the press gang failed to realize that the EDFE blowout was the last charge of the light truck brigade. Look at August's top 15 sellers and clock the change. Only two pickups and two SUV's made the list. More to the point, GM's entries on Ward's automotive hit parade were off a whopping 35.4% (Chevrolet Silverado) and 17.5% (Chevrolet Trailblazer).

August's big winners were relatively small cars like the Ford Focus, Honda Civic, Toyota Camry and Nissan Altima– still. Only more so. Sales increases for these vehicles were well into double digits. Although GM has three Chevrolet automobiles in play, two of these models lost sales and one remained static. The Pontiac Grand Prix was the only bright spot in the General picture, up a staggering 78.4%. One problem: the new G6 (developed at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars) was supposed to be the bright star in the Pontiac firmament…

Obviously, post-Katrina gas prices will accelerate the trend away from low mileage leviathans towards more fuel-efficient vehicles– at the exact moment when GM expects its refreshed trucks and SUV's to carry the can. Of course, any company with 70 models will have a number of products appropriate to a conservation-minded climate. On average, GM's fleet is a fairly frugal bunch. But neither statement obviates the fact that GM has ignored clear and consistent signals that truck-based vehicles were a dead genre guzzling. The General's divisions are still lousy with pickups and SUV's, with no automotive cavalry waiting in the wings. Oops.

Not that you'll hear that expression from inside GM. They're too busy backpedaling from earlier assertions that rising gas prices would not damage their SUV-based plans to finally pull the company out of its tailspin. For months, GM has been insisting that its middle-class customers are insulated from high fuel prices. (No suprise there: The General delayed some mid-sized car programs to speed the launch of their full-sized SUV and pickup programs.) Now that the gas prices are disappearing into the stratosphere, GM's spinfolk are admitting that the cost of gasoline may have a "psychological impact". Spinelessly enough, they're implying that GM's current and impending woes will stem from of potential customers' misguided timidity, rather than The General's abject failure to adapt to market trends.

In any case, the debate over gas hogitude probably suits the suits. It draws attention away from the elephant in the room: sales brought forward by the EDFE. Every industry analyst worth his pocket protector has been saying that GM's summer sales bonanza was the result of customers buying sooner rather than later. Well, it's later. In fact, it's a lot later than GM thinks. The General's rivals are rapidly and inexorably siphoning-off GM's market share. Yet Rabid Rick Wagoner's mob have yet to downsize their operation or 're-negotiate' GM's onerous labor costs to match its dealers' diminishing ability to sell GM vehicles at a price that can generate a profit for the corporation.

GM's reaction to the latest crisis was predictable enough: they extended the EDFE program through September. More significantly, the program now includes many '06 models– a tacit admission that GM has abandoned its ambitious plan to leave their Wal-Mart image behind. At a press conference yesterday, The General's chief industry analyst entered England's understatement hall of fame. After calmly predicting that oil would eventually stabilize at an SUV-friendly $50 a barrel, Paul Bellew admitted that "September will be a challenge."

While GM clings to euphemisms for comfort, corporate carnivore Kirk Kerkorian made an equally predictable play: he bought more of GM's cheapened stock, raising his stake from 7.2 to 9.5 percent. Mr. K's spokesman said the octogenarian billionaire has "confidence in the company, the American auto industry and the US economy as a whole." And, no doubt, the wisdom of firing the boneheads who brought the world's largest automaker to its knees, selling off GM's assets and completely restructuring the business. Hang on folks; it's going to be a wild ride.

By on September 3, 2005

Advanced engineering is not the key to Toyota's success.  Toyota is the most successful automobile company of modern times. By some calculations, they've passed Ford as the world's second largest automaker (a position Ford held since 1952). It's only a matter of time before Toyota surpasses GM for the number one spot. And no wonder: the Japanese company builds an impressive number of highly popular cars and trucks. While its rivals study Toyota's stars– the Camry, the Lexus SUVs and the Prius hybrid— the real recipe for their dominance is found elsewhere.

The most interesting aspect of Toyota's business is how they handle their failures. Take, for example, their forays into the US minivan market. Chrysler invented the genre with the introduction of their Dodge and Plymouth minivans. A few years later, Toyota responded with a small, boxy, mid-engined van, reminiscent of the cargo vans that Chrysler, Ford and GM had sold for years. Needless to say, Toyota's entry didn't even appear on the minivan buyer's radar screen. Toyota then spent a huge amount of money and restyled this van into the smooth and bulbous Toyota Previa. Again, buyers were lined up none-deep.

The ill-fated Previa.  If at first you don't succeed... Toyota's third attempt was closer to a direct copy of the Chrysler vans, but smaller. Although it offered front wheel drive, the vehicle still captured a very small segment of the minivan market. By this time, the big three domestic manufacturers would have thrown in the towel. But Toyota doesn't work that way. They built yet another completely new minivan, the Sienna. Toyota finally got it right, and rapidly carved out a major portion of the minivan segment for their own.

Compare Toyota's persistence to Ford's reaction to the failure of the Freestar/Monterey minivans. After fielding a pair of vehicles that were never designed to be 'best in class', Ford appears mystified that they didn't sell as well as the previous Windstar van. Ford promptly fired the managers responsible and announced that they were getting out of the market.

The Tundra shows Toyota doesn't have its head in the clouds.How about another segment that the Americans appear to rule (at least for now): the full sized pickup truck? Toyota fielded their first full-size truck ten years ago, the T-100. As the pundits predicted, the machine languished in the marketplace. Toyota's response: try again, this time with the Tundra. Although the new truck was hardly a rousing success, it's a decent competitor that sells a lot better than Nissan's new Titan.

But Toyota isn't happy with being an also-ran. Rather than dole out huge incentives to move the old truck, Toyota has committed over a billion dollars to a new plant and a new truck. The plant, situated in the heart of pickup truck land (Texas), will produce a truck sized and powered to take on the Fords and Dodges and Chevrolets roaming the ranches. Will it succeed? I wouldn't bet against it.

The Toyota MR2: still plugging awayRemember Toyota's response to the Fiero? The MR2 was a better-engineered automobile than Pontiac's roadster, but butt ugly. After the Fiero flamed-out (following a rash of engine fires), Toyota persevered. A complete restyle erased the uglies, and the MR2 soon won a deserved reputation as a vest pocket Ferrari. The sports car was the centerpiece of Toyota's performance image for many years. Although it failed to earn its keep in pure profit, it helped burnish Toyota's performance credentials for many years.

GM reacted to the Fiero's shortcomings by discontinuing the car. Not long afterward, the Mercury Capri came and went. But Toyota spent many years developing the MR2 and sporty Celica, and learned many valuable lessons about building budget-minded performance cars. You can bet that experience will be brought to bear on the two machines' inevitable replacements.

The Toyota Camry Solara... still Seen the new Toyota convertible? Not many people have. The Solara, aimed directly at the Chrysler Sebring, remains practically invisible. At the moment, Chrysler owns the convertible image, if not the market. But with Toyota's can-do attitude and long-term committment, it's not unreasonable to expect ongoing improvements to the Solara's engineering, styling and marketing which will eventually make it a credible Sebring competitor.

Contrast this with the product development ethos at Ford or GM. If a car isn't an instant success, they cut off development money. Everyone associated with the program is considered persona non grata. In fact, the employees responsible are often sent to engineering Siberia or simply pushed out of the company. The knowledge gained, at great cost, is lost. Even the worst failure has a few features worth incorporating in future products. Developments from the Mark VIII, for example, could have been used to great advantage in the Lincoln LS to increase its competitiveness. Instead, everything about the Mark was tainted by failure. As a result, the successful parts of the Mark program were lost forever.

Continued commitment to product is the secret of Toyota's success. Everything else is just window-dressing.

By on September 1, 2005

 Last Tuesday, a man named John E Packowski sent me an email: 'Effective immediately, The San Francisco Chronicle will no longer be using your automotive columns.' I'd never heard of the Chronicle's Creative Director. But I was hardly mystified by Mr. Packowski's motivation. The week previous, the paper ran my review of the Subaru B9 Tribeca.

I'm not sure if the Chronicle removed my description of the SUV's front end as a 'flying vagina' (the editors ignore my request for a copy of the published review), but even without it my analysis of the B9 was not bound to please its manufacturer. The section's editor, Mike Berry, refused to clarify the exact cause of my summary dismissal. But a colleague let it be known that a Subaru-scented shit storm had hit the department responsible for my employment. The paper caved.

Initially, I wasn't bothered by the Chronicle's lack of editorial backbone. I'd had a terrific run. For three-and-a-half years, the Chronicle printed my work without significant alteration. Sure, Berry had spiked a few of the more 'extreme' reviews. But I thought it the price of doing business. Considering the no-holds-barred nature of my output, I admired the paper's courage. No other US newspaper will agree to publish my car reviews. Not one. So I was thankful for the opportunity to find an audience, for however long it lasted.

And then I remembered that Mr. Berry had spiked the Subaru B9 review before he left for vacation. During his absence, fellow editor Mike Ansaldo had decided to run it. Then I got fired. This did not strike me as fair, honorable or just. The paper had decided to expose their readers to a negative review, and I, not them, had paid the price. Even worse, no one at the paper is willing to discuss what had happened, or why. Perhaps the Chronicle doesn't wish itself revealed as willing to jettison its editorial independence in the face of advertisers' ire. Perhaps there are legal reasons. In any case, all I want is the truth. This they can not– will not– provide.

Of course, the truth is relative. Or so automotive manufacturers and their minions would have us believe. In fact, the Subaru B9 Tribeca is both subjectively (to the best of my knowledge and experience) and empirically a dreadful machine that besmirches the reputation of its manufacturer. Sure, the B9 handles well. The review pointed this out. But to suggest that it's an SUV worthy of its manufacturer's hype ('The end of the SUV as we know it' and 'The ideal balance of power and refinement') is to become a co-conspirator in Subaru's attempts to mislead the public.

And here's the thing: I believe the media in general, and newspapers in particular, have an obligation to tell the truth about cars. You know all those puff pieces that fill up the odd blank spot in every single automotive section in this great country of ours? Does it ever occur to the propagators of these gutless 'reviews' that a car is the average consumer's second most expensive purchase? To operate under the principle that all cars are wonderful in their own special way is to sacrifice readers' direct financial interests for the paper's short term monetary gain. Chicken and egg though it might be– readers attract advertisers who pay for copy to attract readers– Bob Dylan was right. You gotta serve somebody. Clearly, the mainstream automotive media has made its choice.

And that's why so many car enthusiasts have turned to the web. Other than Dan Neil at the Los Angeles Times, there are no print journalists ready, willing and able to directly challenge the auto manufacturers' influence with the plain, unvarnished truth (including the writers found in the happy clappy buff books). Car lovers yearn for the truth about cars. Sites like www.jalopnik.com are dedicated to providing it. And that's why the mainstream press' cozy little Boys' Club is doomed.

But we are keenly aware that the pursuit of the truth is becoming increasingly difficult. I've been personally blacklisted by three major manufacturers, denied access to their press cars. Invitations to product previews and launches are notable by their absence. On the revenue side, potential advertisers have flat out stated that they are unwilling to accept our editorial independence.

Never mind. I will continue to publish the truth about cars as long as I can afford to do so. If test vehicles disappear completely, I'll write editorials. To those of you who support this website's ambitions, I can't thank you enough. To those of you who would punish us for our zeal, a word of warning. Whether we stand or fall, the truth will out.

[jpackowski@sfchronicle.com]

By on August 30, 2005

The buck stops here.  Ish.As I write, a group of Wall Street analysts are bunkering in GM's corporate HQ for an update on The General's recovery plans. The morning session will feature a PowerPoint pummeling entitled 'The Solstice Will Come out Tomorrow'. The post-prandial spin session will address the big issue: how GM plans to stem the torrent of red ink spewing from every corporate vein, artery and orifice. As TTAC was denied admission to the confab, we thought we'd Blackberry a few questions to our secret admirers…

1. When is GM going to cut UAW benefits?

Early this summer, Rabid Rick Wagoner stood in front of GM shareholders and solemnly swore to cut the automaker's 'legacy costs' (the communist era health care and retirement benefits enjoyed by current and former United Auto Workers' employees). The UAW responded by hiring an accounting firm to justify their intransigence, nickel-and-dimed dozens of hapless GM negotiators to the brink of insanity by 'exploring cost cutting moves within the existing contract', issued a press release expressing concern about the effects of high gas prices on GM truck sales and bought a Ford Escape Hybrid for their President.

For its part, GM has done… nothing. In fact, the company recently confirmed the status quo with a new contract at its Vibe-making California plant. All Rabid Rick's dark hints about unilateral action (emboldened by independent assertions that GM would win the inevitable court battle) have turned out to be nothing more than feeble posturing. Clearly, Wagoner does not want to trigger a company-crippling UAW strike. Clearly, he must.

2. When is GM going to cut its executives' salary?

While it's not a crime to draw a multi-million dollar salary when your company's swirling around the toilet bowl, the annual compensation paid to GM's top brass (Wagoner, Devine, Briggs, Cowger, Burns, Lutz, LaNeve, et al) gives the UAW the moral high ground. When push comes to shove, when the barricades are manned, the execs' high life will not play well in Peoria. GM's top brass should shred the class warfare card NOW, before the UAW can play it.

3. When is GM going to downsize?

With eight divisions deploying over 70 models, The General is still relying on the sheer weight of numbers to overcome its enemies' tightly-focused, niche-driven insurgencies (e.g. Toyota's Prius and Scion). While the sales chart proves that GM is winning battles, the company's continually decreasing market share and non-existent profits show that it's losing the war.

It's well past time for GM to cut the deadwood. Buick, Saturn, Pontiac, Saab– one or all must go, no matter what the cost in dealer lawsuits and/or UAW retaliation. Failing that, each GM division should be wrenched from the corporate tit; freed from administrative tyranny, corruption and waste. Each division's troops must learn to operate quickly, efficiently and, most importantly of all, independently. Platform sharing yes. Inter-divisional pencil pushing, no.

4. When is GM going to commit to no-haggle pricing?

The "Employee Discount for Everyone" program proved beyond a shadow of a debt that customers prefer pricing clarity to marketing spizzarkle. And yet The General is committed to returning to a bewildering combination of incentives, equipment packages and finance deals, now called "value pricing". While the promise pleases GM's profit-squeezed dealers, it will piss away the one thing that money can't buy: customers' good will.

5. When will GM make a car with a decent interior?

There's no question that many GM products now offer class-competitive build quality. There's even evidence that the company is beginning to understand what makes a visually compelling vehicle. But The General's complete inability to create a car, truck or SUV with an aesthetically attractive interior made from high-quality materials– from the Aveo all the way to the Cadillac STS– is symptomatic of its structural problems.

GM's ergonomic engineers are no worse than Audi's. They're just hamstrung by a monolithic bureaucracy that rewards penny pinching over design excellence. A car's interior is inextricably linked to perceived quality; get that right, and people will believe the company's 'best built' mantra. Car Czar Maximum Bob Lutz knows the drill, and was supposed to sort this shit out. He hasn't.

6. When will GM clean up its act?

GM is stuck in a vicious circle. Its leaders refuse to publicly acknowledge or confront its problems, which creates delusional behavior, which alienates customers and employees, which increase its problems. In other words, GM is lost in a forest of fundamental dishonesty.

For example, the Pontiac Solstice's launch is delayed. No one will tell the media why the delay occurred or commit to a new delivery date. Maximum Bob recently announced that Solstice production has finally started and handed over the keys to a couple of hundred buyers. Only customer deliveries haven't started, really. Dealers don't even have demonstrators. When will that happen? When will GM tell the whole truth about this, and their other challenges? About the same time Mr. Wagoner's mob finally finds its nerve– or unfurl their golden parachutes.

By on August 22, 2005

 You may have noticed that TTAC hasn't been maintaining its usual fecundity. That's 'cause we're busy hanging with the homies during the challenging camp – school hiatus, and trying to earn a crust. (If you're suffering sarcasm withdrawl, please note that Robert Farago's reviews now appear on a weekly basis on www.jalopnik.com and in the ghetto known as 'User Reviews' on www.automotive.com. Same cars, different jokes.) Meanwhile…

TTAC has recently been voted 'Best of the Web' by Forbes magazine (official watermark to follow). We've also crested the 3k per day visitor ratio, and have a stunning four minute per visitor hang time. We'd love to expand our coverage in all directions, but we need cash money to do so. We're looking for a single advertiser to help us grow. Someone with vision, money, respect for our editorial independence, money, a cool-looking ad and money. Interested parties please apply by email to robertfarago@hotmail.com. Thanks.

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  • Mike Beranek: ^^THIS^^ Chicago is FOX’s whipping boy because it makes Illinois a progressive bastion in the...

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Who We Are

  • Adam Tonge
  • Bozi Tatarevic
  • Corey Lewis
  • Jo Borras
  • Mark Baruth
  • Ronnie Schreiber