Category: Editorials

By on April 9, 2007

914.jpgSince 1969, Porsche has developed three vehicles with Volkswagen/Audi: the 914, 924 and Cayenne. While we can debate the contributions these vehicles have made to Porsche’s corporate survival, they’re not vehicles that have brought greater glory to Porsche's sports car cred. And yet Zuffenhausen's zealots want us to believe that their decision to take control of Volkswagen is a good thing for both automakers. How credible is that?

My go-to Porsche guy, salesman Kirk Stingle, is on board with the German automaker's justification for its "Maus That Roared” Vee Dub takeover. With the so-called Volkswagen law (guarding Lower Saxony’s controlling interest in VW) headed for the legal dumpster, Porsche had to move to protect its parts supply. “You like your air conditioning unit?” Kirk asked. “Without VW? Fuhgeddaboutit.” For its part, VW gets Porsche’s production expertise.

Uh-oh. That sounds an awful lot like a lopsided proactive synergy defense. Do the letters DCX mean anything to anyone? To me, Daimler-Benz’ failed hook-up with The Crisis Corporation reveals a truism: the Germans aren’t very good at playing with others. Of course, in this case, we have Germans playing with Germans.

In fact, the acquisition is a German version of “All in the Family,” with VW Boss and Porsche shareholder Ferdinand Piëch playing Archie to freshly minted CEO Martin Winterkorn’s Meathead. Imagine the hilarity when they discuss the workmanship produced by Porsche’s foreign plants! Alternatively, schwäbisch Sopranos.

As we’ve outlined here before, VW is in an echt Pökel. The automaker's obese brand portfolio is a disaster. VW, SEAT and Skoda battle each other at the low end (hemmed in by Audi), while Audi, Bentley, Lamborghini and Bugatti duke it out at the top. Meanwhile and in any case, the German labor unions have Volkswagen by the short and curlies. 

So here’s the theory: by minimizing the State of Lower Saxony’s ownership/control of VW, the takeover will loosen the union’s hold on the company, which will allow VW to bring some “sense” to their German labor contracts. At the same time, Porsche wunderkind Wendelin Wiedeking will teach VW how to make money through outsourcing, engineering, rationalization, platform sharing and generally kicking ass.  

Time for some unbequem Wahrheit.

Despite calls for his resignation, the CEO who got VW into this mess in the first place is still large and in charge. I wouldn’t call Ferry Porsche’s grandson a megalomaniac, but this is the same CEO who publicly declared VW’s intention to match Mercedes-Benz’ product line model for model, up to and including the S-Class (hence the ill-fated Phaeton). Look how well THAT strategy turned out.

By the same token, Piëch’s “grand” vision created VW’s bloated brand portfolio. By adding Porsche to Volkswagen’s stable (or vice versa), brand overlap is about to get worse, not better. We’re talking Porsche 911 vs. Audi R8; Porsche Boxster vs. Audi TT; Porsche Cayenne vs. Audi Q8; and Porsche Panamera vs. Audi S8, Bentley Continental GT and VW Phaeton.  

Although Piëch is reputed to rule his complicated kingdom with an iron fist, there’s still a GM-style bureaucratic bun fight to see who gets how much of what technology and marketing support, and when they get it. Can Porsche really work its cost-cutting magic on such a convoluted corporate culture? While Porsche knows a thing or two about building excellence on a budget, what makes them think they can convince thousands of managers and engineers that small is beautiful?

To my eye, this whole deal looks like a not-so-simple extension and consolidation of Piëch’s power. On the face of it, Porsche gets VW. In fact, Piëch gets Porsche AND ditches Lower Saxony. What he doesn’t get– and isn’t up for discussion– is a plan for extricating Volkswagen from its German labor woes and the branding Hell the former VW CEO and current Board member created.

Not that I care what happens to VW. As far as I’m concerned this deal should be called “Cry My Beloved Automaker.” Porsche, my favorite automaker on planet earth, the company that produces the best sports car money can buy, the poster child for this website’s “stay small, stay focused” mantra, is about to be subsumed by Volkswagen’s gi-normous bureaucracy.

Anyone who thinks this German merger of unequals won’t affect Porsche’s ability to keep their eye on the ball should carefully consider the 914, 924 and Cayenne. These vehicles stemmed from a partnership with VW, where Porsche could have (should have?) pulled the plug on any or all aspects of the various projects. Can you imagine a Porsche designed by a committee balancing its needs against those of VW, SEAT, Skoda, Audi, Lamborghini, Bentley and Bugatti?

In a world of compromise, Porsche stood apart. Not anymore.

By on April 8, 2007

cimmaron.jpgGM circa 2007: bad investments and expensive labor contracts; excess capacity and crushing debt; a surfeit of brands and products. It’s also GM circa 1910, 1920, 1973, 1980, 1991 and 1998. In fact, wandering through GM’s history is like watching an endless loop of "Groundhog Day." Clearly, The General doesn’t share Phil Conners’ ability to learn from its mistakes. Can there ever be a happy ending for The General?

Automotive pioneer Billy Durant created General Motors by assembling a group of carmakers in the 1900’s. By 1910, his hands-off management style and buying spree left his creation high and dry. Durant’s backers jettisoned the conglomerate’s founding father. Bankers refinanced GM. Durant regained control in 1915 and restarted the cycle. In 1920, GM was broke, Durant was canned and GM got off the treadmill.

Under the watchful eye of Alfred P. Sloan, GM became an industrial juggernaut. The domestic automaker carved out a 40 to 50 share of the U.S. car market and never reported an annual loss (until 1980). But there was a dark side to GM’s fifty plus years of dominance: the company became fat, dumb and lazy.

The causes of GM’s cyclical mismanagement are rooted in the company’s– indeed Detroit’s– Golden Age. During the boom times, GM was a conglomeration of enormous semi-independent enterprises, all contributing to one big bank account marked “GM profits.” This structure worked well enough in an expanding market with few competitors. 

Despite the logo on their paychecks, the people within this corporate amalgam weren’t loyal to GM. They worked for Buick, or Fisher Body, or Delco, etc. GM gradually evolved into a maze of deeply entrenched hierarchies and fiercely competitive fiefdoms. Workers and management attended to their own interests or the interests of their unit, rather than GM as a whole. Any attempt at altering the status quo was greeted with “what’s in it for me/us?” rather than “Is it good for GM”?

The resulting bureaucracy lacked speed, strategy or shared motivation.

The ‘70’s oil shocks gave GM its first fish slap in fifty years. As GM’s lineup of gas guzzlers and uncompetitive small cars lost out to upstart foreigners, the company’s fortunes began a worrying decline.

In GM’s ossified corporate culture, only one recipe for “change” could satisfy all factions. Ignore problems (protect the status quo), fire workers (reassure Wall Street) and tout the Next Big Thing (deflect everyone’s attention from This Big Mess).

So The General laid off workers, demanded more from remaining employees, built more barges and waited for oil prices to drop. By the mid ‘70's, the imports had gained a secure foothold in GM’s backyard. To stop the rot, The General closed more plants, laid off more workers and declared that its new downsized FWD cars would ‘push Japan back into the sea.’

Faced with GM’s Byzantine bureaucracy, top management tried to foster change through big initiatives. This pattern hit its zenith when Roger Smith (of "Roger and Me" fame) led GM during the '80's. After a massive reorganization in 1984, Smith dismissed thousands of workers and began a buying spree of epic proportions.

GM’s CEO spent an estimated $40b on a laundry list of fashionable solutions distractions: NUMMI (New United Motor Manufacturing Inc.), EDS (Electronic Data Systems Corporation), Hughes Aircraft and more. Meanwhile, GM proclaimed that vehicles like the Saturn, GM-10 midsize cars and the Impact EV would reverse their declining fortunes.

GM’s culture ignored the benefits of these innovations. The Toyota-style production techniques learned at NUMMI and the union-friendly ideas implemented at Saturn’s Spring Hill plant never made it outside the factory gates. GM management remained impervious to EDS’ can-do culture. Saturn devolved into another badge-engineered GM platform brand.

During the SUV-based profits blip, GM couldn’t resist the old urge to bulk up, adding Saab, Hummer, Daewoo and parts of Isuzu, Suzuki, Subaru and FIAT to the portfolio. Now, once again, they’ve been caught up the creek without a small car shaped paddle. Once again, the next Beta-Zeta-Gamma-GMT900 will save them. And again, GM has resorted to layoffs (this time with payoffs).

The net result is GM 2007 looks an awful lot like GM 1910 (or 1920 or 1973). By not rationalizing its management structure, brands, product development process, capital outlays and labor contracts, GM has come full circle. Only now it has a 23 percent market share instead of 50 percent. And it’s running out of time and money.

Ironically, Durant’s reaction to the GM of 1910 still seems relevant today, “I saw cherished ideas laid aside for future actions, never to be revived. Opportunities that should have been taken care of with quickness and decision were not considered. The things that counted so much in the past, which gave General Motors its unique and powerful position were subordinated to liquidate and pay.”

How the mighty have fallen.

By on April 7, 2007

1971_mach1.jpgAt seventeen, I finally joined the ranks of legally sanctioned drivers. I could have taught the drivers-ed class by then, including certain advanced techniques well outside the usual curriculum. Speaking of which, as part of this rite of passage, I retired the implements I’d used for hot-wiring the family Dodges. More importantly, I got a job where I could indulge my love of driving and get paid for the pleasure. Read More >

By on April 6, 2007

nyasacadia01.jpgThere are some amongst us who hate auto shows in general and any given auto show in specific. They see the pistonhead conclaves as a soulless smorgasbord of automobiles in aspic, with side tables filled with deep fried hype. I don't share the antipathy. Where else can you go and see PR flacks spinning each other? It's like Paris after 911, when French café waiters were forced to be rude to each other. Oh yeah, and there are lots of cars for dissing, dismissing and, occasionally, drooling. Live, from New York! It's Here's What You Missed!

vwdiesel.jpgAfter years of W-THIST (Where the Hell is it?), Volkswagen is bringing a 50-state compliant diesel engine to the US, nestled into the snouts of the Rabbit and Jetta. Even better, VW has married the brawny diesel (140hp and 230 lb-ft of torque) with their world beating six speed DSG transmission. Best of all, the parsimonious granola eater's oil burner (40 mpg) is an ideal alternative to the thirsty AND anemic 2.5 liter buzz-box currently infesting the U.S. model range. So why not the Passat? 

ralphgillesdemon.jpgDodge has Demons. Rumor has it someone still employed by DCX green lighted this hideous roadster for production. Boil that dust speck! Bargain-basement pricing assures The Dodge Boys another generous helping of razor thin profit margins. If Dodge wants to sell a true Sunday car, they should build one that appeals to the 50-somethings who might actually buy one, rather than Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles. Ralph Gilles, why has thou forsaken us, bro?

clk65-amg-black-series.jpgMercedes unveiled the new C-Class, which is definitely not a German taxi (except when it is) and the 500hp-ish CLK63 AMG Black Series, which will elevate the model into the top ranks of catastrophic depreciation. The C-Class is, get this, sexy. If its dynamics match its demeanor, if it drives more like the brick C-Class of the early and mid 1990s and less like the flaccid, rolling logo of the current millennium, Mercedes salesman will soon be sailing on high C sales. By the seashore.

jaguarcx-f.jpgThe CX-F is a drop-dead gorgeous concept car from a Ford subsidiary on the brink of dropping dead. This four-wheeled Hail Mary pass is a radical departure from Jaguar's recent design heritage; it's got about as much to do with the S-Type as American car buyers. Ian Callum was at the New York auto show to talk the talk about how his company's new look can pull it back from the brink. Again. Still. But the CX-F concept car wasn't there to walk the talk. This led to some talk: why does someone want the CX-F to disappear? Or has Jag's ballroom budget been busted?

s5newyork.jpgAudi brought their S5 coupe into the Big Apple, complete with the Audi R8's front end. The side profile is… um… let me check the photos… it is. Taken as a hole, the S5 plugs the last remaining gap in Audi's lineup (the one that helped you understand the difference between the various model sizes). If German pricing is any indication, the A5/S5 will make the A4/S4 look like a Blue Light Special. We're talking $46,639.19 and $63,064.33, before tax, title, registration and floor mats.  

mkrconcept_10.jpgLincoln's MKR concept revives the great American tradition of gaudy, sci-fi showcars. Luckily, only the Twin-Force (twin turbo six) powerplant is slated for production– despite rumors that the gargantuan grille may someday see service. The concept allegedly makes 415 horsepower, so we can bet on a final number closer to 315hp when all's said and done. If Ford pawns off Jaguar, Lincoln might actually be allowed to build its own cars again. If so, this engine– not the wacky sheetmetal– will help guide Lincoln's stewards towards what a luxury car should be.

kiataxi.jpgSurprise! Kia didn't have the most exciting cars on display at the New York auto show. I wanted to ask a flackling a few questions, but their display was all about Pink Floyd. Is there anybody out there? out there? out there? Nope. The Kia Rondo taxi cab concept spoke for itself. As the Ford Crown Vic dies, the taxi fleet market is looking for the next cheap thing. With no upmarket retail image to sully, Kia would be happy to oblige.

08_highlanderhybrid.jpgLast but least, Toyota showed the ugliest car Toyota has built in recent memory. Whereas the new Camry and RAV4 sit somewhere between bland, sharp looking and modern, the new Highlander runs the gamut from vile to noxious to Nosferatu. Not to put too fine a point on it, it's a rolling emetic. 

Strange to say, Toyota's becoming more American every day. Think about it: too many overlapping products (Highlander, RAV4, 4Runner), expecting ugly cars to sell on their strong brand name (Highlander) and investing in new SUVs while gas prices ascend to the heavens (Highlander). See? Another great reason to go to the show: you can watch assimilation in action. Or is that inaction?

By on April 5, 2007

alan-mulally-has-flex-appeal.jpgIn the first three months of his employment, Ford CEO Alan Mulally earned himself a cool $28.2m. So how’s the high flying ex-Boeing exec doing in his campaign to save the embattled automaker? According to Big Al, “it’s going pretty well." He’s “reduced complexity” (i.e. paid bureaucrats to leave), sent Aston packing, unloaded the first of thirteen surplus-to-requirements Visteon plants and started to make good on cost savings targets. On the income side of the ledger? Not so hot.

Earlier this week, Ford flackmeister George Pipas proudly proclaimed that FoMoCo market share is now, finally, Thank God, stable. His underlings trumpeted “record sales” of The Blue Oval’s mid-size Mexican troika and Canadian crossovers. The Fusion had its strongest month ever; 15,790 units made a run for the border. The Edge is selling at a level deemed “comparable to long-established crossover products,” boasting 37 percent increases in the U.S. and doubling in Canada. 

The company now hopes (against hope) that the badge transmogrified Taurus and hot-off-the-press Flex will generate interest in all things “Dave” and jump start the automaker’s entirely theoretical nascent sales recovery. Never mind product overlap. (Ford will have three identically-sized crossovers— Edge, Taurus X and Flex—with identical powertrains.) Feel the buzz.

Meanwhile, it’s flat tires at all four corners. The Glass House Gang has just completed its fifth consecutive month of dismal sales and declining market share. 

Given the housing slowdown and sub prime debacle (Big Al: “It’s a concern”), the pinch is being felt damn near industry wide. Ford is faring worst of all. A quick glance at the less shiny numbers indicates that FoMoCo is on pace to move just over 2.5m units this year, roughly 400k less than last year. Nine percent fewer FoMoCo products hit the street in March ’07 than in March ’06. Rounding out the first quarter, 13 percent fewer people have bought a Ford, lately.

The usual sales stalwarts, the Mustang and Explorer, are facing declines of 17 and 26 percent respectively. Most disturbing, Ford’s cash cow has come a cropper. The F-Series pickup has been knocked from its perch as America’s best selling pickup, into the dirt. Year-on-year March sales are down 15.1 percent to 71,481 units. And consider this: the numbers represent the F-Series’ best sales month since August 2006.

Ford’s new ads stress the F-150’s competitive strengths, but it’s not just a matter of keeping traditional Ford customers from opting for Chevy, Dodge and Toyota pickups. It’s a question of getting people to come on down.

CNW Marketing Research reports that automotive showrooms are emptier than Paris Hilton’s panty drawer. Other than Toyota, every major automaker’s dealers are seeing less foot traffic than the year– or month– previous. Ford suffered the most from the footfall freefall. Showroom floor traffic sank 18 percent in January, and then slid roughly 28 percent in February and March. Even a 450 horse F150 sold by the CEO himself won’t cure those kind of numbers.

The Detroit News reports that The Big Boss is pressuring Mark “Movie Star” Fields (El Presidente del Americas) and Cisco Codina (group think vice president for NorAm Marketing, Sales and Service) to initiate a “full court press” to win back the masses. Failure is not an option. There’s been talk of kicking Mark Fields off the corporate jet (saving the company some $5.75m in executive over-compensation) and replacing Cisco Codina with customer service president Daryl Hazel.

Ask the Ford family scions who’ve seen half a billion dollars wiped off their stock value and their dividends disappear. All this corporate turbulence sucks. But it’s nothing compared to the UAW-shaped storm cell that lies dead ahead. 

If Mulally can wrest significant concessions from the United Auto Workers this summer, he'll be worth every penny of his $30m salary. The problem is his $30m salary. Quite how Big Al expects the rank and file to take a hit for the team when he’s banking tens of millions of dollars, while his family enjoys free corporate jet travel, is an interesting question. Perhaps not as interesting as “Why can’t the workers have some of those billions you borrowed?” but close.

Yesterday, Mulally warmed-up for the Ford – UAW Detroit Death Match by announcing that The Blue Oval Boys don’t have specific targets for wage and benefit concessions. Nope. They’ve got a non-negotiable "economic envelope for competitiveness."   If you could read the back of that envelope it would probably say “we can't pay you now so we'd like to pay you later.”

In truth, Big Al doesn’t have a hope in Hell of convincing Big Ron’s team to offer anything other than window dressing. Without increased sales or decreased labor expenses, Big Al will fail. He may even get fired— provided Ford can afford Mr. Mulally’s $27.5m severance package.

By on April 5, 2007

too-little-too-late.jpgIt’s déjà vu all over again. GM’s sales sink, the PR flacks weave a tangled web and the product guys dangle shiny objects in front of the easily distracted press to prevent them from focusing on the company’s ongoing, unstoppable rot. It’s got to the point where Buickman, the original tin foil hat guy, can’t be bothered to pen his usual protracted rant. All we get is three sentences, the first of which proclaims “Need anything more be said?” Well, yes actually. It’s time, once again, to talk about small cars.

It’s no revelation that GM is, was and will be ill-prepared for rising gas prices and increasing demand for smaller, high mileage vehicles. Back when they launched their “new” GMT900 based SUV’s, ttac.com (and everyone else) pointed out that The General had arrived late to the high mileage ball dressed in an oversized clown suit.

That was over a year ago. By now, GM should be at least two years into a small car project (or five), getting ready to stun the market with a Fit-killer, a Versa adversary and a Yaris crusher. And?

And now Chevrolet is running an on-line competition where consumers can choose between three foreign-made mutant micro-cars: the Beat, Trax and Groove. You know, hypothetically. ‘Cause they’re concept cars.

For the next two years, consumers looking for GM’s mark of excellence on a high mileage vehicle are still left with a choice of fuel-gargling SUV’s and pickups, marginally less thirsty crossovers, a wide selection of anemic rental grade sedans, a couple of ergonomically challenged toys (a.k.a. roadsters) and a small range of joyless (if frugal) penalty boxes.

Remind me again: who’s surprised that GM’s March sales are off seven percent from last year, while Toyota’s climbed 11.7 percent, Honda grew by 11.3 percent and Nissan increased 7.8 percent? Well, no one really– save those misguided souls who think the inherently unprofitable (and anemic) Opel Astra will take the US market by storm.

Nope. The miscalculations of the past continue to haunt GM, arguably the least agile automaker on the face of planet earth.

This is the point where I usually trot out one of GM Car Czar Maximum Bob’s inane auto show pronouncements, illustrating the fact that GM is so far behind the curve they’d almost be better off waiting until motoring trends come full circle. Something like, "The real question is will we build these types of vehicles in the U.S.? Historically, these types of cars haven't done well here. But clearly, things are changing."

Normally, I’d segue into a statement about GM’s inability to catch up with the transplants’ constant evolution with timely, segment leading products. But I've discovered a far better example of The General's general cluelessness and temporal distortions, courtesy of GM’s vice president of global design.

"I think American, and [I think] big," pronounced Ed Welburn at this year's New York Auto Show. ”Big has been very much a part of America. The highways are wide, the parking lots are quite large, but the interest level is there for a smaller car…

“I think it is time, especially as people are looking for a unique offering, to be a very creative, or to at least look at a very creative offering in the small car category."

Ed is certainly a corporate survivor, but who knew he spent the last five years as a survivor on a desert island, away from the U.S. automotive marketplace? GM's going to “look" at the "possibility" of building a creative small car? As John McEnroe would say, YOU CANNOT BE SERIOUS!

He is. They are. Incredibly, a full year into an unstoppable downsizing trend amongst American car buyers, GM’s still “thinking” about the whole small car thing– while the transplants are busy gorging themselves on The General’s lunch.

Given the now familiar litany of lost sales and declining market share, this parlous state of affairs leaves GM PR flacks without a coherent story to tell. In other words, there’s spin to be spun.

“In March, we saw continued strength and stability in our retail business led by gains in mid-cars, crossovers, economy cars and luxury SUVs," said Mark LaNeve, vice president, GM North American Sales, Service and Marketing.

"The Chevrolet Silverado, GMC Sierra, Acadia and Saturn Outlook are exceeding our expectations and confirm that when you offer the best product, value, segment-leading fuel economy and the best warranty coverage in the industry, customers respond."

While we’re happy GM’s exceeding their own “expectations” (a meaningless measure if ever there was one), and we’ll defer to Frank Williams' monthly “By the Numbers” editorial to provide the obvious truth behind the hype (a few bright stars do not a universe make), suffice it to say LaNeve’s recipe is spot on. In fact, The General’s competition is using it right now to kick GM’s ass.

When will they ever learn? Never. They will never learn.  

By on April 4, 2007

02prodgen2222.jpgNever mind all that “buy American” and “Asian cars are the enemy” rhetoric. The United Auto Workers (UAW) would love to get their hands on the transplants’ southern redoubts. With their numbers dwindling due to Detroit’s plant closures and buyouts, the UAW realizes they have to go trolling in the transplants’ ponds to stay alive. Last Saturday, they tested the waters with a small group of Toyota workers at the brand’s Georgetown, Kentucky plant. The UAW is smacking their lips at the prospect of dining on catfish sushi.

The meeting was the direct result of a major management screw up. In January, Toyota’s leadership discovered that an employee at the plant had unearthed a confidential file on a shared network drive . The document disclosed the fact that ToMoCo's management was discussing "a greater emphasis on variable pay and ways to slow the growth of our labor costs, including the cost of benefits."

The memo recommended that Toyota work to bring its wage structure into closer alignment with other local industries and "not tie ourselves so closely to the U.S. auto industry or other competitors." Translation: Toyota’s higher ups are unhappy that the company’s labor costs (as a percentage of sales) are increasing faster than their profit margins.

Despite Toyota’s attempts at damage control, the press got ahold of the memo. Rather than fess-up and explain their competitive dilemma, Toyota sacrificed a pair of a scapegoats. They fired two Georgetown plant employees for allegedly accessing and distributing the confidential document.

The employees admitted reading the doc (as did several hundred others), but denied sending it to the press. As allowed by Toyota personnel policy, they pleaded their case before a five-member peer review board. The board ruled that they were both innocent. Toyota management overruled the review board’s decision and fired them.

Salting the wounds, Toyota remained silent on any investigations into– or disciplinary actions against– the person or persons who left the confidential document on the company-wide computer network.

As expected, the UAW seized upon this “unpleasantness” to step up their efforts to unionize the Toyota plant, to gain a precious foothold deep in the heart of non-union territory. On Saturday, the UAW hosted a town hall forum entitled “The Human Cost of Toyota’s Success” in Lexington, Kentucky.

About 150 UAW representatives, Toyota employees, members of the press and other interested parties attended the meeting. Even though the Georgetown plant employs almost 7k workers, only five people spoke at the gathering, including the workers who were dismissed over the confidential document. No representatives from Toyota management attended– at least not officially.

The speakers addressed the document’s implications for Toyota’s HR plans. They also aired a number of complaints about the way the Georgetown plant is managed. They asserted that Toyota does not take workplace injuries seriously, that full-time workers have “disappeared” (to be replaced by lower cost temporary workers) and that training opportunities have dwindled to the point of extinction.

Needless to say, it this was music to the UAW’s collective ears. “It’s time for Toyota to sign a contract with us like everyone else they do business with,” Vice President Terry Thurman announced. The man who directs the UAW’s National Organizing department and helped organize the meeting added, “This is all about Toyota workers.”

The sequence of those two statements tells you everything you need to know about the UAW’s priorities. There’s only one reason they’re making a full-court press against Toyota: it’s their only hope for survival. If the UAW has any success organizing Georgetown you can rest assured they’ll start looking for further inroads into the rest of the transplants’ non-union plants.

Even though the UAW stated their Toyota kvetchfest was not an “organizing event,” they now have a foot firmly in Toyota’s door. The UAW and the National Jobs with Justice Campaign plan to capitalize on their success by establishing a Worker’s Rights Board in Kentucky. According to the UAW's press release, this organization “will be available to hear personal stories of Toyota workers and recommend appropriate remedies when necessary.” In other words, they’ll be collecting information they can use to further their attempts to organize the plant.

And they’ll be moving on from there. One worker from the Toyota plant in West Virginia attending the Kentucky meeting asked if the UAW could conduct a similar meeting for workers at his plant. Of course, the union immediately agreed, seizing the chance to get a presence established at a second Toyota location.

Toyota has no one to blame but itself for this perilous state of affairs. Their sloppy record keeping and short sighted damage control could give the UAW the leverage they need to start pulling Toyota into the same rat hole that disappeared Detroit. Meanwhile, even as they seek to organize Toyota, the UAW continues to call the automaker their enemy. And so it is. 

By on April 3, 2007

2006-02-03_car_break-in222.jpgA couple of months ago, Autoblog revealed that you could open a locked Mazda3 by smacking the door panel. Shortly afterwards, they posted a video demonstrating how to unlock a car using a tennis ball. Car owners and manufacturers greeted the revelation with indignant outrage. How dare these “anyone with a keyboard” communicators tell the whole wide world how to commit an illegal act? Clearly, the automotive community hasn’t grasped the lessons learned by the computer security industry.

In the billion dollar world of computer software, whether or not to disclose a potential security hazard is a genuine dilemma. On one hand, software developers don’t want nefarious forces to know that their product is vulnerable to attack. The law (i.e. the DMCA) is on their side, and they’re not afraid to use it. On the other hand, users have a compelling desire to know if they’ve bought a product that may endanger their intellectual property. 

Thankfully, the users’ needs usually prevail. In this day and age, keeping a computer security story under wraps is more difficult than hiding a new Subaru Impreza from the press’ prying eyes. Inevitably, word gets out, warnings are sent, breaches repaired.

Unfortunately, the same pattern does NOT apply to vehicular vulnerability. Security issues are suppressed, the press isn’t bothered and automakers keep their distance from both problem and patch.

And so Mazda3 owners who learned about the door trick via the web were understandably irked. While it’s easy to focus on the anger they felt towards the messenger, the deeper and more important antagonism fell upon Mazda’s head. Why did the Ford subsidiary design such an easily defeated locking mechanism? When did they know it was game, set and match criminal, and why didn’t they do anything about it? What ARE they doing about it?

As is the way of such things, Mazda3 owners will eventually get over this entire incident. They’ll quickly learn to manage the “additional” (if only perceived) risk by changing their behavior (e.g. altering their parking geography) or adding defensive technology (e.g. upgrading their security system). Either that or they’ll do nothing and continue to take their chances, feeling slightly less secure. Until they don’t.

From a corporate PR POV, Mazda played it exactly wrong. The automaker failed to capitalize on their customers’ brand loyalty by quickly acknowledging the problem. To their credit, when they did put their hands up, Mazda also admitted that other of their vehicles may be susceptible to the same technique. But they refused to name names, ostensibly “protecting” the very consumers their slipshod door design had left vulnerable.

Vehicles from various manufacturers are prone to the same door lock weakness. But that doesn’t excuse Mazda’s piss-poor crisis management. Mazda violated the three rules of news containment: speed, honesty and transparency. They should have immediately admitted the door lock problem and honestly addressed its ramifications. Which are, in fact, none.

The majority of automotive alarm systems are nothing more than what security guru Bruce Schneier calls “security theater.” All those plips and beeps and flashing headlights may make owners feel better about leaving their car behind, but they do little to decrease the actuall odds that the vehicle will be violated. Immobilizers? Random key codes? High tech gadgetry be damned. Anyone with the motive, means and opportunity can pwn your car just as quickly and easily as a hacker can pwn your Windows server. 

Car security companies like Crutchfield promise “When the bad guys see you have a security system, they'll most likely move on to an easier target.” But there’s precious little statistical science behind the claim. Common sense suggests there are far more important variables in play: the aforementioned spoils on display, whether or not your car is being stolen to order (for a chop shop or export), the likelihood of a rapid counter response, etc.

Whether a thief has to rap your door with his fist or hurl a brick through your window simply isn’t a mission critical issue– for them. Truth be told, most owners would prefer the former.

Car manufacturers know that the modern car alarm is little more than a psychological security blanket. But they’re happy to perpetuate the illusion of impregnability, rather than add genuine security (which would require some serious usability and affordability trade-offs). The now ubiquitous car alarm is an important sales-oriented gimme: a cheap way to convince the buyer that the manufacturer cares about protecting the customer’s property rights. And it makes the car seem more valuable.

When Autoblog pulled back the veil, telling the world that thieves had discovered a new way to break into Mazda3 owners’ cherished whip, the likelihood that a crime would be committed didn’t alter. The information simply reminded Mazda3 owners that if they leave a handbag or briefcase in their backseat overnight, they’ll probably be filing an insurance claim in the morning. 

By on April 3, 2007

buicksupers02.jpgFair disclosure: I love Buicks. More accurately, I love Buicks from the ’60's and earlier. For the last forty years or so, GM's “near luxury” brand has forsaken me at the altar without so much as a text message. Me and everyone else. The carmaker that cranked out overlapping, maligned, entirely functional automobiles like the Regal, Park Avenue, LeSabre and Century is in dire straits. This year, the average Buick dealer sold fewer than seven units per month. So when Buick brass invited ttac.com to check out their latest rescue plan at a Manhattan bank vault-cum-restaurant, I was good to go.

Going in, I knew what automotive delights would be sur la table: the face lifted Buick LaCrosse and the new “Super” LaCrosse and Lucerne. Entering the building which once catered to Buick’s doctor-lawyer-mid-management buyers, I harbored unreasonably optimistic expectations. After all, the Buick brand is clearly on the rebound– in China. 

china-lacr-ext22.jpgWorking with its mandatory “partner” in the military dictatorship known (without apparent irony) as The People’s Republic of China, Buick has resurrected and stabilized its protean image of fast with class. No, they haven't pawned off the Chinese with the same lameduckmobiles available in The Land of the Free. The Chinese Buick LaCrosse is priced to go, looks great and comes complete with an honest-to-God, I-can’t-believe-this-is-a-GM-product, top-shelf interior.

When Buick’s extremely tall U.S. Brand Manager Steve Shannon kicked off his spiel about the “new” Buick, giving heavy play to the company’s profitable inroads into the burgeoning Chinese market, I knew exactly what was coming. I nudged the hack next to me and told him we were about to see a striking facsimile of the sharp looking Chinese LaCrosse. Anyone got a bridge to sell?

lacrosse-super.jpgThe “refreshed” 2008 LaCrosse is a 2007 LaCrosse with a bigger chrome grille. I hate to say it, but I preferred the old schnoz. Steve then told us the new LaCrosse Super will earn its monniker with an Olde but Goode: The General's 5.3-liter small block V8.

Provided you believe that Buick’s geriatric audience want a tire smoking vehicle that gets mid-20’s mileage, or think semi-successful rappers will suddenly raise this milquetoast motor from obscurity, or feel there's a huge market of misguided pistonheads looking for an American luxobarge that sends 300 horses through the front wheels, the Super is a guaranteed hit.

To entice the latter demographic, GM marketeers assured me that handling, braking, and steering were all improved on the LaCrosse Super. I forgot to ask whether they were referring to an improvement over the standard LaCrosse or the torque steerific Impala SS and Grand Prix. No matter. Neither possibility holds forth much prospect of pistonhead passion.

x08bu_lu010.jpgThe ”Super” Lucerne offers more warmed-over kisses, leftover love. Buick’s tuned the Lucerne’s Northstar V8 from 275hp to 292hp. Rivet counters rejoice! You’ve got a new factoid to flaunt to your friends. The Lucerne Super offers eight fewer horses than the LaCrosse Super, a car that sits below it in Buick’s product line. While I’m sure the pumped-up Northstar is a refined woofler, when it comes to marketing, numbers speak louder than mufflers. 

Still, driven with a careful right foot and a company gas card, I'm sure there’s nothing particularly wrong with either the LaCrosse or Lucerne Super. The problem– the eternal General Motors problem– is the competition.

x08bu_en001.jpgOnly shoppers like me (who fancy Buick in an entirely unnatural way) would think about dropping $35 large on a LaCrosse Super. Everyone else will [continue to] drive off in something cheaper and more sensible, or opt for luxury branded cars from Germany and Japan. The same goes for the Lucerne Super, which will sticker at around $40k. BMW 335i anyone? Exactly.   

There’s only way these cars could become the smash hits Buick needs to avoid tumbling into the grave next to Oldsmobile: price. If Buick offered the Buick Supers at the same price as the standard issue LaCrosse and Lucerne– around $27k and $32k respectively– you might see some serious movement on Buick's dust-covered showroom floors. Ad campaigns could proclaim “Every LaCrosse and Lucerne comes with a 300 horsepower V8. This isn’t your father's Oldsmobile Buick.”

2008buickenclaveprice.jpgGiven Buick's razor thin margins there ain’t no way in Canada they can afford to adopt that strategy. This leaves Buick right where I found it before I sampled their fine food and less delectable spin. (Perhaps I should have eaten in the back of the bank, where the money men held their enclave.) If Buick’s aesthetically challenged crossover doesn’t pick up some serious slack for the Lucerne and LaCrosse, Buick will continue going nowhere fast. You can take THAT to the bank.

By on April 2, 2007

mustanggt500kr_05222.jpg"We are absolutely going to do what it takes to keep our product fresh and keep it relevant in the market.” Now THAT’S what I’m talking about! A Ford exec making a public commitment to ongoing excellence. No more cut and run. No more vehicles dying on the vine or losing out to some new “flavor of the month.” Oh wait. Ford's truck marketing manager wasn’t talking about keeping it real for the core models. Ben Poore was celebrating the company’s decision to offer a Chip Foose edition F-150. Oh dear.

I’m all for “mass customization.” The MINI and Scion brands nailed it: encourage buyers to give a nice car enough individuality to make it their own– without destroying resale value. But these are niche brands. While the same principle may someday apply to mass market automobiles, most of today’s buyers still frequent dealers with hundreds of roughly similar vehicles waiting for a new home.

And that means that Ford’s big push for “limited editions,” its newfound faith in so-called “microsegmentation,” is yet more evidence that Ford’s fundamentals are broken. The Chip Foose Edition F-150 (450-horsepower 5.8-liter V-8 and Overhaulin’ stylin’), the Shelby GT-500KR (yet more horses for an overpowered death car) and the Funkmaster Expedition (Why not the Funkmaster Flex Flex?). All of these vehicles will do precisely nothing for the sales of the brand’s core products.

I know. They’re fun! They’re exciting! They create “the kind of buzz in the marketplace that keeps companies healthy." Anyway, that’s Ben Poore’s theory. And a plenty popular one it is too; at least amongst the people who really love muscle modded mainstream motors. As far as hard-nosed beancounters are concerned, it’s a less well established principle.

In 2000, Ford flogged some 200K Mustangs. The next year, they offered the 265hp 4.6-liter Bullitt edition. One year and 5582 Bullitts later, ‘Stang sales sank to 155K. In ’03, FoMoCo launched the 305hp 4.6-liter Mach 1. The company sold 9600 of those bad boys. The next year, Mach 1 sales slipped towards subsonic, dropping to 7100 units. Overall ‘Stang sales slid to around 140k units. In short, the hard core variants either cannibalized Mustang sales or did sweet FA to stop the rot. 

Ah, but what of the so-called halo effect? Like many testosterone-crazed auto execs, Poore was implying that way cool Mustangs, F-150’s and Flexible Flyers will create warm fuzzies for the models’ more pedestrian stable mates, or the Ford brand in general, or something. It’s strange to see this trickle down branding concept re-emerge from the Glass House Gang– given that the automaker recently deep-sixed their entire SVT tuning division and pulled the plug on the world class Ford GT supercar.

And fair enough. As we’ve argued before, halo cars are a waste of time and energy that reveal company-killing ADD (Studebaker Avanti anyone?). Sure, Ford’s fire-breathing mutants make US happy. But we’re pistonheads. We love the extreme, the amazing and the unique (ish). Let’s face it: the vast majority of the American car buying public couldn’t care less about a 450-horse pickup truck, or any other wild-ass vehicle. They want vanilla. Plain, old, vanilla.

So never mind all the marketing gobbledygook about intangibles like a special model’s effect on “brand positioning.” At the sharp end, special editions are nothing more than a way to earn the dealer a little extra cash, or provide dealer drive-by props, or give the sales manager a cool car to drive instead of the plain Jane sedan he beats to an inch of its life. Again, you gotta wonder, why bother?

Never underestimate the impact of corporate culture on a company’s priorities. Toyota is on a mass market mission. Does ToMoCo have a halo car? No. Ford is… confused. Their culture is no longer about doing the hard work needed to endlessly improve and promote core vehicles like the Crown Victoria, Escape, Explorer or Freestyle. It’s all about finding a Hail Mary pass that suddenly saves the company from ruin.

High-priced limited edition vehicles are not going to save Ford. They’re not even going to help them. Truth be told, this showboat-load of special edition models only exist because they give Ford’s dispirited marketing and PR folk something “interesting” to do. What’s the bet Ford will provide DOZENS of high quality press pictures of the Shelby ‘Stang— while they remain oblivious to the fact they can’t provide one decent shot of the Focus. Or, for that matter, a decent Focus. Or, quite simply, maintain focus.

Again, don’t get me wrong. I celebrate automotive diversity in all its forms. But someone’s got to remind Ford that their brand isn’t about diversity, or horsepower, or Funkmaster Flex’ fanatical followers, or anything else that smacks of spizzarkle. Ford is about value for money. Period. 

By on March 31, 2007

a_mulally_1958222.jpgBack in ’98, the BBC aired a fly-on-the-wall documentary series called “Back to the Floor.” A camera crew followed five British bosses who left the relative safety of the executive suite for a week's labor with downtrodden workers at the sharp end. When the show migrated to America’s PBS, it lacked the undercurrent of class warfare that gave Auntie Beeb’s original its zing. When Ford CEO Alan Mulally recently revived this scenario by playing car salesman, the results were equally dire.

Of course, Alan didn’t sell cars for a week. He “worked” for an afternoon at Village Ford in Dearborn, Michigan and Galpin Ford in L.A. Hanging with the Village people, Ford’s top dog supposedly set a blistering sales pace: four cars in forty minutes. Wow! Assuming Ford needs to sell 5.3m cars for a turnaround, Mulally should train 375 salesmen to repeat his voodoo. Working ten hour days, six days a week, they’d return Ford to ’05 sales levels by the end of the fiscal year.

Anyway, Nancy Miner was one of Big Al’s scalps. After a bad dealership service experience in New York (which Big Al didn’t investigate), Ms. Miner decided to go car shopping in Ford's home patch. That said, the main reason behind her journey was a visit with her son Kevin, a longtime Ford employee. Now don’t get to thinking Ms. Miner was a Ford family ringer, carefully prepped for purchase. At least, not according to the debrief provided by the divine Mr. M.

"She was down pretty much to a Camry and the Fusion,” Al said, displaying a car salesman’s knack for data capture. ”So I told her all about the Camry because I've had every Camry, I've had Lexus cars, I know all about Japan. I told her about the [Fusion], asked what her needs were. The Fusion was really for her."

It's a shame Ms. Miner didn’t ask Ford’s CEO why he chose Toyotas and Lexi over Fords and Lincolns for all those years, and whether this sudden change in brand loyalty had anything to do with his FoMoCo-sponsored $35m compensation package (plus unlimited G5 air miles). As opposed to, say, a recent, radical shift in Ford's comparative product quality.

Ms. Miner might also have enquired if Mulally’s all-encompassing knowledge of Japan includes insight into that country's automakers' ability to generate millions of sedan sales without relying on rental, taxi, livery and/or law enforcement fleets. While we're at it, readers with sales experience might like to know why “call me Alan” switched the qualify (ask about the customer’s needs) and present (tell her about the car) parts of the official Ford sales process. Never mind. I guess Mulally is more of a closer. 

Big Al put this proposition to the test at Galpin Ford. Needless to say, the L.A. Ford franchise isn’t one of those Midwestern stores where the tumbleweeds blow across the sales floor and the dealer principal can’t afford to even think about divorcing his second wife. Galpin is, in fact, the world's top-selling Ford dealership. Suffice it to say: fish, barrel, Ford, Mulally.

Once again, “Call me Alan” sold four vehicles. Once gain, little was left to chance. Longtime customer Danny Harrington— 15 vehicles and counting– was teed-up. The general contractor was “warned” in advance that FoMoCo’s top dog would be on site, and took full advantage of the opportunity.

Herrington sat in the room where small pens sign big checks with Ford’s CEO and Galpin Sales GM Terry Miller. The Associated Press reports that Herrington wanted more money for his 2000 F-250. M&M did some pencil pushing and reduced the builder's payment to his target of $600 per month– for six years. Oh, and Big Al clinched the deal by throwing in a set of floor mats (I kid you not).

"There were a couple of things that were in question as to be part of the deal," Herrington said post facto. "I think because of him [Mulally] it went my way."

While the word “think” doesn’t indicate that everything went Herrington’s way, there’s a more important question: what did Alan Mulally learn from this exercise?

Call Me Al didn’t face any of the drudgery association with car sales: waiting hours for “ups,” filling out reams of tedious paperwork, making sales calls to old customers, etc. Nor was he subject to any of the psychological pressures facing salesmen and women: depending on a sale to make ends meet, facing down the GM, competing for bonuses, etc. Nor did he get a taste for a “real” customer interaction; all the prospects knew Big Al was Ford’s CEO. In short, The Blue Oval's Big Boss learned more about PR than people.

In the “Back to the Floor” doc series, the egghead CEO always gained an appreciation for his street smart employees’ difficulties— many of which were the direct result of company policies. The basic idea: something will change. In contrast, Mulally’s flying visit to the front line was a cynical move that changed nothing and fooled no one– except maybe Mulally himself.

By on March 31, 2007

buick.jpgOnce I crossed the line, once I became a fifteen year-old driving addict, there was no turning back. Nothing could stop me from using my drug of choice. Like most addicts, I was willing to cross any line to get my fix. If my supply was cut off, I found another. Needless to say this is not my auto-biography’s most innocent chapter. Read More >

By on March 30, 2007

1999-09-03_08-3622.jpgAs Detroit slips into a quagmire of its own creation, The Big 2.5 are busy flexing rapidly wasting political muscles. On Tuesday, the top brass met with President Bush to forestall discuss plans for greater fuel efficiency. The next day, Senator Debbie Stabenow (D-MI) introduced The Japanese Currency Act. Like her Motown home boys, Stabenow claims the Japanese government is manipulating their exchange rate to provide an inherent– and inherently unfair– “discount” over American-made products. Uh, I don’t think so.

There are plenty of reasons to dismiss this legislation as End of Days insanity. First, there’s the timing. If the yen – dollar exchange rate is such a pressing problem for Detroit automakers, why did Stabenow hang fire until after the recent elections? Indeed, The Big 2.5 has been losing ground to Japanese-owned automakers for decades. If [alleged] Japanese currency manipulation wasn’t a problem ten years ago, why should anyone believe it’s a problem now?

Second, the proposed bill directs the U.S. Department of Treasury to work with the Council of Economic Advisors and the Japanese government to devise a plan to draw down Japan's “excessive currency reserves." The Act is a patently ridiculous effort to interfere with one of America’s best trading partners and a key strategic ally. It’s an entirely theoretic maneuver that’s doomed to failure; the Japanese Finance Ministry is about as likely to embrace foreign dictates as the U.S. Federal Reserve Board.

Third, while government bodies can manipulate foreign exchange rates, there are obvious limits. Remember when the Euro came out and dived against the dollar? Nothing the Ministers could do helped stop the rot. In fact, any country with open capital markets can only slow currency valuation trends– not create, prevent or stop them.

Even if the Powers that Be conspired to set the Yen at a more Detroit friendly level, the impact on the U.S. car industry would be minimal. The Automotive Trade Policy Council– a Detroit political mouthpiece– says the exchange rate delivers a $4k to $10k per vehicle “windfall” to Japanese automakers. Even if you accept this logic (and forget about the cost of Japanese labor and transportation), we’re talking about a tiny slice of the Dai-san’s U.S. business.

Ironically enough, Japanese automakers moved most of their production overseas in the mid-‘90’s to head off the impact of the (then) strong Yen. Nowadays, only Toyota’s Lexus and Scion models are made exclusively in Japan. Honda’s CR-V is their last home-grown U.S. export– and they’re shifting production stateside. While a rate-based “discount” on transmissions and some electronics (the major imported components) may help, their competitive advantage is not what you’d call overwhelming.

And what of the reverse? While virtually all its factories are in Japan, Mazda has not been able to lift up Ford. If a Japanese production base gives foreign automakers such a large cost advantage, why did GM and DCX recently cut ties with their Japanese “little brothers”? If access to cheap Yen is truly a great advantage, why are Isuzu and Mitsubishi wallflowers at the automakers’ ball? 

Abandoned by their foreign “partners”, these Japanese automakers have been unable to hook up with new partners– and it’s not for lack of trying. Suzuki has apparently decided to use whatever Yen-based “advantage” they possess to make a big push in the Japanese domestic market. When the one Japanese carmaker with no US manufacturing capacity makes its major market push outside the U.S., it tells us that the days when “made in Japan” meant cheap (in any sense of the word) are long gone.

So why does the Yen remain relatively weak, when the Euro and Pound are getting stronger? While most Japanese car and electronics makers are doing well (some more than others), the Japanese economy is in the same slump it’s been in for the last 15 years. Despite government rates that are a tenth of those of the US and Europe, Japanese banks are still “weak.” They’re still saddled with tens of billions of dollars worth of outstanding loans made during the economic “bubble” of the late ‘80’s. Loans they can’t afford to write-off.

Bottom line: Japanese banks aren’t lending much money. Japan’s economic growth is practically flat, with a shrinking and aging population. What’s good for Lexus– a booming Japanese economy– ain't happening.

If the The Japanese Currency Act is so wrong, so late and so feckless, why make the gesture now? The timing doesn’t match plant closings. It doesn’t smack of Big 2.5 Head-Honcho-dom; the Fat Cats only complain about exchange rates when they need a convenient excuse for lackluster sales.

Nope. The bill’s likeliest target are the people most in sync with its paranoid xenophobia: the United Auto Workers. To this receptive audience, Stebnow's Act makes it sound like “something is being done”. Which is true enough: precious time and energy are being wasted on an unimportant non-issue.   

By on March 29, 2007

2007-convention-resolutions222.jpgWhile the United Auto Workers (UAW) were busy plotting their future, The Detroit News ran a Cyber Survey. “Have UAW members given up enough or should auto makers expect more concessions?” As of the time I’m putting electrons to pixels, only 26 percent of the respondents agreed with the ungrammatical assertion “there’s been enough concessions.” The other 74 percent voted that the “UAW needs to make more concessions.” It’s not too promising when the home town crowd starts turning against you. But does it really matter?

Admittedly, on-line surveys are far from statistically significant. However, the “put your hands up for Detroit” results are a clarion call to the UAW. The days when the union could demand the sun and get the moon are gone. Even a brief look at the automakers’ balance sheets indicates that they can no longer afford to keep idle workers on the payroll, or pay for full time employees who work on a part-time basis, or carry enormous “legacy costs,” or even keep pace with rising health care costs. 

Yet the UAW is like Oliver Twist on an endless loop; they keep asking for more. The speeches and 103-page Resolution approved at their collective bargaining convention all indicate they’re not willing to give many (any?) concessions to their employers. In fact, the UAW wants MORE benefits and job guarantees.

Saber rattling? Don’t be so sure. The UAW doesn’t seem to grasp the simple concept that they’re on the verge of pricing themselves out of a job. The organization is deeply infused with a sense of entitlement, a “Don’t mess with us, we ARE the company” credo that informs everything they do– even if it threatens to take them all the way to the unemployment line.

UAW President Ron Gettelfinger signalled that his union brothers and sisters are ready, willing and able ($847m strike fund and counting) to down tools should their employers get stroppy. Even though Big Ron’s got a look at the automakers' books, he doesn’t believe The Big 2.5 are on the ropes. The fact that Ford and GM have recently topped-up their checking accounts, that investment bankers are clamoring to buy Chrysler, merely reaffirms the UAW's bottom line: where there’s a contract, there’s a way.

Bankruptcy? Fuhgeddaboutit. Gettelfinger vehemently denounced Delphi for trying to use bankruptcy to break their union contracts. Yet Chapter 11 awaits any of the The Big 2.5, should their unionized work force choose to strike. Make that all. If any one of the domestics collapses, it will cause a chain reaction that will end the American auto industry as we know it.

Of course, the automakers aren’t innocent victims in any of this. No matter what you’ve heard, the paradigm has not changed. The automakers still threaten to close plants or withhold new cars from particular plants, using new models and continued employment as hostages to get what they want from the UAW. The workers at GM’s Lordstown, Ohio plant are sweating bullets right now.

What's more, auto company executives are equally mired in the entitlement mentality. According to Ron Tadross at Banc of America Securities, the base salary of the average GM, Ford, or Chrysler vice president is about the same as the total compensation for the CEO of Toyota (just under $1M). Add in the bonuses and stock packages (regardless of how well the company did) and Detroit’s top dogs are making 40 to 50 times as much as the workers they say they can no longer afford.

When was the last time you heard any of these executives offering to take a pay cut or refusing a bonus to preserve their company’s future?

You want to know why the Cadillac DTS, Lincoln Town Car and Chrysler Aspen’s interiors look and feel cheaper than a $17K Honda? Why Motown’s motors lag behind in fuel economy and alternative propulsion? Detroit’s overheads are so high, their bureaucracy so stratified and stultified, that they simply can’t afford to produce what the market demands at a price that the market expects. That’s why the American auto industry, once known for technological innovation and trend setting, is playing a perpetual game of follow-the-leader.

And so the UAW and the Detroit-based automakers continue to squabble like a couple of four-year-olds, each threatening to knock down the other’s blocks and go home. The first concession both sides should make is to reality. The reality is that the old ways no longer work. Those of us on the outside realize this, from top-flight industry analysts all the way down to the poor sap on the dealer floor, trying to sell lackluster domestics against the class leading transplants. But there is no indication whatsoever that the UAW, GM, Ford and Chrysler “get it.”

A wake-up call is on its way, and it ain’t gonna be pretty. 

By on March 29, 2007

pussycat.jpgMost of the guys I know have 93 octane racing through their veins. But I’ve also met more than a few women who have a need for speed, who lust after the fast and the furious, who live from one clichéd car movie moment to the next. So is a pistonhead born or made? Is it nurture or nitrous? While there’s no doubt that high testosterone levels help create (if not prolong the lifespan of) an automotive enthusiast, there’s more to motor mania than what you’re packing in your genes.

Trust me: deep down, most women are car enthusiasts. Like any teenage boy, they start off excited about the intoxicating freedom of driving and scan their automotosphere for the chariot best suited to fleeing the nest and impressing the rest. They may not talk about horsepower and torque, but they “get it.”

And then they grow to dislike cars, if only because the cars they drive are so fundamentally unlikeable. The minivan, the family sedan, the average domestic transplant-– these are the daily drivers of the women I know. Is it any wonder they loathe all things automotive? And yet they buy these vehicles, time and time again.

I suppose nurture has a lot to do with it– if only because your parents’ car buying habits influence yours. My family progressed from one average family car to another, bequeathing unto me a series of slow, po-faced monstrosities. This parade of putrefaction repressed my natural auto-enthusiast tendencies.

As it would. Every minute you spend in a car you hate deepens your dislike for vehicles in general. And so, after years of grinding boredom, the heart and soul of the downtrodden enthusiast becomes bitter and cynical. Early pistonhead passion goes poof.

What the closet enthusiast needs is encouragement-– an excuse to let loose their inner hoon.

Encouragement best comes from the purchase of a new, dynamically superior vehicle. This prospect holds a particular dread for women. Being the practical side of the species, we would rather put up with a car we hate than shell out money for another one that could be just as bad or worse offers more driving pleasure. This is where you– the enthusiast — must intervene.

First, gauge your subject’s heart. Is there an enthusiast somewhere in there, or a true car hater? If you launch the car at a stoplight, is her squealing louder than the tires? Better yet, on a closed course (i.e. abandoned mall parking lot), encourage her to try mucking about with her vanillamobile.

Tell her you want to see what her “fabulous” car can “really do,” or pretend it has something to do with safety. Get her to accelerate, corner, panic stop. Set up tasks (“see if you can stop this barge from 60 in 7 seconds”) and give her lots of praise. If you catch a secret smile, thanks, you’re claiming a soul for ttac.com.

Next, teach her how to drive a manual. This needs to be done before she needs a new vehicle; if she’s in a hurry, she won’t consider it. And unless you’re hankering for a Jersey Divorce, let a third party provide spousal instruction.

Then, become her personal shopper. Women are usually interested in practical, reliable and fun (looking, not driving). Find the cars that add ‘fast’ to the mix and plant her behind the wheel. She’ll know what to do from there.

If she wants an automatic, pull out all the stops. “Oh, the manual gets better gas mileage.” “A clutch is cheaper to replace than a transmission.” “The automatic won’t let you get as much out of the engine as a manual will.” Don’t forget – money and practicality.

It’s entirely possible she’ll still fixate on a dud. She loves it because it’s “cute” or the right color or because it’s been her lifelong fantasy to drive a red Mustang. Try not to vomit in front of her or, worse, pull rank.

If possible, guide her to take a step up in the model range. The Mustang GT.  A Volkswagen GTI instead of a Rabbit. Alternatively, find something similar in a different make. That red Corolla is a great car, but how about a nice red Honda Civic Si instead? Don’t be afraid to pull out economy, reliability or safety data to try to sway her mind.

And don’t fret. She may not buy what you think is the best car, but at least you’ve raised the whole "fun" issue. Baby steps are better than none at all. Before you know it, you'll have a mutual interest that brings you closer together as a couple and, more importantly, another set a wheels to thrash. Viva la evolution!

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