Category: Editorials

By on September 22, 2006

97cirrus_lx222.jpgPop quiz. “What do a Chrysler Cirrus, Chevrolet Blazer, Plymouth Acclaim and Ford Expedition have in common?” Did you say “none of them would ever tempt a pistonhead?” True enough, but not correct. “None of them ever dented the US sales charts”? Another good guess, but still incorrect. And the answer is: all of these vehicles have received the “North American Car (or Truck) of the Year” award. Yes, it’s that time of year again. Time for the automotive media to prove that indiscretion is the worst part of valor. 

Here they come: the Motor Trend Car of the Year, 10Best, North American Car of the Year, International Car of the Year (Auto, Autocar, Stern, L'Automobile, etc.), World Car of the Year, Family Car of the Year, Urban Wheel Awards Car of the Year, Green Car of the Year and (for all I know) Polydactylic Cat Owners Car of the Year award. Multiply most of these by three (to include truck and SUV awards) then add in various sub-awards, and you’ve got enough gongs to satisfy the world’s monasteries for a decade.

As the list of past winners indicates, the value of these accolades is entirely dubious. Their methodology is usually vague, subjective and debatable. In many cases, the fine print isn’t even available for public (or Michael Karesh’s) scrutiny. One thing is for sure: an award doesn’t mean that a “Car of the Year” (COTY) is the best car on the road that year. Remember: a car only merits COTY consideration if it’s new or substantially changed for that year. How new? Many juries test cars that aren’t even on the market.

The candidates for the 2007 North American Car of the Year and North American Truck of the Year (NACOTY and NATOTY) awards were announced on Wednesday. In addition to sterling examples of automotive engineering and cutting edge design like the Dodge Caliber and Chevrolet Suburban, the awards’ crack team of automotive journalists is busy testing the as-yet-unreleased Ford Edge, GMC Acadia and Chrysler Sebring. This practice of testing pre-production models kills any hope that the panelists are testing “real” cars (i.e. press cars that weren’t carefully prepared by their manufacturers). 

You’d be forgiven for thinking COTY awards are little more than a gift to car advertisers, who provide a self-appointed number of “elite” journalists with priority access to press cars, and then co-promote a new product with an old publication. It’s certainly an excellent excuse for carmakers like Renault (Alliance), Chevrolet (Citation), Plymouth (RIP, Volare) and Ford (Probe) to sell cars by touting their COTY award like they’d won the Nobel Prize.

If not pissing off your paymasters is the priority, it is perhaps significant that Car and Driver’s 2006 “10Best” awards considered 52 cars in new categories, including “Best Luxury Sports Car,” “Best Sports Coupe,” “Best Roadster,” “Best Sports Car” and “Best Muscle Car.” Perhaps C&D hopes persnickety pistonheads will spend so much time debating which car belongs in what category they’ll be too tired to dispute the winners.

To their credit, Car and Drivel Driver pits each year’s contenders against last year’s winners, and names the winner of that contest one of their 10Best. The concept is sound in theory, but flawed in execution. All cars are made to a price. When you’re comparing a vehicle that costs $15k to one costing $45k, proclaiming that one is “better” than the other is an inherently flawed judgment. To muffle accusations of price bias, C&D attempts to spread their selections across the price spectrum. In the process, they make the selection process even more arbitrary and artificial.

Anyway, I believe that any award purporting to name the best of anything for any given year should have stringent selection criteria; at least a bit more than “it’s the new kid on the block and we really like it a lot and we know what we’re talking about because we’re professional car journalists.”  In the interests of fairness, and in direct contradiction to The Truth About Cars’ last two Cars of the Year (chosen by RF according to the above methodology), here’s how it should be done:

The judging should include a variety of published factors like performance, engineering, fuel economy, suitability to task for which they were designed, build quality, value for money and ergonomics. To qualify for consideration, a vehicle would have to achieve a minimum score. To win, it would have to be at the top of the ranking. Oh, and the panel should include both car journalists and non-professional pistonheads (that’s you).

I’ve never heard anyone say they bought a car because it received a Car of the Year award. That’s because no media outlet has the cojones (and/or money) to base awards strictly on merit– rather than the intersecting interests of publication and producer. Until then, we’ll keep getting meaningless hyperbole about meaningless awards.

By on September 22, 2006

x05co_ft053ar222.jpg General Motors has a monkey on its back: another monkey. Actually, three point one monkeys. Writing in the August issue of The New Yorker magazine, Malcolm “Tipping Point” Gladwell explored the possibility that GM’s need to support an enormous population of retired workers is dragging the company into the abyss. Although it’s not exactly a new idea, Mr. “Blink” applied a new tool to the job: the dependency ratio.

Economists use dependency ratios as an analytical tool to examine national economies. It’s a pretty simple concept. Imagine a single man bringing down $100k a year. Mr. Man’s got sufficient liquidity to buy a brand new Corvette. Now imagine the same guy making the same money married with 2.3 kids. He can only read about the joys of Corvette ownership (probably here, for free).

The single guy's supporting one person with one income, creating a one-to-one dependency ratio. Assuming his wife doesn't work, the married man’s living not-so-large at three-point-three-to-one. The more dependents a productive worker/economy must support, the less profitable and thus, financial viable, he/it is.

Gladwell’s article applies the dependency ratio to General Motors, casting retirees as company dependants. In 1962, GM had 464k active employees generating sufficient profits to support 40k retirees. The company’s dependency ratio was one to 11.6.

By 2005, GM had 141k active workers failing to provide sufficient profits to support 453k retirees. The General’s dependency ration has increased to a startling 3.2 to 1. In other words, every GM worker has 3.2 mouths to feed.

Productivity gains– related to just-in-time manufacturing and widespread automation– have helped mitigate the impact of GM’s retiree bulge. The General produces more cars with fewer workers than it did back in the early sixties. Unfortunately, this is a fact not a competitive advantage. Everyone in the automotive industry must do more with less. (Some automakers do it a lot better than GM, but that’s a ratio for another day.)

Ford and Chrysler are in similar straits, struggling to increase productivity (and profitability) to keep pace with their increasing dependency ratio. However, no company has as many retirees as The General. As the industry’s dependency “leader,” the enormous weight of their pension and health care obligations put the company at a huge competitive disadvantage.

General Motors would not be the first American company to collapse under the strain. Gladwell cites Bethlehem Steel as an example of a dependency ratio’s ability to destroy a business, if not an entire industry. In the ‘50’s, steel was one of America’s sturdiest, most important industries. Bethlehem stood at the top of the [slag] heap.

Competition from Germans and Japanese steel mills led to smaller and smaller proft margins. Bethlehem began to flounder. Between 1960 and 2000, the company shed 90% of its workforce. In 2001, Bethlehem Steel finally broke under its $7b pension and healthcare obligations, and filed for bankruptcy. Does any of this sound familiar?

Now the “good” news. After Bethlehem Steel’s pension fund was terminated in 2003, the company’s new owners restructured other obligations and started over. The new company’s dependency ratio sank to zero to one. The steelmaker turned a profit in six months, successfully competing against Germans, Japanese and the rest of the world.

The American auto industry in general– and General Motors in specific– understand the competitive disadvantages created by their “legacy costs.” And yet, GM, and now Ford, and soon Chrysler, are downsizing their business by offering union workers “buyouts”: lump sum payments that trim payrolls but do little to relieve their health care and pension costs.

In many ways, buyouts make sense. Cutting production and workforce lets you match supply with demand, and, hopefully, make a buck. But as the company chips away at its work force, it increases its dependency ratio. Buyouts mean fewer workers with even more people to support.

The only way out of the buyout trap: make more money per car. That’s tough to do when you’ve been selling discounts, rebates and finance programs for years, and your competitors don’t share your dependency problems. The margins in the auto industry have thinned like Kojak’s pate, especially in the low to mid-range market— GM’s unhappy hunting ground.  Even the once mighty margins on light trucks and SUVs have taken a hit.

Unless GM can knock one (or ten) out of the park, the only way out of the dependecy trap is… volume. Back up two paragraphs and repeat.

Of course, GM can’t repeat. Every business cycle costs money; The General lost $8.6 billion last year. The repeat is actually a spiral; the plane without an engine kind. Spend, shed, spend more, shed more. In the end, the guy with 3.2 dependants will not be forced to ogle his single buddy’s ‘Vette. The company with 3.2 dependents per worker couldn’t afford to make it in the first place.

For most dependency problems, there’s a rehab program. For this particular affliction, it’s not twelve steps. It’s chapter eleven. 

By on September 21, 2006

news-15364.jpg I remember reading about an environmental group that argued for zero population. Not zero population growth, zero people. They figured there was only one way to return nature to its, um, natural state: take humans out of the equation. I don’t recall their plan to achieve this goal, but I don’t think it involved automobiles. After all: no people, no cars, no pollution. Done. California’s tree huggers may not adhere to the same logical extreme, but c’mon, can someone please knock some sense into the state’s eco-warriors before they do something really stupid?

Yesterday, California Attorney General Bill Lockyer filed a lawsuit against Toyota, General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, Honda and Nissan. The suit alleges that these companies’ vehicles damaged the ozone layer hovering over California. The People seek unspecified financial damages for the diminution of the state’s snow packs, beaches, ozone layer and endangered animals. Clearly, The Golden State has kicked their anti-car agenda back into high gear.

Now we could ignore the political grandstanding that triggered this eminently dismissible lawsuit (they followed all your environmental regulations and you’re suing them?) and get into a debate about whether or not carbon dioxide is an environmental hazard. But let’s just assume it is. Is treating law-abiding automakers like criminals really the best way to sort out their products’ environmental impact? It’s like a bunch of social workers suing the Attorney General’s office for not forcing the legislature to pass more stringent laws against pedophiles, so they could enforce them. 

Of course, there are plenty of people who assume that automobile manufacturers are criminals. The movie “Who Killed the Electric Car” reflects the generally held belief that automakers are deeply, fundamentally corrupt organizations who will gladly sacrifice “the public good” for their shareholder’s gain. They’ll rip up mass transit lines, pretend they can’t build cars that get 100 miles to a gallon, subvert safety and environmental regulations, send jobs abroad, lie, cheat and steal— anything to avoid doing the “right thing.” The logical corollary: the carmakers’ [alleged] foot-dragging must be stopped at any and all costs.

Never mind that these same critics drive cars. Never mind that the society in which they live depends on the automobile for its social, economic and genetic well-being. Never mind that automakers have eliminated virtually all of their products’ harmful pollutants AND increased their fuel efficiency AND increased passenger safety AND maintained the finished products’ affordability AND generated billions in annual tax revenue AND created tens of thousands of skilled and unskilled jobs. Automakers– and automobiles– are the enemy within.

If you want to know where this is heading, look at England. In the name of public health, London hits-up motorists entering the city center with a “congestion charge." In the name of public health, large public areas have been pedestrianized and the number of public parking spaces reduced. In the name of public health, the government levies astronomical taxes on petrol, cars and car licenses. In the name of public health, the government dictates the number of houses that can be built, the number of parking spaces those houses can provide and the location of those houses (to minimize car use and maximize the use of public transportation).

Maybe you’re OK with all that. But the results aren’t exactly as intended. Car use (i.e. “pollution”) has continued to increase. Meanwhile, the country’s public transportation system has become extremely over-crowded (in addition to dirty, unreliable and expensive). Urban congestion (and jobs) has been exported to outlying areas. Decent, affordable housing for middle class buyers is practically non-existent. And speaking of class, motoring’s prohibitive expense puts automotive ownership completely out of reach for lower income workers and lowers the standard of living for the middle class. This situation does nothing to alleviate class resentment, and much to increase it.

And that’s the single biggest issue facing those who would seek to limit America’s automotive “addiction”— whether they know it or not. The automobile is, literally, social mobility. Cars are the platelets in the body politic. By keeping cars and car ownership relatively cheap, our populace can feed outlying areas with employment and business, spreading economic well-being both socially and geographically. Of course, detractors would argue that our cars are also spreading pollution and environmental destruction further and faster, but they’re missing the point.

Politics is supposed to be the art of compromise. If you view the car as a planet-killing demon and move to restrict its use, or try to tax it to death, or regulate it into a corner, success will evoke the law of unintended consequences. Greenhouse gasses may be a threat to our children’s future, but there are other threats we should also consider before we take drastic steps to “solve” the problem. Perhaps California should work with automakers, rather than against them.   

By on September 20, 2006

bronco0722.jpg Auto industry analysts have cast their beady eyes on The Blue Oval's third turnaround plan, and they don’t like what they see. Despite the fact that Billy and Alan and Mark have mashed the gas on Ford’s downsizing, there are ominous rumblings that the cuts aren’t deep enough. The assertion is almost as shocking as the cuts themselves. If asking all of your 75k union workers to piss off isn’t enough, if shuttering sixteen plants doesn’t cut the financial mustard, well, is there any end to this death spiral?  Only the obvious one.

To review: Ford wants to jettison 30k members of the United Auto Workers (UAW). The analysts are saying it ain’t gonna happen dot bomb. FoMoCo’s assembly liners are younger than GM’s. Ford’s $140k lump sum payoff offer matches The General’s, but Ford workers’ relative immaturity means their pensions would be significantly smaller. Some analysts are predicting that Ford will fall short of its workers-out-the-door goal by 10k union members– raising the specter of yet more deposits into Ford’s infamous money-for-nothing jobs bank.  

But that’s not what’s preoccupying prognosticating pundits. They’re concerned that Ford hasn’t named the final two factories they plan on shuttering. While this website has attributed Ford’s secrecy on this matter to political concerns (i.e. not pissing off friendly pols in whose districts the axe will fall), the rest of the crystal ball set see it differently. They consider the mystery a reflection of confusion, indecision and poor product planning (i.e. business as usual). In other words, if you don’t know what you need to build, you don’t know what not to build and where you shouldn’t be building it.

Addressing the topic in Automotive News, Catherine Madden, senior analyst at Global Insight, left her word mincer at home. "This indicates that Ford doesn't have a clear handle on what their product plan strategy is beyond 2008." Analyst Glenn Mercer was equally forthright: "The implication is that they haven't really figured this out yet, and if that's the case, one has to wonder what they have been doing for the past six months — or six years."

These number crunchers reckon that Ford’s production cutbacks will peg the company’s capacity utilization (actual output vs. potential output) at 84%. That would leave The Blue Oval Boys with excess production capacity equal to 500k units. That’s not good; Ford has to pay for this unused, unprofitable potential. Ford spokesman Oscar Suris’ counter: we’re getting there. In fact, if we hit 100% capacity utilization any sooner than our new new 2010 target date, we’ll have to surrender sales and/or invest in costly retooling.

Surrender sales, indeed. The industry analysts' calculations are based on Ford’s projection that it’ll capture 14% of next year’s domestic car market. If they don’t hit that target, even the 84% utilization figure will look like wishful thinking, and the automaker's profitability by '09 pledge will have as much credibility as cold fusion.

Obviously, it all comes down to product. According to Ford execs, the company’s got the goods to hold the fort, and maybe even fight a skirmish or two. They put tremendous stock in the $26k Edge. But back when the Mercury Montego (a badge engineered Ford 500) was launched, John Fitzpatrick predicted "We expect to conquest about 40 percent, meaning 40 percent of our Montego customers will be people who are outside the Ford family right now." 

It didn't happen, but it must, and soon. In order to survive, Ford must lure non-Ford buyers into the fold. Although the media quite rightly focuses on the need for Ford to build gotta have products, the window of opportunity may already be shut. Think of it this way: Toyota, Honda, Nissan et al. didn’t establish segment dominance simply by building good products. They built good products in segments where American cars sucked. Now that the shoe is on the other foot, it’s worth noting that the so-called imports’ products don’t suck.

Perhaps there is merit to this whole “Bold Moves” thing. It seems pretty clear that Ford no longer has enough cash/time to make the incremental changes that could gradually win it enough business to stay in business. Maybe it’s time for the Blue Oval to do a Walt Disney: bet the whole company on a radical new product. Ford has a long history of creating exciting concept cars; cars that could legitimately be called segment busters. Who was it that said history is bunk? Screw the past. Build some weird shit. If we heard about some bold moves on the new product front, we’d have reason to hope. But we don’t, so we don’t.    

By on September 19, 2006

jp007_152wr.jpg A couple of continents ago, I owned a coffee table book called “Quintessence.” Each glossy page featured a black and white product portrait: an Oreo cookie, a Steinway baby grand, a Timex watch, Bicycle playing cards, etc. The author posited that these instantly familiar products represent the essence of a thing in its purest and most concentrated form. The book didn’t contain a quintessential automobile, but I reckon a base Porsche 911 or a Jeep Wrangler would have made the grade. Not a Cayenne or a Compass. And therein lies a tale.

Let’s assume that most brands are built on a single, iconic product. When is it OK to extend the brand, to riff on the elements that made the original product such a success and create something new to increase profitability? The obvious answer: when sales of the original product go flat or, worse, flat line. The 911 may be THE Porsche, but sales of the venerable model have tanked more than once– to the point where the German automaker’s independence and survival were seriously threatened. Who can blame Porsche for developing 914’s, 928’s, 944’s, etc.?

Yes, but– the fact that all these models have come and gone is equally relevant. Despite the entrance of the astounding Boxster, the accomplished Cayenne and sublime Cayman, the 911 still gives the brand the luster and prestige that makes Porsche Porsche. When challenged about the development of the Cayenne or the Panamera four-door, the German automaker maintains that new products support the development of their “core” (i.e. quintessential) product. They have both the sales figures and the killer 911 to back them up.

Chrysler wields the same logic. When I spoke to a PR flack about the new Compass, he freely admitted that Jeep’s new “soft roader” wasn’t faithful to “the central brand proposition.” But hey, the new and improved Jeep Wrangler is! He invited me to share his belief that it was OK for DCX to sell a faux off-roader because the company still caters to Jeep customers who want “the real deal.” Jeep fanatics may argue the point, but this twin-track brand philosophy has become the de facto standard industry-wide.

The financial success of automotive brand extensions seems to make a mockery of the traditional counter: non-quintessential products are a short term fix that eventually erode the parent company’s profitability. After all, iconic models like the 911, Wrangler, BMW 3-Series, Mercedes SL, etc. still fly the flag for their manufacturers. And the companies behind these vehicles– and their non-core companions– are healthy and prosperous. And yet brand extensions are an insidious force, like a slowly leaking tire. They gradually waste precious resources where their corporate sponsors can’t see it: design, marketing and service.

Even if a new vehicle shares a platform and production facility with an existing product, it costs tens of millions of dollars to develop. As in Hollywood, the new product’s marketing and promotional costs are often just as high as the cost of design, assembly and distribution– especially when you figure-in the salaries of all the people generating the launch programs and support materials. Service equipment, parts inventories and training drain even more cash. And every new model adds another layer of corporate bureaucracy, which competes with existing fiefdoms, which slows down the whole organization.

More than that, new products take money away from the older core products. You only have to click on a manufacturer’s media site and see the small range of pathetic PR pictures for well-established models to realize that new vehicles get all the marketing bucks. The lack of investment in an automaker’s quintessential car or cars creates a vicious circle: less marketing = falling sales = less marketing = falling sales. The core products get neglected to death: Ford Taurus, Cadillac Fleetwood, Mercedes 190, Rolls Royce Corniche, the entire Oldsmobile line, Buick Park Avenue, etc.

Car companies lucky enough to make a quintessential product should be endlessly and relentlessly promoting them. Instead of building the Panamera, Porsche should get as many people as possible behind the wheel of a 911. There should be six 911’s in every press fleet in the country. Every Porsche dealership should have a selection of 911 loaner cars. By the same token, Jeep should create off-road courses at or near their dealerships and do everything it can to get people to assault them in a “proper” Jeep.

All of these marketing efforts would cost a fraction of the money required to launch a new model. By reaffirming in the public’s mind what makes a given automobile manufacturer great, they would also add to the appeal of any brand extensions flowing from the original, well-loved vehicle. Concentrating on your core vehicle is, in fact, the quintessential business strategy for long-term growth and sustained profitability.

 

By on September 18, 2006

61210.jpg The idea that Ford and GM will merge or, as they say these days, “form an alliance” is yet another sign that we’re reaching the End of Days, Detroit style. Sorry, haven’t you heard? This morning’s Automotive News quotes proverbial “senior executives” and “sources familiar with the talks” as saying GM contacted Ford shortly after GM investor Kirk Kerkorian invited Nissan to crash The General’s going away party. Or was it the other way around?  Automotive News is wildly, absurdly, irresponsibly vague on the whole story. Suffice it to say, any merger between America’s Number One and Number Two automakers would kill both of them.

Throughout this Death Watch series, commentators have insisted that a GM bankruptcy defies contemplation. The US economy would be plunged into chaos. OK, with so many foreign-owned automakers plying their domestically-constructed wares, a kind of mini-chaos. But there’s no doubt the knock-on effects of a GM Chapter 11 will be on the major side of major— from tens of thousands of jobs destroyed to millions of GM warranties rendered worthless (ironically enough). Now, imagine if that bankruptcy involved both GM and Ford at the same time. The mind boggles.

Aside from the obvious downside, who in their right mind believes that GM and Ford would benefit from a hook-up (other than some Wall Street Journal fantasists back in July)? The two companies suffer from chronic obesity. As this year’s massive cuts show, both The General and The Blue Oval have too many factories, assembly workers, executives, health care costs, pension costs, brands, models and dealers. At the same time, both carmakers face financial anorexia. They have too few attractive products to generate sufficient operating capital to stay in business—at least in the longer term. In the short term, they’re both failing companies.

With no immediate prospect of relief. If fact, GM and Ford are headed for the massive coronary known as the United Auto Workers (UAW). As it has for the last thirty years, the 800-pound gorilla in the room calls the shots. And it's feeding time at the zoo; their contract is up for “negotiation.” Any merger between the two automakers would require the tacit approval of the unions, who are no more likely to make concessions to a new “Big Red One” than organize Chinese labor.

And what of corporate cultures? Ford is a family firm whose stultifying bureaucracy and deeply entrenched corporate fiefdoms have rendered their business commercially impotent. GM is a confederacy of business school dunces whose stultifying bureaucracy and deeply entrenched corporate fiefdoms have rendered their business commercially impotent. Put them together and what have you got? What’s the opposite of synergy? Overlap, on a scale so epic it makes Ben Hur look like a home movie.

Can you imagine trying to create a single, effective dealer network with a coherent range of products that incorporates both company’s eight brands and [well] over a hundred models? If you think that GM’s product range makes no sense, A) you’re right and B) combining Ford and GM’s products lines would define the word “farrago” for all time. On the dealer level, well, if GM and Ford can’t cut down/amalgamate their retail “partners” as they are, what are the chances the two of them could do it together? Would it even be legal?

Perhaps the most bizarre part of this bizarre unsubstantiated rumor is the fact that anyone gives it credence. The mere existence of this merger idea in the intellectual space normally reserved for turnaround talk and BM’s (Bold Moves) indicates just how desperate things have become. If Wall Street reacts positively to this non-news, you’ll know that the world has gone insane. Of course, they’re been reacting to GM’s obfuscation and Ford’s Jump Down Turnaround (pick a bail of debt) with good cheer, ignoring the broken business basics that are dragging– have been dragging– both companies into oblivion. So, I suppose anything is possible.

But not desirable. Yes, a GM / Ford merger would “reinvent” the American automotive scene, creating a behemoth that we haven’t seen since, um, GM was healthy. But its success would depend entirely on wholesale slaughter— something neither company has been able to achieve on its own. And that’s because the only way they could affect the requisite root-and-branch change is… bankruptcy. You first?  No, after you. No after you. I know; let’s go together! No, after you. No, after you.

By on September 17, 2006

f122.jpg Last year, F1 commentators were busy lamenting new rule changes that outlawed the 3.0-liter V10 powerplant. After Renault introduced the motor to the sport in 1989 (with Williams), the configuration quickly became the sport’s defacto standard. Then, in the name of safety, the FIA mandated a reduction in engine capacity from 3.0 to 2.4 liters, and reconfiguration to a V8. Pundits saw the move as one more step toward the spec series they all so desperately want to avoid. Ladies and gentlemen, the jury is in.

The new rules, designed to decrease racing speeds, also eliminated attendant cutting-edge technology, such as variable-length intake trumpets (key to the tuning and tractability of the high-power V10 engines). All in all, the FIA’s new engine rules reduced engine power by around 20%, corresponding to the 20% drop in displacement and cylinder count. In real world terms, the move reduced engine power by around 185 horsepower.

During the off-season, the FIA was lambasted for the switch. Some journalists and drivers (no need to name names, Jenson Button) claimed a schoolgirl could drive the new formula cars, that the element of overwhelming power had been removed from the equation. Perhaps they had a point. The drop from 950 to around 775hp was drastic.

But the pundits failed to foresee the resulting acceleration of aerodynamic and tire technology. As this season’s results prove, the two technologies helped compensate for the rule change. Within months, the smaller-engined cars’ 2006 lap times leaped straight back to their 3.0-liter levels. Here’s the deal…

When tweaking a race car’s aerodynamics, designers must make a basic tradeoff: downforce vs. drag. While adding wings to a car can increase downforce, the gain comes at the expense of drag. Drag increases a vehicle’s high-speed grip, but reduces its top speed. Wing angle, wing size and configuration all play vital roles balancing the two forces.

This is clearly evident when comparing the rear wing angles used by the F1 teams at Monza and Monaco. Looking down the length of the car (from nose to tail) you can easily see the changing cord, or vertical dimension, of the rear main-plane: steep at Monaco, shallow at Monza.

A current F1 car’s front and rear wings only generate 30 to 40% of the total downforce. Underbody airflow management and the diffuser account for the rest; it’s absolutely crucial to the car’s handling at any given speed, as well as the car’s maximum velocity. Correctly manipulating the airflow around the rear of the car is especially important to the performance of the underbody aerodynamics.

The reduced dimension of the new 2.4-liter V8 liberated significant room for development in this mission critical area, placing even more emphasis on the packaging of bodywork and components in the car’s rear. Designers greatly enhanced the efficiency of the undertray and diffuser– to the point where they are largely responsible for the similar speed and grip levels achieved pre and post engine rule change.

The reintroduction of tire changes during pit stops was the other major change for the ’06 season– which also ended-up subverting FIA's intention to lower racing speeds. The maximum stint length during a typical race strategy is now around 25 laps, depending on track conditions. Because one set of tires no longer has to survive an entire race, F1 tires have changed dramatically, both in compound and construction. Equally important, last year’s championship saw Bridgestone struggle unsuccessfully to meet the grip and wear benchmarks set by Michelin. This year, the gap has closed between the two manufacturers’ tire performance.

As two and three stop strategies are the norm for the front running teams, they can run aggressively soft tire compounds which greatly enhance their car’s dynamics. The intense battle between the two tire manufacturers has also led to extreme speciation in tire compounds and constructions. Each tire choice now has a very narrow operating window, particularly with regard to temperature.  These ultra-specialized compounds, while extremely quick inside their respective windows, have shown themselves to be notoriously unreliable (performance-wise) outside them. Thus tire choice is the perhaps the single most important decision made on race weekend.

In short, F1's new rule changes haven’t forced innovation and technology to take a backseat. In fact, FIA’s restrictive engine regulations have given the constructors impetus to advance the sport’s technology in several important areas. In respect to the 20% loss of power, the fact that teams have been able to equal (and in some cases better) last year’s lap times is nothing short of astounding, a testimony to the competitors’ tenacity and ingenuity.

By on September 16, 2006

ford_1657222.jpg Another day, another turnaround plan. For those of you keeping score, Ford’s “Way Forward 2.0” is actually the third version in four years. In terms of strategy, the new, new plan holds few surprises; FoMoCo is simply super sizing their right-sizing program. On the credit side of the ledger… nothing much. New models still won’t hit the streets anytime soon. But the Street has hit Ford. On “Blue Friday,” Ford’s stock shed nearly 12% or $2b of its value. Investors and pundits alike are finally waking up to the fact that America’s number three automaker is in triage, with the crash cart standing by.

The latest round of surgery brings new meaning to the word “invasive.” The United Auto Workers (UAW) rank and file face the deepest cuts: all of union leader Bob King’s 75k plus brothers and sisters will be optioned. Ford hopes that between twenty-five and thirty thousand punch card people will accept one of eight offerings— involving various combinations of lump sum payouts, tuition breaks and health insurance. Employees have until November 27 to sign-up and sign out. All takers must be out the door by September.

The cuts reflect an increase in plant closings and “idlings,” from 14 to 16. The company has identified nine plants it’ll axe in 2008: Atlanta Assembly (Ford Taurus, 2028 workers), Batavia Transmission (1445 workers), Essex Engine Plant (695 workers), Maumee Stamping Plant (680 workers), Norfolk Assembly (F-150, 2433 workers), St. Louis Assembly (Explorer, Aviator, Mountaineer, 1445 workers), Twin Cities Assembly (Ranger, B-Series, 1866 workers), Windsor Casting (522 workers) and Wixom Assembly (Lincoln Town Car, 1259 workers). Sensitive to upcoming elections, Ford refuses to name the five other plants set for closure.

At the same time, fourteen thousand white collar Glass House inhabitants are due for defenestration. Ford figures all the cuts will save the company $5b annually. For now, the buyouts will burn through roughly $7b– in ‘07 alone. At the end of this, Ford reckons it will produce 3.6m units. That would slice FoMoCo’s share of the domestic auto industry pie to somewhere between 14 and 15 percent. Even at this new sub-Toyota size, even with lowered overheads, Ford will still have to score some major new product homeruns to meet their new goal: profitability by ‘09.

That’s going to be tough. The lost market share has gone to the competition. Despite announcing that 70% of Ford, Lincoln and Mercury “products by volume” will soon be new or upgraded, other than the cross boarder crossovers already on their way, Ford’s product pipeline looks decidedly dry. More Mustang variants, re-dubbed F-150’s, a V6 Lincoln flagship and a full-size people-carrying CUV are the only short term prospects. Two of these erstwhile saviors are niche vehicles and another contributes to the shrinking market that led to this debacle. The boxy (bold?) people mover will have its work cut out for it; Honda and DCX’s refreshed minivans are just around the corner.

Despite assurances that Ford will finish the year with $20b in the hopper, roughly half of those funds go to daily operating expenses. Just like GM, cash crunch time is coming. Blue Friday’s revelation that the formerly flush company is eliminating its stock dividend, saving $400m, indicates that liquidity has become a worry. Although Ford insists that none of the members of the Premium Automotive Group are up for sale, they are. Although the company claims it won’t sell a stake in Ford Motor Credit Co., it will. Bailed out parts supplier Visteon is also being cut loose.  And FoMoCo will try to off-load 23 pieces of real estate it acquired last year.

It’s no wonder Billy's Boyz are still in surgery. Their previous doctoring was either too little, too late or too little too late. With the UAW’s inflexibility over at Chrysler and contract negotiations starting next year, it will be a long time before the patient will be stabilized– never mind cured. But the really scary part is that Billy Ford is still large and in charge, leading the Way Fordward. CEO Alan Mulally, who started collecting his gigantic paycheck last week, took a back seat during the press briefings. Mulally's contribution: "They are really trying to look through clear glasses and deal with our industry's reality." Oy they.

There is but one bright spark of hope in all this. Ford has decided not to kill the venerable, well-loved Lincoln Town Car. Could it be that someone in the increasingly-less-vast Ford Empire realized that if so many good products hadn’t been left to whither on the vine (Town Car, Focus, Taurus), if there had been some genuine fordward thinking, FoMoCo wouldn’t be desperately chasing lost market share in crowded segments? It may be a piercing glimpse into the obvious, but when you’re chasing anything, you’re always playing catch-up.

By on September 15, 2006

1963_studebaker_lark_wagonaire22.jpg According to those renowned postmodern philosophers the Barenaked Ladies, “everything old is new again.”  The maxim certainly applies to the automotive industry. Those of us who put ourselves in Moto-PR harm’s way are constantly bombarded by joyous claims of new and improved technology and the latest justgottahavit features: self-parking cars, adaptive cruise control, heated/cooled cup holders, etc. The truth is, many of the technological advancements we lust after are recycled ideas from days gone by. They may be “improved” but they definitely aren’t “new.” 

As manufactures try to squeeze every inch per gallon out of engines that lower their CAFE ratings, variable displacement powerplants (a.k.a. “Displacement on Demand”) are the next big thing. Shutting down half the cylinders turns a powerful V8 into the world’s bulkiest four-cylinder, but saves enough fuel to salve the customer’s conscience and convince them that they’re doing something positive for the environment/America’s energy independence.

Back in ‘77, Ford developed an ill-fated version of their 300-cubic-inch truck engine that shut off three cylinders in cruising mode. In the early ‘80’s, GM’s infamous V-8-6-4 engine made it to market. Unfortunately, engine control technology wasn’t mature enough to handle the task efficiently and the idea died an ignominious death (along with the Cadillac models powered by GM’s variable displacement engine). Now that computer technology has caught up with the concept, we have engines that adapt to changing conditions faster than a White House press secretary.

GM was the first to offer another technological marvel infesting today’s high-priced luxobarges: menu-driven video screen control panels. Whether it’s called iDrive, COMAND, MMI or just plain aggravating, they’re all riffs on the Electronic Control Center (ECC) installed in Buick’s Reatta and Riviera in the late 80’s. The ECC touch screen adjusted the radio and climate control functions and accessed diagnostics for the vehicle's various electronic systems. It was universally reviled by the automotive press, and for good reason: drivers found it confusing and complicated. Of course, today’s mouse-driven multi-media controllers boast high-resolution full-color screens and… greater complexity.

The starter button is a slightly more useful addition to today’s high-priced cars. This hot new feature dates back to the early days of the last century, when Cadillac first introduced the self-starter. For years, the ignition key was used only to close the ignition circuit. To start the car, you turned on the ignition then pushed or stepped on the starter button. On some really fancy cars, it was combined with the accelerator; flooring the pedal would both set the choke and start the car. Today, financially flush carpal tunnel sufferers can rejoice. With an RFI-enabled key fob tucked in your pocket or purse, you just push the button and go.

And then there’s the treehuggers' dream date: the electric car. The way its boosters promote the technology, you’d think they invented electricity. But any pistonhead worth his gas card knows that electric cars pre-date the gasoline-powered car. An electric vehicle was the first to break the 100 kilometers per hour barrier in 1899, reaching the blinding speed of 105.88 kph (65.79 mph). Most production electric cars were limited to a more civil 20 mph and marketed as town cars to upper-class customers and women drivers, thanks to their clean, quiet and genteel operation.

By the 1930’s, the electric car industry had all but disappeared. It’s a good thing we’ve progressed so far in the intervening 70 years or so. Today, there are only a few things standing between us and freeways filled with silent running electric cars: finding a way to create an affordable, safe machine that can travel a distance comparable to a conventionally-powered car that can be recharged quickly and conveniently for the same price as it would cost for a tank of gas. Which is, of course, the same set of problems that killed the concept last time.

Some ideas come and go, then come and go again. In 2003, GMC touted their Envoy XUV’s “first ever” retractable roof (a roof section that slides back and forth to facilitate tall cargo). Forty years earlier Studebaker offered the Wagonaire, a station wagon with a retractable roof. Envoy owners retracted the XUV's top with the flick of a switch, while the Studebaker’s lid was a clever manual design. But both systems had one thing in common: an alarming propensity to leak. At least GMC had enough sense to abandon the idea after two model years; Studebaker hung in for four.

Who knows what the next “new” idea will be or who will have it?  Whatever it is, it’s probably been done before. Which is just as well. The only thing worse than an old idea made new is a new idea made bad.

 

By on September 14, 2006

x06sn_sn47922.jpgDid GM buy a piece of Moller International? The General’s recent TV commercials show its full product range rising off traffic-choked roadways and flying off at tremendous speeds. You can almost hear the Skycar's inventor slapping his thigh and yelling “Now THAT’S what I’m talking about!” Of course, that’s not what GM’s talking about. They’re touting their new five-year, 100k mile warranty. Notice I didn’t say “powertrain.” Neither do the ads, which leave viewers with the impression that GM’s products come with five-year, 100k mile bumper-to-bumper protection. Talk about sins of omission…

Let’s be clear about this. A five-year 100k mile bumper-to-bumper warranty would have been big news. GM’s powertrain warranty only assures buyers that the parts that are least likely to break won’t break. It says GM will fix these parts that shouldn’t break without charge and pick you up from the side of the road for free, should one of the parts that shouldn't break breaks and leaves you stranded. Hang on; is this really a major selling point? And doesn't The General have enough trouble moving the metal without trying to invade Toyota’s turf? Toyota has a twenty-year head start in the reliability business; GM doesn’t have twenty years to catch up.

In his official statement, GM CEO Rick Wagoner asserted that the new powertrain warranty “provides GM customers with an unprecedented level of value and peace of mind.” First and most nit-pickingly, the release specifically refers to “GM customers” rather than “new car buyers.” So, forget conquest sales; just make sure that GM loyalists are happy– er. Considering the automaker’s inexorable market share slide, now reduced to an ironically proclaimed “one out of every four cars sold in America,” Rabid Rick's decision to use a powertrain warranty to recapture lost buyers is, at best, ill-advised and overly optimistic.

Second, Rabid Rick's attempt to stake his company's claim as builder of “value” automobiles thrusts a stake through the heart of its business. Last year’s “Fire Sale for Everyone” program K-Martified the company within the pubic consciousness. Continuing down that road places GM into the worst possible market position: more expensive than the cheapest and less desireable than the best. As an automaker with labor and legacy costs larger than Belize’s GNP, GM can't do cheap (at least not without shipping all the work to South Korea). Going for value– rather than focusing on desirability– makes GM vulnerable from all sides. 

And lastly, GM’s attempt to sell its cars based on “peace of mind” is laughable. Again, Toyota owns that mental space. If you widen the concept to include the single largest cost of car ownership– depreciation– Honda kicks GM’s peace-of-mind ass all day long. More to the point, Eric Hirshberg’s claim that his agency’s “Elevate” campaign proves that GM “shed the baggage and went on offense” is just plain wrong. Saying your product doesn’t suck is not the same as saying its better than the other guy’s. And if GM’s vehicles aren’t better than the other guy’s, well, it’s no wonder they’re talking about value for money and warranties.  

Of course, it’s hard to see where GM could go these days. In the 40’s, 50’s and early 60’s, GM offered some of the most innovative automobiles in the market, if not the entire world. At the same time, Harley Earl’s sheetmetal captured the hopes and dreams of a nation. While there are some standout niche products in GM’s gi-normous portfolio, the gotta have is gone. The vast majority of GM’s products are… generic. Bland. Boring. Vapid. Unrefined. Uncompetitive. They may not break your heart, but neither do they capture it.

Say what you will about the styling and driving dynamics of a bread-and-butter Corolla, Camry, Accord, Fit, Yaris, etc. Their owners love their cars. (And not just because they’re reliable.) Obviously, GM loyalists also love their motors. But the market share says it all: the so-called imports are winning the campaign for US car buyers’ hearts and minds. Concentrating on the “minds” part of the equation with a new warranty puts the cart before the horse. It’s preaching to the converted. It simply won’t work.

Rest assured, the reckoning is coming. The situation over at bankrupt auto parts supplier Delphi remains unresolved. The UAW is flexing its muscles over at Chrysler, while Delphi’s creditor committee breathes down Call Me Steve Miller’s executive neck and a federal judge's seemingly infinite extensions (on the company’s motion to throw out its union contracts) aren’t. The pickup market, upon which Rabid Rick says his company’s immediate future depends, has tanked so badly that Toyota is scaling back production of its next generation Tundra by a third. Meanwhile, here’s a simple question. If GM could make vehicles that lasted forever, would that be a blessing or a curse?

By on September 14, 2006

1052588-h.jpgA friend was riding in the passenger seat of a new Buick Lucerne last month. The driver turned left across an intersection—and was met head-on by a pick-up trying to beat the light. All the big Buick’s safety features worked like a charm. No one in the car was seriously injured. In an initial effort to minimize the accident’s significance, the driver bragged that he’d been through much worse. Personally, I don’t think that’s anything to be proud of. Grateful might be a better reaction.

Whether we personally witness– or experience– the savagery of automobile accidents, we all know it’s a meat grinder out there. Yet we continue to drive, purposefully blind to the possibility that our life could be cut short at any moment. It’s easy to ignore the less immediately apparent ways the automobile might be eroding our life span: pollution, obesity or the aesthetic assault on our landscape. But how can it be so easy to disregard the quick and brutal way in which a pleasant afternoon drive can become a violent death? And why would anyone decide that their cell phone, make-up, or Big Mac is more important than their safe return home?

I suppose it’s human nature. Our talent for distancing ourselves from catastrophe, both mentally and emotionally, allows us to get on with life. Under the bright light of rationality, we understand that death is a certainty. But not now, we tell ourselves. Not here, not yet. We banish any thoughts of potential disaster and get on with the task at hand. And why not? Today’s safety-glassed, plasticized, brake-assisted, stability controlled, belted, bagged and crumple-zoned cars are safer than Ralph Nader could ever have dreamed. We can avoid or survive accidents that would have killed us a decade ago. We’re safer, and we feel it. And yet…

There may be a few degrees of separation between us and a road-related fatality, but there’s no separation between us and other accidents. We’ve all survived fender benders; many of us have walked away from serious shunts. Unfortunately, the experience leaves us shaken, but not stirred. Maybe we feel differently about people who die in auto accidents than we do about those who fall victim to crime because drivers make a free will decision to get behind the wheel. But none of us really expect to pay the ultimate price, do we? Like juvenile delinquents, we presume the other guy will foot the bill. And so they do– until they don’t.

I realize that humanity is one big social marketplace. If the automobile exacted a socially unacceptable human toll, we’d all stop driving. Instead, each of us calculates the odds against our own death, determines them to be acceptable, and ventures out onto the streets. There is no choice. Our society is built upon the car; we’re completely dependent on it. But that fact offers no absolution. We must face the reality that death stalks our highways, and take the appropriate preventative measures.

So, does this add up to just another trite and trifling reminder to ‘drive safely’? Maybe it does. But each driver needs to realize that we are playing God with the lives our passengers, our fellow drivers and ourselves each time we head out of the garage. Around 42k people are going to die on the roadways of the US this year. Maybe that’s an acceptable price for our society to pay in exchange for the personal mobility and clear economic advantages of automotive travel. But maybe the cost doesn’t have to be that high. We drivers treat the issue of fuel expense with deadly seriousness. It’s time to treat the expense in human life just as seriously.

Driver’s Ed instructors used to show aspiring motorists grisly images of horrific car wrecks, to make them appreciate the stakes involved. I’m not sure when the scare tactics stopped. I took drivers’ training in 1989. By then the practice was over. It was probably deemed ineffective or politically incorrect. Regardless, we weren’t forced to view the carnage. Of course, what you don’t see can hurt you. Shortly after I graduated from high school, a classmate was killed in an accident not far from my house. That afternoon changed my outlook on life — for a while. Like millions of other motorists, I eventually got over it. After all, it didn’t happen to me.

What would it really take to get drivers to change their potentially lethal habits? If teenagers can laugh off graphic films of accidental decapitations, if commuters can speed by roadside flowers without a second glance, how can we communicate the need to drive with vigilance, caution and respect? It seems that no matter what we do, Darwin and the Grim Reaper stay focused on their ghastly assignment. 

By on September 13, 2006

eagle22.jpgThe history of the domestic automobile industry is a history of mergers and acquisitions. When times are good, the big fish eat the small fish. When times are tough, the big fish go to school. Witness Ford’s SUV-financed spending spree (Jaguar, Land Rover, Aston and Mazda) and the Daimler/Chrysler and Renault/Nissan mergers. At best, the long-term track record for acquisitions has been spotty, and alliances are equally likely to end in tears. So why do automakers persist?

Acquisitions possess a seductive logic: the “no fear” factors. Factor one: taxes. When a big automaker is doing well they have piles of money lying around. Buying up the competition keeps the taxable profit lower. Factor two: the art of the deal. Many auto industry executives hail from the world of finance. (GM CEO Rick Wagoner is a Harvard MBA.) Pulling off a big acquisition or orchestrating a huge merger is their “project car.” Factor three: capacity. Buying someone else’s production– and, hopefully, customer base– is cheaper and more efficient than building your own from scratch. Yes but…

Troubled automakers are almost always not what they seem. BMW bought Rover thinking it was securing an outlet to the UK’s mid-market. Unfortunately, by the time the Bavarians assumed control, Rover had lost most of its capacity and moved up-market to try to stay afloat.  Instead of gaining entry into the middle of the market, the Germans bought the original “English Patient.” GM bought Saab in 1990 to grow a global luxury brand. After spending $1.5b and pouring a couple more billion down a Swedish sinkhole, The General discovered the brand’s glass ceiling: a limited appeal to a limited market willing to pay a limited price.

And speaking of cross-cultural coyote dates, voracious multinationals seem to forget that acquisitions come with their own traditions (i.e. entrenched bureaucracy and petty fiefdoms) and factories (usually old and in the wrong place). Isuzu, Suzuki or Mitsubishi are gold diggers on the prowl: top-heavy companies offering corporate suitors little more than engineering skills and expensive Japanese factories located in a mature market. For these reasons and more, most acquisitions fail miserably and hang around interminably– or at least until the execs responsible leave the company.

Mergers don’t fare much better. Chrysler accounts for the US auto industry’s two most recent mergers (absorbing AMC and being absorbed by Daimler). Fortunately, in both cases, one company was clearly stronger than the other, avoiding many of the problems inherent in any attempt to combine two corporate cultures. Even so, the first merger helped drag the company into bankruptcy, while the second only threatens to do the same.

History tells us Chrysler’s flirtation with oblivion is no exception. When Austin and Morris merged in 1952 to form BMC, the merged corporations maintained separate dealer networks, factories and management identities. As things went downhill, more companies were added to the mix. When Rover finally rolled over and died, it took with it the remains of over a half-dozen carmakers, all united by failure. The modern equivalent could yet be Hyundai merging with Kia: two rival companies with nearly identical product lines and deep-rooted management cultures.

Brand overlap is yet another merger-related nightmare. All car manufacturers’ line-ups span a number of price points and sizes. Adding in a former competitor necessitates realignment and pruning which, again, creates tremendous internal friction. And that’s on top of the fact that the whole point of buying a new brand is to grow sales, and those sales have to come from somewhere, and that somewhere is the industry equivalent of the horror movie's “he’s in the house!” Not to put too fine a point on it, the end result is often a major clusteryouknowwhat.

For example, while Ford has had success with keeping Mazda healthy (if static) and growing Volvo, you could easily argue that this progress has come at the cost of losing sales from (or simply neglecting) Mercury and Lincoln. Meantime Jaguar tried and failed to go down-market (more trouble for Lincoln).  GM has had it even worse with Saab, especially since they started moving Caddy into the “sporty” side of luxury.

Common sense says it’s always best to stay focused, be your own man, hunker down and do a few things well– rather than gobble up a competitor and squander your resources on ill-advised brand extensions. Unfortunately, the auto industry tends to attracts egomaniacal leaders who see danger as an opportunity, rather than danger. When they're flush with cash, Empire building sings its siren song. As Ford eyes-up Renault, and other automakers eye Ford’s cast-offs, a word of unsolicited advise: look after your own house before coveting thy neighbor's.

By on September 12, 2006

studebaker.jpgServicing my Corvette is only marginally more pleasurable than filling out my tax return. First, I stand around the service desk waiting for a bleary-eyed “advisor” to acknowledge my existence. Then the employee asks if I want to wait for my car or… if someone’s picking me up. If I hang fire, I’m confined to a waiting room with all the charm of a correctional facility. If I leave, I have to call to see if the job’s done. When I pick up my ‘Vette, previous experience has taught me to inspect it for familiar desecrations– oily boot marks, additional miles, changed radio stations, etc. Oh, and to make sure the job’s actually been done. Sound familiar?

If not for warranty work, many of us would never darken the driveway of a franchised dealer’s service department. Service advisors may know plenty about the vehicles they handle– note: may— but the vast majority of them are number takers, not friendly automotive experts ready to discuss the finer points of maintaining your pride and joy. They’re more interested in trying to sell you an additional service. (Would you like us to fill your tires with nitrogen?) And once your second largest financial purchase disappears into the bowels of the service department, the advisor has no clue what’s happening to it. Nor do they care. They’ve moved on to their next victim.

Most of the time, you have no idea who’s working on your car or their experience level. You never see or talk to the mechanic– which means they’re never held directly accountable to the customer for anything they’ve done, or explain problem areas that need watching/budgeting. If they screw up, the service department’s rigid appointment system prevents them from correcting it on the spot. You have to make yet another appointment for yet another trip for yet more aggravation.

Bad service is not an “import vs. domestic” issue. The problem’s spread right across the automotive spectrum. As part of their ongoing effort to play headmaster to the entire car industry, JD Power rates after sale service. Setting aside questions about JD’s methodology and independence, the company’s data yields some surprising results. Toyota consistently rates near the top in Power’s Initial Quality Survey. The automaker sits in the bottom third in customer service satisfaction. Cadillac and Buick dealers are just below Lexus at the top. Customers more easily pleased? Better service? Who knows? Generally speaking, there’s no correlation between a car’s purchase price or country of origin and the level of service customers receive afterwards.

In this age of internet-delivered purchase price transparency, the service and parts departments account a large and growing percentage of a dealership’s total profit. So why is service the dealer department where customers consistently receive the worst overall treatment? After all, service departments that treat their customers like second class citizens degrade the dealer's ability to sell those selfsame customers another car.

It doesn't have to be that way. Wouldn’t it be nice to be greeted by name when you arrive for service? To be treated like an intelligent human instead of a total idiot? To find a clean, cheerful waiting room with current magazines and fresh coffee? Why don’t all service departments provide their customers with a loaner car of equivalent quality (or better) than the car they drive in? At the very least, where’s my damn courtesy ride?  And I don’t mean a 15-passenger van driven by the dealership’s village idiot. I mean a personalized car service that gets you to your destination as quickly, comfortably and safely as possible.

With all of today’s new technology, how much effort would it take for a service advisor to provide you with a progress report by phone, email, IM or pager (if Friday’s can give out pagers…)? How about a webcam on the service bay, so I can watch repairs from the comfort of my office? Or a report card, listing what parts may be due for service in the future? Or a private computer with internet access while I wait? Why can’t service departments go the extra mile to surprise and delight their paying customers?

No, I haven’t ingested hallucinogens. My wife’s Audi dealer’s service department treats us like valued customers. They provide clean loaners cars. They call  during the day to let me know how work is progressing. When I pick up her car, I get a full report on what’s been done, what parts were used and what it cost. The repaired car is right out front, freshly washed, ready to go. It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to figure out where I’ll go the next time I’m in the market for a new car. My experience with this dealership proves good customer service is possible. My question is: why isn’t everyone doing it? 

By on September 11, 2006

sonic_cruiser_1222.jpgThirty-five million dollars, the keys to the corporate jet and a Detroit McMansion is a pretty good compensation package for any aspiring executive. Obviously, if freshly-minted Ford CEO Alan Mulally reverses The Blue Oval’s declining fortunes, it will be shareholder money well spent. If, however, Mulally turns out to be too little CEO too late, his paycheck and parachute will mark the final chapter in a sad story of Ford family interference and/or mismanagement. So what say you Billy Ford? The “biggest problem facing Ford today is a lack of confidence.”

On the face of it, hiring an aerospace engineer to run a car company isn’t exactly what you’d call confidence inspiring. The auto industry in general, and Ford in specific, has a history of betting on outsiders– and losing. Robert McNamara’s tenure at Ford is only one example where “the smartest guy in the room” was hoisted by his own retard. Mulally supporters point to Sergio Marchionne, the Canadian lawyer who runs FIAT, and Jean-Martin Folz, a French businessman helming Peugeot. These are not, as yet, success stories. Mulally’s challenges are at least as daunting, even without considering Billy Ford’s refusal to surrender power to his well-paid minion CEO.

When Mulally stepped up to the microphone on Wednesday, he emphasized efforts to crank up the heat on new cars and to concentrate on fuel efficient vehicles to “complement the position Ford has with trucks." In the meantime, someone’s calling the shots, and they’re coming quick. The Detroit News reports that FoMoCo will attempt to bribe more than four thousand white collar workers and at least twice as many UAW members to leave the company's employ. Clearly, Billy's boys are downsizing as fast as they can.

And more cuts are coming. Roughly 25% of the 82k United Auto Workers (UAW) members will be jettisoned, whether through more plant idling, shuttering or buyouts. At that rate, Union locals stand to lose about $4.9m a month in lost dues contributions. That’s a big whack, but the union isn’t likely to stop the rats from leaving the sinking ship. They may even believe that letting their people go is in their remaining members’– and Ford’s– best interest.

At the same time, it’s no longer a question of “if” Ford will cut loose brands from its Premium Automotive Group, but which ones for how much. Wall Street Whiz Kid Kenneth Leet is looking to pimp Aston, Jaguar and Land Rover. Ford values Aston at $2b; industry experts peg it at $750m. Jaguar is virtually worthless, but a sale would make it someone else’s problem. Thanks to the Range Rover Sport, Land Rover is back from the brink– and priced to go, for another couple of billion or so.

Will it be enough?  Should it be enough? Despite Ford’s platform perfidy of its Japanese subsidiary, Maryann Keller reckons Mazda may be the next brand to be cut adrift. In fact, the straight-talking auto industry analyst believes Volvo and Ford are The Blue Oval’s only viable brands. Her comments suggest the long-anticipated shuttering of Mercury, and the termination of once-proud Lincoln, a luxury brand without a V8, profits or a strong, independent identity.

Ford needs the cash; Mulally’s new control tower is losing Dreamliner loads of the stuff. August SUV and truck sales fell a further 20.8% compared to last year, and the fourth quarter won’t get much better. While production cuts ensure that there’ll be less “new” metal to move, the pileup won’t deplete. There are already enough F-150’s to keep 3000 customers a day busy until the end of 2006 (and in debt until 2012).

Mulally and his generous employer need market share, and they need it fast. Mulally-inspired metal won’t appear until the 61-year-old CEO is eligible for retirement. Meanwhile, the Ford Edge and Lincoln MKX (Em-Kay-Ex) are FoMoCo’s Obi wan Kenobi. Early buzz indicates that the 150K units (slated for annual production in Ford’s Oakville plant) won’t be left longing for custody. But even if sales are double, the crossover’s profit margins are still small SUV’s. Add to that the upcoming loss of FoMoCo’s dismal minvan(s) and the importance of the cross border crossover becomes alarmingly apparent.

The arrival of Alan Mulally marks the fourth time in four years that the Blue Oval has made Bold Moves at the top. Will anything change? Not for some time.  Ford is still struggling to move the metal; the new product cycle is still vapid; the union straightjacket (though roomier) is still on. And despite invitations to bow out gracefully, and the pressing need to jettison brands, Ford’s bloated dealer network will remain desperately obese for many moons to come. The only difference is that shareholders have someone new from which to seek answers– or blame.

By on September 10, 2006

raikkonen-pole-2-600222.jpg Once again, the queen of motor sports is in transition. Big, well-funded manufacturer teams– Ferrari, Mercedes, BMW, Renault and (yes) Toyota, etc.– are doing a Reagan: spending their less well-funded opponents into oblivion. To wit: Jordan, Minardi and (yes) Jaguar are no more. This creeping consolidation will certainly fuel the anger of those fans who’ve long claimed that big business is killing F1’s spirit. While it’s sad to see the privateers leave the circus after decades of noble competition, F1’s commercialization is actually good news. It will lead to a more engaging and closer battle between the teams.

The manufacturers’ motivation is stronger than the smaller independent teams’. A Mercedes racecar that suffers constant reliability problems will negatively reinforce the connection to the brand— an association that Mercedes doesn’t need and can’t afford. A Renault that can beat a Ferrari adds luster to the French brand, stimulating the patriotism upon which the automaker depends. The stakes are higher than mere trophies on a shelf, as F-1 becomes a showcase of a brand's image, for good or worse.

Toyota, who made their team from scratch (as is their style in such things), is throwing billions of dollars into the game, looking for a championship to burnish their reputation for quality and reliability. BMW, who bought Sauber when Williams couldn’t get the job done, want to have the ultimate driving machine in the ultimate sporting arena. Honda, although it has a very successful past in F-1 with McLaren and BAR, now needs to prove that a Honda can earn the ultimate accolade. Again, Mercedes purchase of the McLaren team shows their full-on commitment to set a world standard on a world stage.

In recent years, Ferrari has dominated F1. Their excellent engineers, drivers and teamwork have brought the marque well-deserved glory. But anyone who follows the sport closely knows that Ferrari also has a strong hand behind-the-scenes. This year’s FIA ban on the Renault cars’ active dampers resembles the ban on mechanical differential brakes in the Mclaren-Mercedes cars. Some say Ferrari had a hand in both decisions. I’m not saying Ferrari is manipulating the rules to secure a competitive advantage, but I’m not saying they’re not either. Changing the rules mid-season is not only confusing and detrimental to the long-term planning for engineers but also upsets the naturally evolving battle for technical supremacy.

The need to keep Ferrari (and the money derived from Ferrari) in the sport is quickly becoming less important than the money pouring into the game by the other manufacturer teams. Ferrari still has some cards to play both on and off the track, but time is running out. The years ahead will certainly see many more Ferrari victories, and the strong likelihood of a world champion in the person of Kimmi Räikonnen, but the team will eventually face a more competitive battle for F1 supremacy.

The new manufacturers’ teams have more money and resources than the Italians. As a result, we’re already seeing a better grid; the qualifying grid at Monza was closer than we’ve seen in a long time. Finishing positions are also in flux. Jenson Button’s recent win and the podium for Kubica in Monza show that new names are making the grade. Look for these trends to continue—to the benefit of both F1 race fans and the teams themselves.

There is a bump in the road: recent changes in the rules of the F1 game banning engine development and selecting only one tire manufacturer. These changes will slow down the pace of development. Short term, they will help Ferrari, Red Bull and Cosworth. In the longer term, the rules will favor the strongly committed factory teams. But if history is any indication, no rules can really stop the engineers from getting around them and making better cars.

The change in teams is being accompanied by a radical change in F1’s commercial sponsorship. There has been an momentous shift away from the traditional tobacco sponsors (that used to be so important to be included in team names) to more high-tech sponsors such as HP, AMD and Intel. Teams using Intel chips in their trackside computers or engineering mainframes connect the chipmaker’s brand name to the team's success. Despite Ford’s withdrawal from the sport, the automotive industry is still investing heavily in the sport. In fact, Formula One is sealing its reputation as a top showcase for brands and manufacturers– for what they stand for and what we associate them with. And that’s why the sport’s remains vibrant.

Recent Comments

  • Lou_BC: @Carlson Fan – My ’68 has 2.75:1 rear end. It buries the speedo needle. It came stock with the...
  • theflyersfan: Inside the Chicago Loop and up Lakeshore Drive rivals any great city in the world. The beauty of the...
  • A Scientist: When I was a teenager in the mid 90’s you could have one of these rolling s-boxes for a case of...
  • Mike Beranek: You should expand your knowledge base, clearly it’s insufficient. The race isn’t in...
  • Mike Beranek: ^^THIS^^ Chicago is FOX’s whipping boy because it makes Illinois a progressive bastion in the...

New Car Research

Get a Free Dealer Quote

Who We Are

  • Adam Tonge
  • Bozi Tatarevic
  • Corey Lewis
  • Jo Borras
  • Mark Baruth
  • Ronnie Schreiber